GERMANY'S FIRST PEACE DRIVES
The Declaration of London was not the only problem that distracted Page
in these early months of the war. Washington's apparent determination to
make peace also added to his daily anxieties. That any attempt to end
hostilities should have distressed so peace-loving and humanitarian a
statesman as Page may seem surprising; it was, however, for the very
reason that he was a man of peace that these Washington endeavours
caused him endless worry. In Page's opinion they indicated that
President Wilson did not have an accurate understanding of the war. The
inspiring force back of them, as the Ambassador well understood, was a
panic-stricken Germany. The real purpose was not a peace, but a truce;
and the cause which was to be advanced was not democracy but Prussian
absolutism. Between the Battle of the Marne and the sinking of the
_Lusitania_ four attempts were made to end the war; all four were set
afoot by Germany. President Wilson was the man to whom the Germans
appealed to rescue them from their dilemma. It is no longer a secret
that the Germans at this time regarded their situation as a tragic one;
the success that they had anticipated for forty years had proved to be a
disaster. The attempt to repeat the great episodes of 1864, 1866, and
1870, when Prussia had overwhelmed Denmark, Austria, and France in three
brief campaigns, had ignominiously failed. Instead of beholding a
conquered Europe at her feet, Germany awoke from her illusion to find
herself encompassed by a ring of resolute and powerful foes. The fact
that the British Empire, with its immense resources, naval, military,
and economic, was now leading the alliance against them, convinced the
most intelligent Germans that the Fatherland was face to face with the
greatest crisis in its history.
Peace now became the underground Germanic programme. Yet the Germans did
not have that inexorable respect for facts which would have persuaded
them to accept terms to which the Allies could consent. The military
oligarchy were thinking not so much of saving the Fatherland as of
saving themselves; a settlement which would have been satisfactory to
their enemies would have demanded concessions which the German people,
trained for forty years to expect an unparalleled victory, would have
regarded as a defeat. The collapse of the militarists and of
Hohenzollernism would have ensued. What the German oligarchy desired was
a peace which they could picture to their deluded people as a triumph,
one that would enable them to extricate themselves at the smallest
possible cost from what seemed a desperate position, to escape the
penalties of their crimes, to emerge from their failure with a Germany
still powerful, both in economic resources and in arms, and to set to
work again industriously preparing for a renewal of the struggle at a
more favourable time. If negotiations resulted in such a truce, the
German purpose would be splendidly served; even if they failed, however,
the gain for Germany would still be great. Germany could appear as the
belligerent which desired peace and the Entente could perhaps be
manoeuvred into the position of the side responsible for continuing the
war. The consideration which was chiefly at stake in these tortuous
proceedings was public opinion in the United States. Americans do not
yet understand the extent to which their country was regarded as the
determining power. Both the German and the British Foreign Offices
clearly understood, in August, 1914, that the United States, by throwing
its support, especially its economic support, to one side or the other,
could settle the result. Probably Germany grasped this point even more
clearly than did Great Britain, for, from the beginning, she constantly
nourished the hope that she could embroil the United States and Great
Britain--a calamity which would have given victory to the German arms.
In every German move there were thus several motives, and one of the
chief purposes of the subterranean campaigns which she now started for
peace was the desire of putting Britain in the false light of prolonging
the war for aggressive purposes, and thus turning to herself that public
opinion in this country which was so outspoken on the side of the
Allies. Such public opinion, if it could be brought to regard Germany in
a tolerant spirit, could easily be fanned into a flame by the disputes
over blockades and shipping, and the power of the United States might
thus be used for the advancement of the Fatherland. On the other hand,
if Germany could obtain a peace which would show a profit for her
tremendous effort, then the negotiations would have accomplished their
purpose.
Conditions at Washington favoured operations of this kind. Secretary
Bryan was an ultra-pacifist; like men of one idea, he saw only the fact
of a hideous war, and he was prepared to welcome anything that would end
hostilities. The cessation of bloodshed was to him the great purpose to
be attained: in the mind of Secretary Bryan it was more important that
the war should be stopped than that the Allies should win. To President
Wilson the European disaster appeared to be merely a selfish struggle
for power, in which both sides were almost equally to blame. He never
accepted Page's obvious interpretation that the single cause was
Germany's determination to embark upon a war of world conquest. From the
beginning, therefore, Page saw that he would have great difficulty in
preventing intervention from Washington in the interest of Germany, yet
this was another great service to which he now unhesitatingly directed
his efforts.
The Ambassador was especially apprehensive of these peace moves in the
early days of September, when the victorious German armies were marching
on Paris. In London, as in most parts of the world, the capture of the
French capital was then regarded as inevitable. September 3, 1914, was
one of the darkest days in modern times. The population of Paris was
fleeing southward; the Government had moved its headquarters to
Bordeaux; and the moment seemed to be at hand when the German Emperor
would make his long anticipated entry into the capital of France. It was
under these circumstances that the American Ambassador to Great Britain
sent the following message directly to the President:
_To the President_
American Embassy, London,
Sep. 3, 4 A.M.
Everybody in this city confidently believes that the Germans, if
they capture Paris, will make a proposal for peace, and that the
German Emperor will send you a message declaring that he is
unwilling to shed another drop of blood. Any proposal that the
Kaiser makes will be simply the proposal of a conqueror. His real
purpose will be to preserve the Hohenzollern dynasty and the
imperial bureaucracy. The prevailing English judgment is that, if
Germany be permitted to stop hostilities, the war will have
accomplished nothing. There is a determination here to destroy
utterly the German bureaucracy, and Englishmen are prepared to
sacrifice themselves to any extent in men and money. The
preparations that are being made here are for a long war; as I read
the disposition and the character of Englishmen they will not stop
until they have accomplished their purpose. There is a general
expression of hope in this country that neither the American
Government nor the public opinion of our country will look upon any
suggestion for peace as a serious one which does not aim, first of
all, at the absolute destruction of the German bureaucracy.
From such facts as I can obtain, it seems clear to me that the
opinion of Europe--excluding of course, Germany--is rapidly
solidifying into a severe condemnation of the German Empire. The
profoundest moral judgment of the world is taking the strongest
stand against Germany and German methods. Such incidents as the
burning of Louvain and other places, the slaughter of civilian
populations, the outrages against women and children--outrages of
such a nature that they cannot be printed, but which form a matter
of common conversation everywhere--have had the result of arousing
Great Britain to a mood of the grimmest determination.
PAGE.
This message had hardly reached Washington when the peace effort of
which it warned the President began to take practical form. In properly
estimating these manoeuvres it must be borne in mind that German
diplomacy always worked underground and that it approached its
negotiations in a way that would make the other side appear as taking
the initiative. This was a phase of German diplomatic technique with
which every European Foreign Office had long been familiar. Count
Bernstorff arrived in the United States from Germany in the latter part
of August, evidently with instructions from his government to secure the
intercession of the United States. There were two unofficial men in New
York who were ideally qualified to serve the part of intermediaries. Mr.
James Speyer had been born in New York; he had received his education at
Frankfort-on-the-Main, Germany, and had spent his apprenticeship also in
the family banking house in that city. As the head of an American
banking house with important German affiliations, his interests and
sympathies were strong on the side of the Fatherland; indeed, he made no
attempt to conceal his strong pro-Germanism.
Mr. Oscar S. Straus had been born in Germany; his father had been a
German revolutionist of 'Forty-eight; like Carl Schurz, Abraham Jacobi,
and Franz Sigel, he had come to America to escape Prussian militarism
and the Prussian autocracy, and his children had been educated in a
detestation of the things for which the German Empire stood. Mr. Oscar
Straus was only two years old when he was brought to this country, and
he had given the best evidences of his Americanism in a distinguished
public career. Three times he had served the United States as Ambassador
to Turkey; he had filled the post of Secretary of Commerce and Labour in
President Roosevelt's cabinet, and had held other important public
commissions. Among his other activities, Mr. Straus had played an
important part in the peace movement of the preceding quarter of a
century and he had been a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration
at The Hague. Mr. Straus was on excellent terms with the German, the
British, and the French ambassadors at Washington. As far back as 1888,
when he was American Minister at Constantinople, Bernstorff, then a
youth, was an attaché at the German Embassy; the young German was
frequently at the American Legation and used to remind Mr. Straus,
whenever he met him in later years, how pleasantly he remembered his
hospitality. With Sir Cecil Spring Rice, the British Ambassador, and M.
Jules Jusserand, the French Ambassador, Mr. Straus had also become
friendly in Constantinople and in Washington. This background, and Mr.
Straus's well-known pro-British sentiments, would have made him a
desirable man to act as a liaison agent between the Germans and the
Allies, but there were other reasons why this ex-ambassador would be
useful at this time. Mr. Straus had been in Europe at the outbreak of
the war; he had come into contact with the British statesmen in those
exciting early August days; in particular he had discussed all phases of
the conflict with Sir Edward Grey, and before leaving England, he had
given certain interviews which the British statesmen declared had
greatly helped their cause in the United States. Of course, the German
Government knew all about these activities.
On September 4th, Mr. Straus arrived at New York on the _Mauretania_. He
had hardly reached this country when he was called upon the telephone by
Mr. Speyer, a friend of many years' standing. Count Bernstorff, the
German Ambassador, Mr. Speyer said, was a guest at his country home,
Waldheim, at Scarboro, on the Hudson; Mr. Speyer was giving a small,
informal dinner the next evening, Saturday, September 5th, and he asked
Mr. and Mrs. Straus to come. The other important guests were Mr. Frank
A. Vanderlip, president of the National City Bank, and Mrs. Vanderlip.
Mr. Straus accepted the invitation, mentally resolving that he would not
discuss the war himself, but merely listen. It would certainly have
been a difficult task for any man to avoid this subject on this
particular evening; the date was September 5th, the day when the German
Army suddenly stopped in its progress toward Paris, and began
retreating, the French and the British forces in pursuit. A few minutes
before Count Bernstorff sat down at Mr. Speyer's table, with Mr. Straus
opposite, he had learned that the magnificent enterprise which Germany
had planned for forty years had failed, and that his country was facing
a monstrous disaster. The Battle of the Marne was raging in all its fury
while this pacific conversation at Mr. Speyer's house was taking place.
Of course the war became the immediate topic of discussion. Count
Bernstorff at once plunged into the usual German point of view--that
Germany did not want war in the first place, that the Entente had forced
the issue, and the like.
"The Emperor and the German Government stood for peace," he said.
Naturally, a man who had spent a considerable part of his life promoting
the peace cause pricked up his ears at this statement.
"Does that sentiment still prevail in Germany?" asked Mr. Straus.
"Yes," replied the German Ambassador.
"Would your government entertain a proposal for mediation now?" asked
Mr. Straus.
"Certainly," Bernstorff promptly replied. He hastened to add, however,
that he was speaking unofficially. He had had no telegraphic
communication from Berlin for five days, and therefore could not
definitely give the attitude of his government. But he was quite sure
that the Kaiser would be glad to have President Wilson take steps to end
the war.
The possibility that he might play a part in bringing hostilities to a
close now occurred to Mr. Straus. He had come to the dinner determined
to avoid the subject altogether, but Count Bernstorff had precipitated
the issue in a way that left the American no option. Certainly Mr.
Straus would have been derelict if he had not reported this conversation
to the high quarters for which Count Bernstorff had evidently intended
it.
"That is a very important statement you have made, Mr. Ambassador," said
Mr. Straus, measuring every word. "May I make use of it?"
"Yes."
"May I use it in any way I choose?"
"You may," replied Bernstorff.
Mr. Straus saw in this acquiescent mood a chance to appeal directly to
President Wilson.
"Do you object to my laying this matter before our government?"
"No, I do not."
Mr. Straus glanced at his watch; it was 10:15 o'clock.
"I think I shall go to Washington at once--this very night. I can get
the midnight train."
Mr. Speyer, who has always maintained that this proceeding was casual
and in no way promoted by himself and Bernstorff, put in a word of
caution.
"I would sleep on it," he suggested.
But, in a few moments, Mr. Straus was speeding in his automobile through
Westchester County in the direction of the Pennsylvania Station. He
caught the express, and, the next morning, which was Sunday the sixth,
he was laying the whole matter before Secretary Bryan at the latter's
house. Naturally, Mr. Bryan was overjoyed at the news; he at once
summoned Bernstorff from New York to Washington, and went over the
suggestion personally. The German Ambassador repeated the statements
which he had made to Mr. Straus--always guardedly qualifying his remarks
by saying that the proposal had not come originally from him but from
his American friend. Meanwhile Mr. Bryan asked Mr. Straus to discuss the
matter with the British and French ambassadors.
The meeting took place at the British Embassy. The two representatives
of the Entente, though only too glad to talk the matter over, were more
skeptical about the attitude of Bernstorff than Mr. Bryan had been.
"Of course, Mr. Straus," said Sir Cecil Spring Rice, "you know that this
dinner was arranged purposely so that the German Ambassador could meet
you?"
Mr. Straus demurred at this statement, but the Englishman smiled.
"Do you suppose," Sir Cecil asked, "that any ambassador would make such
a statement as Bernstorff made to you without instructions from his
government?"
"You and M. Jusserand," replied the American, "have devoted your whole
lives to diplomacy with distinguished ability and you can therefore
answer that question better than I."
"I can assure you," replied M. Jusserand, "that no ambassador under the
German system would dare for a moment to make such a statement without
being authorized to do so."
"The Germans," added Sir Cecil, "have a way of making such statements
unofficially and then denying that they have ever made them."
Both the British and French ambassadors, however, thought that the
proposal should be seriously considered.
"If it holds out one chance in a hundred of lessening the length of the
war, we should entertain it," said Ambassador Jusserand.
"I certainly hope that you will entertain it cordially," said Mr.
Straus.
"Not cordially--that is a little too strong."
"Well, sympathetically?"
"Yes, sympathetically," said M. Jusserand, with a smile.
These facts were at once cabled to Page, who took the matter up with Sir
Edward Grey. A despatch from the latter to the British Ambassador in
Washington gives a splendid summary of the British attitude on such
approaches at this time.
_Sir Edward Grey to Sir Cecil Spring Rice_
Foreign Office,
September 9, 1914.
SIR:
The American Ambassador showed me to-day a communication that he
had from Mr. Bryan. It was to the effect that Mr. Straus and Mr.
Speyer had been talking with the German Ambassador, who had said
that, though he was without instructions, he thought that Germany
might be disposed to end the war by mediation. This had been
repeated to Mr. Bryan, who had spoken to the German Ambassador, and
had heard the same from him. Mr. Bryan had taken the matter up, and
was asking direct whether the German Emperor would accept mediation
if the other parties who were at war would do the same.
The American Ambassador said to me that this information gave him a
little concern. He feared that, coming after the declaration that
we had signed last week with France and Russia about carrying on
the war in common[100], the peace parties in the United States
might be given the impression that Germany was in favour of peace,
and that the responsibility for continuing the war was on others.
I said that the agreement that we had made with France and Russia
was an obvious one; when three countries were at war on the same
side, one of them could not honourably make special terms for
itself and leave the others in the lurch. As to mediation, I was
favourable to it in principle, but the real question was: On what
terms could the war be ended? If the United States could devise
anything that would bring this war to an end and prevent another
such war being forced on Europe I should welcome the proposal.
The Ambassador said that before the war began I had made
suggestions for avoiding it, and that these suggestions had been
refused.
I said that this was so, but since the war began there were two
further considerations to be borne in mind: We were fighting to
save the west of Europe from being dominated by Prussian
militarism; Germany had prepared to the day for this war, and we
could not again have a great military power in the middle of Europe
preparing war in this way and forcing it upon us; and the second
thing was that cruel wrong had been done to Belgium, for which
there should be some compensation. I had no indication whatever
that Germany was prepared to make any reparation to Belgium, and,
while repeating that in principle I was favourable to mediation, I
could see nothing to do but to wait for the reply of the German
Emperor to the question that Mr. Bryan had put to him and for the
United States to ascertain on what terms Germany would make peace
if the Emperor's reply was favourable to mediation.
The Ambassador made it quite clear that he regarded what the German
Ambassador had said as a move in the game. He agreed with what I
had said respecting terms of peace, and that there seemed no
prospect at present of Germany being prepared to accept them.
I am, &c.,
E. GREY.
A letter from Page to Colonel House gives Page's interpretation of this
negotiation:
_To Edward M. House_
London, September 10, 1914.
MY DEAR HOUSE:
A rather serious situation has arisen: The Germans of course
thought that they would take Paris. They were then going to propose
a conqueror's terms of peace, which they knew would not be
accepted. But they would use their so-called offer of peace purely
for publicity purposes. They would say, "See, men of the world, we
want peace; we offer peace; the continuance of this awful war is
not our doing." They are using Hearst for this purpose. I fear they
are trying to use so good a man as Oscar Straus. They are fooling
the Secretary.
Every nation was willing to accept Sir Edward Grey's proposals but
Germany. She was bent on a war of conquest. Now she's likely to get
licked--lock, stock and barrel. She is carrying on a propaganda and
a publicity campaign all over the world. The Allies can't and won't
accept any peace except on the condition that German militarism be
uprooted. They are not going to live again under that awful shadow
and fear. They say truly that life on such terms is not worth
living. Moreover, if Germany should win the military control of
Europe, she would soon--that same war-party--attack the United
States. The war will not end until this condition can be
imposed--that there shall be no more militarism.
But in the meantime, such men as Straus (a good fellow) may be able
to let (by helping) the Germans appear to the Peace people as
really desiring peace. Of course, what they want is to save their
mutton.
And if we begin mediation talk now on that basis, we shall not be
wanted when a real chance for mediation comes. If we are so silly
as to play into the hands of the German-Hearst publicity bureau,
our chance for real usefulness will be thrown away.
Put the President on his guard.
W.H.P.
In the latter part of the month came Germany's reply. One would never
suspect, when reading it, that Germany had played any part in
instigating the negotiation. The Kaiser repeated the old charges that
the Entente had forced the war on the Fatherland, that it was now
determined to annihilate the Central Powers and that consequently there
was no hope that the warring countries could agree upon acceptable terms
for ending the struggle.
So ended Germany's first peace drive, and in the only possible way that
it could end. But the Washington administration continued to be most
friendly to mediation. A letter of Colonel House's, dated October 4,
1914, possesses great historical importance. It was written after a
detailed discussion with President Wilson, and it indicates not only the
President's desire to bring the struggle to a close, but it describes
in some detail the principles which the President then regarded as
essential to a permanent peace. It furnishes the central idea of the
presidential policy for the next four years; indeed, it contains the
first statement of that famous "Article X" of the Covenant of the League
of Nations which was Mr. Wilson's most important contribution to that
contentious document. This was the article which pledges the League "to
respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial
integrity and existing political independence" of all its members; it
was the article which, more than any other, made the League obnoxious to
Americans, who interpreted it as an attempt to involve them perpetually
in the quarrels of Europe; and it was the one section of the Treaty of
Versailles which was most responsible for the rejection of that document
by the United States Senate. There are other suggestions in Colonel
House's letter which apparently bore fruit in the League Covenant. It is
somewhat astonishing that a letter of Colonel House's, written as far
back as October 3, 1914, two months after the outbreak of the war,
should contain "Article X" as one of the essential terms of peace, as
well as other ideas afterward incorporated in that document, accompanied
by an injunction that Page should present the suggestion to Sir Edward
Grey:
_From Edward M. House_
115 East 53rd Street,
New York City.
October 3rd, 1914.
DEAR PAGE:
Frank [the Ambassador's son] has just come in and has given me your
letter of September 22nd[101] which is of absorbing interest. You
have never done anything better than this letter, and some day,
when you give the word, it must be published. But in the meantime,
it will repose in the safe deposit box along with your others and
with those of our great President.
I have just returned from Washington where I was with the President
for nearly four days. He is looking well and is well. Sometimes his
spirits droop, but then again, he is his normal self.
Before I came from Prides[102] I was fearful lest Straus,
Bernstorff, and others would drive the President into doing
something unwise. I have always counselled him to remain quiet for
the moment and let matters unfold themselves further. In the
meantime, I have been conferring with Bernstorff, with Dumba[103],
and, of course, Spring Rice. The President now wants me to keep in
touch with the situation, and I do not think there is any danger of
any one on the outside injecting himself into it unless Mr. Bryan
does something on his own initiative.
Both Bernstorff and Dumba say that their countries are ready for
peace talks, but the difficulty is with England. Sir Cecil says
their statements are made merely to place England in a false
position.
The attitude, I think, for England to maintain is the one which she
so ably put forth to the world. That is, peace must come only upon
condition of disarmament and must be permanent. I have a feeling
that Germany will soon be willing to discuss terms. I do not agree
that Germany has to be completely crushed and that terms must be
made either in Berlin or London. It is manifestly against England's
interest and the interest of Europe generally for Russia to become
the dominating military force in Europe, just as Germany was. The
dislike which England has for Germany should not blind her to
actual conditions. If Germany is crushed, England cannot solely
write the terms of peace, but Russia's wishes must also largely
prevail.
With Russia strong in militarism, there is no way by which she
could be reached. Her government is so constituted that friendly
conversations could not be had with her as they might be had even
with such a power as Germany, and the world would look forward to
another cataclysm and in the not too distant future.
When peace conversations begin, at best, they will probably
continue many months before anything tangible comes from them.
England and the Allies could readily stand on the general
proposition that only enduring peace will satisfy them and I can
see no insuperable obstacle in the way.
The Kaiser did not want war and was not responsible for it further
than his lack of foresight which led him to build up a formidable
engine of war which later dominated him. Peace cannot be made until
the war party in Germany find that their ambitions cannot be
realized, and this, I think, they are beginning to know.
When the war is ended and the necessary territorial alignments
made, it seems to me, the best guaranty of peace could be brought
by every nation in Europe guaranteeing the territorial integrity of
every other nation[104]. By confining the manufacture of arms to
the governments themselves and by permitting representatives of all
nations to inspect, at any time, the works[105].
Then, too, all sources of national irritation should be removed so
what at first may be a sore spot cannot grow into a malignant
disease[106]. It will not be too difficult, I think, to bring about
an agreement that will insure permanent peace, provided all the
nations of Europe are honest in their desire for it.
I am writing this to you with the President's knowledge and consent
and with the thought that it will be conveyed to Sir Edward. There
is a growing impatience in this country because of this war and
there is constant pressure upon the President to use his influence
to bring about normal conditions. He does not wish to do anything
to irritate or offend any one of the belligerent nations, but he
has an abiding faith in the efficacy of open and frank discussion
between those that are now at war.
As far as I can see, no harm can be done by a dispassionate
discussion at this stage, even though nothing comes of it. In a
way, it is perhaps better that informal and unofficial
conversations are begun and later the principals can take it up
themselves.
I am sure that Sir Edward is too great a man to let any prejudices
deter him from ending, as soon as possible, the infinite suffering
that each day of war entails.
Faithfully yours,
E.M. HOUSE.
It is apparent that the failure of this first attempt at mediation
discouraged neither Bernstorff nor the Washington administration.
Colonel House was constantly meeting the German and the British
Ambassadors; he was also, as his correspondence shows, in touch with
Zimmermann, the German Under Foreign Secretary. The German desire for
peace grew stronger in the autumn and winter of 1914-1915, as the fact
became more and more clear that Great Britain was summoning all her
resources for the greatest effort in her history, as the stalemate on
the Aisne more and more impressed upon the German chieftains the
impossibility of obtaining any decision against the French Army, and as
the Russians showed signs of great recuperation after the disaster of
Tannenberg. By December 4th Washington had evidently made up its mind to
move again.
_From Edward M. House_
115 East 53rd Street,
New York City.
December 4th, 1914.
DEAR PAGE:
The President desires to start peace parleys at the very earliest
moment, but he does not wish to offend the sensibilities of either
side by making a proposal before the time is opportune. He is
counting upon being given a hint, possibly through me, in an
unofficial way, as to when a proffer from him will be acceptable.
Pressure is being brought upon him to offer his services again, for
this country is suffering, like the rest of the neutral world, from
the effects of the war, and our people are becoming restless.
Would you mind conveying this thought delicately to Sir Edward Grey
and letting me know what he thinks?
Would the Allies consider parleys upon a basis of indemnity for
Belgium and a cessation of militarism? If so, then something may be
begun with the Dual Alliance.
I have been told that negotiations between Russia and Japan were
carried on several months before they agreed to meet at Portsmouth.
The havoc that is being wrought in human lives and treasure is too
great to permit racial feeling or revenge to enter into the
thoughts of those who govern the nations at war.
I stand ready to go to Germany at any moment in order to sound the
temper of that government, and I would then go to England as I did
last June.
This nation would not look with favour upon a policy that held
nothing but the complete annihilation of the enemy.
Something must be done sometime, by somebody, to initiate a peace
movement, and I can think of no way, at the moment, than the one
suggested.
I will greatly appreciate your writing me fully and freely in
regard to this phase of the situation.
Faithfully yours,
E.M. HOUSE.
To this Page immediately replied:
_To Edward M. House_
December 12th, 1914.
MY DEAR HOUSE:
The English rulers have no feeling of vengeance. I have never seen
the slightest traces of that. But they are determined to secure
future safety. They will not have this experience repeated if they
can help it. They realize now that they have been living under a
sort of fear--or dread--for ten years: they sometimes felt that it
was bound to come some time and then at other times they could
hardly believe it. And they will spend all the men and all the
money they have rather than suffer that fear again or have that
danger. Now, if anybody could fix a basis for the complete
restoration of Belgium, so far as restoration is possible, and for
the elimination of militarism, I am sure the _English_ would talk
on that basis. But there are two difficulties-Russia wouldn't talk
till she has Constantinople, and I haven't found anybody who can
say exactly what you mean by the "elimination of militarism."
Disarmament? England will have her navy to protect her incoming
bread and meat. How, then, can she say to Germany, "You can't have
an army"?
You say the Americans are becoming "restless." The plain fact is
that the English people, and especially the English military and
naval people, don't care a fig what the Americans think and feel.
They say, "We're fighting their battle, too--the battle of
democracy and freedom from bureaucracy--why don't they come and
help us in our life-and-death struggle?" I have a drawer full of
letters saying this, not one of which I have ever answered. The
official people never say that of course--nor the really
responsible people, but a vast multitude of the public do. This
feeling comes out even in the present military and naval rulers of
this Kingdom--comes indirectly to me. A part of the public, then,
and the military part of the Cabinet, don't longer care for
American opinion and they resent even such a reference to peace as
the President made in his Message to Congress[107]. But the civil
part of the Cabinet and the responsible and better part of the
public do care very much. The President's intimation about peace,
however, got no real response here. They think he doesn't
understand the meaning of the war. They don't want war; they are
not a warlike people. They don't hate the Germans. There is no
feeling of vengeance. They constantly say: "Why do the Germans
hate us? We don't hate them." But, since Germany set out to rule
the world and to conquer Great Britain, they say, "We'll all die
first." That's "all there is to it." And they will all die unless
they can so fix things that this war cannot be repeated. Lady
K----, as kindly an old lady as ever lived, said to me the other
day: "A great honour has come to us. Our son has been killed in
battle, fighting for the safety of England."
Now, the question which nobody seems to be able to answer is this:
How can the military party and the military spirit of Germany be
prevented from continuing to prepare for the conquest of Great
Britain and from going to work to try it again? That implies a
change in the form, spirit, and control of the German Empire. If
they keep up a great army, they will keep it up with that end more
or less in view. If the military party keeps in power, they will
try it again in twenty-five or forty years. This is all that the
English care about or think about.
They don't see how it is to be done themselves. All they see yet is
that they must show the Germans that they can't whip Great Britain.
If England wins decisively the English hope that somehow the
military party will be overthrown in Germany and that the Germans,
under peaceful leadership, will go about their
business--industrial, political, educational, etc.--and quit
dreaming of and planning for universal empire and quit maintaining
a great war-machine, which at some time, for some reason, must
attack somebody to justify its existence. This makes it difficult
for the English to make overtures to or to receive overtures from
this military war-party which now _is_ Germany. But, if it he
possible so completely to whip the war party that it will somehow
be thrown out of power at home--that's the only way they now see
out of it. To patch up a peace, leaving the German war party in
power, they think, would be only to invite another war.
If you can get over this point, you can bring the English around in
ten minutes. But they are not going to take any chances on it. Read
English history and English literature about the Spanish Armada or
about Napoleon. They are acting those same scenes over again,
having the same emotions, the same purpose: nobody must invade or
threaten England. "If they do, we'll spend the last man and the
last shilling. We value," they say truly, "the good-will and the
friendship of the United States more than we value anything except
our own freedom, but we'll risk even that rather than admit copper
to Germany, because every pound of copper prolongs the war."
There you are. I've blinked myself blind and talked myself hoarse
to men in authority--from Grey down--to see a way out--without
keeping this intolerable slaughter up to the end. But they stand
just where I tell you.
And the horror of it no man knows. The news is suppressed. Even
those who see it and know it do not realize it. Four of the crack
regiments of this kingdom--regiments that contained the flower of
the land and to which it was a distinction to belong--have been
practically annihilated, one or two of them annihilated twice. Yet
their ranks are filled up and you never hear a murmur. Presently
it'll be true that hardly a title or an estate in England will go
to its natural heir--the heir has been killed. Yet, not a murmur;
for England is threatened with invasion. They'll all die first. It
will presently be true that more men will have been killed in this
war than were killed before in all the organized wars since the
Christian era began. The English are willing and eager to stop it
if things can be so fixed that there will be no military power in
Europe that wishes or prepares to attack and invade England.
I've had many one-hour, two-hour, three-hour talks with Sir Edward
Grey. He sees nothing further than I have written. He says to me
often that if the United States could see its way to cease to
protest against stopping war materials from getting into Germany,
they could end the war more quickly--all this, of course,
informally; and I say to him that the United States will consider
any proposal you will make that does not infringe on a strict
neutrality. Violate a rigid neutrality we will not do. And, of
course, he does not ask that. I give him more trouble than all the
other neutral Powers combined; they all say this. And, on the other
side, his war-lord associates in the Cabinet make his way hard.
So it goes--God bless us, it's awful. I never get away from
it--war, war, war every waking minute, and the worry of it; and I
see no near end of it. I've had only one thoroughly satisfactory
experience in a coon's age, and this was this: Two American ships
were stopped the other day at Falmouth. I telegraphed the captains
to come here to see me. I got the facts from them--all the facts. I
telephoned Sir Edward that I wished to see him at once. I had him
call in one of his ship-detaining committee. I put the facts on the
table. I said, "By what right, or theory of right, or on what
excuse, are those ships stopped? They are engaged in neutral
commerce. They fly the American flag." One of them was released
that night--no more questions asked. The other was allowed to go
after giving bond to return a lot of kerosene which was loaded at
the bottom of the ship.
If I could get facts, I could do many things. The State Department
telegraphs me merely what the shipper says--a partial statement.
The British Government tells me (after infinite delay) another set
of facts. The British Government says, "We're sorry, but the Prize
Court must decide." Our Government wires a dissertation on
International Law--Protest, protest: (I've done nothing else since
the world began!) One hour with a sensible ship captain does more
than a month of cross-wrangling with Government Departments.
I am trying my best, God knows, to keep the way as smooth as
possible; but neither government helps me. Our Government merely
sends the shipper's ex-parte statement. This Government uses the
Navy's excuse. . . .
At present, I can't for the life of me see a way to peace, for the
one reason I have told you. The Germans wish to whip England, to
invade England. They started with their army toward England. Till
that happened England didn't have an army. But I see no human power
that can give the English now what they are determined to
have--safety for the future--till some radical change is made in
the German system so that they will no longer have a war-party any
more than England has a war-party. England surely has no wish to
make conquest of Germany. If Germany will show that she has no wish
to make conquest of England, the war would end to-morrow.
What impresses me through it all is the backwardness of all the Old
World in realizing the true aims of government and the true
methods. I can't see why any man who has hope for the progress of
mankind should care to live anywhere in Europe. To me it is all
infinitely sad. This dreadful war is a logical outcome of their
condition, their thought, their backwardness. I think I shall never
care to see the continent again, which of course is committing
suicide and bankruptcy. When my natural term of service is done
here, I shall go home with more joy than you can imagine. That's
the only home for a man who wishes his horizon to continue to grow
wider.
All this for you and me only--nobody else.
Heartily yours,
WALTER H. PAGE.
Probably Page thought that this statement of the case--and it was
certainly a masterly statement--would end any attempt to get what he
regarded as an unsatisfactory and dangerous peace. But President Wilson
could not be deterred from pressing the issue. His conviction was firm
that this winter of 1914-1915 represented the most opportune time to
bring the warring nations to terms, and it was a conviction from which
he never departed. After the sinking of the _Lusitania_ the
Administration gazed back regretfully at its frustrated attempts of the
preceding winter, and it was inclined to place the responsibility for
this failure upon Great Britain and France. "The President's judgment,"
wrote Colonel House on August 4, 1915, three months after the
_Lusitania_ went down, "was that last autumn was the time to discuss
peace parleys, and we both saw present possibilities. War is a great
gamble at best, and there was too much at stake in this one to take
chances. I believe if one could have started peace parleys in November,
we could have forced the evacuation of both France and Belgium, and
finally forced a peace which would have eliminated militarism on land
and sea. The wishes of the Allies were heeded with the result that the
war has now fastened itself upon the vitals of Europe and what the end
may be is beyond the knowledge of man."
This shows that the efforts which the Administration was making were not
casual or faint-hearted, but that they represented a most serious
determination to bring hostilities to an end. This letter and the
correspondence which now took place with Page also indicate the general
terms upon which the Wilson Administration believed that the mighty
differences could be composed. The ideas which Colonel House now set
forth were probably more the President's than his own; he was merely the
intermediary in their transmission. They emphasized Mr. Wilson's
conviction that a decisive victory on either side would be a misfortune
for mankind. As early as August, 1914, this was clearly the conviction
that underlay all others in the President's interpretation of events.
His other basic idea was that militarism should come to an end "on land
and sea"; this could mean nothing except that Germany was expected to
abandon its army and that Great Britain was to abandon its navy.
_From Edward M. House_
115 East 53rd Street,
New York City.
January 4th, 1915.
DEAR PAGE:
I believe the Dual Alliance is thoroughly ready for peace and I
believe they would be willing to agree upon terms England would
accept provided Russia and France could be satisfied.
They would, in my opinion, evacuate both Belgium and France and
indemnify the former, and they would, I think, be willing to begin
negotiations upon a basis looking to permanent peace.
It would surprise me if the Germans did not come out in the open
soon and declare that they have always been for peace, that they
are for peace now, and that they are willing to enter into a
compact which would insure peace for all time; that they have been
misrepresented and maligned and that they leave the entire
responsibility for the continuation of the war with the Allies.
If they should do this, it would create a profound impression, and
if it was not met with sympathy by the Allies, the neutral
sentiment, which is now almost wholly against the Germans, would
veer toward them.
Will you not convey this thought to Sir Edward and let me know what
he says?
The President is willing and anxious for me to go to England and
Germany as soon as there is anything tangible to go on, and
whenever my presence will be welcome. The Germans have already
indicated this feeling but I have not been able to get from Spring
Rice any expression from his Government.
As I told you before, the President does not wish to offend the
sensibilities of any one by premature action, but he is, of course,
enormously interested in initiating at least tentative
conversations.
Will you not advise me in regard to this?
Faithfully yours,
E.M. HOUSE.
_From Edward M. House_
115 East 53rd Street,
New York City.
January 18, 1915.
DEAR PAGE:
The President has sent me a copy of your confidential dispatch No.
1474, January 15th.
The reason you had no information in regard to what General French
mentioned was because no one knew of it outside of the President
and myself and there was no safe way to inform you.
As a matter of fact, there has been no direct proposal made by
anybody. I have had repeated informal talks with the different
ambassadors and I have had direct communication with Zimmermann,
which has led the President and me to believe that peace
conversations may be now initiated in an unofficial way.
This is the purpose of my going over on the _Lusitania_, January
30th. When I reach London I will be guided by circumstances as to
whether I shall go next to France or Germany.
The President and I find that we are going around in a circle in
dealing with the representatives in Washington, and he thinks it
advisable and necessary to reach the principals direct. When I
explain just what is in the President's mind, I believe they will
all feel that it was wise for me to come at this time.
I shall not write more fully for the reason I am to see you so
soon.
I am sending this through the kindness of Sir Horace Plunkett.
Faithfully yours,
E.M. HOUSE.
P.S. We shall probably say, for public consumption, that I am
coming to look into relief measures, and see what further can be
done. Of course, no one but you and Sir Edward must know the real
purpose of my visit.
Why was Colonel House so confident that the Dual Alliance was prepared
at this time to discuss terms of peace? Colonel House, as his letter
shows, was in communication with Zimmermann, the German Under Foreign
Secretary. But a more important approach had just been made, though
information bearing on this had not been sent to Page. The Kaiser had
asked President Wilson to transmit to Great Britain a suggestion for
making peace on the basis of surrendering Belgium and of paying for its
restoration. It seems incredible that the Ambassador should not have
been told of this, but Page learned of the proposal from Field Marshal
French, then commanding the British armies in the field, and this
accounts for Colonel House's explanation that, "the reason you had no
information, in regard to what General French mentioned was because no
one knew of it outside of the President and myself and there was no safe
way to inform you." Page has left a memorandum which explains the whole
strange proceeding--a paper which is interesting not only for its
contents, but as an illustration of the unofficial way in which
diplomacy was conducted in Washington at this time:
* * * * *
Field Marshal Sir John French, secretly at home from his command of the
English forces in France, invited me to luncheon. There were his
especially confidential friend Moore, the American who lives with him,
and Sir John's private secretary. The military situation is this: a
trench stalemate in France. Neither army has made appreciable progress
in three months. Neither can advance without a great loss of men.
Neither is whipped. Neither can conquer. It would require a million more
men than the Allies can command and a very long time to drive the
Germans back across Belgium. Presently, if the Russians succeed in
driving the Germans back to German soil, there will be another trench
stalemate there. Thus the war wears a practically endless outlook so far
as military operations are concerned. Germany has plenty of men and
plenty of food for a long struggle yet; and, if she use all the copper
now in domestic use in the Empire, she will probably have also plenty of
ammunition for a long struggle. She is not nearly at the end of her rope
either in a military or an economic sense.
What then? The Allies are still stronger--so long as they hold together
as one man. But is it reasonable to assume that they can? And, even if
they can, is it worth while to win a complete victory at such a cost as
the lives of practically all the able-bodied men in Europe? But can the
Allies hold together as one man for two or three or four years? Well,
what are we going to do? And here came the news of the lunch. General
French informed me that the President had sent to England, at the
request of the Kaiser, a proposal looking toward peace, Germany offering
to give up Belgium and to pay for its restoration.
"This," said Sir John, "is their fourth proposal."
"And," he went on, "if they will restore Belgium and give
Alsace-Lorraine to France and Constantinople will go to Russia, I can't
see how we can refuse it."
He scouted the popular idea of "crushing out militarism" once for all.
It would be desirable, even if it were not necessary, to leave Germany
as a first-class power. We couldn't disarm her people forever. We've got
to leave her and the rest to do what they think they must do; and we
must arm ourselves the best we can against them.
Now--did General French send for me and tell me this just for fun and
just because he likes me? He was very eager to know my opinion whether
this peace offer were genuine or whether it was a trick of the Germans
to--publish it later and thereby to throw the blame for continuing the
war on England?
It occurs to me as possible that he was directed to tell me what he
told, trusting to me, in spite of his protestations of personal
confidence, etc., to get it to the President. Assuming that the
President sent the Kaiser's message to the King, this may be a suggested
informal answer--that if the offer be extended to give France and Russia
what they want, it will be considered, etc. This may or may not be
true. Alas! the fact that I know nothing about the offer has no meaning;
for the State Department never informs me of anything it takes up with
the British Ambassador in Washington. Well, I'll see.
* * * * *
These were therefore the reasons why Colonel House had decided to go to
Europe and enter into peace negotiations with the warring powers.
Colonel House was wise in taking all possible precautions to conceal the
purpose of this visit. His letter intimates that the German Government
was eager to have him cross the ocean on this particular mission; it
discloses, on the other hand, that the British Government regarded the
proposed negotiations with no enthusiasm. Sir Edward Grey and Mr.
Asquith would have been glad to end hostilities on terms that would
permanently establish peace and abolish the vices which were responsible
for the war, and they were ready to welcome courteously the President's
representative and discuss the situation with him in a fair-minded
spirit. But they did not believe that such an enterprise could serve a
useful purpose. Possibly the military authorities, as General French's
remarks to Page may indicate, did not believe that either side could win
a decisive victory, but this was not the belief of the British public
itself. The atmosphere in England at that time was one of confidence in
the success of British arms and of suspicion and distrust of the British
Government. A strong expectation prevailed in the popular mind, that the
three great Powers of the Entente would at an early date destroy the
menace which had enshrouded Europe for forty years, and there was no
intention of giving Germany a breathing spell during which she could
regenerate her forces to resume the onslaught. In the winter of 1915
Great Britain was preparing for the naval attack on the Dardanelles, and
its success was regarded as inevitable. Page had an opportunity to
observe the state of optimism which prevailed in high British circles.
In March of 1915 he was visiting the Prime Minister at Walmer Castle;
one afternoon Mr. Asquith took him aside, informed him of the
Dardanelles preparations and declared that the Allies would have
possession of Constantinople in two weeks. The Prime Minister's attitude
was not one of hope; it was one of confidence. The capture of
Constantinople, of course, would have brought an early success to the
allied army on all fronts[108]. This was the mood that was spurring on
the British public to its utmost exertions, and, with such a
determination prevailing everywhere, a step in the direction of peace
was the last thing that the British desired; such a step could have been
interpreted only as an attempt to deprive the Allies of their victory
and as an effort to assist Germany in escaping the consequences of her
crimes. Combined with this stout popular resolve, however, there was a
lack of confidence in the Asquith ministry. An impression was broadcast
that it was pacifist, even "defeatist," in its thinking, and that it
harboured a weak humanitarianism which was disposed to look gently even
upon the behaviour of the Prussians. The masses suspected that the
ministry would welcome a peace with Germany which would mean little more
than a cessation of hostilities and which would leave the great problems
of the war unsolved. That this opinion was unjust, that, on the
contrary, the British Foreign Office was steadily resisting all attempts
to end the war on an unsatisfactory basis, Page's correspondence,
already quoted, abundantly proves, but this unreasoning belief did
prevail and it was an important factor in the situation. This is the
reason why the British Cabinet regarded Colonel House's visit at that
time with positive alarm. It feared that, should the purpose become
known, the British public and press would conclude that the Government
had invited a peace discussion. Had any such idea seized the popular
mind in February and March, 1915, a scandal would have developed which
would probably have caused the downfall of the Asquith Ministry. "Don't
fool yourself about peace," Page writes to his son Arthur, about this
time. "If any one should talk about peace, or doves, or ploughshares
here, they'd shoot him."
Colonel House reached London early in February and was soon in close
consultation with the Prime Minister and Sir Edward Grey. He made a
great personal success; the British statesmen gained a high regard for
his disinterestedness and his general desire to serve the cause of
decency among nations; but he made little progress in his peace plans,
simply because the facts were so discouraging and so impregnable. Sir
Edward repeated to him what he had already said to Page many times: that
Great Britain was prepared to discuss a peace that would really
safeguard the future of Europe, but was not prepared to discuss one that
would merely reinstate the régime that had existed before 1914. The fact
that the Germans were not ready to accept such a peace made discussion
useless. Disappointed at this failure, Colonel House left for Berlin.
His letters to Page show that the British judgment of Germany was not
unjust and that the warnings which Page had sent to Washington were
based on facts:
_From Edward M. House_
Embassy of the United States of America,
Berlin, Germany,
March 20, 1915.
DEAR PAGE:
I arrived yesterday morning and I saw Zimmermann[109] almost
immediately. He was very cordial and talked to me frankly and
sensibly.
I tried to bring about a better feeling toward England, and told
him how closely their interests touched at certain points. I also
told him of the broad way in which Sir Edward was looking at the
difficult problems that confronted Europe, and I expressed the hope
that this view would be reciprocated elsewhere, so that, when the
final settlement came, it could be made in a way that would be to
the advantage of mankind.
The Chancellor is out of town for a few days and I shall see him
when he returns. I shall also see Ballin, Von Gwinner, and many
others. I had lunch yesterday with Baron von Wimpsch who is a very
close friend of the Emperor.
Zimmermann said that it was impossible for them to make any peace
overtures, and he gave me to understand that, for the moment, even
what England would perhaps consent to now, could not be accepted by
Germany, to say nothing of what France had in mind.
I shall hope to establish good relations here and then go somewhere
and await further developments. I even doubt whether more can be
done until some decisive military result is obtained by one or
other of the belligerents.
I will write further if there is any change in the situation. I
shall probably be here until at least the 27th.
Faithfully yours,
E.M. HOUSE.
_From Edward M. House_
Embassy of the United States of America,
Berlin, Germany.
March 26, 1915.
DEAR PAGE:
While I have accomplished here much that is of value, yet I leave
sadly disappointed that no direct move can be made toward peace.
The Civil Government are ready, and upon terms that would at least
make an opening. There is also a large number in military and naval
circles that I believe would be glad to begin parleys, but the
trouble is mainly with the people. It is a very dangerous thing to
permit a people to be misled and their minds inflamed either by the
press, by speeches, or otherwise.
In my opinion, no government could live here at this time if peace
was proposed upon terms that would have any chance of acceptance.
Those in civil authority that I have met are as reasonable and
fairminded as their counterparts in England or America, but, for
the moment, they are impotent.
I hear on every side the old story that all Germany wants is a
permanent guaranty of peace, so that she may proceed upon her
industrial career undisturbed.
I have talked of the second convention[110], and it has been
cordially received, and there is a sentiment here, as well as
elsewhere, to make settlement upon lines broad enough to prevent a
recurrence of present conditions.
There is much to tell you verbally, which I prefer not to write.
Faithfully yours,
E.M. HOUSE.
Colonel House's next letter is most important, for it records the birth
of that new idea which afterward became a ruling thought with President
Wilson and the cause of almost endless difficulties in his dealings with
Great Britain. The "new phase of the situation" to which he refers is
"the Freedom of the Seas" and this brief note to Page, dated March 27,
1915, contains the first reference to this idea on record. Indeed, it is
evident from the letter itself that Colonel House made this notation the
very day the plan occurred to him.
_From Edward M. House_
Embassy of the United States of America,
Berlin, Germany.
March 27, 1915.
DEAR PAGE:
I have had a most satisfactory talk with the Chancellor. After
conferring with Stovall[111], Page[112], and Willard[113], I shall
return to Paris and then to London to discuss with Sir Edward a
phase of the situation which promises results.
I did not think of it until to-day and have mentioned it to both
the Chancellor and Zimmermann, who have received it cordially, and
who join me in the belief that it may be the first thread to bridge
the chasm.
I am writing hastily, for the pouch is waiting to be closed.
Faithfully yours,
E.M. HOUSE.
The "freedom of the seas" was merely a proposal to make all merchant
shipping, enemy and neutral, free from attack in time of war. It would
automatically have ended all blockades and all interference with
commerce. Germany would have been at liberty to send all her merchant
ships to sea for undisturbed trade with all parts of the world in war
time as in peace, and, in future, navies would be used simply for
fighting. Offensively, their purpose would be to bombard enemy
fortifications, to meet enemy ships in battle, and to convoy ships which
were transporting troops for the invasion of enemy soil; defensively,
their usefulness would consist in protecting the homeland from such
attacks and such invasions. Perhaps an argument can be made for this new
rule of warfare, but it is at once apparent that it is the most
startling proposal brought forth in modern times in the direction of
disarmament. It meant that Great Britain should abandon that agency of
warfare with which she had destroyed Napoleon, and with which she
expected to destroy Germany in the prevailing struggle--the blockade.
From a defensive standpoint, Colonel House's proposed reform would have
been a great advantage to Britain, for an honourable observance of the
rule would have insured the British people its food supply in wartime.
With Great Britain, however, the blockade has been historically an
offensive measure: it is the way in which England has always made war.
Just what reception this idea would have had with official London, in
April, 1915, had Colonel House been able to present it as his own
proposal, is not clear, but the Germans, with characteristic stupidity,
prevented the American from having a fair chance. The Berlin Foreign
Office at once cabled to Count Bernstorff and Bernhard Dernburg--the
latter a bovine publicity agent who was then promoting the German cause
in the American press--with instructions to start a "propaganda" in
behalf of the "freedom of the seas." By the time Colonel House reached
London, therefore, these four words had been adorned with the Germanic
label. British statesmen regarded the suggestion as coming from Germany
and not from America, and the reception was worse than cold.
And another tragedy now roughly interrupted President Wilson's attempts
at mediation. Page's letters have disclosed that he possessed almost a
clairvoyant faculty of foreseeing approaching events. The letters of the
latter part of April and of early May contain many forebodings of
tragedy. "Peace? Lord knows when!" he writes to his son Arthur on May
2nd. "The blowing up of a liner with American passengers may be the
prelude. I almost expect such a thing." And again on the same date: "If
a British liner full of American passengers be blown up, what will Uncle
Sam do? That's what's going to happen." "We all have the feeling here,"
the Ambassador writes on May 6th, "that more and more frightful things
are about to happen."
The ink on those words was scarcely dry when a message from Queenstown
was handed to the American Ambassador. A German submarine had torpedoed
and sunk the _Lusitania_ off the Old head of Kinsale, and one hundred
and twenty-four American men, women, and children had been drowned.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 100: On September 5, 1914, Great Britain, France, and Russia
signed the Pact of London, an agreement which bound the three powers of
the Entente to make war and peace as a unit. Each power specifically
pledged itself not to make a separate peace.]
[Footnote 101: Published in Chapter XI, page 327.]
[Footnote 102: Colonel House's summer home in Massachusetts.]
[Footnote 103: Ambassador from Austria-Hungary to the United States.]
[Footnote 104: This, with certain modifications is Article 10 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations.]
[Footnote 105: There is a suggestion of these provisions in Article 8 of
the League Covenant.]
[Footnote 106: Article 11 of the League Covenant reflects the influence
of this idea.]
[Footnote 107: From the President's second message to Congress, December
8, 1914: "It is our dearest present hope that this character and
reputation may presently, in God's providence, bring us an opportunity,
such as has seldom been vouchsafed any nation, to counsel and obtain
peace in the world and reconciliation and a healing settlement of many a
matter that has cooled and interrupted the friendship of nations."]
[Footnote 108: The opening of the Dardanelles would have given Russian
agricultural products access to the markets of the world and thus have
preserved the Russian economic structure. It would also have enabled the
Entente to munition the Russian Army. With a completely equipped Russian
Army in the East and the Entente Army in the West, Germany could not
long have survived the pressure.]
[Footnote 109: German Under Foreign Secretary.]
[Footnote 110: It was the Wilson Administration's plan that there should
be two peace gatherings, one of the belligerents to settle the war, and
the other of belligerents and neutrals, to settle questions of general
importance growing out of the war. This latter is what Colonel House
means by "the second convention."]
[Footnote 111: Mr. Pleasant A. Stovall, American Minister to
Switzerland.]
[Footnote 112: Mr. Thomas Nelson Page, American Ambassador to Italy.]
[Footnote 113: Mr. Joseph E. Willard. American Ambassador to Spain.]