AMERICA TRIES TO PREVENT THE EUROPEAN WAR
Page's mind, from the day of his arrival in England, had been filled
with that portent which was the most outstanding fact in European life.
Could nothing be done to prevent the dangers threatened by European
militarism? Was there no way of forestalling the war which seemed every
day to be approaching nearer? The dates of the following letters,
August, 1913, show that this was one of the first ideas which Page
presented to the new Administration.
_To Edward M. House_
Aug. 28, 1913.
MY DEAR HOUSE:
. . . Everything is lovely and the goose hangs high. We're having a
fine time. Only, only, only--I do wish to do something constructive
and lasting. Here are great navies and armies and great withdrawals
of men from industry--an enormous waste. Here are kings and courts
and gold lace and ceremonies which, without producing anything,
require great cost to keep them going. Here are all the privileges
and taxes that this state of things implies--every one a hindrance
to human progress. We are free from most of these. We have more
people and more capable people and many times more territory than
both England and Germany; and we have more potential wealth than
all Europe. They know that. They'd like to find a way to escape.
The Hague programmes, for the most part, just lead them around a
circle in the dark back to the place where they started. Somebody
needs to _do_ something. If we could find some friendly use for
these navies and armies and kings and things--in the service of
humanity--they'd follow us. We ought to find a way to use them in
cleaning up the tropics under our leadership and under our code of
ethics--that everything must be done for the good of the tropical
peoples and that nobody may annex a foot of land. They want a job.
Then they'd quit sitting on their haunches, growling at one
another.
I wonder if we couldn't serve notice that the land-stealing game is
forever ended and that the cleaning up of backward lands is now in
order--for the people that live there; and then invite Europe's
help to make the tropics as healthful as the Panama Zone?
There's no future in Europe's vision--no long look ahead. They give
all their thought to the immediate danger. Consider this Balkan
War; all European energy was spent merely to keep the Great Powers
at peace. The two wars in the Balkans have simply impoverished the
people--left the world that much worse than it was before. Nobody
has considered the well-being or the future of those peoples nor of
their land. The Great Powers are mere threats to one another,
content to check, one the other! There can come no help to the
progress of the world from this sort of action--no step forward.
Work on a world-plan. Nothing but blue chips, you know. Is it not
possible that Mexico may give an entering wedge for this kind of
thing?
Heartily yours,
WALTER H. PAGE.
In a memorandum, written about the same time, Mr. Page explains his
idea in more detail:
Was there ever greater need than there is now of a first-class mind
unselfishly working on world problems? The ablest ruling minds are
engaged on domestic tasks. There is no world-girdling intelligence
at work in government. On the continent of Europe, the Kaiser is
probably the foremost man. Yet he cannot think far beyond the
provincial views of the Germans. In England, Sir Edward Grey is the
largest-visioned statesman. All the Europeans are spending their
thought and money in watching and checkmating one another and in
maintaining their armed and balanced _status quo_.
A way must be found out of this stagnant watching. Else a way will
have to be fought out of it; and a great European war would set the
Old World, perhaps the whole world, back a long way; and
thereafter, the present armed watching would recur; we should have
gained nothing. It seems impossible to talk the Great Powers out of
their fear of one another or to "Hague" them out of it. They'll
never be persuaded to disarm. The only way left seems to be to find
some common and useful work for these great armies to do. Then,
perhaps, they'll work themselves out of their jealous position.
Isn't this sound psychology?
To produce a new situation, the vast energy that now spends itself
in maintaining armies and navies must find a new outlet. Something
new must be found for them to do, some great unselfish task that
they can do together.
Nobody can lead in such a new era but the United States.
May there not come such a chance in Mexico--to clean out bandits,
yellow fever, malaria, hookworm--all to make the country
healthful, safe for life and investment, and for orderly
self-government at last? What we did in Cuba might thus be made the
beginning of a new epoch in history--conquest for the sole benefit
of the conquered, worked out by a sanitary reformation. The new
sanitation will reclaim all tropical lands; but the work must be
first done by military power--probably from the outside.
May not the existing military power of Europe conceivably be
diverted, gradually, to this use? One step at a time, as political
and financial occasions arise? As presently in Mexico?
This present order must change. It holds the Old World still. It
keeps all parts of the world apart, in spite of the friendly
cohesive forces of trade and travel. It keeps back self-government
and the progress of man.
And the tropics cry out for sanitation, which is at first an
essentially military task.
A strange idea this may have seemed in August, 1913, a year before the
outbreak of the European war; yet the scheme is not dissimilar to the
"mandatory" principle, adopted by the Versailles Peace Conference as the
only practical method of dealing with backward peoples. In this work, as
in everything that would help mankind on its weary way to a more
efficient and more democratic civilization, Page regarded the United
States, Great Britain, and the British Dominions as inevitable partners.
Anything that would bring these two nations into a closer coöperation he
looked upon as a step making for human advancement. He believed that any
opportunity of sweeping away misconceptions and prejudices and of
impressing upon the two peoples their common mission should be eagerly
seized by the statesmen of the two countries. And circumstances at this
particular moment, Page believed, presented a large opportunity of this
kind. It is one of the minor ironies of modern history that the United
States and Great Britain should have selected 1914 as a year for a great
peace celebration. That year marked the one hundredth anniversary of the
signing of the Treaty of Ghent, which ended the War of 1812, and in 1913
comprehensive plans had already been formed for observing this
impressive centennial. The plan was to make it more than the mere
observance of a hundred years of peaceful intercourse; it was the
intention to use the occasion to emphasize the fundamental identity of
American and British ideals and to lay the foundation of a permanent
understanding and friendship. The erection of a monument to Abraham
Lincoln at Westminster--a plan that has since been realized--was one
detail of this programme. Another was the restoration of Sulgrave Manor,
the English country seat of the Washingtons, and its preservation as a
place where the peoples of both countries could share their common
traditions. Page now dared to hope that President Wilson might associate
himself with this great purpose to the extent of coming to England and
accepting this gift in the name of the American nation. Such a
Presidential visit, he believed, would exercise a mighty influence in
forestalling a threatening European war. The ultimate purpose, that is,
was world peace--precisely the same motive that led President Wilson, in
1919, to make a European pilgrimage.
This idea was no passing fancy with Page: it was with him a favourite
topic of conversation. Such a presidential visit, he believed, would
accomplish more than any other influences in dissipating the clouds that
were darkening the European landscape. He would elaborate the idea at
length in discussions with his intimates.
"What I want," he would say, "is to have the President of the United
States and the King of England stand up side by side and let the world
take a good look at them!"
_To Edward M. House_
August 25, 1913.
. . . I wrote him (President Wilson) my plan--a mere outline. He'll
only smile now. But when the tariff and the currency and Mexico are
off his hands, and when he can be invited to come and deliver an
oration on George Washington next year at the presentation of the
old Washington homestead here, he may be "pushed over." You do the
pushing. Mrs. Page has invited the young White House couple to
visit us on their honeymoon[54]. Encourage that and that may
encourage the larger plan later. Nothing else would give such a
friendly turn to the whole world as the President's coming here.
The old Earth would sit up and rub its eyes and take notice to whom
it belongs. This visit might prevent an English-German war and an
American-Japanese war, by this mere show of friendliness. It would
be one of the greatest occasions of our time. Even at my little
speeches, they "whoop it up!" What would they do over the
President's!
But at that time Washington was too busy with its domestic programme to
consider such a proposal seriously. "Your two letters," wrote Colonel
House in reply, "have come to me and lifted me out of the rut of things
and given me a glimpse of a fair land. What you are thinking of and what
you want this Administration to do is beyond the power of
accomplishment for the moment. My desk is covered with matters of no
lasting importance, but which come to me as a part of the day's work,
and which must be done if I am to help lift the load that is pressing
upon the President. It tells me better than anything else what he has to
bear, and how utterly futile it is for him to attempt such problems as
you present."
_From the President_
MY DEAR PAGE:
. . . As for your suggestion that I should myself visit England
during my term of office, I must say that I agree with all your
arguments for it, and yet the case against the President's leaving
the country, particularly now that he is expected to exercise a
constant leadership in all parts of the business of the government,
is very strong and I am afraid overwhelming. It might be the
beginning of a practice of visiting foreign countries which would
lead Presidents rather far afield.
It is a most attractive idea, I can assure you, and I turn away
from it with the greatest reluctance.
We hear golden opinions of the impression you are making in
England, and I have only to say that it is just what I had
expected.
Cordially and faithfully yours,
WOODROW WILSON.
HON. WALTER H. PAGE,
American Embassy,
London, England.
In December, however, evidently Colonel House's mind had turned to the
general subject that had so engaged that of the Ambassador.
_From Edward M. House_
145 East 35th Street,
New York City.
December 13th, 1913.
DEAR PAGE:
In my budget of yesterday I did not tell you of the suggestion
which I made to Sir William Tyrrell when he was here, and which I
also made to the President.
It occurred to me that between us all we might bring about the
naval holiday which Winston Churchill has proposed. My plan is that
I should go to Germany in the spring and see the Kaiser, and try to
win him over to the thought that is uppermost in our mind and that
of the British Government.
Sir William thought there was a good sporting chance of success. He
offered to let me have all the correspondence that had passed
between the British and German governments upon this question so
that I might be thoroughly informed as to the position of them
both. He thought I should go directly to Germany without stopping
in England, and that Gerard should prepare the Kaiser for my
coming, telling him of my relations with the President. He thought
this would be sufficient without any further credentials.
In other words, he would do with the Kaiser what you did with Sir
Edward Grey last summer.
I spoke to the President about the matter and he seemed pleased
with the suggestion; in fact, I might say, he was enthusiastic. He
said, just as Sir William did, that it would be too late for this
year's budget; but he made a suggestion that he get the
Appropriations Committee to incorporate a clause, permitting him to
eliminate certain parts of the battleship budget in the event that
other nations declared for a naval holiday. So this will be done
and will further the plan.
Now I want to get you into the game. If you think it advisable,
take the matter up with Sir William Tyrrell and then with Sir
Edward Grey, or directly with Sir Edward, if you prefer, and give
me the benefit of your advice and conclusions.
Please tell Sir William that I lunched at the Embassy with the
Spring Rices yesterday, and had a satisfactory talk with both Lady
Spring Rice and Sir Cecil.
Faithfully yours,
E.M. HOUSE.
* * * * *
It is apparent from Page's letters that the suggestion now contained in
Colonel House's communication would receive a friendly hearing. The idea
that Colonel House suggested was merely the initial stage of a plan
which soon took on more ambitious proportions. At the time of Sir
William Tyrrell's American visit, the Winston Churchill proposal for a
naval holiday was being actively discussed by the British and the
American press. In one form or another it had been figuring in the news
for nearly two years. Viscount Haldane, in the course of his famous
visit to Berlin in February, 1912, had attempted to reach some
understanding with the German Government on the limitation of the German
and the British fleets. The Agadir crisis of the year before had left
Europe with a bad state of nerves, and there was a general belief that
only some agreement on shipbuilding could prevent a European war. Lord
Haldane and von Tirpitz spent many hours discussing the relative sizes
of the two navies, but the discussions led to no definite
understanding. In March, 1913, Mr. Churchill, then First Lord of the
Admiralty, took up the same subject in a different form. In this speech
he first used the words "naval holiday," and proposed that Germany and
Great Britain should cease building first-class battleships for one
year, thus giving the two nations a breathing space, during which time
they might discuss their future plans in the hope of reaching a
permanent agreement. The matter lagged again until October 18, 1913,
when, in a speech at Manchester, Mr. Churchill placed his proposal in
this form: "Now, we say to our great neighbour, Germany, 'If you will
put off beginning your two ships for twelve months from the ordinary
date when you would have begun them, we will put off beginning our four
ships, in absolute good faith, for exactly the same period.'" About the
same time Premier Asquith made it clear that the Ministry was back of
the suggested programme. In Germany, however, the "naval holiday" soon
became an object of derision. The official answer was that Germany had a
definite naval law and that the Government could not entertain any
suggestion of departing from it. Great Britain then answered that, for
every keel Germany laid down, the Admiralty would lay down two. The
outcome, therefore, of this attempt at friendship was that the two
nations had been placed farther apart than ever.
The dates of this discussion, it will be observed, almost corresponded
with the period covered by the Tyrrell visit to America. This fact, and
Page's letters of this period, had apparently implanted in Colonel
House's mind an ambition for definite action. He now proposed that
President Wilson should take up the broken threads of the rapprochement
and attempt to bring them together again. From this, as will be made
plain, the plan developed into something more comprehensive. Page's
ideas on the treatment of backward nations had strongly impressed both
the President and Colonel House. The discussion on Mexico which had just
taken place between the American and the British Governments seemed to
have developed ideas that could have a much wider application. The
fundamental difficulties in Mexico were not peculiar to that country nor
indeed to Latin-America. Perhaps the most prolific cause of war among
the more enlightened countries was that produced by the jealousies and
antagonisms which were developed by their contacts with unprogressive
peoples--in the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire, Asia, and the Far East. The
method of dealing with such peoples, which the United States had found
so successful in Cuba and the Philippines, had proved that there was
just one honourable way of dealing with the less fortunate and more
primitive races in all parts of the world. Was it not possible to bring
the greatest nations, especially the United States, Great Britain, and
Germany, to some agreement on this question, as well as on the question
of disarmament? This once accomplished, the way could be prepared for
joint action on the numerous other problems which were then threatening
the peace of the world. The League of Nations was then not even a
phrase, but the plan that was forming in Colonel House's mind was at
least some scheme for permanent international coöperation. For several
years Germany had been the nation which had proved the greatest obstacle
to such international friendliness and arbitration. The Kaiser had
destroyed both Hague Conferences as influential forces in the remaking
of the world; and in the autumn of 1913 he had taken on a more
belligerent attitude than ever. If this attempt to establish a better
condition of things was to succeed, Germany's coöperation would be
indispensable. This is the reason why Colonel House proposed first of
all to visit Berlin.
_From Edward M. House_
145 East 35th Street,
New York City.
January 4th, 1914.
Dear Page:
. . . Benj. Ide Wheeler[55] took lunch with me the other day. He is
just back from Germany and he is on the most intimate terms with
the Kaiser. He tells me he often takes dinner with the family
alone, and spends the evening with them.
I know, now, the different Cabinet officials who have the Kaiser's
confidence and I know his attitude toward England, naval armaments,
war, and world politics in general.
Wheeler spoke to me very frankly and the information he gave me
will be invaluable in the event that my plans carry. The general
idea is to bring about a sympathetic understanding between England,
Germany, and America, not only upon the question of disarmament,
but upon other matters of equal importance to themselves, and to
the world at large.
It seems to me that Japan should come into this pact, but Wheeler
tells me that the Kaiser feels very strongly upon the question of
Asiatics. He thinks the contest of the future will be between the
Eastern and Western civilizations.
Your friend always,
E.M. House.
By January 4, 1914, the House-Wilson plan had thus grown into an
Anglo-American-German "pact," to deal not only with "disarmament, but
other matters of equal importance to themselves and to the world at
large." Page's response to this idea was consistent and characteristic.
He had no faith in Germany and believed that the existence of Kaiserism
was incompatible with the extension of the democratic ideal. Even at
this early time--eight months before the outbreak of the World War--he
had no enthusiasm for anything in the nature of an alliance, or a
"pact," that included Germany as an equal partner. He did, however, have
great faith in the coöperation of the English-speaking peoples as a
force that would make for permanent peace and international justice. In
his reply to Colonel House, therefore, Page fell back at once upon his
favourite plan for an understanding between the United States, Great
Britain, and the British colonies. That he would completely sympathize
with the Washington aspiration for disarmament was to be expected.
To Edward M. House
January 2, 1914.
My Dear House:
You have set my imagination going. I've been thinking of this thing
for months, and now you've given me a fresh start. It can be worked
out somehow--doubtless, not in the form that anybody may at first
see; but experiment and frank discussion will find a way.
As I think of it, turning it this way and that, there always comes
to me just as I am falling to sleep this reflection: the
English-speaking peoples now rule the world in all essential facts.
They alone and Switzerland have permanent free government. In
France there's freedom--but for how long? In Germany and
Austria--hardly. In the Scandinavian States--yes, but they are
small and exposed as are Belgium and Holland. In the big secure
South American States--yes, it's coming. In Japan--? Only the
British lands and the United States have secure liberty. They also
have the most treasure, the best fighters, the most land, the most
ships--the future in fact.
Now, because George Washington warned us against alliances, we've
gone on as if an alliance were a kind of smallpox. Suppose there
were--let us say for argument's sake--the tightest sort of an
alliance, offensive and defensive, between all Britain, colonies
and all, and the United States--what would happen? Anything we'd
say would go, whether we should say, "Come in out of the wet," or,
"Disarm." That might be the beginning of a real world-alliance and
union to accomplish certain large results--disarmament, for
instance, or arbitration--dozens of good things.
Of course, we'd have to draw and quarter the O'Gormans[56]. But
that ought to be done anyhow in the general interest of good sense
in the world. We could force any nation into this "trust" that we
wanted in it.
Isn't it time we tackled such a job frankly, fighting out the Irish
problem once for all, and having done with it?
I'm not proposing a programme. I'm only thinking out loud. I see
little hope of doing anything so long as we choose to be ruled by
an obsolete remark made by George Washington.
W.H.P.
January H, 1914.
. . . But this armament flurry is worth serious thought. Lloyd George
gave out an interview, seeming to imply the necessity of reducing
the navy programme. The French allies of the British went up in
the air! They raised a great howl. Churchill went to see them, to
soothe them. They would not be soothed. Now the Prime Minister is
going to Paris--ostensibly to see his daughter off to the Riviera.
Nobody believes that reason. They say he's going to smooth out the
French. Meantime the Germans are gleeful.
And the British Navy League is receiving money and encouraging
letters from British subjects, praying greater activity to keep the
navy up. You touch the navy and you touch the quick--that's the
lesson. It's an enormous excitement that this small incident has
caused.
W.H.P.
_To Edward M. House_
London, February 24, 1914.
My Dear House:
You'll be interested in these pamphlets by Sir Max Waechter, who
has opened an office here and is spending much money to "federate"
Europe, and to bring a lessening of armaments. I enclose also an
article about him from the _Daily Telegraph_, which tells how he
has interviewed most of the Old World monarchs. Get also,
immediately, the new two-volume life of Lord Lyons, Minister to the
United States during the Civil War, and subsequently Ambassador to
France. You will find an interesting account of the campaign of
about 1870 to reduce armaments, when old Bismarck dumped the whole
basket of apples by marching against France. You know I sometimes
fear some sort of repetition of that experience. Some government
(probably Germany) will see bankruptcy staring it in the face and
the easiest way out will seem a great war. Bankruptcy before a war
would be ignominious; after a war, it could be charged to "Glory."
It'll take a long time to bankrupt England. It's unspeakably rich;
they pay enormous taxes, but they pay them out of their incomes,
not out of their principal, except their inheritance tax. That
looks to me as if it came out of the principal. . . .
I hope you had a good time in Texas and escaped some cold weather.
This deceptive sort of winter here is grippe-laden. I've had the
thing, but I'm now getting over it. . . .
This Benton[57]-Mexican business is causing great excitement here.
Always heartily yours,
W.H.P.
P.S. There's nothing like the President. By George! the passage of
the arbitration treaty (renewal) almost right off the bat, and
apparently the tolls discrimination coming presently to its repeal!
Sir Edward Grey remarked to me yesterday: "Things are clearing up!"
I came near saying to him: "Have you any miracles in mind that
you'd like to see worked?" Wilson stock is at a high premium on
this side of the water in spite of the momentary impatience caused
by Benton's death.
W.H.P.
_From Edward M. House_
145 East 35th Street,
New York City.
April 19th, 1914.
DEAR PAGE:
I have had a long talk with Mr. Laughlin[58]. At first he thought I
would not have more than one chance in a million to do anything
with the Kaiser, but after talking with him further, he concluded
that I would have a fairly good sporting chance. I have about
concluded to take it.
If I can do anything, I can do it in a few days. I was with the
President most of last week. . . .
He spoke of your letters to him and to me as being classics, and
said they were the best letters, as far as he knew, that any one
had ever written. Of course you know how heartily I concur in this.
He said that sometime they should be published.
The President is now crystallizing his mind in regard to the
Federal Reserve Board, and if you are not to remain in London, then
he would probably put Houston on the Board and ask you to take the
Secretaryship of Agriculture.
You have no idea the feeling that is being aroused by the tolls
question. The Hearst papers are screaming at all of us every day.
They have at last honoured me with their abuse. . . .
With love and best wishes, I am,
Faithfully yours,
E.M. HOUSE.
_From Edward M. House_
145 East 35th Street,
New York City.
April 20th, 1914.
Dear Page:
. . . It is our purpose to sail on the _Imperator_, May 16th, and go
directly to Germany. I expect to be there a week or more, but Mrs.
House will reach London by the 1st or 2nd of June. . . .
Our friend[59] in Washington thinks it is worth while for me to go
to Germany, and that determines the matter. The press is shrieking
to-day over the Mexican situation, but I hope they will be
disappointed. It is not the intention to do anything further for
the moment than to blockade the ports, and unless some overt act is
made from the North, our troops will not cross the border.
Your friend always,
E.M. HOUSE.
_To Edward M. House_
London, April 27, 1914.
MY DEAR HOUSE:
Of course you decided wisely to carry out your original Berlin
plan, and you ought never to have had a moment's hesitation, if you
did have any hesitation. I do not expect you to produce any visible
or immediate results. I hope I am mistaken in this. But you know
that the German Government has a well-laid progressive plan for
shipbuilding for a certain number of years. I believe that the work
has, in fact, already been arranged for. But that has nothing to do
with the case. You are going to see what effect you can produce on
the mind of a man. Perhaps you will never know just what effect you
will produce. Yet the fact that you are who you are, that you make
this journey for this especial purpose, that you are everlastingly
right--these are enough.
Moreover, you can't ever tell results, nor can you afford to make
your plans in this sort of high work with the slightest reference
to probable results. That's the bigness and the glory of it. Any
ordinary man can, on any ordinary day, go and do a task, the
favourable results of which may be foreseen. _That's_ easy. The big
thing is to go confidently to work on a task, the results of which
nobody can possibly foresee--a task so vague and improbable of
definite results that small men hesitate. It is in this spirit that
very many of the biggest things in history have been done. Wasn't
the purchase of Louisiana such a thing? Who'd ever have supposed
that that could have been brought about? I applaud your errand and
I am eagerly impatient to hear the results. When will _you_ get
here? I assume that Mrs. House will not go with you to Berlin. No
matter so you both turn up here for a good long stay.
I've taken me a little bit of a house about twenty miles out of
town whither we are going in July as soon as we can get away from
London. I hope to stay down there till far into October, coming up
to London about thrice a week. That's the dull season of the year.
It's a charming little country place--big enough for you to visit
us. . . .
_From Edward M. House_
An Bord des Dampfers _Imperator_
den May 21, 1914.
Hamburg-Amerika Linie
Dear Page:
Here we are again. The Wallaces[60] land at Cherbourg, Friday
morning, and we of course go on to Berlin. I wish I might have the
benefit of your advice just now, for the chances for success in
this great adventure are slender enough at best. The President has
done his part in the letter I have with me, and it is clearly up to
me to do mine. . . .
Faithfully yours,
E.M. House.
It will be observed that Colonel House had taken the advice of Sir
William Tyrrell, and had sailed directly to Germany on a German
ship--the _Imperator_. Ambassador Gerard had made preparations for his
reception in Berlin, and the American soon had long talks with Admiral
von Tirpitz, Falkenhayn, Von Jagow, Solf, and others. Von
Bethmann-Hollweg's wife died almost on the day of his arrival in Berlin,
so it was impossible for him to see the Chancellor--the man who would
have probably been the most receptive to these peace ideas. All the
leaders of the government, except Von Tirpitz, gave Colonel House's
proposals a respectful if somewhat cynical hearing. Von Tirpitz was
openly and demonstratively hostile. The leader of the German Navy simply
bristled with antagonism at any suggestion for peace or disarmament or
world coöperation. He consumed a large part of the time which Colonel
House spent with him denouncing England and all its works. Hatred of the
"Island Kingdom" was apparently the consuming passion of his existence.
On the whole, Von Tirpitz thus made no attempt to conceal his feeling
that the purpose of the House mission was extremely distasteful to him.
The other members of the Government, while not so tactlessly hostile,
were not particularly encouraging. The usual objections to disarmament
were urged--the fear of other Powers, the walled-in state of Germany,
the vigilant enemies against which it was necessary constantly to be
prepared and watchful. Even more than the unsympathetic politeness of
the German Cabinet the general atmosphere of Berlin was depressing to
Colonel House. The militaristic oligarchy was absolutely in control.
Militarism possessed not only the army, the navy, and the chief officers
of state, but the populace as well. One almost trivial circumstance has
left a lasting impression on Colonel House's mind. Ambassador Gerard
took him out one evening for a little relaxation. Both Mr. Gerard and
Colonel House were fond of target shooting and the two men sought one of
the numerous rifle galleries of Berlin. They visited gallery after
gallery, but could not get into one. Great crowds lined up at every
place, waiting their turns at the target; it seemed as though every
able-bodied man in Berlin was spending all his time improving his
marksmanship. But this was merely a small indication of the atmosphere
of militarism which prevailed in the larger aspects of life. Colonel
House found himself in a strange place to preach international accord
for the ending of war!
He had come to Berlin not merely to talk with the Cabinet heads; his
goal was the Kaiser himself. But he perceived at once a persistent
opposition to his plan. As he was the President's personal
representative, and carried a letter from the President to the Kaiser,
an audience could not be refused--indeed, it had already been duly
arranged; but there was a quiet opposition to his consorting with the
"All Highest" alone. It was not usual, Colonel House was informed, for
His Imperial Majesty to discuss such matters except in the presence of a
representative of the Foreign Office. Germany had not yet recovered from
the shock which the Emperor's conversation with certain foreign
correspondents had given the nation. The effects were still felt of the
famous interviews of October 28, 1908, which, when published in the
London _Telegraph_, had caused the bitterest resentment in Great
Britain. The Kaiser had given his solemn word that he would indulge in
no more indiscretions of this sort, and a private interview with Colonel
House was regarded by his advisers as a possible infraction of that
promise. But the American would not be denied. He knew that an
interview with a third person present would be simply time thrown away
since his message was intended for the Kaiser's own ears; and ultimately
his persistence succeeded. The next Monday would be June 1st--a great
day in Germany. It was the occasion of the Schrippenfest, a day which
for many years had been set aside for the glorification of the German
Army. On that festival, the Kaiser entertained with great pomp
representative army officers and representative privates, as well as the
diplomatic corps and other distinguished foreigners. Colonel House was
invited to attend the Kaiser's luncheon on that occasion, and was
informed that, after this function was over, he would have an
opportunity of having a private conversation with His Majesty.
The affair took place in the palace at Potsdam. The militarism which
Colonel House had felt so oppressively in Berlin society was especially
manifest on this occasion. There were two luncheon parties--that of the
Kaiser and his officers and guests in the state dining room, and that of
the selected private soldiers outside. The Kaiser and the Kaiserin spent
a few moments with their humbler subjects, drinking beer with them and
passing a few comradely remarks; they then proceeded to the large dining
hall and took their places with the gorgeously caparisoned and
bemedalled chieftains of the German Army. The whole proceeding has an
historic interest, in that it was the last Schrippenfest held. Whether
another will ever be held is problematical, for the occasion was an
inevitable part of the trappings of Hohenzollernism. Despite the gravity
of the occasion, Colonel House's chief memory of this function is
slightly tinged with the ludicrous. He had spent the better part of a
lifetime attempting to rid himself of his military title, but uselessly.
He was now embarrassed because these solemn German officers persisted
in regarding him as an important part of the American Army, and in
discussing technical and strategical problems. The visitor made several
attempts to explain that he was merely a "geographical colonel"--that
the title was constantly conferred in an informal sense on Americans,
especially Southerners, and that the handle to his name had, therefore,
no military significance. But the round-faced Teutons stared at his
explanation in blank amazement; they couldn't grasp the point at all,
and continued to ask his opinion of matters purely military.
When the lunch was finished, the Kaiser took Colonel House aside, and
the two men withdrew to the terrace, out of earshot of the rest of the
gathering. However, they were not out of sight. For nearly half an hour
the Kaiser and the American stood side by side upon the terrace, the
German generals, at a respectful distance, watching the proceeding,
resentful, puzzled, curious as to what it was all about. The quiet
demeanour of the American "Colonel," his plain citizen's clothes, and
his almost impassive face, formed a striking contrast to the Kaiser's
dazzling uniform and the general scene of military display. Two or three
of the generals and admirals present were in the secret, but only two or
three; the mass of officers watching this meeting little guessed that
the purpose of House's visit was to persuade the Kaiser to abandon
everything for which the Schrippenfest stood; to enter an international
compact with the United States and Great Britain for reducing armaments,
to reach an agreement about trade and the treatment of backward peoples,
and to form something of a permanent association for the preservation of
peace. The one thing which was apparent to the watchers was that the
American was only now and then saying a brief word, but that the Kaiser
was, as usual, doing a vast amount of talking. His speech rattled on
with the utmost animation, his arms were constantly gesticulating, he
would bring one fist down into his palm to register an emphatic point,
and enforce certain ideas with a menacing forefinger. At times Colonel
House would show slight signs of impatience and interrupt the flow of
talk. But the Kaiser was clearly absorbed in the subject under
discussion. His entourage several times attempted to break up the
interview. The Court Chamberlain twice gingerly approached and informed
His Majesty that the Imperial train was waiting to take the party back
to Berlin. Each time the Kaiser, with an angry gesture, waved the
interrupter away. Despairing of the usual resources, the Kaiserin was
sent with the same message. The Kaiser did not treat her so summarily,
but he paid no attention to the request, and continued to discuss the
European situation with the American.
[Illustration: Walter H. Page, from a photograph taken a few years
before he became American Ambassador to Great Britain]
[Illustration: The British Foreign Office, Downing Street]
The subject that had mainly aroused the Imperial warmth was the "Yellow
Peril." For years this had been an obsession with the Kaiser, and he
launched into the subject as soon as Colonel House broached the purpose
of his visit. There could be no question of disarmament, the Kaiser
vehemently declared, as long as this danger to civilization existed. "We
white nations should join hands," he said, "to oppose Japan and the
other yellow nations, or some day they will destroy us."
It was with difficulty that Colonel House could get His Majesty away
from this subject. Whatever topic he touched upon, the Kaiser would
immediately start declaiming on the dangers that faced Europe from the
East. His insistence on this accounted partly for the slight signs of
impatience which the American showed. He feared that all the time
allotted for the interview would be devoted to discussing the Japanese.
About another nation, the Kaiser showed almost as much alarm as he did
about Japan, and that was Russia. He spoke contemptuously of France and
Great Britain as possible enemies, for he apparently had no fear of
them. But the size of Russia and the exposed eastern frontier of Germany
seemed to appal him. How could Germany join a peace pact, and reduce its
army, so long as 175,000,000 Slavs threatened them from this direction?
Another matter that the Kaiser discussed with derision was Mr. Bryan's
arbitration treaty. Practically all the great nations had already
ratified this treaty except Germany. The Kaiser now laughed at the
treaties and pooh-poohed Bryan. Germany, he declared, would never accept
such an arbitration plan. Colonel House had particular cause to remember
this part of the conversation three years afterward, when the United
States declared war on Germany. The outstanding feature of the Bryan
treaty was the clause which pledged the high contracting parties not to
go to war without taking a breathing spell of one year in which to think
the matter over. Had Germany adopted this treaty, the United States, in
April, 1917, after Germany had presented a _casus belli_ by resuming
unrestricted submarine warfare, could not have gone to war. We should
have been obliged to wait a year, or until April, 1918, before engaging
in hostilities. That is, an honourable observance of this Bryan treaty
by the United States would have meant that Germany would have starved
Great Britain into surrender, and crushed Europe with her army. Had the
Kaiser, on this June afternoon, not notified Colonel House that Germany
would not accept this treaty, but, instead, had notified him that he
would accept it, William II might now be sitting on the throne of a
victorious Germany, with Europe for a footstool.
Despite the Kaiser's hostile attitude toward these details, his general
reception of the President's proposals was not outwardly unfriendly.
Perhaps he was sincere, perhaps not; yet the fact is that he manifested
more cordiality to this somewhat vague "get-together" proposal than had
any of his official advisers. He encouraged Colonel House to visit
London, talk the matter over with British statesmen, and then return to
Berlin.
"The last thing," he said, "that Germany wants is war We are getting to
be a great commercial country. In a few years Germany will be a rich
country, like England and the United States. We don't want a war to
interfere with our progress."
Any peace suggestion that was compatible with German safety, he said,
would be entertained. Yet his parting words were not reassuring.
"Every nation in Europe," he said, "has its bayonets pointed at Germany.
But--"--and with this he gave a proud and smiling glance at the
glistening representatives of his army gathered on this brilliant
occasion--"we are ready!"
Colonel house left Berlin, not particularly hopeful; the Kaiser
impressed him as a man of unstable nervous organization--as one who was
just hovering on the borderland of insanity. Certainly, this was no man
to be entrusted with such powers as the American had witnessed that day
at Potsdam. Dangerous as the Kaiser was, however, he did not seem to
Colonel House to be as great a menace to mankind as were his military
advisers. The American came away from Berlin with the conviction that
the most powerful force in Germany was the militaristic clique, and
second, the Hohenzollern dynasty. He has always insisted that this
represented the real precedence in power. So long as the Kaiser was
obedient to the will of militarism, so long could he maintain his
standing. He was confident, however, that the militaristic oligarchy was
determined to have its will, and would dethrone the Kaiser the moment he
showed indications of taking a course that would lead to peace. Colonel
House was also convinced that this militaristic oligarchy was determined
on war. The coolness with which it listened to his proposals, the
attempts it made to keep him from seeing the Kaiser alone, its repeated
efforts to break up the conversation after it had begun, all pointed to
the inevitable tragedy. The fact that the Kaiser expressed a wish to
discuss the matter again, after Colonel House had sounded London, was
the one hopeful feature of an otherwise discouraging experience, and
accounts for the tone of faint optimism in his letters describing the
visit.
_From Edward M. House_
Embassy of the United States of America,
Berlin,
May 28, 1914.
Dear Page:
. . . I have done something here already--not much, but enough to
open negotiations with London. I lunch with the Kaiser on Monday. I
was advised to avoid Admiral von Tirpitz as being very
unsympathetic. However, I went directly at him and had a most
interesting talk. He is a forceful fellow. Von Jagow is pleasant
but not forceful. I have had a long talk with him. The Chancellor's
wife died last week so I have not got in touch with him. I will
write you more fully from Paris. My address there will be Hotel
Ritz.
Hastily,
E.M.H.
_From Edward M. House_
Hotel Ritz, 15, Place Vendôme, Paris.
June 3, 1914.
Dear Page:
I had a satisfactory talk with the Kaiser on Monday. I have now
seen everyone worthwhile in Germany except the Chancellor. I am
ready now for London. Perhaps you had better prepare the way. The
Kaiser knows I am to see them, and I have arranged to keep him in
touch with results--if there are any. We must work quickly after I
arrive, for it may be advisable for me to return to Germany, and I
am counting on sailing for home July 15th or 28th. . . . I am eager to
see you and tell you what I know.
Yours,
E.M.H.
Colonel House left that night for Paris, but there the situation was a
hopeless one. France was not thinking of a foreign war; it was engrossed
with its domestic troubles. There had been three French ministries in
two weeks; and the trial of Madame Caillaux for the murder of Gaston
Calmette, editor of the Paris _Figaro_, was monopolizing all the
nation's capacity for emotion. Colonel House saw that it would be a
waste of energy to take up his mission at Paris--there was no government
stable enough to make a discussion worth while. He therefore immediately
left for London.
The political situation in Great Britain was almost as confused as that
in Paris. The country was in a state approaching civil war on the
question of Home Rule for Ireland; the suffragettes were threatening to
dynamite the Houses of Parliament; and the eternal struggle between the
Liberal and the Conservative elements was raging with unprecedented
virulence. A European war was far from everybody's mind. It was this
utter inability to grasp the realities of the European situation which
proved the main impediment to Colonel House's work in England. He met
all the important people--Mr. Asquith, Mr. Lloyd George, Sir Edward
Grey, and others. With them he discussed his "pact" proposal in great
detail.
Naturally, ideas of this sort were listened to sympathetically by
statesmen of the stamp of Asquith, Grey, and Lloyd George. The
difficulty, however, was that none of these men apprehended an immediate
war. They saw no necessity of hurrying about the matter. They had the
utmost confidence in Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador in London,
and Von Bethmann-Hollweg, the German Chancellor. Both these men were
regarded by the Foreign Office as guarantees against a German attack;
their continuance in their office was looked upon as an assurance that
Germany entertained no immediately aggressive plans. Though the British
statesmen did not say so definitely, the impression was conveyed that
the mission on which Colonel House was engaged was an unnecessary one--a
preparation against a danger that did not exist. Colonel House attempted
to persuade Sir Edward Grey to visit the Kiel regatta, which was to take
place in a few days, see the Kaiser, and discuss the plan with him. But
the Government feared that such a visit would be very disturbing to
France and Russia. Already Mr. Churchill's proposal for a "naval
holiday" had so wrought up the French that a hurried trip to France by
Mr. Asquith had been necessary to quiet them; the consternation that
would have been caused in Paris by the presence of Sir Edward Grey at
Kiel can only be imagined. The fact that the British statesmen
entertained so little apprehension of a German attack may possibly be a
reflection on their judgment; yet Colonel House's visit has great
historical value, for the experience afterward convinced him that Great
Britain had had no part in bringing on the European war, and that
Germany was solely responsible. It certainly should have put the Wilson
Administration right on this all-important point, when the great storm
broke.
The most vivid recollection which the British statesmen whom Colonel
House met retain of his visit, was his consternation at the spirit that
had confronted him everywhere in Germany. The four men most
interested--Sir Edward Grey, Sir William Tyrrell, Mr. Page, and Colonel
House--met at luncheon in the American Embassy a few days after
President Wilson's emissary had returned from Berlin. Colonel House
could talk of little except the preparations for war which were manifest
on every hand.
"I feel as though I had been living near a mighty electric dynamo,"
Colonel House told his friends. "The whole of Germany is charged with
electricity. Everybody's nerves are tense. It needs only a spark to set
the whole thing off."
The "spark" came two weeks afterward with the assassination of the
Archduke Ferdinand.
* * * * *
"It is all a bad business," Colonel House wrote to Page when war broke
out, "and just think how near we came to making such a catastrophe
impossible! If England had moved a little faster and had let me go back
to Germany, the thing, perhaps, could have been done."
To which Page at once replied:
"No, no, no--no power on earth could have prevented it. The German
militarism, which is _the_ crime of the last fifty years, has been
working for this for twenty-five years. It is the logical result of
their spirit and enterprise and doctrine. It had to come. But, of
course, they chose the wrong time and the wrong issue. Militarism has no
judgment. Don't let your conscience be worried. You did all that any
mortal man could do. But nobody could have done anything effective.
"We've got to see to it that this system doesn't grow up again. That's
all."
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 54: Mr. and Mrs. Francis B. Sayre, son-in-law and daughter of
President Wilson.]
[Footnote 55: Ex-President of the University of California, Roosevelt
Professor at the University of Berlin, 1909-10.]
[Footnote 56: James A. O'Gorman was the anti-British Senator from New
York State at this time working hard against the repeal of the Panama
tolls discrimination.]
[Footnote 57: In February, 1915, William S. Benton, an English subject
who had spent the larger part of his life in Mexico, was murdered in the
presence of Francisco Villa.]
[Footnote 58: Mr. Irwin Laughlin, first secretary of the American
Embassy in London; at this time spending a few weeks in the United
States.]
[Footnote 59: Obviously President Wilson.]
[Footnote 60: Mr. Hugh C. Wallace, afterward Ambassador to France, and
Mrs. Wallace. Mr. and Mrs. Wallace accompanied Mr. and Mrs. House on
this journey.]