Chapter VII.--SIXTH CAMPAIGN OPENS: CAMP OF BUNZELWITZ.

To the outward observer Friedrich stands well at present, and seems

again in formidable posture. After two such Victories, and such almost

miraculous recovery of himself, who shall say what resistance he will

not yet make? In comparison with 1759 and its failures and disasters,

what a Year has 1760 been! Liegnitz and Torgau, instead of Kunersdorf

and Maxen, here are unexpected phenomena; here is a King risen from the

deeps again,--more incalculable than ever to contemporary mankind. "How

these things will end?" Fancy of what a palpitating interest THEN, while

everybody watched the huge game as it went on; though it is so little

interesting now to anybody, looking at it all finished! Finished; no

mystery of chance, of world-hope or of world-terror now remaining in

it; all is fallen stagnant, dull, distant;--and it will behoove us to be

brief upon it.

Contemporaries, and Posterity that will make study, must alike admit

that, among the sons of men, few in any Age have made a stiffer fight

than Friedrich has done and continues to do. But to Friedrich himself it

is dismally evident, that year by year his resources are melting away;

that a year must come when he will have no resource more. Ebbing very

fast, his resources;--fast too, no doubt, those of his Enemies, but not

SO fast. They are mighty Nations, he is one small Nation. His thoughts,

we perceive, have always, in the background of them, a hue of settled

black. Easy to say, "Resist till we die;" but to go about, year after

year, practically doing it, under cloudy omens, no end of it visible

ahead, is not easy. Many men, Kings and other, have had to take that

stern posture;--few on sterner terms than those of Friedrich at present;

and none that I know of with a more truly stoical and manful figure of

demeanor. He is long used to it! Wet to the bone, you do not regard new

showers; the one thing is, reach the bridge before IT be swum away.

The usual hopes, about Turks, about Peace, and the like, have not been

wanting to Friedrich this Winter; mentionable as a trait of Friedrich's

character, not otherwise worth mention. Hope of aid from the Turks, it

is very strange to see how he nurses this fond shadow, which never came

to anything! Happily, it does not prevent, it rather encourages, the

utmost urgency of preparation: "The readier we are, the likelier are

Turks and everything!" Peace, at least, between France and England,

after such a Proposal on Choiseul's part, and such a pass as France has

really got to, was a reasonable probability. But indeed, from the first

year of this War, as we remarked, Peace has seemed possible to Friedrich

every year; especially from 1759 onward, there is always every winter

a lively hope of Peace:--"No slackening of preparation; the reverse,

rather; but surely the Campaign of next Summer will be cut short, and we

shall all get home only half expended!" [Schoning (IN LOCIS).]

Practically, Friedrich has been raising new Free-Corps people, been

recruiting, refitting and equipping, with more diligence than ever; and,

in spite of the almost impossibilities, has two Armies on foot, some

96,000 men in all, for defence of Saxony and of Silesia,--Henri to

undertake Saxony, VERSUS Daun; Silesia, with Loudon and the Russians, to

be Friedrich's heavier share. The Campaign, of which, by the one party

and the other, very great things had been hoped and feared, seemed once

as if it would begin two months earlier than usual; but was staved off,

a long time, by Friedrich's dexterities, and otherwise; and in effect

did not begin, what we can call beginning, till two months later than

usual. Essentially it fell, almost all, to Friedrich's share; and turned

out as little decisive on him as any of its foregoers. The one memorable

part of it now is, Friedrich's Encampment at Bunzelwitz; which did not

occur till four months after Friedrich's appearance on the Field. And

from the end of April, when Loudon made his first attempt, till the end

of August, when Friedrich took that Camp, there was nothing but a series

of attempts, all ineffectual, of demonstrations, marchings, manoeuvrings

and small events; which, in the name of every reader, demand

condensation to the utmost. If readers will be diligent, here, so far as

needful, are the prefatory steps.

Since Fouquet's disaster, Goltz generally has Silesia in charge; and

does it better than expected. He was never thought to have Fouquet's

talent in him; but he shows a rugged loyalty of mind, less egoistic than

the fiery Fouquet's; and honestly flings himself upon his task, in a way

pleasant to look at: pleasant to the King especially, who recognizes in

Goltz a useful, brave, frank soul;--and has given him, this Spring, the

ORDER OF MERIT, which was a high encouragement to Goltz. In Silesia,

after Kosel last Year, there had been truce between Goltz and Loudon;

which should have produced repose to both; but did not altogether, owing

to mistakes that rose. And at any rate, in the end of April, Loudon,

bursting suddenly into Silesia with great increase to the forces already

there, gave notice, as per bargain, That "in 96 hours" the Truce would

expire. And waiting punctiliously till the last of said hours was run

out, Loudon fell upon Goltz (APRIL 25th, in the Schweidnitz-Landshut

Country) with his usual vehemence;--meaning to get hold of the Silesian

Passes, and extinguish Goltz (only 10 or 12,000 against 30,000), as he

had done Fouquet last Year.

But Goltz took his measures better; seized "the Gallows-Hill of

Hohenfriedberg," seized this and that; and stood in so forcible an

attitude, that Loudon, carefully considering, durst not risk an assault;

and the only result was: Friedrich hastened to relief of Goltz (rose

from Meissen Country MAY 3d), and appeared in Silesia six weeks earlier

than he had intended. But again took Cantonments there (Schweidnitz and

neighborhood);--Loudon retiring wholly, on first tidings of him, home to

Bohemia again. Home in Bohemia; at Braunau, on the western edge of the

Glatz Mountains,--there sits Loudon thenceforth, silent for a long time;

silently collecting an Army of 72,000, with strict orders from Vienna to

avoid fighting till the Russians come. Loudon has very high intentions

this Year. Intends to finish Silesia altogether;--cannot he, after such

a beginning upon Glatz last Year? That is the firm notion at Vienna

among men of understanding: ever-active Loudon the favorite there,

against a Cunctator who has been too cunctatory many times. Liegnitz

itself, was not that (as many opine) a disaster due to cunctation, not

of Loudon's?

Loudon is to be joined by 60,000 Russians, under a Feldmarschall

Butturlin, not under sulky Soltikof, this Year; junction to be in Upper

Silesia, in Neisse neighborhood. We take that Fortress," say the Vienna

people; "it is next on the file after Glatz. Neisse taken; thence

northward, cleaning the Country as we go; Brieg, Schweidnitz, Glogau,

probably Breslau itself in some good interim: there are but Four

Fortresses to do; and the thing is finished. Let the King, one to three,

and Loudon in command against him, try if he can hinder it!" This is the

Program in Vienna and in Petersburg. And, accordingly, the Russians

have got on march about the end of May; plodding on ever since, due

hereabouts before June end: "junction to be as near Neisse as you can:

and no fighting of the King, on any terms, till the Russians come."

Never were the Vienna people so certain before. Daun is to do nothing

"rash" in Saxony (a Daun not given that way, they can calculate), but is

to guard Loudon's game; carefully to reinforce, comfort and protect the

brave Loudon and his Russians till they win;--after which Saxony as rash

as you like. This is the Program of the Season:--readers feel what an

immensity of preliminary higglings, hitchings and manoeuvrings will now

demand to be suppressed by us! Read these essential Fractions, chiefly

chronological;--and then, at once, To Bunzelwitz, and the time of close

grips in Silesia here.

"Last Year," says a loose Note, which we may as well take with us,

"Tottleben did not go home with the rest, but kept hovering about, in

eastern Pommern, with a 10,000, all Winter; attempting several kinds of

mischief in those Countries, especially attempting to do something

on Colberg; which the Russians mean to besiege next Summer, with more

intensity than ever, for the Third, and, if possible, the last time.

'Storm their outposts there,' thinks Tottleben, 'especially Belgard,

the chief outpost; girdle tighter and tighter the obstinate little

crow's-nest of a Colberg, and have it ready for besieging in good time.'

Tottleben did try upon the outposts, especially Belgard the chief one

(January 18th, 1761), but without the least success at Belgard; with a

severe reproof instead, Werner's people being broad awake: [Account of

itt, _Helden-Geschichte,_ vi. 670.] upon which Tottleben and they made a

truce, 'Peaceable till May 12th;' till June 1st, it proved, about which

time [which time, or afterwards, as the Silesian crisis may admit!] we

will look in on them again."

MAY 3d, as above intimated, Friedrich hastened off for Silesia, quitted

Meissen that day, with an Army of some 50,000; pressingly intent to

relieve Goltz from his dangerous predicament there. This is one of

Friedrich's famed marches, done in a minimum of time and with a maximum

of ingenuity; concerning which I will remember only that, one night, "he

lodged again at Rodewitz, near Hochklrch, in the same house as on

that Occasion [what a thirty months to look back upon, as you sink to

sleep!]--and that no accident anywhere befell the March, though Daun's

people, all through Saxony and the Lausitz, were hovering on the

flank,--apprehensive chiefly lest it might mean a plunge INTO BOHEMIA,

for relief of Goltz, instead of what it did." For six weeks after that

hard March, the King's people got Cantonments again, and rested.

Prince Henri is left in Saxony, with Daun in huge force against him,

Daun and the Reich; between whom and Henri,--Seidlitz being in the field

again with Henri, Seidlitz and others of mark,--there fell out a great

deal of exquisite manoeuvring, rapid detaching and occasional sharp

cutting on the small scale; but nothing of moment to detain us here

or afterwards, We shall say only that Henri, to a wonderful extent,

maintained himself against the heavy overwhelming Daun and his Austrian

and Reichs masses; and that Napoleon, I know not after what degree of

study, pronounced this Campaign of 1761 to be the masterpiece of Henri,

and really a considerable thing, _"La campagne de 1761 est celle ou ce

Prince a vraiment montre des talents superieurs;_ the Battle of Freyberg

[wait till next Year] nothing in comparison." [Montholon, _Memoires de

Napoleon,_ vii. 324.] Which may well detain soldier-people upon it; but

must not us, in any measure. The result of Henri being what we said,--a

drawn game, or nearly so,--we will, without interference from him,

follow Friedrich and Goltz.

Friedrich and Goltz,--or, alas, it is very soon Friedrich alone; the

valiant Goltz soon perishing from his hand! After brief junction in

Schweidnitz Country, Friedrich detached Goltz to his old fortified

Camp at Glogau, there to be on watch. Goltz watching there, lynx-eyed,

skilful, volunteered a Proposal (June 22d): "Reinforce me to 20,000,

your Majesty; I will attack so and so of those advancing Russians!"

Which his Majesty straightway approved of, and set going. [Goltz's

Letter to the King, "Glogau, 22d June, 1761," is in Tempelhof (v.

88-90), who thinks the plan good.] Goltz thereupon tasked all his

energies, perhaps overmuch; and it was thought might at last really have

done something for the King, in this matter of the Russians still in

separate Divisions,--a thing feasible if you have energy and velocity;

always unfeasible otherwise. But, alas, poor Goltz, just when ready

to march, was taken with sudden violent fever, the fruit probably of

overwork; and, in that sad flame, blazed away his valiant existence

in three or four days:-gone forever, June 30th, 1761; to the regret of

Friedrich and of many.

Old Ziethen was at once pushed on, from Glogau over the frontier, to

replace Goltz; but, I doubt, had not now the requisite velocity: Ziethen

merely manoeuvred about, and came home "attending the Russians," as

Henri, Dohna and others had done. The Russians entered Silesia, from the

northeast or Polish side, without difficulty; and (July 15th-20th)

were within reach of Breslau and of an open road to southward, and to

junction with Loudon, who is astir for them there. About Breslau they

linger and higgle, at their leisure, for three weeks longer: and if

their junction with the Austrians "in Neisse neighborhood" is to be

prevented or impeded, it is Friedrich, not Ziethen, that will have to do

it.

Junction in Neisse neighborhood (Oppeln, where it should have been,

which is some 35 miles from Neisse), Friedrich did, by velocity and

dexterity, contrive to prevent; but junction somewhere he probably

knows to be inevitable. These are among Friedrich's famed marches and

manoeuvrings, these against the swift Loudon and his slow Russians; but

we will not dwell on them. My readers know the King's manner in such

cases; have already been on two Marches with him, and even in these same

routes and countries. We will say only, that the Russians were and had

been very dilatory; Loudon much the reverse; and their and Loudon's

Adversary still more. That, for five days, the Russians, at length close

to Breslau (August 6th-11th), kept vaguely cannonading and belching

noise and apprehension upon the poor City, but without real damage to

it, and as if merely to pass the time; and had gradually pushed out

fore-posts, as far as Oppeln, towards Loudon, up their safe right bank

of Oder. That Loudon, on the first glimpse of these, had made his

best speed Neisse-ward; and did a march or two with good hope; but at

Munsterberg (July 22d), on the morning of the third or fourth day's

march, was astonished to see Friedrich ahead of him, nearer Neisse than

he; and that in Neisse Country there was nothing to be done, no Russian

junction possible there.

"Try it in Schweidnitz Country, then!" said Loudon. The Russians leave

off cannonading Breslau; cross Oder, about Auras or Leubus

(August 11th-12th); and Loudon, after some finessing, marches back

Schweidnitz-way, cautiously, skilfully; followed by Friedrich, anxious

to prevent a junction here too or at lowest to do some stroke before it

occur. A great deal of cunning marching, shifting and manoeuvring there

is, for days round Schweidnitz on all sides; encampings by

Friedrich, now Liegnitz head-quarter, now Wahlstadt, now Schonbrunn,

Striegau;--without the least essential harm to Loudon or likelihood

increasing that the junction can be hindered. No offer of battle either;

Loudon is not so easy to beat as some. The Russians come on at a snail's

pace, so Loudon thinks it, who is extremely impatient; but makes no

mistakes in consequence, keeps himself safe (Kunzendorf, on the edge of

the Glatz Hills, his main post), and the roads open for his heavy-footed

friends.

In Nicolstadt, a march from Wahlstadt, 16th August, there are 60,000

Russians in front of Friedrich, 72,000 Austrians in rear: what can he,

with at the very utmost 57,000, do against them? Now was the time to

have fallen upon the King, and have consumed him between two fires, as

it is thought might have been possible, had they been simultaneous, and

both of them done it with a will. But simultaneity was difficult, and

the will itself was wanting, or existed only on Loudon's side. Nothing

of the kind was attempted on the confederate part, still less on

Friedrich's,--who stands on his guard, and, from the Heights about, has

at last, to witness what he cannot hinder. Sees both Armies on march;

Austrians from the southeast or Kunzendorf-Freyberg side, Russians from

the northeast or Kleinerwitz side, wending in many columns by the back

of Jauer and the back of Liegnitz respectively; till (August 18th) they

"join hands," as it is termed, or touch mutually by their light

troops; and on the 19th (Friedrich now off on another scheme, and not

witnessing), fall into one another's arms, ranked all in one line of

posts. [Tempelhof, v. 58-150.] "Can the Reichshofrath say our junction

is not complete?" And so ends what we call the Prefatory part; and the

time of Close Grips seems to be come!--Friedrich has now nothing for

it but to try if he cannot possibly get hold of Kunzendorf (readers may

look in their Map), and cut off Loudon's staff of bread; Loudon's, and

Butturlin's as well; for the whole 130,000 are now to be fed by Loudon,

and no slight task he will find it. By rushing direct on Kunzendorf with

such a velocity as Friedrich is capable of, it is thought he might have

managed Kunzendorf; but he had to mask his design, and march by the rear

or east side of Schweidnitz, not by the west side: "They will think I

am making off in despair, intending for the strong post of Pilzen there,

with Schweidnitz to shelter me in front!" hoped Friedrich (morning of

the 19th), as he marched off on that errand. But on approaching in that

manner, by the bow, he found that Loudon had been quite sceptical

of such despair, and at any rate had, by the string, made sure of

Kunzendorf and the food-sources. August 20th, at break of day, scouts

report the Kunzendorf ground thoroughly beset again, and Loudon in

his place there. No use marching thitherward farther:--whither now,

therefore?

Friedrich knows Pilzen, what an admirable post it really is; except only

that Schweidnitz will be between the enemy and him, and liable to be

besieged by them; which will never do! Friedrich, on the moment of that

news from Kunzendorf, gets on march, not by the east side (as

intended till the scouts came in), but by the west or exposed side of

Schweidnitz:--he stood waiting, ready for either route, and lost not a

moment on his scouts coming in. All upon the road by 3 A.M. August 20th;

and encamps, still at an early hour, midway between Schweidnitz and

Striegau: right wing of him at Zedlitz (if the reader look on his

Map), left wing at Jauernik; headquarters, Bunzelwitz, a poor Village,

celebrated ever since in War-annals. And begins (that same evening, the

earlier or RESTED part of him begins) digging and trenching at a most

extraordinary rate, according to plan formed; no enemy taking heed of

him, or giving the least molestation. This is the world-famous Camp of

Bunzelwitz, upon which it is worth while to dwell for a little.

To common eyes the ground hereabouts has no peculiar military strength:

a wavy champaign, with nothing of abrupt or high, much of it actual

plain, excellent for cavalry and their work;--this latter, too, is an

advantage, which Friedrich has well marked, and turns to use in his

scheme. The area he takes in is perhaps some seven or eight miles long,

by as many broad. On the west side runs the still-young Striegau Water,

defensive more or less; and on the farther bank of it green little

Hills, their steepest side stream-ward. Inexpugnable Schweidnitz, with

its stores of every kind, especially with its store of cannon and of

bread, is on the left or east part of the circuit; in the intervening

space are peaceable farm-villages, spots of bog; knolls, some of them

with wood. Not a village, bog, knoll, but Friedrich has caught up, and

is busy profiting by. "Swift, BURSCHE, dig ourselves in here, and be

ready for any quotity and quantity of them, if they dare attack!"

And 25,000 spades and picks are at work, under such a Field-Engineer

as there is not in the world when he takes to that employment. At all

hours, night and day, 25,000 of them: half the Army asleep, other half

digging, wheeling, shovelling; plying their utmost, and constant as

Time himself: these, in three days, will do a great deal of spade-work.

Batteries, redoubts, big and little; spare not for digging. Here is

ground for Cavalry, too; post them here, there, to bivouac in readiness,

should our Batteries be unfortunate. Long Trenches there are, and also

short; Batteries commanding every ingate, and under them are Mines: "We

will blow you and our Batteries both into the air, in case of capture!"

think the Prussians, the common men at least, if Friedrich do not.

"Mines, and that of being blown into the air," says Tempelhof, "are

always very terrible to the common man." In places there are "Trenches

16 feet broad, by 16 deep," says an admiring Archenholtz, who was in

it: "and we have two of those FLATTERMINEN (scatter-mines," blowing-up

apparatuses) "to each battery." [Archenholtz, ii. 262 &c.]

"Bunzelwitz, Jauernik, Tschechen and Peterwitz, all fortified,"

continues Archenholtz; "Wurben, in the centre, is like a citadel,

looking down upon Striegau Water. Heavy cannon, plenty of them, we have

brought from Schweidnitz: we have 460 pieces of cannon in all and

182 mines. Wurben, our citadel and centre, is about five miles from

Schweidnitz. Our intrenchments"--You already heard what gulfs some of

them were!" Before the lines are palisades, storm-posts, the things we

call Spanish Horse (CHEVAUX-DE-FRISE);--woods we have in abundance in

our Circuit, and axes busy for carpentries of that kind. There are four

intrenched knolls; 24 big batteries, capable of playing beautifully, all

like pieces in a concert." Four knolls elaborately intrenched, clothed

with cannon; founded upon FLATTER-mines: try where you will to enter,

such torrents of death-shot will converge on you, and a concert of 24

big batteries begin their music!--

On the third day, Loudon, looking into this thing, which he has not

minded hitherto, finds it such a thing as he never dreamt of before.

A thing strong as Gibraltar, in a manner;--which it will be terribly

difficult to attack with success! For eight days more Friedrich did not

rest from his spadework; made many changes and improvements, till he had

artificially made a very Stolpen of it, a Plauen, or more. Cogniazzo,

the AUSTRIAN VETERAN, says: "Plauen, and Daun's often ridiculed

precautions there, were nothing to it. Not as if Bunzelwitz had been so

inaccessible as our sheer rocks there; but because it is a masterpiece

of Art, in which the principles of tactics are combined with those of

field-fortification, as never before." Tielke grows quite eloquent on

it: "A masterpiece of judgment in ground," says he; "and the treatment

of it a model of sound, true and consummate field-engineering."

[Tielke, iii. BUNZELWITZ (which is praised as an attractive Piece);

OESTERREICHISCHER VETERAN, iv. 79: cited in PREUSS, ii. 285.]

Ziethen, appointed to that function, watches on the Heights of Wurben,

the citadel of the place: keeps a sharp eye to the southwest. All round,

in huge half-moon on the edge of the Hills over there, six or more miles

from Ziethen, lie the angry Enemies; Austrians south and nearest, about

Kunzendorf and Freyberg. Russians are on the top of Striegau

Hills, which are well known to some of us; Russian head-quarter is

Hohenfriedberg,--who would have thought it, Herr General von Ziethen?

Sixteen years ago, we have seen these Heights in other tenancy: Austrian

field-music and displayed banners coming down; a thousand and a thousand

Austrian watch-fires blazing out yonder, in the silent June night, eve

of such a Day! Baireuth Dragoons and their No. 67;--you will find the

Baireuth Dragoons still here in a sense, but also in a sense not. Their

fencing Chasot is gone to Lubeck long since; will perhaps pay Friedrich

a visit by and by: their fiery Gessler is gone much farther, and will

never visit anybody more! Many were the reapers then, and they are

mostly gone to rest. Here is a new harvest; the old SICKLES are still

here; but the hands that wielded them--! "Steady!" answers the Herr

General; profoundly aware of all that, but averse to words upon it.

Fancy Loudon's astonishment, on the third day: "While we have sat

consulting how to attack him, there is he,--unattackable, shall we say?"

Unattackable, Loudon will not consent to think him, though Butturlin has

quite consented. "Difficult, murderous," thinks Loudon; "but possible,

certain, could Butturlin but be persuaded!" And tries all his rhetoric

on Butturlin: "Shame on us!" urges the ardent Loudon: "Imperial and

Czarish Majesties; Kriegshofrath, Russian Senate; Vienna, Petersburg,

Versailles and all the world,--what are they expecting of us? To

ourselves it seemed certain, and here we sit helplessly gazing!" Loudon

is very diligent upon Butturlin: "Do but believe that it is possible.

A plan can be made; many plans: the problem is solved, if only your

Excellency will believe." Which Butturlin never quite will.

Nobody knows better than Friedrich in what perilous crisis he now

stands: beaten here, what army or resource has he left? Silesia is gone

from him; by every likelihood, the game is gone. This of Bunzelwitz is

his last card; this is now his one stronghold in the world:--we need not

say if he is vigilant in regard to this. From about the fourth day, when

his engineering was only complete in outline, he particularly expects

to be attacked. On the fifth night he concludes it will be; knowing

Loudon's way. Towards sunset, that evening (August 25th), all the tents

are struck: tents, cookeries, every article of baggage, his own among

the rest, are sent to Wurben Heights (to Schweidnitz, Archenholtz says;

but has misremembered): the ground cleared for action. And horse and

foot, every man marches out, and stands ready under arms.

Contrary to everybody's expectation, not a shot was heard, that night.

Nor the next night, nor the next: but the practice of vigilance was

continued. Punctual as mathematics: at a given hour of the afternoon,

tents are all struck; tents and furnitures, field swept clear; and the

50,000 in their places wait under arms. Next morning, nothing having

fallen out, the tents come back; the Army (half of it at once, or almost

the whole of it, according to aspects) rests, goes to sleep if it can.

By night there is vigilance, is work, and no sleep. It is felt to be a

hard life, but a necessary.

Nor in these labors of detail is the King wanting; far from it; the King

is there, as ear and eye of the whole. For the King alone there is,

near the chief Battery, "on the Pfarrberg, namely, in the clump of trees

there," a small Tent, and a bundle of straw where he can lie down, if

satisfied to do so. If all is safe, he will do so; but perhaps even

still he soon awakens again; and strolls about among his guard-parties,

or warms himself by their fires. One evening, among the orders, is heard

this item: "And remember, a lock of straw, will you,--that I may not

have to sleep on the ground, as last night!" [Seyfarth, ii. 16 n.] Many

anecdotes are current to this day, about his pleasant homely ways and

affabilities with the sentry people, and the rugged hospitalities they

would show him at their watch-fires. "Good evening, children." "The

same to thee, Fritz." "What is that you are cooking?"--and would try a

spoonful of it, in such company; while the rough fellows would forbid

smoking, "Don't you know he dislikes it?" "No, smoke away!" the King

would insist.

Mythical mainly, these stories; but the dialect of them true; and very

strange to us. Like that of an Arab Sheik among his tribesmen; like that

of a man whose authority needs no keeping up, but is a Law of Nature to

himself and everybody. He permits a little bantering even; a rough joke

against himself, if it spring sincerely from the complexion of the fact.

The poor men are terribly tired of this work: such bivouacking, packing,

unpacking; and continual waiting for the tug of battle, which never

comes. Biscuits, meal are abundant enough; but flesh-meat wearing low;

above all, no right sleep to be had. Friedrich's own table, I should

think, is very sparingly beset ("A cup of chocolate is my dinner

on marching-days," wrote he once, this Season); certainly his

Lodging,--damp ground, and the straw sometimes forgotten,--is none of

the best. And thus it has to last, night after night and day after day.

On September 8th, General Bulow went out for a little butcher's-meat;

did bring home "200 head of neat cattle [I fear, not very fat] and 300

sheep." [Tempelhof, v. 172.]

Loudon, all this while, is laboring, as man seldom did, to bring

Butturlin to the striking place; who continues flaccid, Loudon screwing

and rescrewing, altogether in vain. Loudon does not deny the difficulty;

but insists on the possibility, the necessity: Councils of War are

bid, remonstrances, encouragements. "We will lend you a Corps," answers

Butturlin; "but as to our Army cooperating,--except in that far-off way,

it is too dangerous!" Meanwhile provisions are running low; the time

presses. A formal Plan, presented by the ardent Loudon,--Loudon himself

to take the deadlier part,--"Mark it, noble Russian gentlemen; and you

to have the easier!"--surely that is loyal, and not in the old cat's-paw

way? But in that, too, there is an offence. Butturlin and the Russians

grumble to themselves: "And you to take all the credit, as you did

at Kunersdorf? A mere adjunct, or auxiliary, we: and we are a

Feldmarschall; and you, what is your rank and seniority?" In short, they

will not do it; and in the end coldly answer: "A Corps, if you like; but

the whole Army, positively no." Upon which Loudon goes home half mad;

and has a colic for eight-and-forty hours. This was September 2d; the

final sour refusal;--nearly heart-breaking to Loudon. Provisions are run

so low withal: the Campaign season all but done; result, nothing: not

even an attempt at a result.

No Prussian, from Friedrich downwards, had doubted but the attack would

be: the grand upshot and fiery consummation of these dark continual

hardships and nocturnal watchings. Thrice over, on different nights, the

Prussians imagined Loudon to have drawn out, intending actual business;

and thrice over to have drawn in again,--instead of once only, as was

the fact, and then taken colic. [Tempelhof, v. 170.] Friedrich's own

notion, that "over dinner, glass in hand," the two Generals had, in the

enthusiasm of such a moment, agreed to do it, but on sober inspection

found it too dubious, [_OEuvres de Frederic,_ v. 125.] appears to be

ungrounded. Whether they could in reality have stormed him, had they

all been willing, is still a question; and must continue one. Wednesday

evening, 9th September, there was much movement noticeable in the

Russian camp; also among the Austrian, there are regiments, foot

and horse, coming down hitherward. "Meaning to try it then?" thought

Friedrich, and got at once under arms. Suppositions were various; but

about 10 at night, the whole Russian Camp went up in flame; and, next

morning, the Russians were not there.

Russian main Army clean gone; already got to Jauer, as we hear; and Beck

with a Division to see them safe across the Oder;--only Czernichef and

20,000 being left, as a Corps of Loudon's. Who, with all Austrians, are

quiet in their Heights of Kunzendorf again. And thus, on the twentieth

morning, September 10th, this strange Business terminated. Shot of those

batteries is drawn again; powder of those mines lifted out again: no

firing of your heavy Artillery at all, nor even of your light, after

such elaborate charging and shoving of it hither and thither for

the last three weeks. The Prussians cease their bivouacking, nightly

striking of tents; and encamp henceforth in a merely human manner; their

"Spanish Riders" (FRISIAN Horse, CHEVAUX-DE-FRISE, others of us call

them), their Storm-pales and elaborate wooden Engineerings, they

gradually burn as fuel in the cold nights; finding Loudon absolutely

quiescent, and that the thing is over, for the present. One huge peril

handsomely staved away, though so many others impend.

By way of accelerating Butturlin, Friedrich, next day, September 11th,

despatched General Platen with some 8,000 (so I will guess them from

Tempelhof's enumeration by battalions), to get round the flank of

Butturlin, and burn his Magazines. Platen, a valiant skilful person, did

this business, as he was apt to do, in a shining style; shot dexterously

forward by the skirts of Butturlin; heard of a big WAGENBURG or

Travelling Magazine of his, at Gostyn over the Polish Frontier; in fact,

his travelling bread-basket, arranged as "Wagon-fortress" in and round

some Convent there, with trenches, brick walls, cannon and defence

considered strong enough for so important a necessary of the road.

September 15th, Platen, before cock-crow, burst out suddenly on this

Wagon-fortress, with its cannons, trenches, brick walls and defensive

Russians; stormed into it with extraordinary fury: "Fixed bayonets,"

ordered he at the main point of their defence, "not a shot till they are

tumbled out!"--tumbled them out accordingly, into flight and ruin; took

of prisoners 1,845, seven cannon, and burnt the 5,000 provender wagons,

which was the soul of the adventure; and directly got upon the road

again. [Tempelhof, v. 281-293; _Helden-Geschichte,_ vi. 643-649.]

Detachments of him then fell on Posen, on Posen and other small Russian

repositories in those parts,--hay-magazines, biscuit-stores soldiers'

uniforms; distributed or burnt the same;--completely destroying the

travelling haversack or general road-bag of Butturlin; a Butturlin that

will have to hasten forward or starve.

Which done, Platen (not waiting the King's new orders, but anticipating

them, to the King's great contentment) marched instantly, with his best

speed and skilfulest contrivance of routes and methods, not back to the

King, but onward towards Colberg,--(which he knows, as readers shall

anon, to be much in need of him at present);--and without injury, though

begirt all the way by a hurricane of Cossacks and light people doing

their utmost upon him, arrived there September 25th; victoriously

cutting in across the Besieging Party: and will again be visible enough

when we arrive there. Indignant Butturlin chased violently, eager to

punish Platen; but could get no hold: found Platen was clear off, to

Pommern,--on what errand Butturlin knew well, if not so well what to do

in consequence. "Reinforce our poor Besiegers there, and again reinforce

[to enormous amounts, 40,000 of them in the end];--get bread from

them withal:--and, before long, flow bodily thitherward, for bread

to ourselves and for their poor sake!" That, on the whole, was what

Butturlin did.

Friedrich stayed at Bunzelwitz above a fortnight after Butturlin.

"Why did not Friedrich stay altogether, and wait here?" said some,

triumphantly soon after. That was not well possible. His Schweidnitz

Magazine is worn low; not above a month's provision now left for so

many of us. The rate of sickness, too, gets heavier and heavier in this

Bunzelwitz Circuit. In fine, it is greatly desirable that Loudon, who

has nothing but Bohemia for outlook, should be got to start thither

as soon as possible, and be quickened homeward. September 25th-26th,

Friedrich will be under way again.

And, in the mean while, may not we employ this fortnight of quiescence

in noting certain other things of interest to him and us which have

occurred, or are occurring, in other parts of the Field of War? Of Henri

in Saxony we undertook to say nothing; and indeed hitherto,--big

Daun with his Lacys and Reichsfolk, lying so quiescent, tethered by

considerations (Daun continually detaching, watching, for support of his

Loudon and Russians and their thrice-important operation, which has

just had such a finish),--there could almost nothing be said. Nothing

hitherto, or even henceforth, as it proves, except mutual vigilances,

multifarious bickerings, manoeuvrings, affairs of posts: sharp bits of

cutting (Seidlitz, Green Kleist and other sharp people there); which

must not detain us in such speed. But there are two points, the

Britannic-French Campaign, and the Third Siege of Colberg; which in no

rate of speed could be quite omitted.

OF FERDINAND'S BATTLE OF VELLINGHAUSEN (15th-16th July); AND THE

CAMPAIGN 1761.

Vellinghausen is a poor little moory Hamlet in Paderborn Country,

near the south or left bank of the Lippe River; lies to the north of

Soest,--some 15 miles to your left-hand there, as you go by rail from

Aachen to Paderborn;--but nobody now has ever heard of it at Soest or

elsewhere, famous as it once became a hundred years ago. Ferdinand had

taken a singular position there, in the early days of July, 1761. Here

is brief Notice of that Affair, and of some results, or adjuncts, still

more important, which it had:--

"This Year, Ferdinand's Campaign is more difficult than ever; Choiseul

having made a quite spasmodic effort towards Hanover, while negotiating

for Peace. Two Armies, counting together 160,000 men, in great

completeness of equipment, Choiseul has got on foot, against Ferdinand's

of 95,000. Had a fine dashing plan, too;--devised by himself (something

of a Soldier he too, and full of what the mess-rooms call 'dash');--not

so bad a Plan of the dashing kind, say judges. But it was marred sadly

in one point: That Broglio, on issuing from his Hessian Winter-quarters,

is not to be sole General; that Soubise, from the Lower-Rhine Country,

is to be Co-General;--such the inexorable will of Pompadour. This clause

of the business Ferdinand, at an early stage, appears to have guessed or

discerned might, for him, be the saving clause.

"Now, as formerly, Ferdinand's first grand business is to guard

Lippstadt,--guard it now from these two Generals:--and, singular to see,

instead of opposing the junction of them, he has submitted cheerfully

to let them join. And in the course of a week or two after taking

the field, is found to be on the western or outmost flank of Soubise,

crushing him up towards Broglio, not otherwise! And has, partly by

accident, taken a position at Vellinghausen which infinitely puzzles

Broglio and Soubise, when they rush into junction at Soest (July 6th)

and study the thing, with their own eyes, for eight whole days, in

concert.' What continual reconnoitring, galloping about of high-plumed

gentlemen together or apart; what MEMOIR-ing, mutual consulting, beating

of brains, to little purpose, during those eight days!--

"Ferdinand stands in moory difficult ground, length of him about eight

miles, looking eastward; with his left at Vellinghausen and the Lippe;

centre of him is astride of the Ahse (centre partly, and right wing

wholly, are on the south side of Ahse), which is a branch of Lippe; and

in front, he has various little Hamlets, Kirch-Denkern [KIRCH-Denkern,

for there are three or four other Denkerns thereabouts], Scheidingen,

Wambeln and others; and his right wing is covered farther by a quaggy

brook, which runs into the above-said Ahse, and is a SUB-branch of

Lippe. At most of these Villages Ferdinand has thrown up something

of earthworks: there are bogs, rough places, woods; all are turned to

advantage. Ferdinand is in a strongish, but yet a dangerous position;

and will give difficulties, and does give endless dubieties, to these

high-plumed gentlemen galloping about with their spy-glasses for eight

days. One possibility they pretty soon discern in him: His left flank

rests on Lippe, yes; but his right flank is in the air, has nothing to

rest on;--here surely is some possibility for us? A strong Position,

that of his; but if driven out of it by any method, he has no retreat;

is tumbled back into the ANGLE where Ahse and Lippe meet, and into the

little Town of Hamm there, where his Magazine is. What a fate for him,

if we succeed!--

"Ferdinand, by the incessant reconnoitring and other symptoms, judges

what is coming; concludes he will be attacked in this posture of his;

and on the whole, what critics now reckon very wise and very courageous

of him, determines to stand his chance in it. The consultations of

Broglio and Soubise are a thing unique to look upon; spread over volumes

of Official Record, and about a volume and a half even of BOURCET, where

it is still almost amusing to read; [_Memoires Historiques_ (that is to

say, for most part, Selection of Official Papers) _sur la Guerre que les

Francais ont soutenue en Allemagne depuis 1757 jusqu'au 1762_: par

M. de Bourcet, Lieutenant-General des Armees du Roi (3 tomes, Paris,

1792);--worthily done; but occupied, two-thirds of it, with this

Vellinghausen and the paltry "Campaign of 1761"!] and ending in helpless

downbreak on both parts. Of strategic faculty nobody supposes they

had much, and nearly all of it is in Broglio; Soubise being strong in

Court-favor only. Exquisitely polite they both strive to be; and

under the exquisite politeness, what infirmities of temper, splenetic

suspicions, and in fact mutual hatred lay hidden, could never be

accurately known. 'Attack him, Sunday next; on the 13th!' so, at the

long last, both of them had said. And then, on more reflection, Broglio

afterwards: 'Or not till the 15th, M. le Prince; till I reconnoitre ye

and drive in his outposts?' 'M. le Marechal's will is always mine:

Tuesday, 15th, reconnoitre him, drive him in; be it so, then!' answers

Soubise, with extreme politeness,--but thinking in his own mind (or

thought to be thinking), 'Wants to do it himself, or to get the credit

of doing it, as in former cases; and bring me into disgrace!' Not quite

an insane notion either, on Soubise's part, say some who have looked

into the Broglio-Soubise Controversy;--which far be it from any of us,

at this or at any time, to do. Here are the facts that ensued.

"TUESDAY, JULY 15th, 1761, Broglio reconnoitred with intensity all day,

drove in all Ferdinand's outposts; and about six in the evening,

seeing hope of surprise, or spurred by some notion of doing the feat

by himself, suddenly burst into onslaught on Ferdinand's Position:

'Vellinghausen yonder, and the woody strengths about,--could not we get

hold of that; it would be so convenient to-morrow morning!' Granby and

the English are in camp about Vellinghausen; and are taken quite on the

sudden: but they drew out rapidly, in a state of bottled indignation,

and fought, all of them,--Pembroke's Brigade of Horse, Cavendish's

of Foot, BERG-SCHOTTEN, Maxwell's Brigade and the others, in a highly

satisfactory way,--'MIT UNBESCHREIBLICHER TAPFERKEIT,' says Mauvillon

on this occasion again. Broglio truly has burst out into enormous

cannonade, musketade and cavalry-work, in this part; and struggles at

it, almost four hours,--a furious, and especially a very noisy business,

charging, recharging through the woods there;--but, met in this manner,

finds he can make nothing of it; and about 10 at night, leaves off till

a new morning.

"Next morning, about 4, Broglio, having diligently warned Soubise

overnight, recommenced; again very fiercely, and with loud cannonading;

but with result worse than before. Ferdinand overnight, while Broglio

was warning Soubise, had considerably strengthened his left wing

here,--by detachments from the right or Anti-Soubise wing; judging,

with good foresight, how Soubise would act. And accordingly, while poor

Broglio kept storming forward with his best ability, and got always

hurled back again, Soubise took matters easy; 'had understood the hour

of attack to be' so-and-so, 'had understood' this and that; and on the

whole, except summoning or threatening, in the most languid way, one

outlying redoubt ('redoubt of Scheidingen') on Ferdinand's right wing,

did nothing, or next to nothing, for behoof of his Broglio. Who, hour

after hour, finds himself ever worse bested;--those Granby people

proving 'indescribable' once more [their Wutgenau also with his

Hanoverians NOT being absent, as they rather were last night];--and

about 10 in the morning gives up the bad job; and sets about retiring.

If retiring be now permissible; which it is not altogether. Ferdinand,

watching intently through his glass the now silent Broglio, discerns

'Some confusion in the Marechal yonder!'--and orders a general charge

of the left wing upon Broglio; which considerably quickened his retreat;

and broke it into flight, and distressful wreck and capture, in some

parts,--Regiment ROUGE, for one item, falling wholly, men, cannon, flags

and furniture, to that Maxwell and his Brigade.

"Ferdinand lost, by the indistinct accounts, 'from 1,500 to 2,000:'

Broglio's loss was 'above 5,000; 2,000 of them prisoners.' Soubise, for

his share, 'had of killed 24,'--O you laggard of a Soubise! [Mauvillon,

ii. 171-189; Tempelhof, v. 207-221; Bourcet, ii. 75 et seq. In

_Helden-Geschichte_ (vi. 770-782-792) the French Account, and the

English (or Allied), with LISTS, and the like. Slight LETTER from

Sir Robert Murray Keith to his Excellency Papa, now at Petersburg,

"Excellency first," as we used to define him, stands in the miserably

edited _Memoirs and Correspondence_ (London, 1849), i. 104-105; and may

tempt you to a reading; but alters nothing, adds little or nothing.

Sir R. fights here as a Colonel of Highlanders, but afterwards became

"Excellency second" of his name.] And it is a Battle lost to Choiseul's

grand Pair of Armies; a Campaign checked in mid volley; and nothing

but recriminations, courts-martial, shrieky jargonings,--and plain

incompatibility between the two Marechaux de France; so that they had to

part company, and go each his own road henceforth. Choiseul remonstrates

with them, urges, encourages; writes the 'admirablest Despatches;' to

no purpose. 'How ridiculous and humiliating would it be for us, if,

with Two Armies of such strength, we accomplished nothing, and the whole

Campaign were lost!' writes he once to them.

"Which was in fact the result arrived at; the two Generals parting

company for this Campaign (and indeed for all others); and each, in his

own way, proving futile. Soubise, with some 30,000, went gasconading

about, in the Westphalian, or extreme western parts; taking Embden (from

two Companies of Chelsea Pensioners; to whom he broke his word, poor old

souls;--to whom, and much more to the Populations there [LETTER FROM

A FRENCH PROTESTANT GENTLEMAN AT GRONINGEN; followed by confirmatory

LETTER FROM &c. &c. (copied into _Gentleman's Magazine_ for 1761), give

special details of the altogether ULTRA-Soltikof atrocities perpetrated

by Soubise's people (doubtless against his will) on the recalcitrant

or disaffected Peasants, on the &c. &c.]),--taking Embden, not taking

Bremen; and in fact doing nothing, except keep the Gazetteers in vain

noise: a Soubise not in force, by himself, to shake Ferdinand; and

who, it is remarked, now and formerly, always prefers to be at a

good distance from that Gentleman. Broglio, on the other hand, keeps

violently pulsing out, round Ferdinand's flanks; taking Wolfenbuttel

(Broglio's for two days), besieging Brunswick (for one day);-and,

in short, leaving, he too, the matter as he had found it. A man of

difficult, litigious temper, I should judge; but clearly has something

of generalship: 'does understand tactic, if strategy NOT,' said

everybody; 'while Soubise, in both capacities, is plain zero!'

[Excellency Stanley (see INFRA) to Pitt, "Paris, 30th July, 1761:" in

THACKERAY, ii. 561-562.] The end, however, was: next Winter, Broglio

got dismissed, in favor of Soubise;--rest from shrieky jargon having its

value to some of us; and 'hold of Hanover' being now plainly a matter

hopeless to France and us."

In this Battle a fine young Prince of Brunswick got killed; Erbprinz's

second Brother;--leading on a Regiment of BERG-SCHOTTEN, say the

accounts. [_"The Life of Prince Albert Henry_ [had lived only 19 years,

poor youth, not much of a "Life"!--but the account of his Education is

worth reading, from a respectable Eye-witness] _of Brunswick-Luneburg,

Brother to the Hereditary Prince; who so eminently &c. at Fellinghausen_

&c. &c. (London, Printed for &c. 1763). _Written originally in German

by the Rev. Mr. Hierusalem"_ (Father of the "Young Jerusalem" who

killed himself afterwards, and became, in a sense, Goethe's WERTHER

and SORROWS). Price, probably, Twopence).] Berg-Schotten, and English

generally, Pembroke's Horse, Cavendish's Brigade,--we have mentioned

their behavior; and how Maxwell's Brigade took one whole regiment

prisoners, in that final charge on Broglio. "What a glorious set of

fellows!" said the English people over their beer at home. Beer let us

fancy it; at the sign of THE MARQUIS OF GRANBY, which is now everywhere

prevalent and splendent;--the beer, we will hope, good. And as this is

a thing still said, both over beer and higher liquors, and perhaps

is liable to be too much insisted on, I will give, from a caudid

By-stander, who knows the matter well, what probably is a more solid

and circumstantially correct opinion. Speaking of Ferdinand's skill

of management, and of how very composite a kind his Army was, Major

Mauvillon has these words:--

"The first in rank," of Ferdinand's Force, "were the English; about

a fourth part of the whole Army. Braver troops, when on the field of

battle and under arms against the enemy, you will nowhere find in the

world: that is a truth;--and with that the sum of their military merits

ends. In the first place, their Infantry consists of such an unselected

hand-over-head miscellany of people, that it is highly difficult to

preserve among them even a shadow of good discipline,"--of MANNSZUCHT,

in regard to plunder, drinking and the like; does not mean KRIEGSZUCHT,

or drill. "Their Cavalry indeed is not so constituted; but a foolish

love for their horses makes them astonishingly plunderous of forage;

and thus they exhaust a district far faster in that respect than do the

Germans.

"Officers' Commissions among them are all had by purchase: from which

it follows that their Officers do not trouble their heads about the

service; and understand of it, very VERY few excepted, absolutely

nothing whatever [what a charming set of "Officers"!]--and this goes

from the Ensign up to the General. Their home-customs incline them to

the indulgences of life; and, nearly without exception, they all expect

to have ample and comfortable means of sleep. [Hear, hear!] This leads

them often into military negligences, which would sound incredible,

were they narrated to a soldier. To all this is added a quiet natural

arrogance (UEBERMUTH),"--very quiet, mostly unconscious, and as if

inborn and coming by discernment of mere facts,--"which tempts them to

despise the enemy as well as the danger; and as they very seldom think

of making any surprisal themselves, they generally take it for granted

that the enemy will as little.

"This arrogance, however, had furthermore a very bad consequence for

their relation to the rest of the Army. It is well known how much these

people despise all Foreigners. This of itself renders their co-operating

with Troops of other Nations very difficult. But in this case there

was the circumstance that, as the Army was in English pay, they felt a

strong tendency to regard their fellow-soldiers and copartners as a

sort of subordinate war-valets, who must be ready to put up with

anything:--which was far indeed from being the opinion of the others

concerned! The others had not the smallest notion of consenting to any

kind of inferior treatment or consideration in respect of them. To the

Hanoverians especially, from known political feelings, they were at

heart, for most part, specially indisposed; and this mode of thinking

was capable of leading to very dangerous outbreaks. The Hanoverians, a

dull steady people, brave as need be, but too slow for anything but foot

service, considered silently this War to be their War, and that all

the rest, English as well, were here on their [and Britannic Majesty's]

account.

"Think what difficulties Ferdinand's were, and what his merit in quietly

subduing them; while to the cursory observer they were invisible, and

nobody noticed them but himself!" [Mauvillon, ii. 270-272.]

Yes, doubtless. He needed to know his kinds of men; to regard

intensely the chemic affinities and natural properties, to keep his

phosphorescents his nitres and charcoals well apart; to get out of

these English what they were capable of giving him, namely, heavy

strokes,--and never ask them for what they had not: them or the others;

but treat each according to his kind. Just, candid, consummately

polite: an excellent manager of men, as well as of war-movements, though

Voltaire found him shockingly defective in ESPRIT. The English, I think,

he generally quartered by themselves; employed them oftenest under the

Hereditary Prince,--a man of swift execution and prone to strokes like

themselves. "Oftenest under the Erbprinz," says Mauvillon: "till, after

the Fight of Kloster Kampen, it began to be noticed that there was a

change in that respect; and the mess-rooms whispered, 'By accident or

not?'"--which shall remain mysterious to me. In Battle after Battle he

got the most unexceptionable sabring and charging from Lord Granby and

the difficult English element; and never was the least discord heard

in his Camp;--nor could even Sackville at Minden tempt him into a loud

word.

But enough of English soldiering, and battling with the French. For

about two months prior to this of Vellinghausen, and for more than two

months after, there is going on, by special Envoys between Pitt and

Choiseul, a lively Peace-Negotiation, which is of more concernment to

us than any Battle. "Congress at Augsburg" split upon formalities,

preliminaries, and never even tried to meet: but France and England are

actually busy. Each Country has sent its Envoy: the Sieur de Bussy, a

tricky gentleman, known here of old, is Choiseul's, whom Pitt is on his

guard against; "Mr. Hans Stanley," a lively, clear-sighted person, of

whom I could never hear elsewhere, is Pitt's at Paris: and it is in

that City between Choiseul and Stanley, with Pitt warily and loftily

presiding in the distance, that the main stress of the Negotiation lies.

Pitt is lofty, haughty, but very fine and noble; no King or Kaiser

could be more. Sincere, severe, though most soft-shining; high, earnest,

steady, like the stars. Artful Choiseul, again, flashes out in a

cheerily exuberant way; and Stanley's Despatches about Choiseul ("CE FOU

PLEIN D'ESPRIT," as Friedrich once christens him), about Choiseul and

the France then round him, and the effects of Vellinghausen in society

and the like,--are the liveliest reading one almost anywhere meets with

in that kind. [In THACKERAY, i. 505-579, and especially ii. 520-626, is

the Stanley-and-Pitt Correspondence: Stanley went "23d May;" returned

(got his passports for returning) "September 20th."] Choiseul frankly

admits that he has come to the worst: ready for concessions, but the

question is, What? Canada is gone, for instance; of Canada you

will allow us nothing: but our poor Fisher-people, toiling in the

Newfoundland waters, cannot they have a rock to dry their fish on; "Isle

of Miquelon, or the like?" "Not the breadth of a blanket,"--that is

Pitt's private expression, I believe; and for certain, that, in polite

official language, is his inexorable determination. "You shall go home

out of those Countries, Messieurs; America is to be English or YANkee,

not FRANGcee: that has turned out to be the Decree of Heaven; and we

will stand by that."

So that Choiseul soon satisfies himself it will be a hard bargain, this

with Pitt; and turns the more assiduously to the Majesty of Spain (Baby

Carlos, our old friend, who has sore grudges of his own against the

English, standing grievance of Campeachy Logwood, of bitter Naples

reminiscences, and enough else), turns to Baby Carlos, time after

time, with his pathetic "See, your Most Catholic Majesty!" And by rapid

degrees induces Most Catholic Majesty to go wholly into the adventure

with Most Christian Ditto;--and to say, at length, or to let Choiseul

say for him, by way of cautious first-step (15th July, a date worth

remembering, if the reader please): "Might not Most Catholic Majesty be

allowed perhaps to mediate a little in this Business?" "Most Catholic

Majesty!" answers Pitt, with a flash as if from the empyrean: "Who

sent for Most Catholic Majesty?"--and the matter catches fire, totally

explodes, and Spain too declares War; in what way is generally known.

Details are not permitted us. The Catastrophe we shall give afterwards,

and can here say only: FIRST, That old Earl Marischal, Friedrich's

Spanish Envoy, is a good deal in England, coming and going, at this

time,--on that interesting business of the Kintore Inheritance,

doubtless,--and has been beautifully treated. Been pardoned,

disattainted, permitted to inherit,--by the King on the instant, by the

Parliament so soon as possible; [King's Patent is of "30th April, 1760

[DATED 29th May, 1759], Act of Parliament to follow shortly;" "August

16th, 1760, Act having passed, is Marischal's public Presentation to

his Majesty (late Majesty);" Old GAZETTES in _Gentleman's Magazine_ (for

1760), xxx. 201, 392.]--and is of a naturally grateful turn. SECONDLY,

That in the profoundest secrecy, penetrable only to eyes near at hand

and that see in the dark, a celebrated Bourbon Family Compact was signed

(August 15th, 1761, ten days before the digging at Bunzelwitz began), of

which the first news to the Olympian man (conveyed by Marischal, as is

thought) was like--like news of dead Pythons pretending to revive upon

him. And THIRDLY, That, postponing the Catastrophe, and recommending

the above two dates, 15th JULY, 15th AUGUST, to careful readers, we must

hasten to Colberg for the present.

THIRD SIEGE OF COLBERG.

Readers had, some while ago, a flying Note, which we promised to take

up again; about Tottleben's procedures, and a Third Siege of Colberg

coming. Siege, we have chanced to see, there accordingly is, and

a Platen gone to help against it. Siege, after infinite delays and

haggles, has at length come,--uncommonly vivid during the final days

of Bunzelwitz;--and is, and has been, and continues to be, much in the

King's thoughts. Probably a matter of more concernment to him, before,

during and after Bunzelwitz (though the Pitt Catastrophe, going on

simultaneously, is still more important, if he knew it), than

anything else befalling in the distance. Let us now give a few farther

indications on that matter.

Truce between Werner and Tottleben expired May 12th; but for five

weeks more nothing practical followed; except diligent reinforcing,

revictualling and extraordinary fortifying of Colberg and its environs,

on the Prussian part,--Eugen of Wurtemberg, direct from Restock and his

Anti-Swede business, Eugen 12,000 strong, with a Werner and other such

among them, taking head charge outside the walls; old Heyde again as

Commandant within: while on the Russian part, under General Romanzow,

there is a most tortoise-like advance,--except that the tortoise carries

all his resources with him, and Romanzow's, multifarious and enormous,

are scattered over seas and lands, and need endless waiting for, in the

intervals of crawling.

This is the Romanzow who failed at Colherg once already (on the heel

of Zorndorf in 1758, if readers recollect); and is the more bound to be

successful now. From sea and from land, for five weeks, there is rumor

of a Romanzow in overwhelming force, and with intentions very furious

upon Colberg,--upon the outposts, under Werner, as first point. Five

weeks went, before anything of Romanzow was visible even to Werner (22d

June, at Coslin, forty miles to eastward); after which his advance (such

waiting for the ships, for the artilleries, the this and the that)

was slower than ever; and for about eight weeks more, he haggles along

through Coslin, through Corlin, Belgard again, flowing slowly forward

upon Werner's outposts, like a summer glacier with its rubbishes; or

like a slow lava-tide,--a great deal of smoke on each side of him (owing

to the Cossacks), as usual. Romanzow's progress is of the slowest;

and it is not till August 19th that he practically gets possession of

Corlin, Belgard and those outposts on the Persante River, and comes

within sight of Colberg and his problem. By which time, he finds Eugen

of Wurtemberg encamped and intrenched still ahead of him, still nearer

Colberg, and likely to give him what they call "DE LA TABLATURE," or

extremely difficult music to play.

"It was on AUGUST 19th [very eve of Friedrich's going into Bunzelwitz]

that Romanzow,--Werner, for the sake of those poor Towns he holds,

generally retiring without bombardment or utter conflagration,--had got

hold of Corlin and of the River Persante [with "Quetzin and Degow," if

anybody knew them, as his main posts there]: and was actually now within

sight of Colberg,--only 7 or 8 miles west of him, and a river more or

less in his way:--when, singular to see, Eugen of Wurtemberg has rooted

himself into the ground farther inward, environing Colberg with a

fortified Camp as with a second wall; and it will be a difficult problem

indeed!

"But Sea Armaments, Swedish-Russian, with endless siege-material and

red-hot balls, are finally at hand; and this pitiful Colberg must be

done, were it only by falling flat, on it, and smothering it by weight

of numbers and of red-hot iron. The day before yesterday, August 17th,

after such rumoring and such manoeuvring as there has been, six Russian

ships-of-war showed themselves in Colberg Roads, and three of them tried

some shooting on Heyde's workpeople, busy at a redoubt on the beach; but

hit nothing, and went away till Romanzow himself should come. Romanzow

come, there is utmost despatch; and within the eight days following,

the Russian ships, and then the Swedish as well, have all got to their

moorings,--12 sail of the line, with 42 more of the frigate and gunboat

kind, 54 ships in all;--and from August 24th, especially from August

28th, bombardment to the very uttermost is going on. [Tempelhof, v.

311.] Bombardment by every method, from sea and from land, continues

diligent for the next fortnight,--with little or no result; so diligent

are Eugen and veteran Heyde.

"SEPTEMBER 4th. The Swedish-Russian gunboats have been much shot down

by Heyde's batteries on the beach; no success had, owing to Heyde and

Eugen: paltry little Colberg as impossible as Bunzelwitz, it seems?

'Double our diligence, therefore!' That is Romanzow's and everybody's

sentiment here. Romanzow comes closer in, September 4th; besieges in

form, since not Colberg, Eugen's CAMP, or brazen wall of Colberg; and

there rises in and round this poor little Colberg (a 2,000 balls daily,

red-hot and other) such a volcano as attracts the eyes of all the world

thither.

"SEPTEMBER 12th. News yesterday of reinforcement, men and provender,

coming from Stettin; is to be at Treptow on the 13th. Werner, night of

the 11th, stealthily sets out to meet it, IT in the first place; then,

joined with it, to take by rearward a certain inconvenient battery,

which Romanzow is building to westward of us, out that way; to demolish

said battery, and be generally distressful to the rear of Romanzow. At

Treptow, after his difficult night's march, Werner is resting, secure

now of the adventure;--too contemptuous of his slow Russians, as

appeared! Who, for once, surprise HIM; and, at and round Treptow, next

morning, Werner finds himself suddenly in a most awkward predicament.

Werner, one of the rapidest and stormiest of skilful men, plunged

valiantly into the affair; would still have managed it, they say, had

not, in some sudden swoop,--charge, or something of critical or vital

nature,--rapid Werner's horse got shot, and fallen with him; whereby not

only the charge failed, but Werner himself was taken prisoner. A loss of

very great importance, and grievous to everybody: though, I believe,

the reinforcement and supply, for this time, got mostly through, and

the dangerous battery was got demolished by other means. [Seyfarth,

_Beylagen,_ iii. 238; Tempelhof, v. 314.] This is Romanzow's first item

of success, this of getting such a Werner snatched out of the game [and

sent to Petersburg instead as we shall hear]; and other items fell to

Romanzow thenceforth by the aid of time and hunger.

"In the way of storming, battering or otherwise capturing Eugen's Camp,

not to speak of Heyde's town, Romanzow finds, on trial after trial, that

he can do as good as nothing; and his unwieldy sea-comrades (equinoctial

gales coming on them, too) are equally worthless. September 19th [a week

after this of Werner, tenth day after Bunzelwitz had ended], Romanzow

made his fiercest attempt that way; fiercest and last: furious

extremely, from 2 in the morning onwards; had for some time hold of the

important 'Green Redoubt;' but was still more furiously battered and

bayoneted out again, with the loss of above 3,000 men; and tried that

no farther. Impossible by that method. But he can stand between the

Eugen-Heyde people and supplies; and by obstinacy hunger them out: this,

added to the fruitless bombardment, is now his more or less fruitful

industry.

"In the end of September, the effects of Bunzelwitz are felt: Platen,

after burning the Butturlin Magazine at Gostyn, has hastened hither; in

what style we know. Blaten arrives 25th September; cuts his way through

Romanzow into Eugen's Camp, raises Eugen to about 15,000; [Tempelhof, v.

350.] renders Eugen, not to speak of Heyde, more impossible than ever.

Butturlin did truly send reinforcements, a 10,000, a 12,000, 'As many as

you like, my Romanzow!' And, in the beginning of October, came rolling

thitherward bodily; hoping, they say, to make a Maxen of it upon those

Eugens and Platens: but after a fortnight's survey of them, found there

was not the least feasibility;--and that he himself must go home, on the

score of hunger. Which he did, November 2d; leaving Romanzow reinforced

at discretion [40,000, but with him too provisions are fallen low],

and the advice, 'Cut off their supplies: time and famine are our sole

chances here!' Butturlin's new Russians, endless thousands of them,

under Fermor and others, infesting the roads from Stettin, are a great

comfort to Romanzow. Nor could any Eugen--with his Platens, Thaddens,

and utmost expenditure of skill and of valor and endurance, which are

still memorable in soldier-annals, [_Tagebuch der Unternehmungen

des Platenschen Corps vom September bis November 1761_ (Seyfarth,

_Beylagen,_ iii. 32-76). _Bericht von der Unternehmungen des

Thaddenschen Corps vom Jenner bis zum December 1761_ (ibid.

77-147).]--suffice to convey provisions through that disastrous

Wilderness of distances and difficulties.

"From Stettin, which lies southwest, through Treptow Gollnow and other

wild little Prussian Towns is about 100 miles; from Landsberg south,

150: Friedrich himself is well-nigh 300 miles away; in Stettin alone is

succor, could we hold the intervening Country. But it is overrun with

Russians, more and ever more. A Country of swamps and moors, winter

darkness stealing over it,--illuminated by such a volcano as we see: a

very gloomy waste scene; and traits of stubborn human valor and military

virtue plentiful in it with utter hardship as a constant quantity;

details not permissible here only the main features and epochs, if they

could be indicated.

"The King is greatly interested for Colberg; sends orders to collect

from every quarter supplies at Stettin, and strain every nerve for the

relief of that important little Haven. Which is done by the diligent

Bevern, the collecting part; could only the conveying be accomplished.

But endless Russians are afield, Fermor with a 15,000 of them waylaying;

the conveyance is the difficulty." [_Bericht von den Unternehmungen

der Wurtembergischen Corps in Pommern, vom May 1761 bis December

1761_ (Seyfarth, _Beylagen,_ iii. 147-258). Tempelhof, v. 313-326.

_Helden-Geschichte,_ vi. 669-708.]

But now we must return to Bunzelwitz, and September 25th, in

Head-quarters there.

History of Friedrich II of Prussia — Volume 20 · 第 7 / 13 章