_Long Toms of Battery A, 7th 155mm Gun Battalion, III Corps Artillery,
were set up in the open 500 yards from White Beach 2 in the shadow of
the mountain range secured by the 4th Marines and the Army’s 305th
Infantry after heavy fighting._]
Captain Wilson organized and led the 17-man patrol which climbed
the slope in the face of the same continued enemy fire to seize the
critical high ground at Fonte and keep it.
A half century later, Colonel Fraser E. West recalled the engagement
at Fonte as bitter, close, and brisk. As a young officer, he commanded
Company G, and reinforced Wilson’s unit. West joined on Company F’s
flank, then reconnoitered to spot enemy positions and shared the night
in a common CP with Captain Wilson.
In late afternoon of the 25th, a platoon of four tanks of Company C, 3d
Tank Battalion, had made its way up to the Mount Tenjo Road and gone
into position facing the most evident Japanese strongpoints. At the
height of the battle by Wilson’s and West’s companies to hold their
positions, First Lieutenant Wilcie A. O’Bannon, executive officer
of Company F, managed to get down slope from his exposed position
and bring up two of these tanks. By use of telephones mounted in the
rear of the tanks to communicate with the Marines inside, Lieutenant
O’Bannon was able to describe targets for the tankers, as he positioned
them in support of Wilson’s and West’s Marines. West recalled the tanks
came up with a precious cargo of ammunition. He and volunteers stuffed
grenades in pockets, hung bandoleers over their shoulders, pocketed
clips, carried grenade boxes on their shoulders, and delivered them all
as they would birthday presents along the line to Companies G and F
and a remaining platoon of Company E. Major West was also able to use
a tank radio circuit to call in naval gunfire, and guarantee that the
terrain before him would be lit all night by star shells and punished
by high explosive naval gunfire.
On the morning of 26 July, 600 Japanese lay dead in front of the 2d
Battalion, 9th Marines positions. But the battle was not over. General
Turnage ordered the military crest of the reverse slope taken. There
would be other Japanese counterattacks, fighting would again be
hand-to-hand, but by 28 July, the capture of Fonte was in question
no longer. Companies E, F, and G took their objectives on the crest.
Lieutenant Colonel Cushman’s battalion in four murderous days had lost
62 men killed and 179 wounded.
It was not any easier for the 21st Marines with its hard fighting in
the morning of the 25th. Only by midafternoon did that regiment clear
the front in the center of the line. The 2d Battalion, 21st Marines,
had to deal with a similar pocket of die-hards as that which had held
up the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, on Fonte. Holed up in commanding
cave positions in the eastern draw of the Asan River, just up from
the beachhead, the Japanese were wiped out only after repeated Marine
attacks and close-in fighting. The official history of the campaign
noted that “every foot of ground that fell to Lieutenant Colonel
[Eustace R.] Smoak’s Marines was paid for in heavy casualties, and
every man available was needed in the assault....”
The 9th Marines under Colonel Craig made good progress on the 25th from
its morning jump-off and reached the day’s objective, a line running
generally along the course of a local river (the Sasa) by 0915. The 9th
Marines had taken even more ground than was planned. General Turnage
was then able to reposition the 9th Marines for the harder fighting
on the beleaguered left. The 2d Battalion pulled out of position to
reinforce the 3d Marines and the remaining two battalions spread out a
little further in position.
The determined counterattack that hit the 3d Marines on the night of
25-26 July was matched in intensity all across the 3d Division’s front.
It wasn’t long before there were enemy troops roaming the rear areas
as they slipped around the Marine perimeters and dodged down stream
valleys and ravines leading to the beaches.
Major Aplington, whose 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, now constituted the
only division infantry reserve, held positions in the hills on the left
in what had been a relatively quiet sector. Not for long, he recalled:
With the dark came heavy rain. Up on the line Marines huddled
under ponchos in their wet foxholes trying to figure out the
meaning of the obvious activity on the part of the opposing
Japanese. Around midnight there was enemy probing of the lines
of the 21st [Marines], and slopping over into those of the 9th
[Marines].... All was quiet in our circle of hills and we received
no notification when the probing increased in intensity or at 0400
when the enemy opened ... his attack.... My first inkling came at
about 0430 when my three companies on the hills erupted into fire
and called for mortar support. I talked to the company commanders
and asked what was going on to be told that there were Japanese all
around them ... the Japanese had been close. Three of my dead had
been killed by bayonet thrusts.
In the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, sector, Private Dale Fetzer, a dog
handler assigned with his black Labrador Retriever alerted Company C.
The dog, Skipper, who had been asleep in front of his handler’s foxhole
suddenly bolted upright, alerting Fetzer. Skipper’s nose was pointed up
and directly toward Mount Tenjo. “Get the lieutenant!” called handler
Fetzer, “They’re coming.”
At about 0400, the Japanese troops poured down the slopes in a frenzied
_banzai_ attack. Japanese troops had been sighted drinking during the
afternoon in the higher hills, and some of these attackers appeared
drunk. Marine artillery fire had immediately driven them to cover then,
but they apparently continued to prepare for the attack.
In the area of the 21st Marines, along a low ridge not far from the
critical Mount Tenjo Road, the human wave struck hard against the 3d
Battalion and the Japanese actually seized a machine gun which was
quickly recaptured by the Marines. The 3d Division was holding a front
of some 9,000 yards at the time, and it was thinnest from the right
of the 21st Marines to the left of the 9th Marines. Much of that line
was only outposted. The 3d Battalion, 21st Marines, held throughout.
Some of the raiders got through the weakly manned gap between the
battalions. They charged harum-scarum for the tanks, artillery, and
ammunition and supply dumps. The attack seemed scattered, however, and
unorganized. The fighting was fierce, nonetheless, and it shattered the
hastily erected Marine roadblock between the battalions.
Some of the attackers got through the lines all along the front. A
group of about 50 reached the division hospital. Doctors evacuated
the badly wounded, but the walking wounded joined with cooks, bakers,
stretcher bearers, and corpsmen to form the line that fought off the
attackers. One of the patients, Private First Class Michael Ryan,
“grabbed up the blanket covering me and ran out of the building without
another stitch on.” He had to run with a wounded foot through crossfire
to reach some safety.
Lieutenant Colonel George O. Van Orden (3d Division infantry training
officer), on orders from General Turnage, assembled two companies of
the 3d Pioneer Battalion to eliminate this threat. In three hours
the pioneers killed 33 of the assailants and lost three of their own
men. The 3d Medical Battalion had 20 of its men wounded, but only one
patient was hit and he was one of the defenders.
For many men in the furious and confused melees that broke out all over
the Marine positions, the experience of Corporal Charles E. Moore of
the 2d Platoon, Company E, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, wasn’t unique.
His outfit held a position about a quarter mile from Fonte Plateau. He
recalled:
We set up where a road made a sharp turn overlooking a draw. It
was the last stand of the second platoon. There were three attacks
that night and by the third there was nobody left to fight, so
they broke through. They came in droves throwing hand grenades and
hacked up some of our platoon. In the morning, I had only ten
rounds of ammunition left, half the clip for my BAR. I was holding
those rounds if I needed them to make a break for it. I had no
choice. Everybody was quiet, either dead or wounded. The Japanese
came in to take out their dead and wounded, and stepped on the edge
of my foxhole. I didn’t breath. They were milling around there
until dawn then they were gone.
As Lieutenant Colonel Cushman, evaluating the action later, said:
With the seizure of Fonte Hill, the capture of the beachhead
was completed. In the large picture, the defeat of the large
counterattack on the 26th by the many battalions of the 3d Division
who fought valiantly through the bloody night finished the Jap on
Guam.... What made the fighting for Fonte important was the fact
that [the advance to the north end of the island] could not take
place until it was seized.
The enemy attack failed in the south also, and in the south it was just
as much touch and go at times. The Japanese sailors on Orote were just
as determined as the soldiers at Fonte to drive the Americans from Guam.
[Sidebar (page 24): General Robert E. Cushman
[Illustration]
As a 29-year-old lieutenant colonel commanding the 2d Battalion, 9th
Marines, 3d Marine Division, on Guam, Robert E. Cushman, Jr., was
awarded the Navy Cross for extraordinary heroism during the period 21
July to 30 August 1944. The medal citation states in part:
When his battalion was ordered to seize and hold a strongly
organized and defended enemy strong-point which had been holding
up the advance for some days, Lieutenant Colonel Cushman directed
the attacks of his battalion and the repulse of numerous Japanese
counterattacks, fearlessly exposing himself to heavy hostile rifle,
machine gun and mortar fire in order to remain in the front lines
and obtain first hand knowledge of the enemy situation. Following
three days of bitter fighting culminating in a heavy Japanese
counterattack which pushed back the flank of his battalion, he
personally led a platoon into the gap and, placing it for defense,
repelled the hostile force. By his inspiring leadership, courage
and devotion to duty, he contributed materially to the success of
the mission with the annihilation of one enemy battalion and the
rout of another....
General Cushman became the 25th Commandant of the Marine Corps on 1
January 1972. Interestingly enough, he was succeeded four years later
by General Louis H. Wilson, Jr., who commanded a company in Cushman’s
2d Battalion, 9th Marines, on Guam.
]
[Sidebar (page 25): ‘Daring Tactics’ Gave Capt Wilson Medal of Honor
[Illustration]
Captain Louis Hugh Wilson, Jr.’s Medal of Honor citation reads as
follows: “For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of
his life above and beyond the call of duty as commanding officer of
a rifle company attached to the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, 3d Marine
Division, in action against enemy Japanese forces at Fonte Hill, Guam,
25-26 July 1944. Ordered to take that portion of the hill within his
zone of action, Captain Wilson initiated his attack in midafternoon,
pushed up the rugged, open terrain against terrific machine gun and
rifle fire for 300 yards and successfully captured the objective.
Promptly assuming command of other disorganized units and motorized
equipment in addition to his own company and one reinforcing platoon,
he organized his night defenses in the face of continuous hostile fire
and, although wounded three times during this 5-hour period, completed
his disposition of men and guns before retiring to the company command
post for medical attention. Shortly thereafter, when the enemy launched
the first of a series of savage counterattacks lasting all night, he
voluntarily rejoined his besieged units and repeatedly exposed himself
to the merciless hail of shrapnel and bullets, dashing 50 yards into
the open on one occasion to rescue a wounded Marine laying helpless
beyond the front lines. Fighting fiercely in hand-to-hand encounters,
he led his men in furiously waged battle for approximately 10 hours,
tenaciously holding his line and repelling the fanatically renewed
counter-thrusts until he succeeded in crushing the last efforts of the
hard-pressed Japanese early the following morning. Then organizing a
17-man patrol, he immediately advanced upon a strategic slope essential
to the security of his position and, boldly defying intense mortar,
machine gun and rifle fire which struck down 13 of his men, drove
relentlessly forward with the remnants of his patrol to seize the vital
ground. By his indomitable leadership, daring combat tactics, and valor
in the face of overwhelming odds, Captain Wilson succeeded in capturing
and holding the strategic high ground in his regimental sector, thereby
contributing essentially to the success of his regimental mission and
to the annihilation of 350 Japanese troops. His inspiring conduct
throughout the critical periods of this decisive action sustains and
enhances the highest traditions of the United States naval service.”
]
[Sidebar (page 26): The Colt .45-Caliber M1911A1 Pistol
The Colt M1911A1 pistol was standard issue to many Marine officers,
noncommissioned officers, and specialists not armed with either the M1
carbine or rifle during World War II. From 1911, this pistol served its
Marine owners as well as members of the other U.S. services armed with
it.
The first M1911 pistols were issued to the Marine Corps in 1912, and
shortly afterwards the Corps was able to field this pistol exclusively.
Although Colt manufactured more than 55,000 pistols by the time the
United States entered World War I, not enough were on hand to preclude
arming some units of the American Expeditionary Force with revolvers.
Subsequently, more than a half million M1911s were produced before
1926, when the M1911 was modified and the revised pistol now dubbed the
M1911A1.
These modifications included a shorter, and serrated, trigger; wider
sights; a contoured handgrip; and a longer grip safety. Approximately
1.8 million of the newer M1911A1s were produced and the M1911s also
were upgraded to meet these new specifications during World War II.
The advent of World War II also meant further changes for the pistol.
Among these was altering the finish from the common shiny blue-black to
a dull gray, in the process called “Parkerization,” which was designed
to give the pistol a nonreflective matte surface. Wartime M1911A1s also
sported checkered plastic grips instead of molded rubber.
Colt could not keep up with wartime demand, and the following firms
were licensed to produce the M1911A1: Remington Arms Company, North
American Arms Company Limited, Remington-Rand Company, Ithaca Gun
Company, Union Switch and Signal Company, and Singer Sewing Machine
Company. One curious note is that the Remington-Rand Company actually
outproduced Colt during the wartime years by approximately 500,000
pistols.
During the war, in its table of equipment, a Marine division
rated 1,707 pistols, but the actual number it had was in general
substantially higher; a tribute to the popularity of the M1911A1. A
number of Marine aviators, given the option, chose the .45-caliber Colt
over the .38-caliber Smith & Wesson “Victory” revolver.
--Second Lieutenant G. M. Anthony, USMC
]
_Orote_
The 22d Marines had driven up the coast from Agat in a series of
hard-fought clashes with stubborn enemy defenders. The 4th Marines
had swept up the slopes of Mount Alifan and secured the high ground
overlooking the beachhead. By the 25th, the brigade was in line across
the mouth of Orote Peninsula facing a formidable defensive line
in depth, anchored in swamps and low hillocks, concealed by heavy
undergrowth, and bristling with automatic weapons.
[Illustration: _Sherman mediums from the 3d Tank Battalion lumber up
the long incline from the Asan beachhead towards the scene of battle
around Fonte and X-Ray Ridges._
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 93640
]
The 77th Infantry Division had taken over the rest of the southern
beachhead, relieving the 4th Marines of its patrolling duties to the
south and in the hills to the west. The division’s artillery and a good
part of the III Corps’ big guns hammered the Japanese on Orote without
letup. Just in case of enemy air attack, the beach defenses from Agat
to Bangi Point were manned by the 9th Defense Battalion. There were
not too many Japanese planes in the sky, and so the antiaircraft
artillerymen could concentrate on firing across the water into the
southern flank of the enemy’s Orote positions. On Cabras Island, the
14th Defense Battalion moved into position where it could equally
provide direct flanking fire on the peninsula’s northern coast and
stand ready to elevate its guns to fire at enemy planes in the skies
above.
The 5,000 Japanese defenders on Orote took part in General Takashina’s
all-out counterattack and it began in the early morning hours of 26
July. The attackers stormed vigorously out of the concealing mangrove
swamp and the response was just as spirited. Here, as in the north,
there was evidence that some of the attackers had fortified themselves
with _sake_ and there were senseless actions by officers who attacked
the Marine tanks armed only with their _samurai_ swords. There were
deadly and professional attacks as well, with Marines bayoneted in
their foxholes. There was one attendant communications breakdown
obliging Captain Robert Frank, commanding officer of Company L, 22d
Marines, to remain on the front relaying artillery spots to the
regimental S-2 and thence to brigade artillery.
[Illustration: _Stretchers for wounded Marines lie scattered among the
bodies of Japanese dead in the wake of the attack on the 3d Division
hospital the evening of 25-26 July. Doctors, corpsmen, and wounded
Marines joined in the fight to repulse the enemy._]
The artillery response was intense and effective. The fire was “drawn
in closer and closer toward our front lines; 26,000 shells were thrown
into the pocket [of attackers] between midnight and 3 a.m.” The
screaming attacks came at 1230, then again at 0130, and at 0300. At
daylight the muddy ground in front of the Marine positions was slick
with blood. More than 400 Japanese bodies were sprawled in the driving
rain.
General Shepherd, secure in the knowledge that his frontline troops,
4th Marines on the left, 22d Marines on the right, had withstood
the night’s _banzai_ attacks in good order, directed an attack to
be launched at 0730. But first there would be another artillery
preparation. At daybreak it opened with the 77th Infantry Division’s
105s and 155s, the brigade’s 75s, the defense battalion’s 90s, and
whatever guns the 12th Marines could spare. It was one of the more
intense preparations of the campaign. Major Charles L. Davis, S-3
of 77th Division Artillery, recalled how, on the request of General
Shepherd, he had turned the heavy 155mm battalion and two 105mm
battalions around to face Orote to soften the Japanese positions.
The 155s and 105s battered well-prepared positions, and ripped the
covering, protection, and camouflage from bunkers and trenches. Pieces
of men soon hung in trees. Marines saw that this fire counted and made
it a point to return to congratulate and thank the 77th’s artillery
section leaders.
The advance, when it came, only went 100 yards before it was addressed
by a blistering front of machine gun and small arms fire. Enemy
artillery fire came falling almost simultaneously with the cessation of
American support, leaving the Marines to think the fire was from their
own guns, a favorite Japanese ruse. For a moment there, the Japanese
return fire on the 22d Marines disorganized its forward move. It was
about 0815 before the attack was on again in full force, spearheaded by
Marine and Army tanks.
Immediately to the front of the 22d Marines was the infernal mangrove
swamp from where the _banzai_ attack had been mounted the night before.
It was still manned heavily by Japanese, was dense, and the only means
of penetrating it was by a 200-yard-long corridor along the regimental
boundary which was covered by Japanese enfilade fire and could only be
navigated with the cover of tanks. The armor gunners and commanders
directed their fire just over the head of prone Marines and into the
gunports of enemy pillboxes. By 1245, Colonel Schneider’s regiment
had worked its way through all bottlenecks past the mangrove swamps,
destroying bunkers with demolitions and flamethrowers. The 4th’s
assault battalions kept pace with this advance, finding somewhat easier
terrain but just as determined defenders. By evening the brigade had
advanced 1,500 yards from its jump-off line. Both regiments, weary,
wary, and waiting, dug in with an all-around defense.
Again, there was a heavy pre-attack barrage on the 27th and the Marines
were stopped again before they’d gone 100 yards. The 3d Battalion, 4th
Marines, facing a well-defended ridge, a coconut grove, and a sinister
clearing, was nearing the sentimental and tactically important goals
of the old Marine barracks, its rifle range, and the runways of Orote
airfield. With heavy tank support, the 22d Marines surged forward past
the initial obstacles and by afternoon had reached positions well
beyond the morning’s battles. On the left of the 4th Marines, where
resistance was lighter, the assault was led by tanks that beat down
the brush. While inspecting positions there, Lieutenant Colonel Samuel
D. Puller, the 4th’s executive officer and brother of famed Lieutenant
Colonel Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller, was killed by a sniper.
By mid-afternoon, the 4th Marines’ assault elements broke out of the
grove just short of the rifle range, only to stall in a new complex at
dug-in defenses and minefields. Strangely, and yet not unusual in the
climax of a losing engagement, a Japanese officer emerged to brandish
his sword at a tank. It was easier than ritual suicide.
The horror of the American guns again must have been too much for the
Japanese defending the immediate front. Surprisingly, they just cut and
ran from their strong, well-defended positions. The elated Marines, who
did not care why the enemy ran--just that they ran--now dug in only 300
yards from the prized targets. Their capture would wait for tomorrow,
28 July. The Japanese were now squeezed into the last quadrant of
the peninsula. All of their strongly entrenched defenses had failed
to hold. The Orote airfield, the old Marine barracks, the old parade
ground which had not felt an American boot since 10 December 1941, were
all about to be retrieved.
General Shepherd sounded a great reveille on 28 July for what was left
of the Japanese naval defenders: a 45-minute air strike and a 30-minute
naval gunfire bombardment, joined by whatever guns the 77th Division,
brigade, and antiaircraft battalions could muster. At 0830 the brigade
would attack for Orote airfield.
[Illustration: CAPTURE OF OROTE PENINSULA