aggressive policy in her favor. If the Sick Man could get out of bed
only with assistance, Germany was anxious to help him; and the Turk
vastly preferred an alliance with a Power which was eager to make him
well to one with Powers almost afraid to keep him alive. The Turks
wished a capable government, a good army, a State deserving of
independence, and were overjoyed to find Germany ready and desirous to
foster this ambition. Indeed, as a member of the Pan-Germanic
Confederation, the Turk must be strong enough to hold Constantinople and
the Bagdad Railway in the event of a general European war, without
depending upon Germany for more than assistance, supplies, and advice.
Germany and Austria, menaced on both sides at home, would not be able to
take the risks of sending troops to the Near East, and the Turk would
have to be strong enough to keep at bay such forces as it seemed likely
Russia would be able to spare from the battlefields of northern Europe.
[Sidenote: Pan-Islam.]
Germany was equally ready to have the Turk gratify his imperialist and
religious ambitions. Pan-Islam would destroy the political control of
England and France in northern Africa and in Egypt. It might even
overturn the British Empire in India. This would be the greatest
possible service any one could render Germany, and it might be one which
Germany could accomplish in no other way. If the Triple Entente was the
greatest foe of Pan-Islamism, Pan-Germanism should be its greatest
friend. Where ambition and interest coincide, co-operation is simple.
[Sidenote: Reorganization of Turkey.]
In complete accord, therefore, the Germans and the Turks undertook the
reorganization of Turkey above five years or more ago. They saw with
clear vision the real truth about Turkey. With engaging candor they laid
the blame for the deficiencies of Turkish government upon England and
France and declared them the work of intention. Turkey, they saw, was
not a nation in the European sense of the word; it was not even a single
race. It was not a geographical unit by any means, but a series of
districts on the whole geographically disconnected. Far from being an
economic unit with a single interest vital to all its inhabitants, it
produced nothing essential to the outside world which its inhabitants
could depend upon exchanging for European manufactured goods.
[Sidenote: Turkey's economic interests.]
Its economic interests were potential rather than real; its trade, the
result of its strategic position rather than of the interests and the
capacity of its population. Normally and naturally the Turk should be a
middleman, a distributor rather than a producer. He was placed in
control of the continental roads between Asia and Central Europe, and
was able to control the overland trade as soon as it emerged from the
Caucasus or the Persian Gulf, and maintain that control until the
continental highway passed into the defiles of the Balkans beyond
Adrianople. Constantinople itself, controlling the narrow passage which
formed the exit of the Black Sea, was in a position to foster or hinder
the entire trade of southern Russia with the rest of the world. In fact,
it was impossible to deny, and the Germans thoroughly well understood
it, that the trade of the East with Europe and the trade of Russia with
the rest of the world might pass through Turkey, but was not likely to
stay there.
[Sidenote: Turkey's important strategic position.]
In this important strategic position, economically valuable to others
but not to its inhabitants, had been collected a peculiar and
extraordinary conglomeration of races, creeds, and interests; few of
which had much in common, and all of which cherished for each other
antipathies and jealousies almost as old as history. The racial problem
of Turkey would be less difficult if the races were only located side by
side in solid masses. With few exceptions the races interpenetrate one
another to a remarkable extent and the Turk himself is numerically in
the majority in comparatively few districts of Asia Minor, where the
bulk of the Turkish population lives, and in scarcely any part of
European Turkey. The Turks are literally overlords, a ruling class.
[Sidenote: Turkey's weak political fabric.]
The Turk has governed this vast territory and this conglomeration of
races and religions by a peculiarly weak political fabric which seemed
in the nineteenth century to combine in one structure all the
disadvantages of centralization, and all those of decentralization.
Subject peoples have been ruled by a combination of military, civil, and
religious authority which has been dependent in the long run for its
support on the army. However, had the subject peoples hated each other
less cordially, had they been more capable of organization and willing
to compromise, they might have ended the Turkish rule decades ago, army
or no army. Some observers, indeed, have thought the Turkish Government
an artificial sham kept alive by France and England for their own
purposes. Whatever reasons were to be given, the Germans and the Turks
saw that Turkey as a nation and Turkey as a state had been, both of
them, practically non-existent. Both had been names, not realities.
Turkey had appeared on the European maps. A series of so-called
statesmen had taken European bribes in Constantinople; numerous
incompetent and venal officials had robbed the populace with the help of
the soldiers in the provinces, and this Government plus the army was
Turkey. Turkey had, indeed, been sick, but that particular kind of
illness, the Turks thought, could be cured; and the Germans agreed with
them.
[Sidenote: Germany's willingness to assist Turkey.]
[Sidenote: Germany's influence in Turkey.]
[Sidenote: Reasons for Turkey's joining Germany.]
We must not forget as observers the exceeding importance of German
willingness to assist the ambitions of the educated Turks for
self-government and for independence from European influence. The
English and French control of Turkey was fortuitous and artificial and
depended solely upon the control of a little group of men in
Constantinople. German influence in Turkey has deep and fundamental
roots in a large and significant part of the Turkish population and
appeals to their best and highest impulses. We have here in the last
analysis the reasons why Turkey has joined Germany in the war. The
enlightened Turks see in Pan-Germanism a democratic Turkey with
constitutional self-government, a Turkey developing its own resources, a
Turkey gradually freeing itself from the fetters of European alliances
and becoming gradually but certainly strong enough to take its place in
the Pan-Germanic chain as a state of worth, integrity, and importance.
They see in the victory of Pan-Germanism the effective promise of the
realization of such ideals. They see in the defeat of Pan-Germanism
political and national death, the annexation of Turkey by its enemies,
and the subjection of the Turks to the rule of the Infidel. For these
reasons they joined Germany in the first place. For these deep,
fundamental reasons they hold staunchly to their friend. We shall be
guilty of quibbling and of shortsightedness if we look for an
explanation of Turkish policy in the seizure of warships and the breach
of treaties.
[Sidenote: Reorganization of Turkey.]
The reorganization of Turkey was duly observed by the Triple Entente and
its purpose thoroughly well understood. Their opposition to it was
prompt, and Italy attempted by the Tripolitan War to rob the Turk of one
of his distant provinces. Having seized Tripoli with the consent of the
Triple Entente, Italy then changed sides, returned to the Triple
Alliance and took Tripoli with her. The result was a prompt reversal of
the strategic situation in the Eastern Mediterranean and placed England
and France in such danger that they saw the moment had probably come
when it would be positively to their advantage to gratify Russia's
ambition and allow her to seize Constantinople. The Tripolitan War
suspended the sword of Damocles over the Turk's head.
[Sidenote: The Balkan War.]
[Sidenote: The loss of Macedonia.]
The Balkan War threatened for a time to annihilate him. The prompt aid
of Austria and Germany as stout representatives in the international
conclave, the mobilization of the Austrian army, the knowledge that
Germany was ready to mobilize, saved the Turk. The ambitions of Bulgaria
brought her over to the side of the Triple Alliance, which was more than
ready to assist her in dominating the Balkans. The second war cost
Bulgaria dear but gave back to the Turk Adrianople. Macedonia, however,
was lost entirely, and much of Thrace, with Salonika, the key of the
AEgean, was also lost and fell into the hands of the Turk's enemy,
Greece.
[Sidenote: Little likelihood of attack on Constantinople.]
The reorganized state was now undeniably in great peril; and the
probability of an outbreak of a European war in the near future, the
knowledge that the Turk must himself defend Constantinople and the
Bagdad Railway, urged the Germans and the Turks to great efforts in
reorganizing the army and providing equipment. The fleet also received
attention; two battleships were building in England and another was
purchased from one of the South American states. There would this time
be no escape. The death sentence had been passed upon the Turk, and if
he waited for his enemies to gather and descend upon him defense would
be problematical. It was, of course, realized that in the long run
Germany would save Turkey by battles won in France or in Poland, and
also that German defeats in Europe would in the long run spell the
downfall of Turkey whatever the Turk did. It was, therefore, advisable
to postpone action as long as possible. While Russia was exerting
herself to the utmost to mobilize an army in Poland, there was small
likelihood of an attack on Constantinople, and the Turk might well
remain neutral, equip and organize the army, acquire supplies, and
choose the moment to take the offensive.
[Sidenote: German cruisers at Constantinople.]
England, on the outbreak of the war, seized the two battleships building
in England, and, therefore, weakened the Turkish strength in the Black
Sea. The deficiency was supplied by sending two German cruisers to
Constantinople and selling them to the Turkish Government. Some weeks
ago the Germans judged that the time had come when the Turk must openly
join in the war, send his troops to the frontier in order to hold the
invader as far as possible from Constantinople. Indeed, action at this
time might allow the Turk to accomplish results of the utmost
importance. Those who see simply the fact that Russia could easily
overwhelm the Turk standing alone, that the Balkan States united might
also dispose of him, entirely fail to grasp the possibilities before the
Turk at the present moment when Russia is extremely busy in the North,
when the Balkan States seem hopelessly divided, and when Italy is
maintaining with determination her neutrality.
[Sidenote: Closing of the Black Sea by Turkey.]
[Sidenote: Enormous value of oil supplies in the Black Sea District.]
The most important thing the Turk has done for Germany has been the
closing of the Black Sea. The sowing of a few mines in the Straits
promptly put an end to Russian trade from the Black Sea and dealt
southern Russia a great blow commercially. Germany thus struck at
England, because a large part of the English food supply has normally
come from the Black Sea district, and the desire to protect the grain
ships through the Mediterranean has been one of England's chief reasons
for maintaining control of that sea. So large were these supplies
normally that England has had considerable difficulty in replacing them
and is destined soon to experience greater difficulty in furnishing a
supply equivalent in volume and accessibility. The Black Sea district
also has large oil supplies which would be of enormous value to England
and France, now that the extensive use of the automobile in warfare has
made gasolene a supply second in importance only to powder and food. If
the Turkish navy, augmented by the German cruisers, can dispose of the
Russian ships in the Black Sea, and this seems not improbable, the Turk
might annex for Germany this supply of oil. That would be a stroke of
the utmost consequence.
[Sidenote: Isolation of Russia.]
[Sidenote: Importance of Turkey to Germany.]
Closing the Black Sea by the Turk, plus the closing of the Baltic by the
German fleet in the North Sea, would also accomplish another extremely
important result, the absolute and complete isolation of Russia from
contact with all parts of the world except Germany, Austria, and Turkey.
The question has often arisen as to the ability of Germany to prolong
the war in the face of her inability to export goods to her usual
customers. The complete cessation of manufacture in Germany would sooner
or later bankrupt the country and bring her to her knees. The Germans
point out that the isolation of Russia will have precisely the same
effect on that country unless Russia can find some place where her raw
products can be exchanged for the manufactured goods which are much more
necessary in warfare than the crude products which she always has to
sell. The experience of the past has proved again and again that
belligerent countries persistently trade with one another when it is
profitable. The Germans expect to sell their manufactured goods in
Russia in exchange for the raw materials which Russia produces, just as
long as their fleet holds the mouth of the Baltic and the Turk controls
Constantinople. A brisk trade between Germany, Austria, and Russia is
already reported and if it attains the proportions the Germans expect,
their commercial problem will have been largely solved. But its
continued solution will depend upon the maintaining of Turkey in
Constantinople. If these considerations are as important as the
Pan-Germanists have usually claimed, it will be obvious that the
adhesion of the Turk has exceeding importance for Germany and had long
been arranged in advance.
[Sidenote: Control of the Suez Canal vital to Great Britain.]
The possibilities before the Turkish army, well equipped with modern
munitions of war and capably officered by Germans, have been by no means
forgotten. The great objective of Pan-Germanism is not in Europe but in
Asia and Africa. The defense of the English and French dominions in both
will have to be made in Europe. The strength of the German army, the
size of the German fleet, would prevent the English and French from
dissipating their forces over the vast territory which they claim to
control. The experienced troops in India, in Egypt, and in Morocco were
shipped to France upon the outbreak of the war exactly as the Germans
expected and hoped. Their places were filled by less experienced
regiments from France, England, and the English colonies. Egypt and the
Suez Canal, India, and the great defenses would not be so strongly held.
The Turk occupied a position flanking Persia and a position flanking
Egypt. A strong, well-trained Turkish army might conceivably capture
either or both. Assistance from within might well be expected in both,
and victory in either would exert a moral effect upon the war in Europe
which would be of the utmost importance. A few hours' possession of the
Suez Canal, furthermore, would allow the Germans to obstruct it and
effectually block the approach of England to Australia and India except
by the long road around Africa. Conceivably this might interfere
seriously with the English food supplies from Australia and New Zealand,
particularly with the supplies of meat from the latter. This would be
more than usually important in view of the deficiency of meat supplies
in the United States and Canada, and the length of time necessary to
procure them from the Argentine Republic. It is by these blows at the
food supply that the Germans expect to make the greatest impression upon
England. Short of actual invasion, the stoppage of supplies is the only
method by which the Germans can inflict suffering upon England.
[Sidenote: Bulgaria ally of Germany.]
[Sidenote: All Balkan states weakened by Balkan War.]
No one in Berlin or Constantinople has forgotten the existence of the
Balkans. Servian enmity, Greek hatred for the Turk, are only too
obvious; Bulgaria is believed to be entirely faithful to the German
interests; Roumania has never been very trustworthy, and has at times
been an ally of both the coalitions in Europe. The ability of the Turk,
of course, to hold Constantinople and above all to take the offensive
would depend upon the continued neutrality or alliance of the Balkan
States. Combined, they are amply strong enough to overrun Turkey in
Europe and probably to invade Asia Minor in force. All the Balkan States
except Roumania--which is hardly a Balkan State--were very much weakened
in men and in resources by the late Balkan wars, and will probably have
considerable difficulty in obtaining any quantity of supplies from
foreign countries, though we are told of large purchases by the Greeks
in the United States. The fact, however, that the Turk has taken the
offensive against Egypt and Persia makes it extremely probable that the
Balkan hatreds have offset each other. Bulgaria's existence probably
depends upon Austrian protection. Roumania is probably afraid to take
the field with Bulgaria, Turkey, Russia, and Austria against her, while
the Greeks and Servians have still to recover from the recent wars. It
is probable, therefore, that, Bulgaria and Roumania being neutral,
Servia at war with Austria, Turkey can take from Greece Salonika and
possibly Macedonia. Should the war in Europe progress favorably for
Germany, the attitude of the Balkan States toward Germany would be
influenced and a scramble would ensue to join the victor, which would
probably result in the extinction of Servia and Greece and the
strengthening of Bulgaria and Turkey. Naturally, the Turk would retake
the islands in the AEgean Sea which are now in Italy's hands.
[Sidenote: Turkey's position if Germany wins in Europe.]
Let us suppose that all goes as they hope: that the Germans win in
Europe; that the Turks and Bulgarians take control of the Balkans; that
the Russians are excluded from Persia, and the English from Egypt. The
victorious Turkish army is then in a position to advance along the
Persian Gulf road upon India, and would assail India at her weakest
point, outflanking the great defenses at Quetta which have been
developed primarily against Russia.
[Sidenote: Possibilities of Pan-Islam.]
We must not forget to enumerate, among the possibilities, Pan-Islam.
Success by the Turks in Egypt or Persia would undoubtedly give an
impulse to Pan-Islam which might put all the fanatical enthusiasm of the
Mohammedans into a vast uprising which might sweep the French and
English out of northern Africa and India. The Sultan of Turkey is the
official head of the Mohammedan religion. His orders Moslems are all
bound to obey. At present the Mohammedans in the English and French
possessions, who are, of course, under English and French influence, are
claiming that the acts of the Sultan are not really his, but those of
German officers; and the reports at the time of writing indicate that at
the present moment the order from Constantinople for a holy war will
probably not be regarded or obeyed. But a victory by Turkish arms would
probably instantly change the situation and might loose the pent-up
fanaticism of the most intensely emotional of the Oriental races. Here
is another weapon in the German arsenal whose use will depend upon the
cooperation of the Turk.
[Sidenote: Key of situation is Constantinople.]
It should now be evident that there is much to be said for the view that
the key to the present situation is Constantinople. We are dealing with
world politics, with a world war which is being fought on the
battlefields of Europe; but we are dealing with a world war whose
results are not expected to develop in Europe proper. The key to this
situation lies in Constantinople, and the Turk holds it.
* * * * *
The outbreak of the Great War found the British navy in a high state of
preparedness, and so preponderant in number of vessels and in weight of
guns that the German Grand Fleet as a whole was content to remain behind
the walls of Helgoland. Squadrons were sent out, however, to attack
isolated British ships, and on August 28 the first naval battle of the
war occurred in the Bight of Helgoland. Here British and German cruisers
engaged in a struggle in which the honors were for a time even. The
arrival of British dreadnoughts quickly turned the scale, and the German
ships fled to the safety of their harbor. The Germans lost four large
ships, while the British fleet lost none.
The German navy was revenged in November 3, when a fleet of warships met
and sunk three British cruisers off the Coronel. On December 9, however,
a British fleet, after a search of many days, came up with and sank
three German cruisers, and severely damaged two others in the Battle of
Falkland Islands.
THE FALKLAND SEA FIGHT
A. N. HILDITCH
Battle Sketches by A. N. Hilditch, Oxford University Press.
[Sidenote: The Falkland Islands.]
In 1592, John Davis, the arctic explorer, after whom the strait between
Greenland and the North American mainland is named, made an attempt, in
company with Thomas Cavendish, to find a new route to Asia by the
Straits of Magellan. Differences arose between the two leaders. One was
an explorer: the other had a tendency towards freebooting. They parted
off the coast of Patagonia. Davis, driven out of his course by stormy
weather, found himself among a cluster of unknown and uninhabited
islands, some three hundred miles east of the Straits of Magellan. This
group, after many changes and vicissitudes, passed finally into the
hands of Great Britain, and became known as the Falkland Islands.
[Sidenote: Climate surface, and vegetation.]
They consist of two large islands and of about one hundred islets,
rocks, and sandbanks. The fragments of many wrecks testify to the
dangers of navigation, though masses of giant seaweed act as buoys for
many of the rocks. So numerous are the penguins, thronging in battalions
the smaller islands and the inland lagoons, that the governor of the
colony is nicknamed King of the Penguins. As New Zealand is said to be
the most English of British possessions, the Falklands may perhaps be
appropriately termed the most Scottish. Their general appearance
resembles that of the Outer Hebrides. Of the population, a large
proportion are of Scottish extraction. The climate is not unlike that of
Scotland. The winters are misty and rainy, but not excessively cold. So
violent are the winds that it is said to be impossible to play tennis or
croquet, unless walls are erected as shelter, while cabbages grown in
the kitchen-gardens of the shepherds, the only cultivated ground, are at
times uprooted and scattered like straw. The surface, much of which is
bogland, is in some parts mountainous, and is generally wild and rugged.
Small streams and shallow freshwater tarns abound. A natural curiosity,
regarded with great wonder, exists in 'stone-rivers'; long, glistening
lines of quartzite rock debris, which, without the aid of water, slide
gradually to lower levels. There are no roads. Innumerable sheep, the
familiar Cheviots and Southdowns, graze upon the wild scurvy-grass and
sorrel. The colony is destitute of trees, and possesses but few shrubs.
The one tree that the Islands can boast, an object of much care and
curiosity, stands in the Governor's garden. The seat of government, and
the only town, is Port Stanley, with a population of about 950. Its
general aspect recalls a small town of the western highlands of
Scotland. Many of the houses, square, white-washed, and grey-slated,
possess small greenhouse-porches, gay with fuchsias and pelargoniums, in
pleasing contrast to the prevailing barrenness. A small cathedral,
Christ Church, and an imposing barracks, generally occupied by a company
of marines, stand in the midst of the town. The Government House might
be taken for an Orkney or Shetland manse.
[Sidenote: Government.]
[Sidenote: Prosperity of the colony.]