LENS
_March 17th, 1917._ _July 4th, 1917._
After relief at Gommecourt we spent two days at Souastre, and then
marched via Bayencourt and Courcelles-au-Bois to Contay, where we
arrived on March 23rd. The roads for much of this journey were in an
appalling mess, partly as a result of constant shelling, and partly
through being cut up by the masses of transport which had passed over
them during the recent wet weather either in following up the
retreating enemy or in withdrawing to back areas. Vehicles were often
up to the axle in mud, whilst bicycles gave an immense amount of
trouble, and this was not the only occasion on which we found it far
preferable to foot-slog, even with heavy packs, than to be Signallers
with bicycles, which practically had to be carried. Loaded with pack
and other paraphernalia, the heavy army pattern bicycle is not a
lovable companion, except on a more or less perfect road. A really
first-class exhibition of bicycle manoeuvring was given during the
move by Pvte. Bunce, who always seemed to be in trouble, and was a
source of much amusement to his fellow Signallers. We stayed one night
at Contay, moving the following day to Bertangles, and on March 25th
to Revelles, a delightful village about seven miles West of Amiens. We
were taken through Amiens itself in motor 'buses, which picked us up
just North of the town, and deposited us on the other side, leaving us
to finish the journey on foot.
On passing through one village during this backward march we saw some
men wearing Sherwood Forester badges. They turned out to be men of the
2/8th Battalion, and proved the correctness of rumours we had
recently heard that that Battalion was actually in France. One of the
2/8th men accosted a fellow man of our Battalion, as he passed, with
the remark "Who are you?" "1/8th" was the reply, "Who are you?"
"2/8th"--"Right", said our friend--we believe a Signaller--"You can
tell your mother you've seen some real soldiers now!"
We were supposed to entrain for the North almost at once, but as five
or six other Divisions were being moved besides ourselves it was not
surprising that trains were running a day or two late, so we were able
to have a short rest at Revelles, which was much enjoyed, especially
as we were able to make trips to Amiens, which at that time had only
been slightly damaged by bombs, and was full of life. The chief
centres of attraction were the Hotel Godbert, The Savoy, Charlie's
Bar, and the Café du Cathédral.
Eventually we entrained at Bacouel Station in the afternoon of March
28th, the entrainment being one of the most expeditious ever carried
out by the Battalion. Not so, however, the journey! Times without
number we came to a stop with a succession of jerks, not on account of
signals--indeed it would appear that few, if any, existed--but because
other trains were in front. During a tedious night of such progress,
we passed through Abbeville, Boulogne, Calais and St. Omer, and
arrived about 9.0 a.m. on March 29th, at Hazebrouck. Being told there
by a French Railway Official that the train would stop for 15 minutes,
most of the Officers dashed for the buffet on the opposite platform
and ordered "Omelettes et café." As one might have imagined, the train
began to move without warning just as breakfast was started. There was
a wild dash, but all to no purpose, for the train was well under way.
By the best of good luck, however, a supply train was found, which
apparently was going in the same direction, though the guard and
driver appeared to have different views on the subject, which led to a
decidedly heated argument between them. At any rate our party boarded
the train and fortunately found it brought them very shortly to
Berguette Station, where the rest of the Battalion were just
detraining.
The Adjutant's duty of seeing the Battalion safely across the railway,
near the station, was indeed a pleasant one, and less fortunate
members of the Battalion have accused him of carrying on in an
unseemly manner with the fair keeper of the level crossing. We have
his assurance, however, that though he felt proud indeed at having
such a charming young lady by his side, his behaviour was beyond
reproach! A few hours' march brought us to Westrehem, where we found
most comfortable billets, and were welcomed and treated in the most
cordial manner by all.
This move brought us into the First Army (General Horne), of which we
were now to form part for many months, and into the II Corps, and
though we only remained in this Corps for a few days the Commander,
Lieut.-General Sir C. Jacob, lost no time in coming to make our
acquaintance, having all the Officers paraded to meet him at the
School at Westrehem, two days after our arrival.
We spent about a fortnight there refitting and training, the most
important part of the latter being practice in the new Company and
Platoon formations for attack, in which much attention was paid to the
question of the numbers and positions of the personnel attached to
Company and Platoon Headquarters. Practice advances were also carried
out with these formations behind a creeping barrage represented by
flags and drums. Outposts and advance guards were practised, as well
as tactical open warfare schemes, with Officers and N.C.O.'s, and
firing was carried out on a range near the village. One day was
devoted to a Divisional Route March, in which every unit in the
Division took part. It was carried out as a tactical scheme, the
Division supposed to be pursuing a retreating enemy, and the 8th
Battalion forming part of the Advance Guard.
On the recreational side, football was the chief feature, and several
very interesting matches were played, in one of which the 7th
Battalion Officers got their revenge by beating us three--nil at
Nédonchelle. Westrehem was also the venu of a Rugby football match,
between a team from the 6th and 8th Battalions, and one from the 5th
and Machine Gun Company, which ended after a hard fight in a draw.
Padre Uthwatt, who had recently joined us, did his best to try and
organise amusements, and the Divisional Cinema came over and gave one
or two shows. There was small attraction in the village except one or
two shops and estaminets, but you could get anything from chewing gum
upwards at "Lane's Emporium," and the inhabitants were so extremely
kind that we lacked little. The chief drawback during our stay at
Westrehem was the weather, which at times was very cold, and on
several days there were heavy falls of snow.
On April 13th, we began to move towards the line once more, spending
that night at Vendin-lez-Béthune, and proceeding the following day to
Houchin. There we went under canvas, sharing a camp with the 7th
Battalion, and had a comfortable if chilly stay of three days.
Changes which took place about this time included the departure of our
Medical Officer, Capt. C. B. Johnstone, who was replaced for a brief
period by Capt. Walsh, and later by Capt. W. C. Gavin; Capt. E. M.
Hacking, and Lieut. Moore were invalided to England, and "Weetie",
who had been our Adjutant for over 18 months, handed over his duties
to Lieut. Whitton on being attached to Brigade Headquarters. A little
later he succeeded "Peter" Wordsworth, who left to take up a higher
appointment after being Staff Captain for over three years, during
which we were grateful for his kind help on many occasions. Regimental
Quarter-Master Sergt. Dench went home to train for a commission, but
we met him again in the later stages of the war, when he did excellent
work with the 5th Battalion, gaining the M.C. and two bars. His place
was taken by Comp. Quarter-Master Sergt. Pritchard, who was succeeded
in D Company by Sergt. Gammon; Armourer Quarter-Master Sergt. Loughman
went to hospital, and from that time onwards no official armourer was
allowed.
We left Houchin on April 18th, and soon found familiar signs of our
proximity to the front. In Noeux-les-Mines, a not exactly encouraging
notice said "These cross-roads are registered." Needless to say we did
not loiter there, especially as it had been shelled several times
during the preceding few days. Passing Petit Sains and Aix
Noulette--the latter mostly in ruins--another notice warned us that
"Small box Respirators must be worn in the alert position East of this
point". A little further on we found parties of men at work making
good the roads, and laying temporary corduroy tracks across what had
recently been No Man's Land. Passing over this waste we descended to
Angres--known later as "Angry Corner"--and entered Liévin, where we
took over billets from the 13th Middlesex.
[Illustration: AIR PHOTOGRAPH OF LENS-LOOS AREA, 1917. _Reproduced by
permission of Captain P. Huskinson, M.C._]
Liévin had only been evacuated by the enemy and occupied by the 24th
Division two days before our arrival. This evacuation was not part of
his general scheme of withdrawing from some of his salients and
shortening his line, which we had experienced at Gommecourt, but had
been forced on him by the capture by the Canadians early in April of
Vimy Ridge.
Included in the line now held by the enemy West of Lens were the
strong positions of Fosse 3 and Hill 65, opposite the South of the
front taken over by the 46th Division, and Hill 70 on the North. His
outpost line ran through the Cité-de-Riaumont and Eastern outskirts of
Liévin, across the Lens-Liévin Road, through Cité-St. Laurent to Hill
70. Lens itself was one of the most important centres in the mining
district and the whole area was a mass of mining villages or "Cités,"
with their rows of cottages and neat gardens, pits or "puits,"
slag-heaps, and other usual features of a colliery district.
The town of Liévin lay astride the Souchez river, about three miles
West of Lens. Previously a thriving mining centre, it had now been
badly knocked about by shelling, though large numbers of houses were
still more or less intact. The Boche had done much work in
strengthening the cellars of the houses by covering them with
concrete, paving setts torn up from the road, bricks and other
material, the only drawback being that much of the extra strengthening
had been put on the side facing the old front line, so that we now got
little advantage from it, and felt we should like to turn the houses
round, as the side towards the enemy was often none too strong. The
evacuation had been so hurried that the enemy had not had time to
destroy or remove much of the furniture and clothing from the houses,
in many of which we found all the available beds collected in the
cellars, which were also well furnished with chairs, tables,
cupboards, cutlery and much other civilian property and made very
comfortable billets. Sappers made an inspection of all these cellars,
and of the dug-outs recently evacuated by the enemy before we occupied
them, in order to ensure the absence of "booby traps," and in this
respect we had no excitement.
Information from prisoners indicated that a further retreat behind
Lens was imminent, and the impression of the Higher Command was that
only slight pressure was necessary to push the enemy outposts out of
Cité-de-Riaumont and Hill 65, and to establish a line East of that
town. Unfortunately this information was true only up to a point. It
has transpired since that for a day or two before the 46th Division
came into the line there really was something approaching a panic in
the German Command in this sector, and that all preparations had been
made to evacuate Lens. By the time of our arrival, however, the panic
was at an end, and the enemy were undoubtedly holding the Southern
portion of Cité-de-Riaumont and the strong defences of Hill 65 in
considerable strength. Corps and Army Intelligence refused, however,
to believe this to be more than a show, and the general trend of
orders was that attacks by small numbers should be made at once to
clear the enemy out of Cité-de-Riaumont and finally from Hill 65. The
loss of this last covering position should, it was thought,
necessitate their withdrawal from Lens.
The flexibility of the position is indicated by the fact that a
Divisional Commander, in making a reconnaissance in Riaumont Wood, had
run against an enemy patrol. History does not relate which was the
more surprised, but both escaped without casualties.
On April 19th we took over the left sub-sector of the Brigade sector
from the 7th Northamptons, commanded by that gallant sportsman, Col.
Mobbs. The main defence just established was on the Eastern edge of
the Bois de Riaumont. The Northern two rows of houses in the village
of Riaumont were occupied by our outposts, and the enemy were reported
to be holding the remainder in force. A Company (Capt. A. Hacking)
took over the outpost line; B Company (Lieut. G. Wright, during the
absence on leave of Capt. Turner) were in support in the Bois de
Riaumont and Cité des-Bureaux, whilst C Company (Capt. A. Bedford) and
D Company (Capt. Simonet) were in billets in the "River Line," not far
from Battalion Headquarters, which were at the White Château.
It was clear that no attempt to capture Hill 65 would be possible
until the whole of Riaumont village was in our hands, and instructions
to this effect were given to Capt. A. Hacking, operations to secure
which were carried out on the night after relief in conjunction with
the 6th Battalion on our right. The advance took place quietly in
pitch darkness. Several parties of the enemy were encountered, some
being killed and one captured. By midnight the Battalion's objective
had been secured, and posts established in the Railway Cutting along
the Company front. In this difficult and rather uncanny work of
clearing and searching the houses and cellars of the village, Lieut.
Geary, Sergt. Stokes and Corpl. Brett did splendid work, for which the
first-named--who was the last Officer of the Battalion to be killed, a
fortnight before Armistice--was awarded the Military Cross. Later in
the night the enemy opened a sudden and very heavy bombardment, and
parties were seen advancing down one of the streets, but were driven
off with loss. We had no casualties during this operation.
Meanwhile the 6th Battalion were not able to make good the remainder
of the village South of the cross roads, which the enemy were holding
in greater strength, and it was apparent that he intended to hold the
trench on the South side as part of his Lens outposts.
The work put into the cellars of the colliery houses here was quite
extraordinary. In several cases, fifteen feet under the cellars, were
found subterranean passages with large dormitories and rooms capable
of accommodating large numbers of men. These were well furnished, but
owing to their depth and the proximity of the enemy, we were unable to
use them as much as we should have liked.
Further fighting and a good deal of shelling took place during the
night of April 21/22, causing us several casualties, but not any
material alteration in the situation. Particularly good work was done
during that time by Sergt. Bolton.
It was in these circumstances, and rather to the surprise of those who
were acquainted with the position, that orders were received that we
were to attack and capture Hill 65 in conjunction with the 6th
Battalion, who were at the same time to attack Fosse 3, and make good
the remainder of the village and the enemy trench to the South. The
attack was to be carried out by C Company, starting from the railway
cutting, so far as this had been established by A Company. There was
little time to make any preparations. A hasty reconnaissance was made
from an old Boche reinforced observation post East of the railway
cutting, just off "Absalom" Trench, kindly placed at our disposal by a
Gunner Officer, from which an excellent view was obtained of Hill 65,
a bare hill with a row or two of colliery cottages on the top, later
found to contain the inevitable deep cellars. The rest of the details
were fixed at hurriedly summoned conferences of Officers and N.C.O.'s.
The final objective was "Advance" Trench, just beyond the Hill. The
137th Brigade on the left were to send patrols to gain touch with us
at "Abode" Trench, and the 6th Battalion on the right were to meet our
parties in "Admiral" Trench. Their attack was not in line with ours
but was more or less echelonned in rear.
As soon as it was dark the Company moved up from their quarters in the
River Line to Cité-de-Riaumont, where the men were safely got into the
cellars of the houses, relieving part of A Company. Pvte. Bradshaw, a
most excellent Company cook, having decided that a Company Mess in
Advance Trench would be a dreary place for his Officers without
whisky, slung on his back a bottle which the Mess President had
thought of leaving behind for the incoming Mess. Unfortunately it
proved to be a case of "Love's Labour Lost," for the man, and it is
feared the bottle too, fell into the hands of the Boche!
D Company, who were to "mop up," took over the rest of A Company's
area, the latter Company returning to Liévin, and two platoons of B
Company occupied Absalom Trench. The imminence of our attack was
evidently known to the enemy, whose artillery during the night
liberally shelled Absalom Trench, Riaumont Château, the Eastern edge
of the village, and the approaches from Liévin. Trench mortars were
also very active on the village, in fact, at one time it was thought
that the Boche himself might be attacking, and shortly after midnight
C Company were got out of the cellars and ordered to stand to. During
that time Comp. Sergt.-Major Haywood was slightly wounded and had to
go back. Nothing further happened, however, and the Company eventually
took up their final position in the railway cutting about 4.0 a.m. on
April 23rd (after waiting for the rum and tea which were delayed by
the shelling and arrived too late). Several casualties were caused now
by our own artillery firing short, one shell, which luckily was a
"dud," burying itself in the side of the embankment amongst a group of
men.
Leaving a right flanking party to deal with the enemy in the railway
cutting, the remainder of the Company, deploying from the cutting at
Zero, 4.45 a.m., changed direction half-right and moved forward under
a barrage of artillery and trench mortars. The preliminary bombardment
had more or less destroyed the houses on the hill and cut good gaps
in the wire, which the party had little difficulty in getting through.
The right leading platoon under Lieut. Skinner got into one of the
numerous trenches and at first met with little opposition, but being
separated from the rest of the Company, were rapidly surrounded by
large numbers of the enemy, and practically all were killed or
captured. The left platoon, under 2nd Lieut. Hopkinson, reinforced by
the remainder of the Company, were held up by machine gun fire, which
caused many casualties, until Corpl. Fletcher managed to get a direct
hit on one of the guns with a No. 23 grenade. A message was meanwhile
taken by C Company runner, the redoubtable "Mungo" Marsh, to D
Company, asking them to try and work a party round to the North side
of the houses. Further attempts made to rush another gun which was
doing much damage, were met now with bombs thrown from a trench just
in front of the houses. The folly of attempting the attack with the
Southern half of the cutting still in the hands of the enemy, now
became apparent, for at this moment large parties of the enemy
appeared on the right rear, with which the flanking party had
apparently been quite unable to deal. Then from the cellars of the
houses on top of the hill also emerged many of the enemy, and the now
small remains of the Company were in imminent danger of being
completely surrounded. Orders were given to withdraw, but few returned
to tell the tale. Duff, one of the most heroic and stout-hearted
Officers the Battalion ever possessed, was last seen firing his
revolver amid a horde of the enemy. Hopkinson was never heard of
again. Sergt. Cox died of wounds and Sergts. Curtis, Sansom and Chalk
were amongst the 70 missing, whilst the wounded numbered 34. The
highest praise is due to all ranks of C Company for their magnificent
efforts and especially to Capt. A. Bedford, who throughout worked
incessantly and led the attack with the utmost gallantry. It was only
through a hard fate that his endeavours did not meet with the success
they so well deserved. Very good work was also done by the mopping-up
platoon of D Company, under Sergt. Painter, which helped to cover the
withdrawal of the remnants of C Company.
The 6th Battalion fared no better, and the attack produced, what was
suspected by those who knew the ground, exactly nothing except a total
of casualties which are felt to have been sacrificed on the altar of
faulty intelligence.
It is easy, perhaps, to be wise after the event. All information
received by Corps Intelligence indicated an imminent retreat by the
enemy. On no other premises could an attack by so small a force on so
strong a position have been justified. One further principle of
warfare, by no means new, was justified to the hilt--no frontal attack
should ever be attempted unless all counter attack from a flank is
impossible, or unless sufficient forces are available to render such
an attack an impracticability. The ultimate capture of the Hill
necessitated nearly two months' artillery preparation and the
employment at intervals of two Brigades. Perhaps there is one further
illustration of the uncertainty of modern warfare in the history of
Hill 65. With that Hill in our hands, and later on the dominating
position of Hill 70, all the tenets of war would conclude that Lens
would be completely untenable, and yet it was not until more than a
year afterwards that the enemy, in the last stages of the war,
evacuated a town which will, in the history of the Battalion and of
the 46th Division, be for ever associated with the fortunes of Hill
65.
On April 24th we went back into Brigade Support with Battalion
Headquarters at the Red Mill, and Companies billeted in cellars. Some
readjustments had to be made the following day, when Battalion
Headquarters moved to cellars on the Lens Road. This spot seemed to
be a favourite target for a Whizz-bang, which fired straight down the
road, and was responsible for many sprints and much language at
different times on the part of various members of Battalion
Headquarters.
Three days later the Brigade was relieved by the 137th Brigade and
moved into Divisional Reserve, the Battalion proceeding to a
delightful little spot known as Marqueffles Farm, nestling under the
wooded slopes of the Lorette Ridge. Here we were extremely
comfortable, and on this and a future occasion spent a most agreeable
time, being especially fortunate in the matter of weather. It was a
stiff climb to the top of the ridge, at the Eastern edge of which were
the remains of Notre Dame de Lorette. This was the favourite spot of
the Gipsy bomber, whose story was told in _Punch_ a few years ago:--
"But most he loved to lie upon Lorette
And, couched on cornflowers, gaze across the lines
On Vimy Ridge--we had not Vimy yet--
Pale Souchez's bones, and Lens among the mines.
Till, eagle-like, with hoarse indignant shrieks.
Gunners arose from some deep-delved lair.
To chase the intruder from their sacred peaks
And cast him down to Ablain-St. Nazaire."
Torrance on one occasion climbed the ridge with Col. Blackwall, and
can testify that the view from the top was worth the walk! It formed a
perfectly ideal observation post, and we now understood why the Hun
had fought so strenuously to maintain a footing on the ridge.
The chief item whilst at rest was the reorganisation of C Company,
which was practically non-existent. Each of the other three Companies
contributed a quota, the transfers including Sergt. Stokes, from
A Company, who was appointed Comp.-Sergt. Major. A little later
Sergt. H. J. Wilson, who for a long period had ably superintended
the Battalion cooking arrangements, was appointed Comp.
Quarter-Master-Sergt., and was succeeded as Sergt.-Cook by Corpl.
Bateman. In addition to other casualties we had lost Lieut. G. Wright,
who injured his knee up in the Riaumont sector and was now invalided
to England, whilst 2nd Lieut. White went to England for temporary duty
as a Bombing Instructor, and 2nd Lieut. Mitchell was appointed
Adjutant of I Corps School. Our strength was thus considerably
reduced, whilst reinforcements at the moment were exactly nil.
On May 6th we relieved the 5th Lincolns in the left sub-sector of the
left Brigade sector, with Battalion Headquarters in the remnants of
some mine galleries at the back of Hart's Crater, just in front of
Loos. There were only two Brigades of the Division in the line at this
period, and each Brigade went to each sector in turn. We always went
into the left sub-sector of each sector, relieving with the 7th
Battalion. The trenches here were very bad, so shallow that it was
almost impossible to get round by day, and considerably overlooked by
the enemy, particularly from the tower of Fosse 14. Their names began
with the letter N, the best known being "Nero," "Novel," "Netley," and
"Nash." They were old Boche trenches taken in the recent advance. The
whole sector had a very desolate appearance and life was not pleasant
there. The discomfort was increased by the enormous number of wing
bombs and rifle grenades and occasional deluges of gas bombs and
shells fired by the enemy, which in our first six-day tour there,
caused us 39 casualties. This was followed by six days in support,
when we lived in dug-outs in some trenches between Loos and the famous
Colliery slag heap, known as the "Double Crassier." Battalion
Headquarters were at an exceptionally fine dug-out known as "Elvaston
Castle," which had been dug by the 2nd Sherwood Foresters. Here, in
addition to ordinary work, we amused ourselves at times by cutting the
vetches which were thriving on some parts of the area, and sending
them back for the transport animals. It was here also that a certain
Padre was overheard one day by the I-Tok, arranging for a funeral at
Maroc, with the result that he was requested to attend at Brigade
Headquarters to explain his indiscretions.
After a short rest at Noeux-les-Mines, we went back to the Liévin
sector again on May 25th and took over the line from Fosse 9 and
Cité-St. Théodore to just South of the Liévin-Lens Road. Battalion
Headquarters were at the corner house near the "Marble Arch" in
Liévin. Here the monotony of trench life was varied by long distance
patrols, and an enemy raid on the night of May 29/30th on our post at
the junction of "Crocodile" Trench and the railway cutting, when we
lost two men captured, three killed and seven wounded. Casualties
during the whole of this period unfortunately were heavy and
reinforcements few, one Officer, 2nd Lieut. H. C. Orton and 36 men who
joined in May, being our sole additions. We also lost Sergt. Burton,
who had done much excellent work as Signalling-Sergeant. He went for a
Commission, and was succeeded by Corpl. J. T. Templeman. Our strength
at this period was so small that for some time Companies had to be
organised in three platoons instead of four. About the same time, much
to the regret of all those who had been privileged to serve under him
at any time, during the long period in which he so successfully
commanded the Brigade, both in England and France, General
Shipley left for a tour of duty at home, and was succeeded by
Brigadier-General G. G. S. Carey, C.B., R.A.
The first six days of June were spent in Brigade support in Liévin, at
the end of which time we went back into the line in front of Cité-St.
Théodore, where the only excitements were the pushing forward of
advanced posts to help to protect the left flank of the 138th Brigade
in an attack on Fosse 3, and a number of long distance patrols in
which Lieut. Martelli and his Scouts always played a prominent part.
After another short rest at Marqueffles Farm, where on June 12th we
won first prize for the best Transport turnout at the Brigade Horse
Show, we went back for a short tour in Brigade support in front of
Loos on June 15th.
We had now fairly sampled most of the area and found little of it to
our liking. Hart's Crater sector was the most monotonous for both
front line and support work, there being nothing but trenches to live
in. In Liévin sector, though the front line work was more interesting
and we had fairly comfortable billets when in support, the enemy
shelled the town itself so incessantly both with high explosive and
gas, that one had to take more than ordinary precautions. Apart from
the fact that our own Division and the Canadians on the right were
carrying out "stunts" of one kind or other almost every day, provoking
considerable retaliation, we had an immense number of batteries tucked
away amongst the houses in Liévin, and under almost every bank round
about it, besides many more or less in the open. The Boche located
these batteries with considerable accuracy, and from time to time
literally rained shells (principally 5.9's) on to them, and almost
every day knocked out numbers of guns.
Many of the gardens in the area close behind the front line were now
in full bearing and provided a very welcome addition to our rations,
and more than one has pleasant recollections of the excellent dishes
of early asparagus and stewed gooseberries gathered from the garden of
Riaumont Château. Strawberries, currants, gooseberries and rhubarb
were also plentiful in Cité-St. Pierre. Indeed the attractions of the
first were too much for one greedy German, who was so much occupied
in filling his helmet with this luscious fruit that he walked into
one of the outposts of the 6th Battalion. It is doubtful if he was
allowed to reap the fruits of his labour, at any rate when he
eventually arrived at Battalion Headquarters both the helmet and the
strawberries were conspicuous by their absence!
The Transport and Quarter-Master's Stores were back in a very nice
spot at Sains-en-Gohelle, but their journeys to the line with rations
and stores were almost as unpleasant as they could be. In going to
Liévin they usually got shelled with high explosive and at Loos with
gas, and it says much for the excellent way in which Capt. H. Kirby
and Sergt. Blunt handled the Transport on these occasions that they
never failed to deliver the stores and had scarcely a single casualty.
For a short period in the Liévin sector, stores were sent up by light
railway from Bully Grenay or Aix Noulette.
The Higher Command all this time had the fixed idea that the enemy
could be driven out of Lens, and all the efforts of the 46th Division
and of the Canadians on the right were concentrated to bring this
about. The idea was probably strengthened by the fact that fires and
explosions were observed almost daily in Lens itself, evidently due to
the enemy's desire to leave as little as possible in the event of his
having to withdraw. Numerous small enterprises carried out from time
to time enabled some slight advance to be made, but towards the end of
June operations took place more frequently and on a larger scale.
The Canadians having just captured the Generating Station and the high
ground around it, South of the Souchez River, which overlooked the
Boche positions about Fosse 3, the 138th Brigade were ordered to
attack the Fosse again on June 19th, and this time succeeded in taking
it, and on the night June 21/22nd, we relieved the 5th Leicesters in
their new outpost line in "Boot" and "Brick" trenches, having spent
the last three days at Calonne, to which place we had moved from the
Loos area on June 18th. The two days spent there were two of the most
unpleasant in the history of the Battalion. All four Companies were in
the line, there was little accommodation or shelter, the enemy
shelling and trench-mortaring were intense, and there was the constant
fear of a counter-attack from the right--altogether rather a
nightmare. We were lucky in not getting more casualties than we did;
as it was we lost ten killed and 31 wounded in the two days, during
which we were attached in turn to the 138th and 137th Brigades. We
were relieved on the night June 23/24th and went back to Calonne. A
Company had a particularly unpleasant relief, as the enemy chose that
time to send over a number of gas shells and trench mortars, most of
which fell amongst that Company, causing them several casualties.
On June 25th the 137th Brigade, with little or no trouble, at last
occupied Hill 65, and the same night we were again attached to that
Brigade, and moved into Liévin, with Headquarters at the Red Mill.
Here we got orders for working parties required for carrying and
digging assembly trenches at Cité-de-Riaumont for the 137th and 138th
Brigades, who were to carry out further operations. Company Commanders
assembled at the Red Mill to get their orders for this work at the
same moment that the Boche had planned to shell a battery of our guns
almost adjacent to it. Heavies arrived in salvoes for some time;
several direct hits were obtained on the guns, the ammunition dump
just behind it was hit and explosions continued for days. It caused
considerable inconvenience to Company Commanders and further entailed
the hasty exit of Lieut. Tomlinson from the delightful bathing pool
which had been made in the stream adjoining the Mill. It was whilst
out with one of these working parties at Riaumont that Moffat
Johnston, temporarily in command of B Company, got badly knocked about
by a shell and had to leave, the Company then being taken over by 2nd
Lieut. Day, Capt. Turner being away with the 46th Division Depôt
Battalion. On the night of June 27/28th we moved back to billets in
Maroc. The following evening the 137th and 138th Brigades made further
progress in another successful attack, the Canadians also pushing on
South of the River Souchez, practically into the outskirts of Lens
itself. At the same time the 6th and 7th Battalions co-operated with
considerable success North of the Lens-Liévin Road.
[Illustration: MAP TO ILLUSTRATE OPERATIONS NEAR LENS: April-July,
1917.]
The Higher Authorities were now more convinced than ever that the
Germans opposite us were completely demoralised, and that with a small
push we should capture Lens itself. Hasty plans were accordingly
devised, and, although we were now lamentably weak in numbers, it was
resolved to put the whole Division into a final effort on the morning
of July 1st. The 137th and 138th Brigades were to attack South of the
Lens-Liévin Road and the 139th Brigade North of it. For this attack
the 2nd Sherwood Foresters and the 9th Norfolks from the 6th Division
on our left were attached to our Brigade. The assaulting Battalions
were the 2nd, 5th and 6th Sherwood Foresters. We were in support and
late on June 30th moved into St. Pierre. A and D Companies were
attached to the 6th Battalion, A being now commanded by Capt. Andrews,
who had recently succeeded Capt. A. Hacking on the latter's
appointment as Second-in-Command of the 5th Battalion. This Company
held the 6th Battalion left Company front, whilst D Company remained
in support. B Company were attached to the 2nd Battalion, but were not
required until the following afternoon, when they were taken up to
"Crook Redoubt." Owing to casualties this Company came under the
command of Sergt. Cobb, who carried out his duties and looked after
the Company during a rather trying time in a most excellent manner. C
Company were attached to the 5th Battalion and were in support in
"Cowden" Trench.
The attack was launched at dawn on July 1st and part of the objective
taken, but an enemy-counter attack found our men too weak to hold the
position, and apart from a small portion in the neighbourhood of
Crocodile Trench, the ground gained had to be evacuated. The 137th and
138th Brigades on the right met with no greater success and Lens
remained in the hands of the enemy. July 1st is not a lucky day in the
history of the 46th Division.
We remained in St. Pierre, with some Companies still detached, until
the night of July 3/4th, when we were relieved by the 23rd and 27th
Canadian Battalions, and went back to the Square at Bully Grenay,
where 'buses picked us up soon after dawn on July 4th, and took us
back to the delightful little village of Chelers.
In spite of considerable shelling our casualties during the last few
days had only been two Officers (Day and Hammond) and four men
wounded. Our total casualties during the Lens operations amounted to
five Officers wounded, three missing, 42 other ranks killed, 180
wounded, and 72 missing.
The whole history of the Lens operations proves, if proof were needed,
how important a part intelligence plays in modern operations.
Intelligence is gained by reconnaissance by land or from the air, and
from information from prisoners and captured documents. The
responsibility of the Officer, who must judge the truth from what must
often be conflicting reports from these sources, is serious indeed. On
his appreciation of the position depends to an extent not always
recognised the success or failure of active operations. The Infantry
in the line unfortunately take the hard consequences of faulty
information or false appreciation.
In reviewing the short history of these operations we are inclined to
forget other occasions in which the credit of successes was due not
only to the dash and courage of the Infantry but to the information
sifted from one source or another, weighed in the balance, and finally
put forward as the premises on which operations have been based. In
our humble judgment the Army of the future should take care that this
branch of technical training receives a greater measure of attention
than it had received up to the commencement of the Great War.