HOHENZOLLERN REDOUBT
_October 1st, 1915._ _October 17th, 1915._
We packed up during the afternoon of October 1st, and in the evening
marched to Abeele, where we entrained for a destination unknown to
most of us, but presumed to be somewhere in the far South. We made
ourselves as comfortable as we could for the expected long journey,
only to be rudely awakened after what seemed to be a five minutes'
sleep, and turned out into the cold dark night at Fouquereuil, a
suburb of Béthune. The remainder of the night was spent at a somewhat
elusive Orphanage in the town itself. On the following day we moved
into billets at the Northern end of the town on the banks of the La
Bassée Canal, where we were joined by the Transport which had come
from Ouderdom by road. October 3rd saw us once more on the move to
Mont Bernenchon, a clean, attractive little village, a few miles N.W.
of Béthune. Our hopes of spending a day or two in peace were soon
shattered, for on the following day we made what seemed to be another
emergency move to Béthune, where we embussed for regions unknown.
Shortly after dark we arrived at Vermelles, and picked up guides, who
led us as only guides can, to what proved to be a portion of the
German front line system captured in the fighting a few days before.
The trenches, which were near the "Lone Tree," and within sight of the
famous "Tower Bridge" at Loos, were little damaged, and seemed to have
been captured without a great deal of fighting, but the incessant rain
and scarcity of habitable dug-outs made our stay as uncomfortable as
the most hardened stoic could have desired. Our work consisted of
reversing portions of the original German support trench to form a
fire trench facing the other way. Owing to the distance to the then
German line (1,000 to 1,500 yards) and the low visibility, we were
able to work openly and practically unmolested. Our only casualties
were the result of an unlucky shell which fell on the morning of
October 5th, amongst a party of Signallers, killing L.-Sergt. C. E.
Harrison, Signalling Sergeant, and three men, whilst another man died
of wounds a few days later.
The same evening we got orders to leave the trenches, and after a
thoroughly unpleasant tramp, in heavy rain and thick darkness over the
slippery chalk tracks, which were guess-work to most of us, we arrived
soon after midnight at Mazingarbe, which for dirt, damp, and general
cheerlessness, almost rivalled our never-to-be-forgotten billets at
Bac-St. Maur. So ended a beastly, tiring, and, for all we ever
learned, quite purposeless expedition.
After a short meal and much needed rest we felt fit for anything, and
made light of the trek on the early morning of October 6th, to our
rest billets, which we found at Fouquières, a nice clean little
village about a mile west of Béthune. Here we found ourselves, for a
short time, in peace and something approaching luxury.
Our move South had brought us into the First Army (General Haig) and
XI Corps. (Lt.-General Haking), which had been busy in the recent
fighting, and we now learned definitely for the first time that in the
further fighting that was shortly to take place we were to play a
prominent part. On Saturday, October 9th, preliminary orders and plans
were issued, and we learned that our task was to be the capture of the
"Hohenzollern Redoubt" and "Fosse 8," an admirably constructed scale
model of which had been made on the ground outside Divisional
Headquarters at Gosnay, where Officers and N.C.O.'s (and stray
inhabitants) spent some time in a careful and interested examination
of it.
In addition, a somewhat hurried reconnaissance of the position itself
was made by Col. Fowler and the Company Commanders from our trenches
in front of Vermelles, from which the attack was to be made. In the
short space of a couple of hours they endeavoured to get a working
knowledge of the maze of communication trenches, and the hostile
ground over which, if all went well, we should have to advance. Sunday
was spent in Church Parade, and in going again through the preliminary
orders and plans, and in the afternoon the Corps Commander interviewed
the Officers of the Division at Divisional Headquarters. We were then
told something more as to the reason and general plan of the attack,
and were informed that we should be supported by the heaviest
concentration of artillery yet known in the war--400 guns of all
calibres,--that all contingencies had been provided for, and that in
spite of the strength of the position, we should probably encounter
very little opposition before reaching our objective.
The object of the attack, which was to be undertaken by the XI Corps,
was to establish the left flank of the First Army, and to render
possible a further advance in conjunction with the French on the
South. The objective included the "Quarries" and Fosse 8, the 46th
Division being allotted the task of capturing the Hohenzollern Redoubt
and Fosse 8, whilst the 12th Division was to attack on our right, and
be responsible for the Quarries. The Fosse and surroundings had
already been in our hands once, having been attacked and captured
during the last week in September by the 9th Division, who
unfortunately, however, had been compelled to withdraw, and a
subsequent attempt by the 28th Division to recapture it had also
proved a dismal failure. What, we wondered, was in store for the 46th
Division?
Fosse 8 is, or rather was, a typical colliery pit, with the usual
winding and head gear and other plant, and pit-head pile of slag
(called in this case "The Dump"), which like its neighbour, the famous
Tower of Wingles, overlooked the whole position, whilst in rear there
were the usual rows of miners' cottages. These cottages (called
"Corons") had cellars, and were thus very easy to defend with machine
guns, which could fire with great effect, and comparative safety, from
ground level. In front of the Fosse and protecting it lay the
Hohenzollern Redoubt, consisting of a salient trench system shaped
rather like a big bean, and projecting well in front of the German
main system, to which it was connected by communication trenches, and
by two flank trenches known as "Big Willie" and "Little Willie." The
importance of the position lay in the fact that it was on the top of a
gentle rise, giving command and good observation of our position on
either side. Its capture was rendered difficult by the fact that the
ground in front of it was level, and almost devoid of cover, affording
a very fine field of fire, which could be swept from practically every
direction. From our trenches very little could be seen except the
Dump, and the roof of the manager's house.
The attack was to be carried out by the 137th Brigade on the right
under Brigadier-General E. Feetham, C.B., and the 138th Brigade on the
left under Brigadier-General G. C. Kemp, whilst the 139th Brigade were
to be in Divisional Reserve under Brigadier-General C. T. Shipley. To
the 137th Brigade were attached 100 Grenadiers from the 139th Brigade,
two sections Divisional Cyclist Company, and the 1/2nd Field Company,
Royal Engineers (less one section), and to the 138th Brigade, the 1st
Monmouthshire Regiment (Divisional Pioneer Battalion), 125 Grenadiers
from the 139th Brigade, two sections Divisional Cyclist Company, and
the 1/1st Field Company, Royal Engineers (less one section), whilst
General Shipley's Divisional Reserve consisted of the 139th Brigade
(less 225 Grenadiers), one Platoon Divisional Cyclist Company, and two
Troops Yorkshire Hussars. The covering Artillery consisted of three
groups of heavy Artillery under the Corps Commander, and one group of
Divisional Artillery (six Brigades of 18-pounders, and one Brigade of
4.5 Howitzers).
To his immense pleasure, 2nd Lieut. R. E. Hemingway, our Battalion
Grenade Officer, was put in charge of the Grenadiers attached to the
138th Brigade, the party also including the Battalion Grenadier
Sergeant, G. F. Foster. Bombing was now entering on the period of its
greatest importance--always in our humble opinion greatly exaggerated.
The Mills bomb was rapidly ousting all other kinds, and shortly became
almost the only one in normal use. Much time was put in at throwing
practice, and every kind of artifice was adopted by instructors to
make it interesting, and at the same time improve the aim and distance
thrown. A "platoon" of "grenadiers," as they were at first called, was
formed in each Battalion, consisting of a Grenadier Officer, a
sergeant and 32 men, (eight from each Company), and to show how much
we respected them, we put them when on the march at the head of the
Battalion. There was a Brigade Grenadier Officer too, who made himself
generally responsible for the training and work of Grenadiers
throughout the Brigade. The first Officer appointed to this post in
our Brigade was Lieut. A. Hacking, who had taken over the duties just
before the Hohenzollern battle. The task allotted to the Grenadiers in
this fight, was to bomb the various communication trenches leading
from "West Face" to "Fosse Trench," clear dug-outs and establish
blocks in "Fosse Alley."
Information regarding the enemy, gained by Corps Intelligence during
the attacks of September 25th, and following days from our own
Officers, and from the examination of prisoners, was to the effect
that the enemy trenches in the Redoubt, with the exception of "Dump
Trench" and "South Face," were badly damaged and not strongly wired,
that previous attacks had been exposed to heavy enfilade fire from
"Mad Point" or "Madagascar," that it was not thought there would be
much enfilade fire from the South-East, and that it was not necessary
to waste a lot of heavy shell on the Dump, as it could be made
untenable by both sides. How far this was justifiable will be seen.
Our few days at Fouquières passed very quickly in the bustle of
completing equipment, going again and again with all ranks through the
maps and plans of attack, detailing and organising bombing squads in
the place of those detached for duty with the other Brigades, and
writing last letters home "in case----" There was little or no
excitement. We had most of us seen too much by this time to be either
unduly pessimistic or over-confident about our own chances, so that
everything seemed to go quietly and smoothly. The first steel helmets
had just arrived--quaint, antique, Japanese looking things, with
ingenious corrugations to catch the bullets--and were issued to the
Machine Gunners, who had also received the first supply of the new Box
Respirator, issued in place of the Smoke Helmet. The Machine Gun
section was now commanded by Lieut. Adams.
It was at 3.45 p.m. on October 12th, after making our final
inspections and collecting blankets, packs and other surplus stores at
a convenient barn, that we moved off from Fouquières on a fine Autumn
afternoon, leaving behind only 2nd Lieut. Gray, and a few odd men, who
were not fit to go into action. Transport marched in rear of the
Battalion to temporary lines behind Noyelles, where it remained until
after the battle.
We had a very pleasant and easy march up to Vermelles, where a halt
was made for tea. Here we were passed by one of the Stafford
Battalions who were to make the assault. It was too dark to see their
faces, but their voices were full of confidence and cheeriness, which
it did one good to hear.
A temporary Quarter-Master's Stores was fitted up at "Clarke's Keep,"
Vermelles, where Companies picked up their rations for the 13th, water
in petrol tins, grenades, Vermorel sprayers, and other odds and ends
likely to be required. An emergency ration of cold bacon and bread was
also issued.
Eventually after a very slow march through Vermelles, which was a
seething mass of men and transport, we arrived about 11 p.m. at our
assembly position in "Sussex Trench," where space was allotted to us
by Lieut. C. L. Hill, Signalling Officer, who had gone on ahead with a
few Signallers for that purpose. We soon settled down and made the
best we could of what remained of the night. This was not long, for
the carrying parties for the 138th Brigade, and others had to report
for duty at Clarke's Keep at 6 a.m. on October 13th. In all we
provided a total of five Officers and 300 other ranks for this duty,
and they were busy most of the morning taking up to the front line
such necessary articles as rations, water, grenades, and rum. His
devotion to the last-named duty was too much for one bloodthirsty, but
very ill-disciplined member of the Battalion, who became
"non-effective" in consequence, and was reported by someone, who saw
him lying in the bottom of a communication trench, as "dead--shot
through the head." He was "dead" right enough, but he lived to
fight--and, it is feared to "die" again--another day!
Our artillery fire during the morning was normal, "so as not to arouse
the suspicions of the Germans," who, as a fact, probably knew quite
as much as most of us about the time and nature of our attack. But at
12.0 noon, every gun began in real earnest, and it was possible to
stand on the firestep of our trench, and get an undisturbed, if rather
distant, view of the shells bursting all over the German trenches.
After half-an-hour of this most unusual, but very pleasing spectacle,
one felt that there would be little left for us to attack.
At 1 p.m. the greenish yellow clouds of smoke and chlorine gas (known
for some time as "The Auxiliary") discharged from cylinders in our
front line began to roll towards the enemy lines, the breeze being
exactly right both in strength and direction, and we became happier
still at the thought of paying the Germans back in their own coin.
During the whole of our bombardment we could hear very little reply
from the German guns, though from time to time we could see a few
"woolly bears" and other shell-bursts, at odd points about the forward
trenches. Probably they were saving most of their fire for the actual
assault, and except for a stray machine gun bullet or two, we
ourselves were in no kind of danger. One of those, however, which must
have dropped at a steep angle, slightly wounded Regimental Sergt-Major
Mounteney, who was standing in the trench with the Officers of
Battalion Headquarters. He had only rejoined from England a few days
before, and was our first casualty in the attack.
At 1.50 p.m. the gas discharge ceased, but the smoke was continued
until 2.0 p.m., when our guns "lifted" from the enemy front line, and
the 137th and 138th Brigades began the assault. As the smoke cleared
away, we could get a fair view of a portion of the attacking troops
(Staffords) on the right as they went steadily, and apparently in
excellent order over the top, but, almost at the same time we heard
with surprise and dismay, the somewhat slow "tap-tap" of numbers of
those enemy machine guns, which were to have been so completely
silenced by our bombardment! We watched the Staffords for a few
moments until they disappeared from view.
Then followed a period of anxious waiting, and the only information we
got was to the effect that the 138th Brigade on the left had
practically gained their portion of the Redoubt.
Soon after 3 o'clock, we received orders to move forward, and began to
proceed by way of "Inverness Trench," "Bomb Alley" and "Left Boyau" to
"Reserve Trench." Movement was very slow, owing to the congestion of
the traffic, and the narrowness of the trenches, and took a long time
to complete. There we were destined to remain for several hours, and
suffered a few casualties from shell fire, apparently directed at the
junctions of the trench with "Central" and "Right Boyaux." We were now
nominally at the disposal of General Officer Commanding 137th Brigade,
but never received any orders from him, and eventually drifted to the
command of General Officer Commanding 138th Brigade.
Traffic became more and more congested by the stream of wounded which
was now pouring down Central Boyau and "Barts Alley," and by carrying
parties and supports endeavouring to get along the Reserve Trench up
to the Redoubt.
Soon we began to gather scraps of information from those who were
coming down, and to realise that things were going far from well. The
usual answer was "Don't ask me, all I know is it's Hell up there!" It
was now getting too dark to see, and we could only gather that at any
rate we were holding the West Face and having a pretty bad time in
doing so; also that our Grenadiers attached to the 138th Brigade, had
suffered heavily. Sergt. G. F. Foster was carried down dying from
wounds in the body, and Hemingway was reported to be dangerously
wounded, if not already dead.
Things had not gone well. As we learned afterwards the attack of the
Staffords on the right had been held up almost immediately by machine
gun fire, and very little ground had been made. On the left, the
Lincolns and Leicesters at first were more fortunate, and reaching
West Face with comparatively few casualties, began to make their way
up to Fosse Trench. But the further they advanced, the more heavy
became their losses, until eventually the advance came to a
standstill, the furthest point reached being about 100 yards from
Fosse Trench. From these more advanced positions they were gradually
forced back, until only the West Face was in our hands. It is
abundantly clear that the effect of our bombardment did not come up to
expectations, and that many machine guns were untouched, and, worst of
all, that the Dump, on which "heavy shell need not be wasted, as it
could be made untenable by either side," proved to be a miniature
Gibraltar, honeycombed with shafts and galleries leading to concealed
machine gun emplacements. Small wonder that little ground could be
made or held in the face of such defences.
The news that things were going badly induced a Battalion Commander of
another Brigade, whose Battalion had been taken from him piecemeal and
scattered to the four winds of heaven, to order A Company, in the
absence of Col. Fowler, to go across to the Redoubt to reinforce the
troops there. Information, however, was brought by L.-Corpl. Simpson
of A Company (killed a few hours later), who made a rapid and
courageous journey over the open to West Face, to the effect that that
trench was already overcrowded, and that the troops there required
thinning, rather than reinforcing.
It was now getting late and things seemed to be in a very
unsatisfactory state, when orders were issued by Col. Fowler, who had
met General Kemp in the trenches, and received verbal instructions to
be prepared to carry out an attack at short notice on the right
portion of the Redoubt, for Companies (except B who were detached for
other work) to begin to move up in readiness to our front line
trenches. This movement began about 9.0 p.m. very slowly along Reserve
Trench and "Hayward's Heath." The difficulty of moving a Battalion at
night, in single file, through a maze of unfamiliar trenches without
losing touch, may be better imagined than described, and it was after
midnight before we had covered the 400 or 500 yards, which was all we
had to do.
Whilst this was going on Col. Fowler and the Adjutant, accompanied by
the Staff Captain, Major Wordsworth, made a hasty reconnaissance of
the position, and found that elements of the 138th Brigade and
Monmouths were holding the North-Western portion of West Face, whilst
the Eastern portion of Big Willie was held by the 6th Battalion.
Except for a short distance near the barricade on each flank, the
trench between these points was held by the enemy.
At 2.45 a.m. on October 14th, we received from General Officer
Commanding 138th Brigade, written orders to attack and consolidate "as
soon as possible" the South-Eastern portion of West Face, the junction
of South Face and Big Willie (shewn on the map as Point 60), and if
possible the "Chord" of the Redoubt. The order stated that the 6th
Battalion in Big Willie would co-operate by a bombing attack along
that trench "at the same time." Owing to the difficulty of getting
messages to and fro, in the maze of unknown trenches in the dark, it
was quite impossible to get in touch with the 6th Battalion so as to
give them any idea when our attack would begin, so that we were not
able to rely on getting much help from them. The Commanding Officer
decided that two Companies would be sufficient for the attack, which
was of course going to be without artillery support, and A Company
(Major A. L. Ashwell), and D Company (Capt. B. W. Vann), were
detailed. A hasty conference was arranged at a small dug-out at which
Col. Fowler, who intended himself to lead the attack, gave the few
orders that were possible in the circumstances:--"A quiet advance, no
firing, and in with the bayonet."
Owing to the darkness and the unfamiliar ground, it was necessary to
make some arrangement for keeping direction. Major Becher was,
therefore, sent across to the West Face, with instructions to stay at
the extreme right flank of the 138th Brigade position, and there to
show a light from a flash lamp on which the left flank of our attack
would be directed.
As soon as this was settled, and Company Commanders had issued their
instructions, we began to deploy in front of our original front line
trench, as nearly as possible opposite our objective.
It was again a very slow job getting the men out of the deep and
narrow support trenches, and over a single duck-board bridge across
the front line into position; indeed many men of D Company never
received the order at all, and remained in the support trench in
ignorance of what was going on. The men were extended to about four
paces, D Company on the right, A on the left. This movement was
carried out very quietly, with entire absence of hesitation or
confusion, and the men were then dressed as nearly as possible on the
required alignment--no easy matter when one has only a map, and has
never seen the objective or the ground in front of it. Rifles were
loaded and bayonets fixed, Col. Fowler with characteristic
unselfishness, giving his rifle to an Officer who had a bayonet, but
no rifle to put it on. All these preliminaries were carried out
without attracting the attention of the enemy, who were about 250
yards away. Finally at about 3.45 a.m. the order was given to advance,
keeping our left flank on Becher's lamp, which we could see from time
to time across the intervening ground. It was a strange experience,
this slow night advance through the darkness and mist in the almost
uncanny stillness which, sooner or later, always follows heavy
fighting; so like what many of us had done in peace-time "night-ops,"
that it was difficult to realise that this was war, and would end in
hand-to-hand fighting; that, however quietly we went, we must
eventually be discovered, and perhaps swept away by machine gun and
rifle fire. The ground was for the most part level, and not badly cut
up, and there was little wire. A few of our dead, one or two severely
wounded still struggling painfully back to our lines, and a number of
abandoned rifles were all that were left to show what had happened on
the previous day. When we were about half-way across it was realised
that we were getting too far to the left, and direction was changed
half-right. It was not until the right of the line was close up to the
old German wire, that we were discovered. Fire was opened from
somewhere half-right, probably in the neighbourhood of Point 60, but
it was not severe, and only a few casualties were caused. On arriving
at West Face it was found to be practically empty on the right, the
few Germans who had been there having probably left hurriedly as we
approached. On the left we found a mixed crowd of Lincolns,
Leicesters, and Monmouths, with a few Robin Hoods, all under the
command of Col. Evill, of the Monmouths. Many of them were wounded,
and nearly all were exhausted by their dreadful experiences of the
previous day. Our arrival was, therefore, very opportune and put
fresh life into them.
It was now quite evident that we had come too far to the left, and
although we had gained 100 yards or so of the West Face, our right
flank was not in touch with the 6th Battalion in Big Willie. In their
eagerness to get at the Germans, and urged on by the shouts of the
Lincolns and Leicesters, the left half of A Company ran through the
West Face and began pushing on. The enemy, however, were waking up,
and our men were met with much heavier fire, which, although unaimed,
caused a number of casualties. Edge was severely wounded in the arm
and chest, and Everard Handford was killed instantaneously by a bullet
in the head, whilst numbers of men also fell. It was then seen that
any further advance was out of the question. The only thing to be done
was to consolidate what we had, and try to extend our gains laterally
by bombing along the West Face. Grenadiers and grenades (English and
German) were collected, parties were organised by Ashwell and Vann,
and several more yards of trench were gained. Strachan leading one of
these along the trench with utter fearlessness was never seen again,
and was probably killed at once. Shortage of grenades soon made it
clear that we must stop and build a barricade to hold up the Germans,
who as usual seemed to have a never-ending supply.
On the extreme right, Vann and others of D Company had come across
some Boches out of the trench, apparently preparing to make an attack
over the open. Most of these were slaughtered, and the rest made all
possible haste back to their trench. This appears to have been part of
an organised counter-attack, as the enemy tried a similar attack on
the left as well, which also failed. Nothing was heard of the bombing
in Big Willie by the 6th Battalion, but we learnt afterwards that
they had made several attempts to progress along that trench without
success.
All available tools and sandbags were got together in the trench to
build a barricade at the right flank. It was now getting light, and
this was attended with much danger, and in the work of filling
sandbags and placing them at the barricade, we had several men killed
in a very short time.
Vann had already been wounded by a bullet in the left forearm, and had
gone down to be dressed, returning with his usual courage and
tenacity, after having his wound attended to. The Commanding Officer,
however, would not let him stay, and he had to go down again to
hospital. Ashwell was hit by a bullet in the right shoulder a few
minutes after Vann, and he, too, had to leave us.
The enemy were not more than fifty yards away, and the least exposure
brought a bullet with deadly aim, though in this respect they did not
have things entirely their own way. We could distinctly see the tops
of their helmets over the parapet, and at one time there was such a
collection that we thought they were going to attack, but nothing came
of it, and we settled down to work again. There was no wire or
obstacle of any kind between the two trenches. We were too close to
get our guns on to them, otherwise we could have done much execution.
Practically all the work on the right was done by men of D Company,
who eventually made a barricade, which was more or less bullet-proof,
and dug a length of trench to protect that flank. Here Sergt. W. L.
Green did excellent work, encouraging everyone by his fine example.
For nearly 24 hours he stuck to his post in spite of bombs and rifle
fire. He was ably assisted by Sergt. Turgoose and Pvtes. Keeling,
Hubbard, Dickinson, Offord and Sly of D Company, also Pvte. F.
Attenborough of A Company, whilst L.-Corpl. Skelton did splendid work
in attending to wounded.
Meanwhile Col. Fowler had made arrangements for the defence of the
trench on the left, from which, much to their relief the Lincolns,
Leicesters, and Monmouths, had been withdrawn during the early hours
of the morning. Their place had been taken by A Company, which having
lost all its Officers, was now commanded by Sergt. L. Bell. Parties
were set to work to improve the trench, which was badly knocked about,
and during the following night the Company dug a new trench a few
yards in front, in order to get a better field of fire and for better
protection. The Northern end of West Face was all this time held by
the 7th Battalion.
C Company (Capt. H. B. S. Handford, in place of Capt. G. S. Heathcote,
who had left to do duty at the Base) who had been left behind in
Hayward's Heath when A and D Companies went over to attack, stayed
there until 5.0 a.m. when 2nd Lieut. R. A. Abrams and a party of 15
were detailed to carry grenades up to A Company in the Redoubt, where
many of them remained. The rest of the Company moved up to a
communication trench near the original front line, where they received
orders from a Battalion Commander of another Brigade, to carry water
and grenades over the open to the Redoubt. They started shortly after
7.30 a.m., but as it was quite light, they were seen immediately, and
heavy machine gun and rifle fire was opened on them at once. Basil
Handford and several others were killed instantaneously, and several
were wounded. The attempt was foredoomed to failure, and the men were
ordered back into the trench. For the rest of the day they helped to
carry stores to the Redoubt by way of a new communication trench and
to fetch in and attend to the wounded. Very gallant work was done in
this operation by Comp. Sergt.-Major Haywood, Sergts. Leivers and
Bexton, and Pvtes. Winterbottom, Allen, and Eyre.
B Company (Capt. Turner) had been detached about 5.0 p.m. on October
13th, and ordered to proceed over the open to reinforce the garrison
of our original front line. They remained for some time in the old
support line, from which all the Company Grenadiers were sent up to
reinforce the men in the Redoubt. One of these, L.-Corpl. G. W. Moore,
did very gallant work in remaining alone for three-quarters-of-an-hour
on the enemy's side of a barricade, which was being built up behind
him, and then continued to bomb the enemy for eight hours. The Company
was later ordered to dig a communication trench to link up the Redoubt
with our old front line. They started about 9.0 p.m., and worked
continuously on it throughout the night, much of the time under heavy
rifle fire, and by dawn a serviceable trench had been dug, and a very
important communication established. Capt. Turner was congratulated by
the Officer Commanding the 7th Battalion on the very good work of his
Company, in the supervision of which he had been most ably assisted by
Sergt. Rawding.
[Illustration: Map to illustrate the Battle of HOHENZOLLERN. October
13th-15th. 1915.]
October 14th seemed a never-ending day for those in the Redoubt.
Fortunately in a way, the lines were too close together for us to be
shelled, but bombing went on almost uninterruptedly, and our
casualties mounted rapidly. Grenadier reinforcements were sent along
from time to time from every Company in the Battalion, also from the
5th Battalion, whilst 2nd Lieut. G. H. Fisher, who was acting as
Grenade Officer in the absence of Hemingway, came up during the
morning, and at the right barricade displayed the greatest courage
until he was badly wounded and had to leave, dying a few days later.
Bombing was also going on at the left barricade, and throughout the
day from one flank or the other, the cry was ever "more bombs" or
"more Bombers." We had fortunately been able to get a signal line up
to the Redoubt, and a station established there, in a fairly deep
dug-out, so that most of the time we were in telephonic communication
with those behind.
Our relief promised for the night of October 14th, never came, and we
were compelled, alas, to remain in the Redoubt. Everyone was tired
out, having had little or no sleep, and very little food, for 48
hours. As soon as it was dark the Sappers put out some wire in front
of West Face, which encouraged us considerably, and we got through the
night without any untoward incident. About 6.30 a.m., on the morning
of October 15th, we were relieved in West Face by portions of the 5th
and 6th Battalions, and by Grenadiers of the Irish Guards, and
withdrawn to "Railway Reserve Trench," where we joined up with the
remainder of B and C Companies. By the tragic irony of fate, as the
Guards were actually filing into West Face and the relief was nearly
complete, Col. Fowler, who was taking a last glance over the top to
see if he could find any trace of Major Becher, the last signs of whom
had been the flashes of his lamp, to guide us across to the
Redoubt--was killed instantaneously by a sniper's bullet. So
determined had he been to find Becher, that he had himself gone out
during the night with Sergt. Stokes in a gallant but unsuccessful
endeavour to find him.
Major J. E. Blackwall of the 6th Battalion took over the remnants of
the Battalion the same evening, and shortly before midnight we were
devoutly thankful to be relieved by the Irish Guards. As the relief
was taking place, the enemy attempted an attack against the garrison
of West Face, but as this was now swelled by the relieving troops,
they got rather more than they bargained for, and were beaten off with
heavy loss. At the same time they put down quite a barrage on the
reserve trenches, and made our relief distinctly unpleasant, but
eventually we got it completed without further casualty.
Much to our delight, just before leaving, we heard that Becher had
been found. It appears that whilst we were going over to the attack,
he had been bombed by the Boches, and badly wounded, as also had
Daniels, his batman, who was with him. They got separated, but both
managed to crawl away, though Becher eventually had to lie by in an
old bit of trench near the German lines. It was from here that, after
having been discovered by an Officer of the Leicesters, he was
eventually rescued on October 15th, by Comp. Sergt.-Major Haywood, and
L.-Sergt. T. Martin, who carried him a distance of 200 yards under
more or less continuous rifle fire. Alas, however, he was not to
recover, and after lingering on for ten weeks, he died in hospital on
January 1st, 1916. In John Becher the Battalion lost one who was
beloved by all, who had throughout ever had at heart the welfare of
his men, whether in or out of the trenches, at work or at play. What
he did in the early trench days at Kemmel, was known to few. Often and
often he was out on patrol at night in "No Man's Land," mainly for the
sake of example, for it was part of his creed never to tell a man to
do anything that he would not dare to do himself. He lies buried in
the British cemetery at Abbeville. It was a hard fate that struck down
John Becher and his two brothers-in-law, Basil and Everard
Handford--two of the most promising young Officers in the
Battalion--within a few hours of each other.
Much untiring energy and devotion were shewn by many during these
strenuous three days, not by any means the least by our Medical
Officer, Capt. C. B. Johnstone, and his stretcher bearers. Johnstone
himself worked almost incessantly for over 48 hours in attending the
wounded, and in many cases helped to carry them long distances, often
under heavy fire. To him and all his helpers are due our grateful
thanks for their work on that occasion.
On relief we marched out to the Transport Lines behind Noyelles,
where, in the early hours of October 16th, we got some most welcome
and refreshing tea, supplied by Torrance and his followers, and then
moved on, most of us more asleep than awake, to Vaudricourt, where we
arrived about 6.30 a.m., and at once got down to sleep in some of the
poorest billets it was ever our misfortune to strike.
Thus ended the more or less fruitless battle of Hohenzollern Redoubt.
Though we held a portion of the Redoubt as a result of the fighting,
it was of no tactical value, and indeed later on was evacuated or
blown up. The 12th Division fared no better, and we can only look back
on the whole attack as, through no fault of our own, a dismal failure.
The battle caused us enormous casualties, all to no purpose. Our
Battalion alone lost seven Officers and 35 other ranks killed or died
of wounds, three Officers and 132 other ranks wounded, and 14 missing,
all of whom were afterwards found to have been killed. Amongst the
casualties were Sergt. H. Hall, killed, and Sergts. Archer, Burn,
Barrow, and I. B. Bell and Corpl. Bruerton wounded.
It was a pleasure to all to hear a little later that for his gallantry
and splendid work in this attack, and on many other occasions, "Pat"
Ashwell was awarded a well-deserved D.S.O.
At 5.0 p.m. on the afternoon of October 17th, the whole Battalion and
many Officers of the Brigade and Division, attended the funeral of our
beloved Colonel in the English cemetery, under the Church at
Fouquières, the service being taken by his old friend Padre Hales.
Some 18 months afterwards the Battalion arrived in billets six miles
away from this spot, after a long and tiring march. They were expected
to move into the line the next day, and some Officers who were lucky
enough to be mounted, rode over to see the Colonel's grave. Around the
grave, which had been carefully looked after by the Curé and other
kind friends, and was covered with snowdrops and daffodils just in
bloom, they found a number of the old Warrant Officers and N.C.O.'s of
the Battalion paying a silent tribute to their old Commanding Officer.
Such a tribute, surely is the finest testimonial to the character of a
man who ever inspired in all ranks an affection and respect, which can
never have been exceeded in any unit of the army.