SECTION I.

Note: Images of the original pages are available through

the Making of America digital library collection,

the University of Michigan. See

https://quod.lib.umich.edu/m/moa/AFZ6813.0001.001?view=toc

Transcriber's note:

Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_).

There are minor differences between the titles of sections

and those given in the Table of Contents. A reference to two

notes, at the end of the book, has been inserted in the table.

NATURAL HISTORY OF ENTHUSIASM.

by

ISAAC TAYLOR

... δύο ἐστὶ, τὸ μὲν ἀρετὴ φυσικὴ, τὸ δ' ἡ κυρία.

From the Ninth London Edition.

New York:

Robert Carter & Brothers

No. 530 Broadway

1859.

ADVERTISEMENT.

The belief that a bright era of renovation, union, and extension,

presently awaits the Christian Church, seems to be very generally

entertained. The writer of this volume participates in the cheering

hope; and it has impelled him to undertake the difficult task of

describing, under its various forms, that FICTITIOUS PIETY which

hitherto has never failed to appear in times of unusual religious

excitement, and which may be anticipated as the probable attendant of a

new development of the powers of Christianity.

But while it has been the writer's principal aim to present to the

Christian reader, in as distinct a manner as possible, the characters of

that specious illusion which too often supplants genuine piety, he has

also endeavored so to fix the sense of the term Enthusiasm as to wrest

it from those who misuse it to their own infinite damage.

The author would say a word in explanation of his choice of a term in

this instance; and of the extent of meaning he has assigned to it. The

best that can be done, when matters of mind are under discussion, is to

select, from the stores of familiar language, a word which, in its usual

sense, approximates more nearly than any other to the abstraction spoken

of. To require from an ethical writer more than this, would be to demand

that, before he enters upon his subject, he should both renovate the

science of mind, and reform his mother tongue: for when things not yet

scientifically defined are to be spoken of, it must needs happen that,

in proportion to the accuracy with which they are described, there will

be apparent occasion for taking exception against the sense imputed to

the term employed.

The author proposed it to himself, as his task, to depict, under its

principal forms, FICTITIOUS SENTIMENT in matters of religion, including,

of course, a consideration of those opinions which seem to be either the

parents or the offspring of such artificial sentiments. Having this

object before him, he would have thought it a very inauspicious, as well

as cumbrous method, to have constructed a many-syllabled phrase of

definition, to be used on every page of his essay. Instead of attempting

any such laborious accuracy, he has boldly chosen his single

term—Enthusiasm; confiding in the good sense and candor of his readers

for allowing him a span or two of latitude when employing it in

different instances, which seem to come under the same general class.

CONTENTS.

PAGE

SECTION I.

Enthusiasm, Secular and Religious, 7

SECTION II.

Enthusiasm in Devotion, 27

SECTION III.

Enthusiastic Perversions of the Doctrine of Divine Influence, 62

SECTION IV.

Enthusiasm the Source of Heresy, 79

SECTION V.

Enthusiasm of Prophetic Interpretation, 96

SECTION VI.

Enthusiastic Abuses of the Doctrine of a Particular

Providence, 120

SECTION VII.

Enthusiasm of Philanthropy, 153

SECTION VIII.

Sketch of the Enthusiasm of the Ancient Church, 177

SECTION IX.

The same Subject.—Ingredients of the Ancient Monachism, 201

SECTION X.

Hints on the probable Spread of Christianity, submitted to

those who misuse the term—Enthusiasm, 238

NOTES

Section VIII 292

Section IX 294

NATURAL HISTORY OF ENTHUSIASM.

SECTION I.

ENTHUSIASM, SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS.

Some form of beauty, engendered by the imagination, or some semblance of

dignity or grace, invests almost every object that excites desire. These

illusions, if indeed they ought so to be called, serve the purpose of

blending the incongruous materials of human nature, and by mediating

between body and spirit, reconcile the animal and intellectual

propensities, and give dignity and harmony to the character of man. By

these unsubstantial impressions it is that the social affections are

enriched and enlivened; by these, not less than by the superiority of

the reasoning faculties, mankind is elevated above the brute; and it is

these that, as the germinating principles of all improvement and

refinement, distinguish civilized from savage life.

The constitutional difference between one man and another is to be

traced, in great measure, to the quality and vigor of the imagination.

Thus it will be found that eminently active and energetic spirits are

peculiarly susceptible to those natural exaggerations by which the mind

enhances the value of whatever it pursues. At the same time an efficient

energy implies always the power of control over such impressions. Yet it

is enough that these creations of fancy should be under the command of

reason; for good sense by no means demands a rigid scrutiny into the

composition or mechanism of common motives, or asks that whatever is not

absolutely substantial in the objects of desire should be spurned. He

who is not too wise to be happy, leaves the machinery of human nature to

accomplish its revolutions unexplored, and is content to hold the

mastery over its movements. Whoever, instead of simply repressing the

irregularities of the imagination, and forbidding its predominance,

would altogether exclude its influence, must either sink far below the

common level of humanity, or rise much above it.

* * * * *

The excesses of the imagination are of two kinds; the first is when,

within its proper sphere, it gains so great a power that every other

affection and motive belonging to human nature is overborne and

excluded. It is thus that intellectual or professional pursuits seems

sometimes to annihilate all sympathy with the common interests of life,

and to render man a mere phantom, except within the particular circle of

his favorite objects.

The second kind of excess (one species of which forms the subject of the

present work) is of much more evil tendency, and consists in a trespass

of the imagination upon ground where it should have little or no

influence, and where it can only prevent or disturb the operation of

reason and right feeling. Thus, not seldom, it is seen that, on the

walks of common life, the sobrieties of good sense, and the counsels of

experience, and the obvious motives of interest, and perhaps even the

dictates of rectitude, are set at naught by some fiction of an

exorbitant imagination, which, overstepping its proper function, invests

even the most ordinary objects, either with preposterous charms or with

unreal deformities.

Very few minds seem to be altogether free from such constitutional

errors of the intellectual sight, which, to a greater or less extent,

intercept our view of things as they are. And from the same cause it is

that we so greatly miscalculate the amount of happiness or of suffering

that belongs to the lot of those around us; which happens, not so much

because their actual circumstances are unknown, as because the habitual

illusions are not perceived by us amidst which they live. And if the

coloring medium through which every man contemplates his own condition

were exposed to the eyes of others, the victims of calamity might

sometimes be envied; and still oftener would the favorites of fortune

become the objects of pity. Or if every one were in a moment to be

disenchanted of whatever is ideal in his permanent sensations, every one

would think himself at once much less happy, and much more so, than he

had hitherto supposed.

The force and extravagance of the imagination is in some constitutions

so great, that it admits of no correction from even the severest lessons

of experience, much less from the advices of wisdom: the enthusiast

passes through life in a sort of happy somnambulency—smiling and

dreaming as he goes, unconscious of whatever is real, and busy with

whatever is fantastic: now he treads with naked foot on thorns; now

plunges through depths; now verges the precipice, and always preserves

the same impassible serenity, and displays the same reckless hardihood.

But if the predominance of the imagination do not approach quite so near

to the limits of insanity, and if it admit of correction, then the many

checks and reverses which belong to the common course of human life

usually fray it away from present scenes, and either send it back in

pensive recollections of past pleasures, or forwards in anticipation of

a bright futurity. The former is, of the two, the safer kind of

constitutional error; for as the objects upon which the imagination

fixes its gaze, in this case, remain always unchanged, they impart a

sort of tranquillity to the mind, and even favor its converse with

wisdom; but the visions of hope being variable, and altogether under the

command of the inventive faculty, bring with them perpetual agitations,

and continually create new excitements. Besides; as these egregious

hopes come in their turn to be dispelled by realities, the pensioner

upon futurity lives amid the vexations of one who believes himself

always plundered; for each day as it comes robs him of what he had

fondly called his own. Thus the real ills of life pierce the heart with

a double edge.

The propensity of a disordered imagination to find, or to create, some

region of fictitious happiness, leads not a few to betake themselves to

the fields of intellectual enjoyment, where they may be exempt from the

annoyances that infest the lower world. Hence it is that the walks of

natural philosophy or abstract science, and of literature, and

especially of poetry and the fine arts, are frequented by many who

addict themselves to pursuits of this kind, not so much from a genuine

impulse of native genius or taste, as from a yearning desire to discover

some paradise of delights, where no croaking voice of disappointment is

heard, and where adversity has no range or leave of entrance. These

intruders upon the realms of philosophy—these _refugees_ from the

vexations of common life, as they are in quest merely of solace and

diversion, do not often become effective laborers in the departments

upon which they enter: their motive possesses not the vigor necessary

for continued and productive toil. Or if a degree of ambition happens to

be conjoined with the feeble ardor of the mind, it renders them empirics

in science, or schemers in mechanics; or they essay their ineptitude

upon some gaudy extravagance of verse or picture; or perhaps spend their

days in loading folios, shelves, and glass cases with curious lumber of

whatever kind most completely unites the qualities of rarity and

worthlessness.

Nature has furnished each of the active faculties with a sensibility to

pleasure in its own exercise: this sensibility is the spring of

spontaneous exertion; and if the intellectual constitution be robust, it

serves to stimulate labor, and yet itself observes a modest sobriety,

leaving the forces of the mind to do their part without embarrassment.

The pleasurable emotion is always subordinate and subservient, never

predominant or importunate. But in minds of a less healthy temperament,

the emotion of pleasure, and the consequent excitement, is

disproportionate to the strength of the faculties. The efficient power

of the understanding is therefore overborne, and left in the rear; there

is more of commotion than of action; more of movement than of progress;

more of enterprise than of achievement.

* * * * *

Such, then, are those who, in due regard both to the essential

differences of character, and to the proprieties of language, should be

termed Enthusiasts. To apply an epithet which carries with it an idea of

folly, of weakness, and of extravagance, to a vigorous mind, efficiently

as well as ardently engaged in the pursuit of any substantial and

important object, is not merely to misuse a word, but to introduce

confusion among our notions, and to put contempt upon what is deserving

of respect. Where there is no error of imagination, no misjudging of

realities, no calculation which reason condemns, there is no enthusiasm,

even though the soul may be on fire with the velocity of its movement in

pursuit of its chosen object. If once we abandon this distinction,

language will want a term for a well-known and very common vice of the

mind; and, from a wasteful perversion of phrases, we must be reduced to

speak of qualities most noble and most infirm by the very same

designation. If the objects which excite the ardor of the mind are

substantial, and if the mode of pursuit be truly conducive to their

attainment; if, in a word, all be real and genuine, then it is not one

degree more, or even many degrees more, of intensity of feeling that can

alter the character of the emotion. Enthusiasm is not a term of

_measurement_, but of _quality_.

When it is said that enthusiasm is the fault of infirm constitutions, a

seeming exception must be made in behalf of a few high-tempered spirits,

distinguished by their indefatigable energy, and destined to achieve

arduous and hazardous enterprises. That such spirits often exhibit the

characters of enthusiasm cannot be denied; for the imagination spurns

restraint, and rejects all the sober measurements and calculations of

reason, whenever its chosen object is in view; and a tinge, often more

than a tinge, of extravagance belongs to every word and action. And yet

the exception is only apparent; for although these giants of human

nature greatly surpass other men in force of mind, courage, and

activity, still the heroic extravagance, and the irregular and

ungovernable power which enables them to dare and to do so much, is, in

fact, nothing more than a partial accumulation of strength, necessary

because the utmost energies of human nature are so small, that, if

equally distributed through the system, they would be inadequate to

arduous labors. The very same task, which the human hero achieves in the

fury and fever of a half-mad enthusiasm, would be performed by a seraph

in the perfect serenity of reason. Although, therefore, these vigorous

minds are strong when placed in comparison with others, their enthusiasm

is in itself a weakness;—a weakness of the species, if not of the

individual.

* * * * *

Unless a perpetual miracle were to intercept the natural operation of

common causes, religion, not less than philosophy or poetry, will draw

enthusiasts within its precincts. Nor, if we recollect on the one hand

the fitness of the vast objects revealed in the Scriptures to affect the

imagination, and on the other, the wide diffusion of religious ideas,

can it seem strange if it be found, in fact, that religious enthusiasts

outnumber any other class. It is also quite natural that enthusiastic

and genuine religious emotions should be intermingled with peculiar

intricacy; since the revelations which give them scope combine, in a

peculiar manner, elements of grandeur, of power, and of sublimity

(fitted to kindle the imagination), with those ideas that furnish

excitement to the moral sentiments.

The religion of the heart, it is manifest, may be supplanted by a

religion of the imagination, just in the same way that the social

affections are often dislodged or corrupted by factitious sensibilities.

Every one knows that an artificial excitement of the kind and tender

emotions of our nature may take place through the medium of the

imagination. Hence the power of poetry and the drama. But every one must

also know that these feelings, how vivid soever and seemingly pure and

salutary they may be, and however nearly they may resemble the genuine

workings of the soul, are so far from producing the same softening

effect upon the character, that they tend rather to indurate the heart.

Whenever excitements of any kind are regarded distinctly as a source of

luxurious pleasure, then, instead of expanding the bosom with beneficent

energy, instead of dispelling the sinister purposes of selfishness,

instead of shedding the softness and warmth of generous love through the

moral system, they become a freezing centre of solitary and unsocial

indulgence; and at length displace every emotion that deserves to be

called virtuous. No cloak of selfishness is, in fact, more impenetrable

than that which usually envelops a pampered imagination. The reality of

woe is the very circumstance that paralyses sympathy; and the eye that

can pour forth its flood of commiseration for the sorrows of the romance

or the drama, grudges a tear to the substantial wretchedness of the

unhappy. Much more often than not, this kind of luxurious sensitiveness

to fiction is conjoined with a callousness that enables the subject of

it to pass through the affecting occasions of domestic life in immovable

apathy:—the heart has become, like that of leviathan, "firm as a stone,

yea, hard as a piece of the nether millstone."

This process of perversion and of induration may as readily have place

among the religious emotions as among those of any other class; for the

laws of human nature are uniform, whatever may be the immediate cause

which puts them in action; and a fictitious piety corrupts or petrifies

the heart not less certainly than does a romantic sentimentality. The

danger attending enthusiasm in religion is not, then, of a trivial sort;

and whoever disaffects the substantial matters of Christianity, and

seeks to derive from it merely, or chiefly, the gratifications of

excited feeling; whoever combines from its materials a paradise of

abstract contemplation, or of poetic imagery, where he may take refuge

from the annoyances and the importunate claims of common life; whoever

thus delights himself with dreams, and is insensible to realities, lives

in peril of awaking from his illusions when truth comes too late. The

religious idealist sincerely believes himself, perhaps, to be eminently

devout; and those who witness his abstraction, his elevation, his

enjoyments, may reverence his piety; meanwhile, this fictitious

happiness creeps as a lethargy through the moral system, and is

rendering him, continually, less and less susceptible of those emotions

in which true religion consists.

Nor is this always the limit of the evil; for though religious

enthusiasm may sometimes seem a harmless delusion, compatible with

amiable feelings and virtuous conduct, it more often allies itself with

the malign passions, and then produces the virulent mischiefs of

fanaticism. Opportunity may be wanting, and habit may be wanting, but

intrinsic qualification for the perpetration of the worst crimes is not

wanting to the man whose bosom heaves with religious enthusiasm,

inflamed by malignancy. If checks are removed, if incitements are

presented, if the momentum of action and custom is acquired, he will

soon learn to contemn every emotion of kindness or of pity, as if it

were a treason against heaven, and will make it his ambition to rival

the achievements, not of heroes, but of fiends. The amenities that have

been diffused through society in modern times forbid the overt acts and

excesses of fanatical feeling; but the venom still lurks in the vicinity

of enthusiasm, and may be quickened in a moment meantime, while

smothered and repressed, it gives edge and spirit to those hundred

religious differences which are still the opprobrium of Christianity.

Whoever, then, admits into his bosom the artificial fire of an

imaginative piety, ought first to assure himself that his heart harbors

no particle of the poison of ill-will.

* * * * *

The reproach so eagerly propagated by those who make no religious

pretensions, against those who do—that their godliness serves them as a

cloak of immorality, is, to a great extent, calumnious: it is also, in

some measure, founded upon facts, which, though misunderstood and

exaggerated, give color to the charge. When professors of religion are

suddenly found to be wanting in common integrity, or in personal virtue,

no other supposition is admitted by the world than that the delinquent

was always a hypocrite; and this supposition is, no doubt, sometimes not

erroneous. But much more often his fall has surprised himself not less

than others; and is, in fact, nothing more than the natural issue of a

fictitious piety, which, though it might hold itself entire under

ordinary circumstances, gave way necessarily in the hour of unusual

trial. An artificial religion not only fails to impart to the mind the

vigor and consistency of true virtue, but withdraws attention from those

common principles of honor and integrity which carry worldly men with

credit through difficult occasions. The enthusiast is, therefore, of all

men, the one who is the worst prepared to withstand peculiar seductions.

He possesses neither the heavenly armor of virtue, nor the earthly.

It were an affront to reason, as well as to theology, to suppose that

true and universal virtue can rest on any other foundation than the fear

and love of God. The enthusiast, therefore, whose piety is fictitious,

has only a choice of immoralities, to be determined by his temperament

and circumstances. He may become, perhaps, nothing worse than a

recluse—an indolent contemplatist, and intellectual voluptuary, shut up

from his fellows in the circle of profitless spiritual delights and

conflicts. The times are, indeed, gone by when persons of this class

might, in contempt of their species, and in idolatry of themselves,

withdraw to dens, and hold society only with bats, and make the supreme

wisdom to consist in the possession of a long beard, a filthy blanket,

and a taste for raw herbs: but the same tastes, animated by the same

principles, fail not still to find place of indulgence, even amid the

crowds of a city: and the recluse who lives in the world will probably

be more sour in temper than the anchoret of the wilderness. An ardent

temperament converts the enthusiast into a zealot, who, while he is

laborious in winning proselytes, discharges common duties very remissly,

and is found to be a more punctilious observer of his creed than of his

word. Or, if his imagination be fertile, he becomes a visionary, who

lives on better terms with angels and with seraphs than with his

children, servants, and neighbors: or he is one who, while he reverences

the "thrones, dominions, and powers" of the invisible world, vents his

spleen in railing at all "dignities and powers" of earth.

Superstition—the creature of guilt and fear—is an evil almost as ancient

as the human family. But Enthusiasm—the child of hope—hardly appeared on

earth until after the time when life and immortality had been brought to

light by Christianity. Hitherto, a cloud of the thickest gloom had

stretched itself out before the eye of man as he trod the sad path to

the grave; and though poetry supplied its fictions, and philosophy its

surmises, the one possessed little force, and the other could claim no

authentication; neither, therefore, had power to awaken the soul. But

the Christian revelation not only shed a sudden splendor upon the awful

futurity, but brought its revelations to bear upon the minds of men,

with all the pressure and intensity of palpable facts. The long

slumbering sentiment of immortal hope—a sentiment natural to the human

constitution, and chief among its passions—instead of being deluded, as

heretofore, by dreams, was thoroughly aroused by the hand and voice of

reality; and human nature exhibited a new development of the higher

faculties. When therefore, in the second century of the Christian era,

various and vigorous forms of an enthusiasm, such as the world had

hitherto never known, are seen to start forth on the stage of history,

we behold the indications of the presence of Truth, giving an impulse to

the human mind both for the better and the worse, which no fictions of

sages or poets had ever imparted.

In proportion as the influence of scriptural religion faded, the elder

and the younger vice—Superstition and Enthusiasm, joined their forces to

deform every principle and practice of Christianity, and in the course

of four or five centuries, under their united operations, a faint

semblance only of its primeval beauty survived; another period of five

hundred years saw Superstition prevail, almost to the extinction, not

only of true religion, but of Enthusiasm also; and mankind fell back

into a gloom as thick as that of the ancient polytheism. But at length

the breath of life returned to the prostrate church, and the accumulated

and consolidated evils of many ages were thrown off in a day. Yet as

Superstition more than Enthusiasm had spoiled Christianity, she chiefly

was recognized as the enemy of religion; and the latter, rather than the

former, was allowed to hold a place in the sanctuary after its

cleansing. Since that happy period of refreshment and renovation, both

vices have had their seasons of recovered influence; but both have been

held in check, and their prevalence prevented. At the present time

(1828)—we speak of protestant Christendom—the power of superstition is

exceedingly small; for the diffusion of general knowledge, and the

prevalence of true religion, and not less the influence of the infidel

spirit, forbid the advances of an error which must always lean for

support on ignorance and fear. Nor, on the other hand, can it be fairly

affirmed that ours is eminently or conspicuously an age of religious

enthusiasm. Yet, as there are superstitions which still maintain a

feeble existence under favor of the respect naturally paid to antiquity,

so are there also among us enthusiastic principles and practices, which,

having been generated in a period of greater excitement than our own,

are preserved as they were received from the fathers; and seem to be in

safe course of transmission to the next generation.

* * * * *

But even if it should appear that—excepting individual instances of

constitutional extravagance, which it would be absurd, because useless,

to make the subject of serious animadversion—enthusiasm is not now

justly chargeable upon any body of Christians, there would still be a

very sufficient reason for attempting to fix the true import of the

term, so long as it is vaguely and contumeliously applied by many to

every degree of fervor in religion which seems to condemn their own

indifference. Not, indeed, as if there were ground to hope that even the

most exact and unexceptionable analysis, or the clearest definitions,

would ever avail so to distinguish genuine from spurious piety as should

compel irreligious men to acknowledge that the difference is real; for

such persons feel it to be indispensable to the slumber of conscience to

confound the one with the other; and although a thousand times refuted,

they will again, when pressed by truth and reason, run to the old and

crazy sophism which pretends that, because Christianity is sometimes

disfigured by enthusiasts and fanatics, therefore there is neither

retribution nor immortality for man. It is the infatuation of persons of

a certain character, to live always at variance with wisdom, on account

of other men's follies; and this is the deplorable error of those who

will see nothing in religion but its corruptions. Nevertheless Truth

owes always a vindication of herself to her friends, if not to her

enemies; and her sincere friends will not wish to screen their own

errors, when this vindication requires them to be exposed.

* * * * *

If, as is implied in some common modes of speaking, enthusiasm were only

an error in _degree_, or a mere fault by excess, then the attempt to

establish a definite distinction between what is blameworthy and what is

commendable in the religious affections—between the _maximum_ and

_minimum_ of emotion which sobriety approves, must be both hopeless and

fruitless; inasmuch as we should need a scale adapted to every man's

constitution; for the very same amount of fervor which may be only

natural and proper to one mind, could not be attained by another without

delirium or insanity. If this notion were just, every one would be

entitled to repel the charge of either apathy or enthusiasm; and while

one might maintain, that if he were to admit into his bosom a single

degree more of religious fervor than he actually feels, _he_ should

become an enthusiast, another might offer an equally reasonable apology

for the wildest extravagances. At this rate the real offenders against

sober piety could never be convicted of their fault; and in allowing

such a principle we should only authenticate the scorn with which

indifference loves to look upon sincerity.

That the error of the enthusiast does not consist in an _excess_ merely

of the religious emotions, might be argued conclusively on the ground

that the Scriptures, our only safe guide on such points, while they are

replete with the language of impassioned devotion, and while they

contain a multitude of urgent and explicit exhortations, tending to

stimulate the fervency of prayer, offer no cautions against any such

supposed excesses of piety.

But, as matter of fact, nothing is more common than to meet with

religionists whose opinions and language are manifestly deformed by

enthusiasm, while their devotional feelings are barely tepid: languor,

relaxation, apathy, not less than extravagance, characterize their style

of piety; and it were quite a ludicrous mistake to warn such persons of

the danger of being "religious overmuch." Yet it must be granted that

those extremes, in matters of opinion or practice, which sometimes

render even torpor conspicuous by its absurdities, have always

originated with minds susceptible of high excitement. Enthusiasm, in a

concrete form, is the child of vivacious temperaments; but when once

produced, it spreads almost as readily through inert, as through active

masses, and shows itself to be altogether separable from the ardor or

turbulence whence it sprang.

To depict the character of those who are enthusiasts by physical

temperament is then a matter of much less importance than to define the

errors which such persons propagate; for, in the first place, the

originators of enthusiasm are few, and the parties infected by it many;

and, in the second, the evil with the latter is incidental, and

therefore may be remedied; while with the former, as it is

constitutional, it is hardly in any degree susceptible of correction.

The examination of a few principal points will make it evident that a

very intelligible distinction may, without difficulty, be established

between what is genuine and what is spurious in religious feeling; and

when an object so important is before us, we ought not to heed the

injudicious, and perhaps sinister, delicacy of some persons who had

rather that truth should remain forever sullied by corruptions, and

exposed to the contempt of worldlings, than that themselves should be

disturbed in their narrow and long-cherished modes of thinking. And yet

there may be some lesser misconceptions, perhaps, which it will be more

wise to leave untouched than to attempt to correct them at the cost of

breaking up habits of thought and modes of speaking connected

indissolubly with truths of vital importance. It should also be granted,

that, when those explanations or illustrations of momentous doctrines

which an exposure of the error of the enthusiast may lead us to propound

seem at all to endanger the simplicity of our reliance upon the

inartificial declarations of Scripture, they are much better abandoned

at once, although in themselves, perhaps, justifiable, than maintained;

if in doing so we are seduced from the direct light of revelation into

the dim regions of philosophical abstraction.

Christianity has in some short periods of its history been entirely

dissociated from philosophical modes of thought and expression; and

assuredly it has prospered in such periods. At other times it has

scarcely been seen at all, except in the garb of metaphysical

discussion, and then it has lost all its vigor and glory. In the present

state of the world the primitive insulation of religious truth from the

philosophical style is scarcely practicable; nor indeed does it seem so

desirable while, happily, we are in no danger of seeing the light of

revelation again immured in colleges. But although it is inevitable, and

perhaps not to be regretted, that religious subjects, both doctrinal and

practical, should, especially in books, admit such generalities, every

sober-minded writer will remember that it is not by an intrinsic and

permanent necessity, but by a temporary concession to the spirit of the

age, that this style is used and allowed. He will moreover bear in mind

that the concession leans towards a side of danger, and will therefore

always hold himself ready to break off from even the most pleasing or

plausible speculation when his Christian instincts, if the phrase may be

permitted, give him warning that he is going remote from the vital

atmosphere of scriptural truth. Whatever is practically important in

religion or morals, may at all times be advanced and argued in the

simplest terms of colloquial expression. From the pulpit, perhaps, no

other style should at any time be heard; for the pulpit belongs to the

poor and to the uninstructed. But the press is not bound by the same

conditions, for it is an instrument of knowledge foreign to the

authenticated means of Christian instruction. A writer and a layman is

no recognized functionary in the Church; he may, therefore, choose his

style without violating any rules or proprieties of office.

Natural History of Enthusiasm · 第 1 / 10 章