The Colenso controversy has entered on a new phase. It appears we must no
longer speak of Dr. Colenso as the Protestant Bishop of Natal. He enjoyed
this title indeed for a time, in virtue of letters patent issued by the
supreme head of the Established Church. But the judicial committee of her
Majesty’s privy council has sat in judgment on her Majesty’s letters
patent, and has just pronounced that they are invalid and without effect
in law; that her Majesty had assumed a prerogative which did not belong to
her, and had been guilty in fact, though inadvertently, of an illegal
aggression upon the rights of her colonists.
The history of this remarkable decision may be told in a few words. Dr
Colenso was appointed to the See of Natal in the year 1853. In the same
year, Dr. Gray, as Bishop of Cape Town, was invested by royal letters
patent with metropolitan jurisdiction over Dr. Colenso and the diocese of
Natal. Ten years passed away, and each in his own sphere exercised the
authority which he was supposed to have received from the crown. At length
Dr. Colenso’s book appears, and a charge of heresy is preferred against
him. The charge is entertained by the supposed metropolitan, who sets up a
court, proceeds to try the cause, and finally, in December, 1863, delivers
his sentence. By this sentence Dr. Colenso is deprived of his see, and
forbidden to exercise his sacred functions within the ecclesiastical
province of Cape Town. The deposed bishop refuses to acknowledge the
jurisdiction of the court, and appeals to the privy council. The
controversy was thus reduced to a simple question of law,—was Dr. Gray
legally possessed of those metropolitan rights to which he laid claim? To
this question the judicial committee of the privy council has given a
clear and decisive answer. When a colony is once endowed with legislative
institutions of its own, the crown no longer possesses any authority to
create sees or to confer ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Now in the two
colonies of Cape Town and Natal an independent legislature had been
established in the year 1850; and therefore the letters patent of 1853
were null and void in law. Hence it follows that, according to English
law, Dr. Gray was never in point of fact the Metropolitan of Cape Town;
but neither was Dr. Colenso the Bishop of Natal.
Thus has Dr. Colenso pulled down the whole edifice of the English colonial
episcopate. Like Sampson of old, he has been, indeed, avenged upon his
enemies, but he has been himself crushed beneath the ruins he has made.
Yet, though his jurisdiction as a bishop may be taken away, his moral
power and his influence are increased. He now appears not only as an
eminent leader of the free-thinking and infidel school of theology, but as
a martyr who has suffered in the cause; and this new character gives him
an additional claim to the sympathy and veneration of his followers. When
the youthful plant is checked in its upward growth by the skilful knife of
the gardener, it puts forth new branches on every side, and flourishes
with increased luxuriance. And so, according to every human probability,
the check which Dr. Colenso has received will but promote the rapid
expansion of his views, and their dissemination throughout the Protestant
Church. It is therefore all the more important for those who defend the
cause of truth to refute his charges against the Bible, and to lay bare
the sophistry of his arguments. Let us take the following example:—
“ ‘_And Jehovah spake unto Moses, saying, ... Gather thou the
congregation together unto the door of the tabernacle of the
congregation. And Moses did as Jehovah commanded him. And the
assembly was gathered unto the door of the tabernacle of the
congregation_’—(_Lev._, viii. 1-4).
“First, it appears to be certain that by the expressions used so
often, here and elsewhere, ‘the assembly’, ‘the whole assembly’,
‘all the congregation’, is meant the whole body of the people—at
all events, the _adult males in the prime of life_ among them—and
not merely the _elders_ or _heads of the people_, as some have
supposed, in order to escape from such difficulties as that which
we are now about to consider. At any rate, I cannot, with due
regard to the truth, allow myself to believe, or attempt to
persuade others to believe, that such expressions as the above can
possibly be meant to be understood of the elders only....
“This vast body of people, then, received on this occasion, and on
other similar occasions, as we are told, an express command from
Jehovah himself, to assemble ‘at the door of the tabernacle of the
congregation’. We need not press the word ‘all’ so as to include
every individual man of this number. Still the expression ‘all the
congregation’, the ‘whole assembly’, must be surely understood to
imply the _main body_ of those who were able to attend, especially
when summoned thus solemnly by the direct voice of Jehovah
himself. The _mass_ of these 603,550 men _ought_, we must believe,
to have obeyed such a command, and hastened to present themselves
at the ‘door of the tabernacle of the congregation’....
“Now the whole width of the _tabernacle_ was 10 cubits, or 18
feet, ... and its length was 30 cubits, or 54 feet, as may be
gathered from _Exodus_, xxvi. Allowing two feet in width for each
full-grown man, nine men could just have stood in front of it.
Supposing, then, that ‘all the congregation’ of adult males in the
prime of life had given due heed to the divine summons, and had
hastened to take their stand, side by side, as closely as
possible, in front, not merely of the _door_, but of the whole
_end_ of the tabernacle in which the door was, they would have
reached, allowing 18 inches between each rank of nine men, for a
distance of more than 100,000 feet, in fact nearly _twenty
miles_”—(Part i. pp. 31,33).
Dr. Colenso revels in figures. When he sets about a problem he delights to
look at it from every point of view, and to work out his sum in a variety
of ways. By a very simple process of multiplication and addition he has
here proved that the Scripture narrative is quite ridiculous and absurd.
Yet he is not content. He must lead his readers to the same conclusion by
another process:—
“As the text says distinctly ‘at the door of the tabernacle’, they
must have come _within the court_. And this, indeed, was necessary
for the purpose for which they were summoned on this occasion,
namely, to witness the ceremony of the consecration of Aaron and
his sons to the priestly office. This was to be performed inside
the tabernacle itself, and could only, therefore, be seen by those
standing at the door....
“But how many would the _whole court_ have contained? Its area (60
yards by 30 yards) was 1,800 square yards, and the area of the
tabernacle itself (18 yards by 6 yards) was 108 square yards.
Hence the area of the court outside the tabernacle was 1,692
square yards. But the whole congregation would have made a body of
people nearly twenty miles—or, more accurately, 33,530 yards—long,
and 18 feet or 6 yards wide; that is to say, packed closely
together, they would have covered an area of 201,180 square yards.
In fact the court, when thronged, could only have held five
thousand people; whereas the able-bodied men alone exceeded six
hundred thousand.... It is inconceivable how, under such
circumstances, ‘all the assembly’, the ‘whole congregation’, could
have been summoned to attend ‘at the door of the tabernacle’, by
the express command of Almighty God”—(pp. 33, 34).
Before we proceed to examine this singular objection, put forward in so
plausible and popular a form, it may be useful to describe, in a few
words, the general appearance of the tabernacle, and of the court which
surrounded it. Our readers will thus be placed in a position to form a
clear and distinct idea of the difficulty which Dr. Colenso has raised.
And we are satisfied that the more thoroughly it is understood, the more
complete and satisfactory will the explanation be found.
The court of the tabernacle was an oblong rectangle, one hundred cubits(2)
in length, from east to west, and fifty cubits in breadth, from north to
south. This space was enclosed by hangings of fine twisted linen,
supported by sixty pillars, to which they were attached by hooks and
fillets of silver. The entrance to the court was at the eastern end; it
was twenty cubits in width; and across the opening was suspended a
curtain, embroidered with fancy needlework, and rich with gorgeous
colours.
Within the court, and towards the western end, was erected the tabernacle.
It was simply a large tent, constructed with elaborate care, and formed of
costly materials. Like the court in which it was placed, it was an oblong
rectangle, being thirty cubits in length and ten cubits in breadth. The
walls were of setim or acacia wood; the roof of fine linen, covered with
curtains of goats’ hair and skins. The eastern end was open, but was
furnished with a rich hanging to serve as a door. Internally the
tabernacle was divided by a veil into two apartments;—the _Holy Place_,
twenty cubits in length, which contained the golden candlestick, the table
of show-bread, and the altar of incense; and the _Holy of Holies_, ten
cubits in length, in which was placed the ark of the covenant. The _Holy
Place_ was appropriated to the priests, who entered it twice a day,
morning and evening. The _Holy of Holies_ was forbidden to all but the
high priest alone, and even he could enter only once a year, on the great
day of atonement.
The argument of Dr. Colenso is now easily understood. According to the
Scripture narrative, the whole multitude of the Israelites, or at least
six hundred thousand men, were summoned to attend, and actually did
attend, “at the door of the tabernacle”. It follows that they must have
stood in a line eighteen feet broad and twenty miles long, which is
perfectly absurd. Besides, they could not have witnessed the ceremony to
which they were summoned unless they came within the court. But this is an
absolute impossibility, as the court would only hold five thousand men,
even if they were closely packed together.
Here is, indeed, a very serious charge against the credibility of the
Pentateuch. But it seems to us a charge which, from its very nature, must
refute itself. Dr. Colenso will not deny that the Book of _Leviticus_ was
written while the tabernacle was still in existence; and that its author,
whoever he may have been, had the tabernacle and its appurtenances
constantly before his eyes. If he was not a truthful historian, but an
impostor, he was certainly a most skilful impostor. He must have known
well, all his readers must have known well—quite as well as Dr.
Colenso—that the tabernacle could not hold more than five thousand people.
Now it is perfectly incredible that any man of common sense, not to say a
most clever and successful impostor, under these circumstances, would have
ventured boldly to state that six hundred thousand persons were gathered
within its precincts.
Let us, however, examine the argument in detail. The foundation on which
it rests is clearly enough stated by Dr. Colenso. “It appears to be
certain that by the expressions, used so often here and elsewhere, ‘the
assembly’, ‘the whole assembly’, ‘all the congregation’, is meant the
whole body of the people—at all events, the _adult males in the prime of
life_ among them—and not merely the _elders_ or _heads of the people_”,
etc. We deny this assertion. The Hebrew word עדה (heda), which is here
translated the _assembly_, the _congregation_, comes from the root יעד
(yahad), _to appoint_, and means literally an _assembly meeting by
appointment_. It is quite true, as Dr. Colenso contends, that the word is
sometimes employed to designate the entire body of the people. But it is
also true, though he ignores the fact, that it is sometimes applied to a
_select few_, invested with a certain authority and jurisdiction. We shall
be content with submitting to our readers one remarkable example.
In the thirty-fifth chapter of _Numbers_ we read of the cities of refuge.
They were to be six in number—three upon each side of the Jordan; and were
intended to afford shelter to those who had unintentionally shed innocent
blood. “And they shall be for you cities for refuge from the avenger; that
the manslayer die not until he stand before the _assembly_ (עדה) for
_judgment_” (_Numbers_, xxxv. 12).(3) It is then laid down that if the
murder have been deliberate, it shall be punished with death (16-21). But
if the fatal blow have been struck _without enmity_ or _premeditation_, or
_by chance_ (22, 23), “then the _assembly_ (עדה) shall _judge_ between the
slayer and the revenger of blood.... And the _assembly_ (עדה) shall
deliver the slayer out of the hand of the revenger of blood, and the
_assembly_ (עדה) shall restore him to the city of his refuge” (24, 25). It
is quite impossible to suppose that the judicial tribunal here spoken of
could be the entire body of the people, or even the 600,000 male adults.
The question to be tried was one of the highest moment, involving the life
or death of a fellow-citizen. It was also one of extreme delicacy, having
to deal, not with the mere external act, but with the motives and feelings
of the heart. To the _assembly_ (עדה) it belonged to pronounce, not merely
whether one man had killed another, but whether in his heart he had
_committed the crime_ of murder. For this purpose witnesses should be
examined, evidence should be carefully sifted, and, perhaps, even the
domestic secrets of the accused and of his victim should be laid bare. Was
this a task that could be entrusted to a mixed multitude of 600,000 men?
Accordingly we find that Rosenmuller, in his commentary on this passage
(_Num._, xxxv. 24), explains the word, _the assembly of judges_—“cætus
judicum urbis in cujus agro contigerit homicidium”. If we apply this
interpretation to the passage in _Leviticus_, every shadow of
improbability and inconsistency will at once disappear from the narrative.
Now, we ask Dr. Colenso, when a word in Scriptural usage has two different
meanings, which must we choose when we come to examine a text in which
that word is found? Are we to select the meaning which is in every way
suitable to the context and circumstances; or must we rather adopt an
interpretation which will make the sense absurd and impossible? Dr.
Colenso has preferred the latter course. It appears to us that the former
is alone consistent with the instinct of common sense and the principles
of genuine criticism.
We think our readers will admit that we have fairly established our point,
and proved that Dr. Colenso’s argument is utterly destitute of foundation.
For the ordinary purposes of controversy it would be unnecessary to go
further. But we frankly confess we aim at something more. We are not
content with answering the argument of Dr. Colenso; we wish to shake his
authority as a trustworthy critic. All that he has written against the
Pentateuch is made up of these two elements—first, the _meaning_ which he
attaches to the narrative, and, secondly, the _process of reasoning_ by
which he labours to show that this meaning is inconsistent or impossible.
Now it is plain, from the argument we are considering, that Dr. Colenso is
liable to the grossest errors, not only when he undertakes to interpret
the sacred text, but also when he proceeds to reason on his own
interpretation. If this assertion be established, his authority can have
but little weight.
Let us suppose then, for a moment, that by the _assembly_ is meant, in a
general way, the entire people of Israel; does it follow, as Dr. Colenso
maintains, that, according to the narrative, 600,000 men must have
“hastened to present themselves at the ‘door of the tabernacle?’ ” We
believe it does not. Nay, more, we believe that the absurdity of Dr.
Colenso’s opinion is clearly proved by some of the texts which he has
himself adduced. For instance:—“Bring forth the blasphemer out of the camp
... and let _all the assembly_ (עדה) stone him” (_Lev._, xxiv. 14). And
again, in the case of the Sabbath-breaker:—“The man shall be surely put to
death; _all the assembly_ (עדה) shall stone him with stones without the
camp. And _all the assembly_ (עדה) brought him without the camp, and
stoned him with stones, and he died” (_Num._, xv. 35, 36). No one will
maintain that the writer here means to say that 600,000 men were engaged
in carrying the condemned man, or that 600,000 men threw stones at him. If
Dr. Colenso had paused for a moment to reflect on these texts as he copied
them from the Bible, we are convinced he would have suppressed his foolish
argument. Exactly as it is said that _all the assembly_ was gathered into
the door of the tabernacle, so too is it said that _all the assembly_
stoned the blasphemer and the Sabbath-breaker. In the latter case, it is
clear that the number of those who were actually engaged in carrying out
the sentence of God was comparatively small, but the act is fairly
ascribed to the whole community, because _all_ were _summoned_ to take
part in it, and those who complied with the summons _represented_ those
who did not. Surely there is no reason why we may not apply the same
interpretation to the former passage.
Nor is this mode of speaking peculiar to Sacred Scripture. Every year the
members of the House of Commons are summoned to appear at the bar of the
House of Lords; every year we are told that they obey that summons. Who is
there that questions the truth of this statement? It represents a fact
with which we are all familiar. Yet Dr. Colenso with his rule and measure
will demonstrate that the fact is impossible and the statement false,
because the place in which the Commons are said to assemble cannot
possibly hold one-tenth of their number.
So much for Dr. Colenso as an interpreter of the Bible. He is satisfied
that if we accept the narrative we must believe that six hundred thousand
men were gathered unto the door of the tabernacle. We have seen that he is
mistaken; but let us now concede this fact, and let us see how he proceeds
to reason upon it. Since the tabernacle was only eighteen feet wide, this
immense multitude must have stood in a line eighteen feet in breadth and
twenty miles in length. This is certainly a most extraordinary conclusion.
No multitude ever yet stood in such a line; no multitude _could_ stand in
such a line unless they had been specially trained during many years for
that purpose. There is no conceivable reason why the Jews on this occasion
should have stood in such a line. And yet Dr. Colenso will have it that
they _must_ have stood in this way, if it be true that they were gathered
unto the door of the tabernacle.
We are tempted to offer an illustration of the very peculiar manner in
which Dr. Colenso here pursues his critical examination of the Bible. Many
of our readers will remember the 15th of August, 1843. In the phraseology
of Scripture it might be said that upon that day 100,000 Irishmen were
_gathered to O’Connell_ on the Hill of Tara.(4) To the ordinary reader
such a statement would present no insuperable difficulty. It would convey,
indeed, a pretty correct idea of what we all know actually to have taken
place. But when submitted to the Colenso process, this simple narrative
will be found to undergo a very startling transformation. O’Connell did
not occupy a space more than two feet broad. Therefore there was just room
for one full-grown man to stand in front of him. The second must have
stood behind the first; the third behind the second; and so the whole
multitude must have extended in a single unbroken line over many miles of
country. A little boy at school could tell us that, when we say the
multitude was gathered unto O’Connell, we do not mean that the multitude
occupied a space which was only as broad as O’Connell. Yet Dr. Colenso
maintains that this is the only meaning which the phrase admits. Such
principles would make strange havoc with history.
Again, Dr. Colenso contends that all who were _gathered unto the door of
the tabernacle_ “must have come _within the court_”. “This, indeed”, he
says, “was necessary for the purpose for which they were summoned on this
occasion, namely, to witness the ceremony of the consecration of Aaron and
his sons to the priestly office”. Now it is nowhere stated that this was,
in point of fact, the purpose for which the people were gathered together.
Certainly, if it were _impossible_ they could witness the ceremony, as Dr.
Colenso assures us, we are bound to infer that it was _not_ for this
purpose they were assembled. Nor is it difficult to find another, and
quite a sufficient reason, for gathering the people together on this
solemn occasion. It may have been the design of God that, by their
_presence_ in and around the court of the tabernacle, they should make a
public profession of their faith, and formally acknowledge the priesthood
of Aaron. Thus, in the illustration already introduced, it was impossible
for 100,000 people to hear O’Connell speak; but their presence was itself
a public declaration that they adhered to his principles and accepted him
for their leader.
Was it, however, really impossible that those without the court should
witness the leading features of the ceremony? Certainly not. We must bear
in mind that the court was not enclosed by stone walls, but by hangings of
fine linen. Nothing, therefore, could have been more simple than to loop
up these curtains to the pillars by which they were supported, and thus to
afford a full view of the tabernacle to those who stood without. Dr.
Colenso will probably say that in the scripture narrative there is no
mention of any such arrangement. Neither, we reply, is it said that those
without the court were intended to witness the ceremony. But if we suppose
that this was intended, we must also suppose that the means were adopted
which would make it _possible_.
There is yet another error of Dr. Colenso which we cannot pass by in
silence. It is true, the blunder to which we refer has little to do with
his argument. But it has much to do with the question whether he is a
competent authority on the sacred text, even when he speaks with special
emphasis and with unhesitating confidence. “Supposing that ‘all the
congregation’ of adult males ... had hastened to take their stand ... in
front, not merely of the _door_, but of the whole _end_ of the tabernacle
in which the door was”, etc. It is clear that the writer of this passage
was under the impression (which, indeed, he conveys not only by his words,
but still more by his italics—for they _are_ his) that _the whole end_ of
the tabernacle was wider than the _door_. Now if he had taken the pains to
read even an English translation of the sacred book which he so rashly
presumed to condemn, he never could have fallen into so great a mistake.
He would have seen that the _whole eastern end_ of the tabernacle was left
open, and that the open space was covered only by a curtain which extended
across from side to side. Consequently, if mention were really made of a
door, it must have been this curtain itself that was called by that name.
But if Dr. Colenso had gone a little further, and had consulted any Hebrew
lexicon, he would have discovered that the sacred writer does not speak of
a _door_, but rather of a _doorway_. The tabernacle had in fact no _door_
properly so called. The word פתח (_pethach_), which is used by the sacred
writers when speaking of the tabernacle, signifies, as Gesenius explains
it, _an opening_, _an entrance_. It means, therefore, the whole end of the
tabernacle, which was left _open_ to the court when the curtain was drawn.
In Hebrew the idea of _a door_ is expressed by דלת (_deleth_). When
treating of this word, Gesenius, having first explained its meaning,
pointedly remarks: “It differs from פתח, which denotes the doorway which
the door closes”. It is quite certain, therefore, that the _door_ and the
_whole end of the tabernacle_, which Dr. Colenso so emphatically
contrasts, were in reality one and the same thing.