WHAT HAPPENED AT OMSK
At 11 A.M. on November 18 I was officially informed that the Council of
Ministers had met at 9 A.M., and were now in session, having met to
consider the situation produced by the arrest of the Directorate. They
had already asked Admiral Koltchak to accept supreme authority, that he
had refused, but the Ministers had great hope that for the sake of
Russia the admiral could be prevailed upon to take the burden of
Government upon himself, as it appeared to be the only means of getting
the country out of her desperate situation. The wildest rumours were in
circulation: that my carriage would be attacked by bombs, that the
British would at any time be obliged to fight for their lives. I told my
informants that they need not worry about us; we were well able to take
care of ourselves. They could not understand our indifference. The fact
was that not a man or officer in my battalion had the slightest inkling
of the position. Then the tune changed. Would I defend the Ministers who
were still in session if they were attacked? My answer was that any
political refugee who sought asylum in my lines would be protected, but
he must give up every idea of again taking any part in Russian affairs.
"But what would you do if the Russian troops revolted and sought to
murder those who had come into your lines. Would you give them up?"
"Never!" "What if the Czech commanders made the demand?" "Still never;
besides which the Czechs are too honourable ever to make a demand such
as no soldier could accept." The last question was the most important of
all, and was doubtless the kernel of the whole series, the others being
mere camouflage.
The Czechs had just inaugurated their National Republican Government,
and were naturally obsessed with the usual "Liberty, Equality, and
Fraternity" business, and could not be expected to view the
establishment of a Dictatorship within their sphere of operations with
entire unconcern or without serious misgivings. The hostile attitude of
the Russian branch of their National Council at Ekaterinburg and
Chilliyabinsk, directly they heard of Koltchak's acceptance of the
supreme authority, is proof of the danger which might evolve from that
quarter.
The Council of Ministers, and perhaps Koltchak himself, were unable to
take the final plunge until they had a thorough understanding of the
British attitude. The position of the Czech forces at Omsk made it
impossible for them to approach the place where the Ministers were in
session without passing the British, and my machine guns commanded every
avenue leading to or from the Russian Headquarters.
Things were now in such a state of tension that for the safety of my
command I informed both the Russian and Czech authorities that I should
not allow bodies of troops or citizens either to approach or collect
near my cantonment; that such approach or collection would be treated as
hostile, and dealt with accordingly. That these arrangements gave the
Ministers greater confidence to proceed with their policy I have no
doubt. That was one of the inevitable consequences of the preparations
for our own defence, but not the inspiration of their policy, which was
entirely their own; but it did steady the situation.
I place these facts on record that those who are interested may be able
to give them their proper order of value and importance. I afterwards
learnt that more than one highly-placed official's wife had all
preparations made for a rapid descent upon the Middlesex quarters.
About 2.30 P.M., November 18, I was informed that Admiral Koltchak had
assumed absolute power under the title of "Supreme Governor," with a
Council of Ministers who would be responsible to him for the proper
performance of their duties; that he proposed to call on the French
representative, Monsieur Renault, to present himself in the evening;
that he would then call on me, as the senior British officer in Omsk,
and in my case he would answer any questions I chose to put to him. He
called, and it is as well to place here the report I made upon the
subject at the time:
From Lieutenant-Colonel John Ward, M.P., C.M.G., Omsk, Siberia.
To G.O.C. China Command. Through B.M.M. H.Q.
Headquarters B.M.M., Vladivostok.
SIR,--For State reasons I deem it necessary to give the following
information that it may be forwarded home to the proper authorities.
About 2.30 P.M. on November 18, 1918, my liaison officer (Colonel Frank,
of the Russian Army) informed me that at a meeting of the Council of
Ministers, just held, the Council had offered to place supreme sovereign
power in the hands of Admiral Alexander Koltchak. The admiral had first
refused to accept, but that such pressure had been applied to force him
to accept that he had at last reluctantly consented.
Further, that Admiral Koltchak had assumed the title of "Supreme
Governor of all Russia," and was calling upon the French Ambassador in
the evening, after which he would call on me as the Senior British
Officer holding official position in Omsk.
About 9 P.M. Admiral Koltchak called at my headquarters. The following
gentlemen were present to receive him: Lieutenant-Colonel J.F. Neilson,
Captain Stephani, Colonel R. Frank (Russian Army), and Mr. Frazer
(_Times_ correspondent). He wore the full dress of a Russian admiral.
The admiral, who speaks fair English, informed me of the circumstances
and reasons for his assumption of supreme authority in all Russia.
An attempt had been made to combine all parties in the Government of
the country to reduce it to a state of order, so that the people might
be able to decide the future Government of Russia. The Council chosen by
the Ufa Assembly had tried to work together for this purpose, but had
failed. The final dissolution had been brought about by a proclamation
issued by the Central Committee of the Social Revolutionary party, which
was intended to produce in the new army the same conditions that had
destroyed the old army. The proclamation had been signed by the Social
Revolutionary President, Chernoff, and when it was proposed to take
action against those who were destroying the discipline of the army, two
Social Revolutionary members of the Council, Avkzentieff and Zenzinoff,
could see nothing wrong in Chernoff's subversive propaganda. It later
transpired that both were members of the Social Revolutionary Committee
which had issued the literature in question, and refused to either leave
the Social Revolutionary Committee or repudiate the anti-discipline
propaganda of their friends.
This brought the new Government to a complete standstill, and, faced
with absolute anarchy, the Council of Ministers had no alternative but
to dissolve the old Directorate of Five and centre the supreme power in
one person, to whom the Council of Ministers would be responsible for
the administration of their several departments.
I answered that the reasons, coupled with my own knowledge, appeared to
justify the action, but I had heard that the Social Revolutionary
members of the Directorate and others had been arrested, and that if
this action supposed their execution it would make the whole proceeding
look like an attempt on the part of the old army officers to destroy the
present arrangements in favour of a return to the old régime. Further,
if the people of England thought this was the policy of the admiral and
his friends, they would not only lose the friendly sympathy of the
English people but also of America and France.
Admiral Koltchak replied that at the moment he did not know the
whereabouts of the prisoners, but he would make inquiries and inform me
later. That his sole object in burdening himself with the overwhelming
responsibilities of Supreme Governor of Russia in this sad hour of her
history was to prevent the extremists on either side continuing the
anarchy which made the establishment of a free constitution impossible.
That if his action at any future time was not in harmony with the
establishment of free political institutions as understood by the
Democracy of England, he would be convinced that he had failed.
I thanked him for his good opinion of my country, and called his
attention to the letter of His Majesty the King to President Wilson,
received at Omsk on November 14, 1918, in which the principles of
democracy and freedom were exalted, and warned him that the free peoples
of the world would resist any attempt to force the Russian people back
under a system of tyranny and despair.
Admiral Koltchak replied that he had read the letter of His Majesty the
King of England, and his one hope was that soon Russia might enjoy the
blessing of equally free institutions.
Omsk, Siberia, _November_, 20, 1918.
From Lieutenant-Colonel John Ward, M.P., C.M.G., Omsk, Siberia.
To G.O.C. China Command. Through B.M.M.
Headquarters B.M.M., Vladivostok.
_Further Report on Political Crisis in Russia_.
Following my report of the assumption by Admiral Koltchak of the supreme
Governorship of Russia, I wish to add:
As I was unable to secure any official information relative to the
whereabouts of the members of the Directorate who had been made
prisoners during the night of November 17, I wrote to the Russian
authorities (through Lieutenant-Colonel J. F. Neilson) on the night of
the 18th requesting information upon the subject. On November 19, in the
absence of information, I sent the following letter direct to Admiral
Koltchak, the Supreme Governor:
OMSK, 19.11.18. 3 P.M.
From Colonel Ward.
To Admiral Koltchak.
After our interview last evening I sent you a note (through
Lieutenant-Colonel J. F. Neilson) asking for information and some
guarantee for the imprisoned members of the Council.
So far I have received no information upon the subject.
I have already told you that I am sure my country would look with grave
concern upon any injury inflicted without proper trial upon these
prisoners of State, and I should esteem it as a favour if you can supply
me with information upon this subject.--Yours sincerely,
(Signed) JOHN WARD (Lt.-Col.).
Colonel Frank, my liaison officer, took the letter to Russian
Headquarters, and on his return informed me that the admiral thanked me
for my letter and that he was pleased to be able to allay my fears.
Three officers, named Lieutenant-Colonel Krasilnikoff, Colonel Volkov,
and Lieutenant-Colonel Katanaev, had presented themselves at
Headquarters and reported that they took upon themselves the entire
responsibility for the arrest of the members of the old Russian
Government, that they had not injured them in any way, that they were
prepared to hand their prisoners over to the authorities, together with
several millions of roubles, believed to be loot, and papers which they
had found in their possession. That the admiral had placed the prisoners
under a strong guard of his own, and had placed the three officers under
arrest to be tried by court-martial.
He further promised that no harm should come to them, and that he
proposed to convey them out of the country at the earliest opportunity.
_November 20_. 1 P.M.
Admiral Koltchak, hearing that a supply guard of my battalion was
returning to Vladivostok, has made request that I would allow the
railway cars conveying the State prisoners to some unknown point on the
Chinese frontier to be attached to my train for purposes of secrecy and
additional safety. I have consented, and have strengthened the guard for
this purpose.
Omsk, Siberia, _November_, 21, 1918.
[COPY.]
From Second-Lieutenant P.C. Cornish-Bowden, 25th Battalion Middlesex
Regiment.
To The Adjutant, 25th Battalion Middlesex Regiment.
Sir,--I have the honour to report for the information of the Commanding
Officer:
1. The train conveying the four Russian political exiles (Messrs.
Avkzentieff, Argunoff, Rogovsky, and Zenzinoff) and the Russian guard,
together with a detachment of British troops under my command, left Omsk
about 2 A.M. on November 21, and arrived at Harbin on November 27. The
journey was quiet. Most of the larger towns, where trouble was
anticipated, were passed at night.
2. I have since been informed by the officer commanding the Russian
guard that all traffic between Irkutsk and Chita was stopped by order of
General Semianoff, and that the trains were searched for the exiles
after we had passed, but I have no evidence in support of this.
3. The exiles expressed the greatest possible gratitude for the presence
of British troops, and said that they mistrusted their own Russian
guard, though I saw nothing whatever at any time to lead me to believe
their suspicions were well founded.
4. On arrival at Harbin the exiles strongly petitioned me to accompany
the train to Chang-Chun, and the officers in charge of the Russian guard
being quite willing, I decided to accompany the train to the
Chinese-Manchurian frontier. We reached Chang-Chun about 2 A.M. on
November 28, and the exiles left that place by themselves by train on
the evening of the same day.
5. We reached Harbin again on the 29th inst., where I parted company
with the Russian guard. We reached Vladivostok on the morning of
December 2. I immediately reported to the O.C. Detachment, and I
reported the before-mentioned facts verbally to General Knox.
6. The conduct of the N.C.O. and men of my detachment on the journey was
very good, and no increase of sickness took place amongst them.--I have
the honour to be, sir, your obedient servant,
(Signed) P.C. CORNISH-BOWDEN
(Second-Lieutenant).
Vladivostok, Siberia, _December_ 2, 1918.
I had already gained enough experience of revolutions to know that if I
did not press my point vigorously Avkzentieff and Co. were as dead as
mutton. I also knew that my countrymen have a rooted dread of
dictatorships, and that if Admiral Koltchak's assumption of power was
either connected with or promoted by the execution of his opponents
without trial, assistance or eventual recognition by the British
Government would be made almost impossible. My own agents had discovered
the place where the prisoners were detained, also that they were to be
quietly bayoneted in the night, as shooting would attract attention. I
was also certain that Koltchak knew nothing about this. The whole
business was in the hands of an Officers' Revenge Society, a body who
had sworn an oath to kill just the number of Bolshevik Revolutionaries
as there had been officers murdered by Trotsky's and Avkzentieff's
people. Both parties had similar combinations which left the marks of
their foul deeds on the streets every night.
The state of affairs was such that only by a dictatorship could the most
rudimentary order be maintained. I, a democrat, believing in government
of the people by the people, thought I saw in the dictator the one hope
of saving the remnants of Russian civilisation and culture. Words and
names have never frightened me. If circumstances force on me a problem
for solution, I never allow preconceived notions and ideas formed in the
abstract, without the experience of the actual then existing facts, to
warp my judgment in deciding the issue; and I am vain enough to believe
that, had the same situation presented itself to Englishmen generally,
nine out of ten would act as I did. I merely "carried on." The
traditions of our race and country did the rest.
Having, in my talk with the admiral and the report I made, accepted his
position of Supreme Governor, I did not mean that he should be left to
fight his way unaided against the enemies who surrounded him. In other
words, while outwardly remaining neutral, I constantly made
representations and gave advice, when asked, about everything, both
internal and external; and here it may be interesting to our own people
to know some of the problems which confronted the Supreme Governor. The
Japanese question was the first. General Rosanoff was Bolderoff's Chief
of Staff, and it was important to the Supreme Governor that he should
get the hang of outstanding matters and also make himself fairly
acquainted with the policy of the deposed Directorate. He interviewed
General Rosanoff and the Staff generally, and discovered that after the
fall of Samara the Bolshevik army moved rapidly towards Ufa, and the
Directorate became so alarmed that they demanded some definite policy
from the Commander-in-Chief as to how he proposed to deal with this
menace. Bolderoff never thought of effectively organising the new
Russian army, but suggested that things were so critical, and that
England, France, and America were so slow, that the only alternative was
to invite the Japanese to push their army forward to the Urals. This was
exactly what Japan wanted, but the Japanese Staff demanded as a _quid
pro quo_ to their advance to Ekaterinburg and Chilliyabinsk that they
should be placed in absolute possession of the railway and telegraph
lines to those points. Bolderoff and the Directorate boggled at this for
a time, but as the Bolsheviks began to get close to Ufa, and also
concentrated an army of about one hundred thousand men for an offensive
towards Ekaterinburg, the situation became so pressing that the
Directorate gave way, and a few days before the _coup d'état_ Bolderoff
had sent word to the Japanese that their terms were accepted.
The Japanese had made all preparations to move when Koltchak took the
reins in his own hands. He asked my advice. I advised him to say to the
Japanese that the change of Government had also involved a change of
policy, and that it would be inadvisable for the Japanese to advance
beyond their position at Chita until the subject had been further
discussed. They made him many tempting offers of help, both arms and
money, but he refused them all, and they were unable to move him from
the position he had taken up.
A subject that led to unfortunate bickerings between Admiral Koltchak
and the French was the appointment by the Allied Council of Paris of
General Ganin as the Commander of the Allied and Russian Forces in
Siberia.
It is too important an item in the general failure of Allied policy to
pass over without mention. From the very nature of the case the main
Allied effort was the formation and organisation of a new Russian army.
Our policy was not to prop Russia on her feet, but to enable her to
stand by herself. Major-General Knox had been sent out by the War
Office to accomplish this purpose, and no more able or competent officer
could have been appointed for the task.
General Knox had hardly begun to perform this duty when the French
agents in Siberia became alarmed for their own position. Cables were
dispatched to Europe pointing out the danger to French prestige which
General Knox's mission entailed. If the English were to be made
responsible for the reorganisation of the Russian Army, and were
successful, this would tend to make New Russia rely more upon the
English than the French, as had been the case hitherto; that it would be
better to leave Russia without an army than have it organised under such
influence. These senseless fears of our French friends found willing
listeners in Paris. General Knox had already made some selections of
officers and the business was well under way when a message from the
Allied Council in Paris put an extinguisher on all his work. His orders
were cancelled, and he was told to do nothing until a French commander
had been appointed, whose name would be forwarded later.
By this uninformed Allied interference a well-thought-out scheme of army
reorganisation was hung up for four of the most precious months to
Russia. By the time General Ganin arrived the time for the project had
passed and the whole business had been taken out of Allied hands.
The Russian situation at that time was such that four days' delay would
have been fatal, and if nothing had been done for four months we should
have been hunted out of the country.
Finding Allied jealousy so great as to render all their efforts
impotent, first General Bolderoff and then his successor, the Supreme
Governor, began to organise armies on their own for the protection of
the people and their property. These armies were ill-equipped and badly
disciplined--not the kind of armies which would have been raised had
General Knox's plans been allowed to develop--but they performed their
duty, they captured Perm, and had increased to over 200,000 before
General Ganin appeared on the scene.
When General Ganin reported himself to the Supreme Governor with the
Allied Council's orders to take over the command of the Allied and
Russian forces in Siberia, he was met with a blank refusal from the Omsk
Government.
I was consulted upon the question, and I am therefore able to give the
reasons for their objection. The Omsk Government's position was a very
simple one: "Had General Knox or any other Allied commander organised,
paid, and equipped the new Russian army he would have naturally
controlled it until such time as a Russian Government could have been
established strong enough to have taken over the responsibility. The
French would not allow this to be done, and we ourselves therefore
undertook the duty. Having formed our own army in our own country, it is
an unheard of proposal that we should be forced to place it under the
command of a non-Russian officer. It would be derogatory to the
influence and dignity of the Russian Government and lower the Government
in the estimation of the people."
From this position they never retreated, but Allied bungling had landed
General Ganin, who is himself an able and excellent officer, in a not
very dignified position.
Bolderoff, as I have stated, was at the Ufa front when Koltchak assumed
supreme power. He remained there in consultation with the Czech National
Council and the members of the old Constituent Assembly for five or six
days without a word as to his intentions. It was a critical position for
Koltchak, who did not know what he was doing or intended to do.
Hot-heads advised immediate action, but I suggested caution. The
subject-matter of Bolderoff's conferences or whether he had any we do
not know, but we do know this: General Dutoff, who commanded the Russian
armies south of Ufa, had some proposals from Ufa put before him, and
replied advising caution, as he had it on unimpeachable authority that
the English were behind Admiral Koltchak. This statement, I was told,
fell like a bombshell among the conspirators at Ufa, and soon after
General Bolderoff returned to Omsk. There he interviewed Koltchak as
Supreme Governor, and made satisfactory statement relative to his
absence. He was offered a post, which he refused, stating that he wished
to leave the country, as he did not believe that a dictatorship could
help Russia out of her difficulties. His request was granted, and so
ended a very different interview between these two men from that at
Petropalovsk a few days before.
Some time after this the Japanese representative at Omsk made a request
to be informed whether General Bolderoff had been forced to leave the
country, or had left voluntarily. This was answered in a definite way in
accordance with the facts. In the same note the Japanese also demanded
to be informed whether the British Army had supplied the train and guard
which had taken the exiled Social Revolutionary Members of the
Directorate to Chang-Chun, on the Chinese frontier. This question was
not answered quite so definitely, but the interest of the Japanese in
these men shows how far the _coup d'état_ had upset their plans relative
to the occupation of the Urals.
The Supreme Governor issued definite orders to the different isolated
sections of the Russian forces. All commanders obeyed these orders more
or less except one, General Semianoff, whose headquarters were alongside
that of the Japanese at Chita, from which he sent insolent refusals to
recognise Koltchak's authority. Koltchak prepared to deal with this
mutinous and buccaneering officer. The Japanese at once plainly informed
the Omsk Government that General Semianoff was under their protection,
and they would not allow the Russian Government to interfere with him.
Under Japanese protection this fellow continued to carry out
indiscriminate executions and flogging of workmen until the whole
district became depopulated, and the Allies were forced to demand an
explanation from Japan for their extraordinary conduct. So fearful were
they that their tool was about to be dealt with, that when the 1/9th
Battalion of the Hampshire Territorial Regiment started from
Vladivostok, the Japanese asked the Omsk Government whether these
British troops were coming forward to attack General Semianoff. The
answer we gave was that all movements of British troops were conducted
by the British Military Mission, to whom they must apply for
information. I never heard any more of their inquiries.
About this time a party of Cossacks, with a high officer at their head,
called at the prison one night and produced to the governor an alleged
order for the release of nine political prisoners. The [perhaps]
unsuspecting governor handed his prisoners over; they were taken away,
and next morning their friends found them shot. Someone ought to have
been hanged, but Koltchak could find no one to hang. His Chief of Staff
must have discovered some facts about the crime, but he refused to act.
In fact, he did not acquaint the admiral about the crime until four days
later when it had become public property. Koltchak was quite overcome,
first with rage at the crime itself, and secondly at his impotence in
being unable to prevent it. But Omsk went on the even tenor of its way:
it is remarkable what horrors people can face without a tremor when they
get used to them, as they must in revolutions.