JAPAN INTERVENES
It should be remembered that directly it was decided by the Paris
Council that a diversion through Russia was the surest way of relieving
pressure on the French front, the English apparently decided to be first
in. Though Japan was unquestionably in the most favourable position to
send help quickly, she was known to have German commitments of such a
character as precluded her from taking the lead in what was, at that
time, more an anti-Teutonic than pro-Russian expedition. Her Press was,
and had been all through the war, violently pro-German, and however much
the Tokio Cabinet might wish to remain true to the Anglo-Japanese
Treaty, it was forced to make a seeming obeisance to popular feeling in
Japan. If it had been only an English expedition, Japan's hand would not
have been forced; but the American cables began to describe the rapid
organisation by the U.S.A. of a powerful Siberian expedition, which gave
the Japanese Government ample justification--even in the eyes of her
pro-German propagandists--to prepare a still larger force to enable her
to shadow the Americans, and do a bit of business on her own. Several
months earlier Japanese suspicions had been aroused by the dispatch to
Siberia of an alleged civilian railway engineering force to help Russia
reorganise her railways, and the immense benefit that this force had
admittedly conferred on the Far Eastern populations was acknowledged on
all sides. But the very success of American enterprise in this
beneficent direction had created in the minds of the Japanese a doubt as
to the wisdom of allowing free play to American penetration.
Japan consequently hurried forward her preparations, and a few days
after I had taken over the Ussurie command her 12th Division, under the
command of General Oie, landed at Vladivostok. He at once established
his headquarters at Nikolsk, and his Chief of Staff, General Kanaka,
took up his position behind our lines at Svagena, using us as a screen
for the deployment of his command, which had already begun.
Major Pichon informed me that he had telephoned the Japanese general at
Nikolsk describing the new situation on our front, and asking him to
move up sufficient forces from Svagena to protect our right. I went to
my wagon to get breakfast. A little later Major Pichon informed me that
the Japanese commander had asked us to suspend our retirement as he was
moving up from Svagena a battery of artillery and one battalion of
infantry, who would re-establish the position at Antonovka on our right
rear, from which we need not fear any further danger. In consequence of
this message I ordered my men to re-occupy their old positions, and by
9.30 we had carried out the orders of the Japanese commander.
Having got back into our old position, we inquired the direction of the
Japanese advance that we might, if necessary, co-operate with their
movement, and to our utter consternation were informed that the Japanese
had not started, had no intention of doing so, and that we must take
what steps were necessary for our own safety, but if we retired at all
we were to fall back behind their lines and, we suppose, take no further
part in the operations.
The first promise of help and its countermanding had placed us in an
extremely dangerous situation. We had left our positions once, and
nothing but the lack of vigilance on the part of the enemy had enabled
us to reoccupy them without fighting. Our movements must have been seen,
and though he had not understood them till too late to take full
advantage the first time, that he would allow us to get away so easily
again seemed to us to be very unlikely. In fact, it appeared as though
we had been sacrificed to give a clear field for some manoeuvre or
purpose which we could not understand.
Our conference was a very urgent one, and for a time Major Pichon
thought it best to hang on to our positions and trust to someone making
an effort for our relief. Had British or American troops been collecting
in our rear, we would not have hesitated a moment to remain, for we
should have been certain of immediate help.
We knew that a battalion of Czech infantry had been moved up from
Svagena towards Antonovka to threaten the enemy's outflanking columns,
and that this battalion had made it a dangerous proceeding for the enemy
to close in on our rear. Hence we decided to withdraw certain units to
Svagena, and for the remainder to retire to a position at Dukoveskoie
and make a new line from the railway through that village, thus linking
up with the Czech troops who had marched to our assistance; they would
thus become the extreme right of our new line.
This movement would enable the Japanese 12th Division at Svagena to
continue their deployment behind our screen, and if the enemy continued
his outflanking tactics would involve the Japanese in the fighting
whether they willed it or not.
The retirement was carried out as arranged in perfect order, with the
loss of very little material and not more than a dozen men taken
prisoners. The French were the last to entrain. The whole movement was
covered by the two armoured trains under the command of Captain Bath,
R.M.L.I. Before retiring the bluejackets blew up the bridge on our front
and otherwise destroyed the line in a very workmanlike manner. If we had
been supported, the retirement would have been quite unnecessary; it was
the result of lack of confidence in our Allies after the first let-down.
The new line was held as follows: On the left of the railway one company
of Czech infantry; the two British armoured trains occupied the railway,
and a Middlesex machine-gun battery of four maxims occupied the right,
while the wooded slope leading to Dukoveskoie was held by the French,
and a battalion of Japanese infantry extended beyond the village. The
right of the village was very sparsely held by a reduced battalion of
the 5th Czech Regiment and Kalmakoff's Cossacks. The whole force was
under the personal command of Major Pichon.
The enemy quickly repaired the bridges and the line, and within
forty-eight hours his armoured trains were observed moving cautiously
into Kraevesk, my old headquarters. Simultaneously his patrols advanced
from Antonovka and came into touch with Kalmakoff's scouts on the right,
and three days from our retirement his advanced elements were testing
our line from end to end.
On the morning of August 22 the Japanese 12th Division began to move up
from Svagena to Dukoveskoie and deploy immediately behind the new line.
As is usual in all Japanese tactics, they pushed their right out far
beyond the enemy positions, and early in the evening began to envelop
his left with their usual wide turning movement. Their right was
supported by two heavy batteries, and from the centre, near Dukoveskoie
church, their units, now acting as a reserve, were in position before
sunset. Large bodies of Japanese troops were in bivouac immediately
behind the centre of the village near their headquarters ready to deploy
in either direction.
On the evening of August 22 orders were received to push forward the
observation post of our armoured trains to a spot indicated, which
proved to be six hundred yards ahead of our positions and near enough to
be easily raided from the enemy lines. Lieutenant T.E. King, my
machine-gun officer, was at the same time ordered to move forward two
maxims, with a reduced company of Czech infantry in support to protect
this advanced post. The night was enlivened by constant skirmishes
between British and Terrorist patrols until about 8.30 A.M., when it was
observed that the Japanese patrols on the right had quietly retired
without giving any notice of their intention, and that the enemy were in
position on the plain for an attack and had already advanced along a
ridge to within a hundred yards of the outpost. The movements of the
enemy were observable only from the main look-out, from which orders
were already on the way gradually to withdraw the party to a position
nearer the lines. Before the order could be delivered the enemy
attacked. Lieutenant King proceeded to withdraw the guns alternately,
working the foremost gun himself, but defective ammunition frustrated
his effort. He gallantly tried to restart the gun, but the enemy were
now upon him, and he had no alternative but to retire without the gun.
The small Naval party in the advanced look-out were practically
surrounded, but under Petty Officer Moffat, who was in charge, they
managed to get out, with the enemy on their heels. This party was saved
by a marine named Mitchel, who, seeing Petty Officer Moffat in
difficulties, turned on his knee and faced his pursuers. Their fire was
erratic, but his was cool and accurate, and after three or four rounds
the Magyars kept their heads well down in the long marsh grass, which
permitted the party to escape. The result of this skirmish, however,
allowed the enemy armoured train to advance to a point dangerously near
our defensive works, which, with a little more enterprise and
determination, he might easily have enfiladed. But though the enemy
train had mounted a 6-inch gun our 12-pounder Navals were too smartly
handled to allow any liberties to be taken. This was the situation on
the morning that the Japanese 12th Division began to deploy behind the
new Allied line at Dukoveskoie.
About 3 P.M. on August 23 I asked my liaison officer, Colonel R.
Antonivitch Frank, of the Russian Army, to accompany me towards the
front line, as I had heard rumours of large concentrations of the enemy,
who, elated with this small initial success, seemed determined to
dispute our possession of the village of Dukoveskoie. I arrived in time
to witness a duel between one of our armoured trains and a rather
spirited fellow of the same sort on the other side. The Bolshevik shells
would persist in dropping to the right of our train on a road on which
Colonel Frank and I were sitting our horses, so we decided to dismount
and send the animals out of range, while we boarded the train and
enjoyed the contest. One of our 12-pounders went groggy and obliged us
to retire slightly, but we dared not go back far, as the Terrorist train
had all the appearance of following, and would soon have made short work
of our infantry, which were occupying very indifferent trenches near the
railway, Captain Bath saw the danger and steamed forward, firing
rapidly; shells burst all round his target, and so bewildered his
opponent that he soon turned tail and retired to safety. I applied to
the Japanese commander, General Oie, through Major Pichon that our
trains, directly it was dark, might be allowed to return to Svagena to
shunt the injured gun to the rear train. About 7 P.M., while preparing
to return for this purpose, a few sharp rifle-cracks were heard near the
centre of the line. These reports grew rapidly in volume, and now became
mixed up with the bass "pop-pop" of machine guns. The rolling sound of
conflict spread from the centre along the whole right front. Till now it
had been exclusively a small-arm fight. At this point the Bolshevik
artillery began to chime in, followed by the Japanese and Czech
batteries. The lovely Siberian summer night became one huge booming,
flashing inferno, terrible but intensely attractive. The silent
tree-clad mountains to right and left vibrated with the music of battle,
while shell and shrapnel screeched like frightened ghouls over the
valley below, where white and yellow men were proving that there is no
colour bar to bravery. This din lasted about two hours, and then died
away almost as rapidly as it began.
Our trains which had remained to take a hand in the business if
necessary steamed slowly back to Svagena, and I turned into my wagon for
the night. After the usual battle with the mosquitoes, I fell asleep,
but it seemed as though I had only slept a few minutes, when a banging
at the door announced a visitor, who turned out to be a Staff captain
from the Japanese Headquarters with an urgent message for the Commander
of the Reserves at Svagena, who with great ceremony handed me the
following order of the day:
"To COLONEL WARD,
Officer Commanding Reserves.
Operation Order by
LIEUT.-GENERAL S. OIE,
Commanding 12th Division,
Svagena.
"_August 23, 1918._
"1. All enemy attacks were driven back to-day. We gained two
machine guns and five captives.
"2. The Allied troops will attack the enemy, inflicting upon
them an annihilating disaster, to-morrow, August 24.
"3. The Japanese troops will attack the enemy, starting the
present line, at 3 o'clock, the 24th, morning.
"4. The reserve British, French, Kalmakoff's forces, and a few
Japanese companies will be under the command of Japanese. Colonel
Inagaki will arrive at the north-western side of Dukoveskoie at
2 o'clock to-morrow morning.
"(Signed) S. OIE,
Lieut.-General,
Commanding 12th Division."