With the "Die-Hards" in Siberia
By Col. John Ward
C.B., C.M.G., M.P.
With Eight Plates
1920
To MY COMRADES
OFFICERS, N.C.O.s AND MEN OF THE
18th, 19th, 25th AND 26th BATTALIONS OF
THE MIDDLESEX REGIMENT
who, on sea and land, in sunshine and snow, so
worthily upheld the traditional gallantry and
honour of their people and country
FORWARD
Originally written for the private use of my sons in case I did not
return, this narrative of events connected with the expedition to
Siberia must of necessity lack many of the necessary elements which go
to make a history. I wrote of things as they occurred, and recorded the
reasons and motives which prompted the participants. Many things have
happened since which seem to show that we were not always right in our
estimate of the forces at work around us. Things are not always what
they seem, and this is probably more evident in the domain of Russian
affairs than in any other. It would have been comparatively easy to
alter the text and square it with the results, but that would have
destroyed the main value of the story.
The statesman and the soldier rarely write history; it is their
misfortune to make it. It is quite easy to be a prophet when you know
the result. You can, as a rule, judge what a certain set of people will
do in a certain set of circumstances, but where you deal with State
policy which may be influenced by events and circumstances which have
not the remotest connection with the question involved, it is impossible
to give any forecast of their conduct on even the most elementary
subject.
The recent tragic events played out in the vast domain of Siberia are a
case in point. It is certain that Admiral Koltchak would never have gone
to Siberia, nor have become the head of the constitutional movement and
government of Russia, if he had not been advised and even urged to do so
by the Allies. He received the most categorical promises of
whole-hearted support and early Allied recognition before he agreed to
take up the dangerous duty of head of the Omsk Government. Had these
urgings and promises been ungrudgingly performed a Constituent Assembly
would be now sitting at Moscow hammering out the details of a Federal
Constitution for a mighty Russian Republic or a parliamentary system
similar to our own.
On the declaration of the Koltchak Government, General Denikin, General
Dutoff, General Hovart, and the North Russian Governments made over
their authority to Omsk. There was at once a clear issue--the Terrorist
at Moscow, the Constitutionalist at Omsk. Had the Allies at this
juncture translated their promises into acts, from what untold suffering
Russia and Europe might have been saved!
The mere act of recognition would have created a wonderful impression on
the Russian mind, in addition to giving the Allies a lever by which they
could have guided the course of events and stabilised the Baltic. It
would have given security to Russian finance, and enabled trade
relations to have commenced with the wealthiest part of the Russian
dominions.
The reconstruction of Russia, about which the Allies talk so glibly,
would have gone forward with a bound by natural means, which not even
Allied bungling could have prevented. The Omsk Government could have got
money on better terms than any of the Allies, because, accepted within
the comity of nations, it could have given better security than any of
them, even including America. Europe would have been fed, Russia would
have been clothed, and the world would have been saved from its greatest
tragedies. All this and more would have naturally followed from the
barest performance of our promises.
We did worse than this. Breach of promise is only a negative crime. The
Allies went to the other extreme; their help took the form of positive
wilful obstruction. The Japanese, by bolstering up Semianoff and
Kalmakoff, and the Americans, by protecting and organising enemies, made
it practically impossible for the Omsk Government to maintain its
authority or existence. The most that could be expected was that both
would see the danger of their policy in time to avert disaster. One did;
the other left when the evils created had got beyond control. Koltchak
has not been destroyed so much by the acts of his enemies as by the
stupidity and neglect of his Allied friends.
As the Bolshevik rabble again sweeps over Siberia in a septic flood we
hear again the question: "How can they do so unless they have a majority
of the people behind them?" I answer that by asking: "How did a one-man
government exist in Russia from 'Ivan the Terrible' to Nicholas II?"
Both systems are autocratic; both exist by the same means--"Terror."
There is, however, this difference. The autocracy of the Tsars was a
natural product from an early form of human society. The Bolshevik
autocracy is an unnatural product, and therefore carries within itself
the seed of its own destruction. It is an abortion, and unless it
rapidly changes its character cannot hope to exist as a permanent form
of organised society. It is a disease which, if we cannot attack, we can
isolate until convalescence sets in. There is, however, the possibility
that the patient during the progress of the malady may become delirious
and run amok; for these more dangerous symptoms it would be well for his
neighbours to keep watch and guard. This madness can only be temporary.
This great people are bound to recover, and become all the stronger for
their present trials.
JOHN WARD.
February, 1920.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER
1. FROM HONG-KONG TO SIBERIA
2. BOLSHEVIK SUCCESSES
3. JAPAN INTERVENES
4. THE BATTLE OF DUKOVESKOIE AND KRAEVESK
5. JAPANESE METHODS AND ALLIED FAR-EASTERN POLICY
6. ADMINISTRATION
7. FURTHER INCIDENTS OF OUR JOURNEY
8. BEYOND THE BAIKAL
9. OMSK
10. ALONG THE URALS
11. WHAT HAPPENED AT OMSK
12. THE CAPTURE OF PERM: THE CZECHS RETIRE FROM THE FIGHTING
13. THE DECEMBER ROYALIST AND BOLSHEVIST CONSPIRACY
14. A BOMBSHELL FROM PARIS AND THE EFFECT
15. MORE INTRIGUES
16. RUSSIAN LABOUR
17. MY CAMPAIGN
18. OMSK RE-VISITED
19. IN EUROPEAN RUSSIA
20. MAKING AN ATAMAN
21. HOMEWARD BOUND
22. AMERICAN POLICY AND ITS RESULTS
23. JAPANESE POLICY AND ITS RESULTS
24. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
COL. JOHN WARD, C.B., C.M.G., M.P. _Frontispiece_
LANDING OF THE 25TH MIDDLESEX AT VLADIVOSTOK
ALLIED COMMANDERS IN FRONT OF HEADQUARTERS AT VLADIVOSTOK
GEN. DETRIKS (CZECH) AND COL. WARD AFTER THE ALLIED COUNCIL at
VLADIVOSTOK
A CONFERENCE OUTSIDE HEADQUARTERS WAGON.
COL. WARD AND THE CZECH LEADER (COL. STEPHAN) EXAMINING THE USSURIE
FRONT
BRITISH PARADE AT OMSK
RUSSIAN HEADQUARTERS "STAFFKA," OMSK
BRITISH STAFF AND C.O.'s WAGON
ARRIVAL OF THE BRITISH AT IRKUTSK
ADMIRAL KOLTCHAK
WITH THE "DIE-HARDS" IN SIBERIA
CHAPTER I
FROM HONG-KONG TO SIBERIA
The 25th Battalion of the Middlesex Regiment had already such a record
of travel and remarkable experiences to its credit that it was in quite
a matter-of-fact way I answered a summons from Headquarters at
Hong-Kong, one morning in November, 1917, and received the instruction
to hold myself and my battalion in readiness to proceed to a destination
unknown. Further conferences between the heads of departments under the
presidency of the G.O.C., Major-General F. Ventris, revealed that the
operations of the battalion were to be conducted in a very cold climate,
and a private resident at tiffin that day at the Hong-Kong Club simply
asked me "at what date I expected to leave for Vladivostok?"
The preparations were practically completed when orders to cease them
were received from the War Office at home, followed by a cable (some
time in January, 1918) to cancel all orders relating to the proposed
expedition. So we again settled down in Far Eastern home quietly to
await the end of the war, when we hoped to return to the Great Old
Country and resume the normal life of its citizens.
Things remained in this condition until June, 1918, when we were
suddenly startled by an order to call upon the half of my battalion
stationed at Singapore to embark on the first ship available and join me
at Hong-Kong. This seemed to suggest that the truly wonderful thing
called "Allied Diplomacy" had at last made up its mind to do something.
After a great deal of bustle and quite unnecessary fuss the whole
battalion embarked on the _Ping Suie_ on a Saturday in July, 1918.
It should be remembered that my men were what were called "B one-ers,"
and were equipped for the duty of that grade; but, after our arrival at
Hong-Kong, Headquarters had called in most of our war material to
replenish the dwindling supplies of this most distant outpost of the
British Empire. Very little information could be gathered as to the kind
of duty we might expect to be called upon to perform, and the ignorance
of the Staff as to the nature of the country through which we were to
operate was simply sublime. Added to this, most of the new material with
which we were fitted was quite useless for our purpose. Those things
which had been collected on the first notice of movement in 1917 had
been dispersed, and the difficulty of securing others at short notice
was quite insurmountable.
The voyage was not remarkable except that one typhoon crossed our track
not ten miles astern, and for eighteen miles we travelled alongside
another, the heavy seas striking the ship nearly abeam, and causing her
to roll in a very alarming manner. The troops had a very uncomfortable
time, and were glad to sight the coast of Korea and the calm waters of
the Sea of Japan.
At Hong-Kong many of the men, including myself, had suffered much from
prickly heat, which had developed in many cases into huge heat boils. It
was very strange how rapidly these irruptions cured themselves directly
we reached the cool, clear atmosphere of the coast of Japan.
Elaborate preparations had been made for our reception, insomuch that we
were the first contingent of Allied troops to arrive at Vladivostok. Two
Japanese destroyers were to have acted as our escort from the lighthouse
outside, but they were so busy charting the whole coastline for future
possibilities that they forgot all about us until we had arrived near
the inner harbour, when they calmly asked for our name and business.
Early next morning, August 3, they remembered their orders and escorted
us to our station at the wharf, past the warships of the Allied nations
gaily decorated for the occasion.
At 10 A.M. a battalion of Czech troops, with band and a guard of honour
from H.M.S. _Suffolk_, with Commodore Payne, R.N., Mr. Hodgson, the
British Consul, the President of the Zemstrov Prava, and Russian and
Allied officials, were assembled on the quay to receive me. As I
descended the gangway ladder the Czech band struck up the National
Anthem, and a petty officer of the _Suffolk_ unfurled the Union Jack,
while some of the armed forces came to the present and others saluted.
It made quite a pretty, interesting and immensely impressive scene. The
battalion at once disembarked, and led by the Czech band and our
splendid sailors from the _Suffolk_, and accompanied by a tremendous
crowd of people, marched through the town to a saluting point opposite
the Czech Headquarters, where parties of Czech, Cossack and Russian
troops, Japanese, American and Russian sailors were drawn up, all of
whom (except the Japanese) came to the present as we passed, while
Commodore Payne took the salute for the Allied commanders, who were all
present.
Our barracks were outside the town at Niloy-ugol; they were very dirty,
with sanitary arrangements of the most primitive character, though I
believe the local British authorities had spent both time and money in
trying to make them habitable. The officers' accommodation was no
better, I and my Staff having to sleep on very dirty and smelly floors.
A little later, however, even this would have been a treat to a weary
old soldier.
On August 5 I attended the Allied commanders' council. There were many
matters of high policy discussed at this meeting, but one subject was of
intense interest. General Detriks, the G.O.C. of the Czech troops, gave
in reports as to the military situation on the Manchurian and Ussurie
fronts. The conditions on the Manchurian front were none too good, but
those on the Ussurie front could only be described as critical, and
unless immediate help could be given a further retirement would be
forced upon the commander, who had great difficulty with his small
forces in holding any position. The Ussurie force had recently
consisted of some 3,000 indifferently armed Czechs and Cossacks. The day
I landed a battle had been fought, which had proved disastrous, and
resulted in a hurried retirement to twelve versts to the rear of
Kraevesk. The Allied force, now reduced to about 2,000 men, could not
hope to hold up for long a combined Bolshevik, German and Magyar force
of from 18,000 to 20,000 men. The Bolshevik method of military
organisation,--namely, of "Battle Committees," which decided what
superior commands should be carried out or rejected--had been swept away
and replaced by the disciplined methods of the German and Austrian
officers, who had now assumed command. Should another retirement be
forced upon the Ussurie forces, it could be carried out only with great
loss, both of men and material. The next position would be behind
Spascoe, with Lake Hanka as a protection on the left flank and the
forest on the right. If this could not be held, then the railway
junction at Nikolsk would be endangered, with the possibility of the
communications being cut with other forces operating along the
Transbaikal Railway and at Irkutsk. Under these circumstances the
council decided that there was nothing left but to ask for authority
from the War Office to send my battalion forward at once to the Ussurie
front to render what assistance was possible. I naturally pointed out
that my battalion was composed of B1 men, most of whom had already done
their "bit" on other fronts, and that a few weeks before I had had about
250 General Service men in my ranks, but on a blundering suggestion of
the G.O.C. at Singapore they had been taken from my unit and transferred
to others doing garrison duty in India. I had protested against this at
the time, but had been over-ruled by London, so that my command was
reduced to men of the lowest category. However, after making this
statement I informed the council that in view of the desperate
circumstances in which the Ussurie force was placed I would render every
assistance in my power.
About 2 P.M. Commodore Payne, R.N., came to my quarters and showed me a
paraphrased cable he had received from the War Office. The cable
authorised the immediate dispatch of half my battalion to the front,
subject to the approval of the commanding officer. It seems to me they
might have plucked up courage enough to decide the matter for
themselves, instead of putting the responsibility upon the local
commander. As it was left to me, however, I gave the necessary orders at
once. That very night, August 5, I marched through Vladivostok to
entrain my detachment. It consisted of 500 fully equipped infantry and a
machine-gun section of forty-three men with four heavy-type maxims.
Leaving my second in command, Major F.J. Browne, in charge of the Base,
I marched with the men with full pack. The four miles, over heavy, dirty
roads, were covered in fair time, though many of the men became very
exhausted, and at the end of the march I found myself carrying four
rifles, while other officers carried packs in addition to their own kit.
The train was composed of the usual hopeless-looking Russian
cattle-trucks for the men, with tiers of planks for resting and sleeping
on. A dirty second-class car was provided for the Commanding Officer and
his Staff, and a well-lighted first-class bogey car of eight
compartments for the British Military Representative, who was merely
travelling up to see the sights. When I got to the front I found a
first-class car retained by every little officer who commanded a dozen
Cossacks, but I proudly raised the Union Jack, to denote the British
Headquarters, on the dirtiest and most dilapidated second-class
contraption that could be found on the line. But of course we meant
business; we were not out for pleasure.
I was advised before I started from Vladivostok that Nikolsk, the
junction of the Manchurian and Central Siberian Railways, was the most
important strategical point on the South Siberian end of the line, and
that though the position on the Ussurie was pretty hopeless and
retirement might take place at any moment, we were not in any
circumstances to retire below Nikolsk. The place to which we were to
retire and take up a new position had been already decided--a line just
below Spascoe, with Lake Hanka on the left and a line of forest-covered
mountains on the right.
We arrived at Nikolsk in the early morning, but the platform was crowded
with inhabitants and two guards of honour, Czech and Cossack, with band,
which mistook "Rule Britannia" for the National Anthem. I was introduced
to all the officers, the British Vice-Consul, Mr. Ledwards, and his
energetic wife. Breakfast was served to the men by the other corps, and
my officers received the hospitality of the good Consul and Mrs.
Ledwards. Then a march through the town, to show the inhabitants that
the long-sought-for Allied assistance had really arrived at last.
It appears that a very sanguine French officer had travelled over the
line some months previously and had made lavish promises of Allied
support, which accounts, perhaps, for my previous orders received at
Hong-Kong towards the end of 1917. The Allies had decided to make a much
earlier effort to reconstruct the Russian line against their German
enemies, but, like all Allied efforts, their effective action had been
frustrated by divided counsels and stupid national jealousy.
It was the prospect of Falkenhayn, with the huge army of half a million
men, flushed with its recent easy victory over Rumania, being freed for
employment on the French front, that caused our hurried over-late
expedition to Siberia. If the effort had been made at the right time the
Russian people and soldiery would not have become so demoralised and
hopeless as they had when I arrived, and millions of lives would have
been saved from untold tortures. A famous statesman once sternly
admonished his colleagues for their fatal policy of doing nothing until
it was too late; in this case he himself is open to the same censure.
At Nikolsk had recently been fought an important battle between the
Czechs and the Terrorists, and we were shown a series of photographs of
horribly mutilated Czech soldiers who had fallen into the hands of the
Bolshevik army as prisoners of war. By a section of people at home the
Bolsheviks are thought to be a party of political and democratic
idealists, but when one is brought face to face with their work they are
then proved to be a disgusting gang of cut-throats, whose sole business
in life appears to be to terrorise and rob the peasant and worker and
make orderly government impossible.
We received equally warm welcomes at many other stations, and at length
we arrived at Svagena, which is the last fairly large town before
Kraevesk, the station without a town, and very near the range of hostile
artillery. Here quite a full-dress programme was gone through by the
Czech band and the Czech and Cossack soldiers, ending with a short march
past, and speeches by the English and Russian commanders. My speech was
made along the lines of my instructions, which were mostly to this
effect: We Britishers had entered the territory of Holy Russia not as
conquerors, but as friends. The Bolshevik power had made a corrupt and
dishonourable compact with their German masters, by which the
territories of their Motherland, Russia, had been torn from her side,
and a huge indemnity wrung from her people. Under German pressure the
Bolshevik Soviet power had armed the released German and Austrian
prisoners of war, and by means of this alien force was terrorising the
Russian people and destroying the country. The Allies looked upon the
Bolshevik power as a mere hireling branch of the autocratic German
menace, and as such the enemies of British and Russian democracy alike.
We came to help, resurrect and reconstruct the orderly elements of
Russian life, and promised that if they would join us in this crusade,
we would never cease our efforts till both our enemies were utterly
defeated. And here the soldiers of the two nations made their pact, and
though it was not an official utterance it had official sanction. My
troops retired to quarters at Spascoe, which I had made my forward base.
Next morning, August 7, with my interpreter, Lieutenant Bolsaar, I
visited Kraevesk, and had a long consultation with the commander at the
front, Captain Pomerensiv. I personally examined the line right up to
the outposts, and eventually it was decided that I would send forward
243 men with four maxims to take up a position towards what I considered
to be the threatened part of our right flank. As I was senior officer,
Captain Pomerensiv handed the command of this front over to me,
promising all help.
Once in the saddle I asked for intelligence reports from all directions,
and found it impossible for the enemy to make a frontal attack down the
narrow space of the railway, flanked as it was on both sides by
impassable marshes. The enemy centre was at Shmakovka, the place from
which the Czechs had been forced to retire: that day, however, he had
been observed moving a company of about 180 men with three machine guns
along the road towards Uspenkie, a small town situated on our extreme
right front. After consultation with Captain Stephan, Czech commander,
and Ataman Kalmakoff, commanding the Cossacks, I decided to take the
necessary steps to destroy this recently formed outpost. Ataman
Kalmakoff had that morning announced to me his intention to leave my
front and make a wide detour on the right behind the hills, and join his
Cossack friends at Iman. I discovered that he was dissatisfied with the
lack of enterprise hitherto shown on this front, and had decided to make
a raid "on his own" on the rear of the enemy. But the moment I stated my
intention to mop up Uspenkie he fell into line, and forgot all about his
previous ill-humour. He took up an advanced position at Olhanka,
reconnoitred the Uspenkie position the next day, and unmasked the
Bolshevik formation, with a loss of two horses and a Cossack badly
wounded. I formed my plans on his observations.
My scheme was to advance one company of Czech troops from Khamerovka to
Olhanka, the Ataman's most forward post on my right front, where they
were to prepare a small entrenched camp. I would also advance 200
infantry with two machine guns the first night from Kraevesk to
Khamerovka.
The next day I ordered 200 men to entrain from Spascoe to Kraevesk to
act as a reserve. They were to night march to Khamerovka, and occupy the
place of my forward party, who would advance by night and join the
Cossacks and Czech troops at Olhanka. I would be with the advanced group
and make a daylight examination of the post to be attacked, and be
joined at night by my second detachment from Khamerovka. By this means I
should have had 400 British rifles, a machine-gun section of forty-three
men with four maxims, a company of Czech infantry of about 200 men, and
last, but by no means least, Ataman Kalmakoff with about 400 Cossack
cavalry--a total of about 1,000 men. I ordered the two roads along which
any reinforcements for the enemy post must pass to be patrolled at night
and also closely observed during the day.
I had drawn up my plan of attack and the first stage of the operation
had actually been executed, when I was brought to a sudden standstill by
a piece of fussy interference.
There was no linguist in my battalion capable of speaking Russian
sufficiently well for my purpose, hence I had to seek the services of an
agent of the British Military Representative at "Vlady." This agent
returned to "Vlady" directly the necessary arrangements for the attack
had been completed. I ought to have compelled him to remain with me, but
as he appeared to favour the proposed forward movement I did not scent
any danger to my purely defensive policy. He did not wait until he had
reported to the Military Representative, but when only half way
telegraphed from Nikolsk warning me that in his opinion this forward
movement should not take place, as he had already received important
information which altered the entire situation. I ignored this
interference of an understraper, but a few hours later received definite
instructions from the Political Representative, that I was to stand
purely on the defensive, and not move an inch beyond my position. I was
compelled to accept the instruction, but was disgusted with the
decision. It proved to me in a forcible way what I had never realised
before, how impossible it is for a man at a distance, however clever he
may be, to decide a military problem, limited in locality and isolated,
as was this case, from questions of public policy. When the one purpose
of a force is the protection or maintenance of a limited front, only the
man on the spot can be the judge of what is necessary to accomplish that
purpose.
My actual plan of operations was very simple. Having assembled my force
at Olhanka, I should at dusk have occupied the roads leading from
Shmakovka to Uspenkie, and from Uspenkie to the monastery by cavalry,
thus making it impossible for enemy reinforcements to reach the post to
be attacked under the cover of night. My own troops, together with the
Czech company, would have approached the position from the south, and
during the hours of darkness have taken up a line within rifle- and
machine-gun range. At daybreak fire would have been opened from such
cover as could be obtained, and while our eight machine-gunners barraged
the post, the infantry would have advanced rapidly on the south front at
the same time as the Cossacks charged in from the rear. The result would
have been as certain as anything in war could be, and, as since then I
have met the Bolsheviks in open fight, I am convinced that this small
effort might have had decisive political and military influence in
Eastern Siberia. But the "politicals" in uniform are not always noted
for daring, and in this case were very timid indeed, and our position
grew worse from day to day.
I made the best dispositions possible in view of my cautious
instructions, and soon every man, British, Czech and Cossack, was imbued
with a determination to baulk the enemy's eastward ambitions at all
costs. The numbers I had brought to their assistance were nothing
compared to the influence of the sight of the poor, frayed and dirty
Union Jack that floated from my Headquarters, and the songs of the
Tommies round the mosquito fires in the bivouac at night. These two
factors together changed the whole atmosphere surrounding the valiant,
ill-fed and ill-equipped Czech soldiers.
The day following the night I had fixed for the destruction of the enemy
outpost two companies of enemy infantry and three guns marched out of
Shmakovka as a reinforcement to the debatable position. I watched
through my binoculars their slow movement along the dusty road. I judged
what the enemy's intentions were, and knew also that I was powerless to
prevent them. He quickly placed his guns in position, and the following
day sent a few trial shots at Kalmakoff's position at Olhanka; after
getting the range he ceased fire. About 11 P.M. the flash of guns was
observed on our right, which continued until midnight. At 12.30 the
field telephone informed me that the Czech company I had pushed forward,
together with Kalmakoff's Cossacks, had been shelled out of their
positions at Olhanka and were retreating along the Khamerovka and
Runovka roads. I disregarded the imperative instructions I had received
from "Vlady" not to move, and advanced my detachment by a midnight march
to occupy a position where I could protect the bridges and cover the
retreat of our friends. Had I failed to perform this simple soldierly
duty we should have placed ourselves in a ridiculous position in the
eyes of our Russian and Czech comrades. But though I acted against
orders, I think in the circumstances I was fully justified in doing so.
The Czech company retired safely behind the river at Khamerovka, and
Kalmakoff's Cossacks took up a new position at Runovka, where he could
still hang on to the skirts of the enemy and keep constant observation
upon his movements. I retired to a bivouac of branches and marsh grass
behind "Lookout Hill," where for a fortnight I carried on constant
warfare against infected waters and millions of mosquitoes, without
transport, tents, nets, or any of the ordinary equipment required by
such an expedition. I admit that my ignorance of the conditions which
might be expected to prevail in Siberia was colossal, but so also was
that of those whose duty it was to have made themselves acquainted with
the situation.
At Hong-Kong I had suggested that we might find tents useful, but the
proposal was turned down, either because there was none or because they
were considered quite unnecessary. I asked timidly whether I should
require mosquito nets, and well remember the scorn with which the Chief
of Staff greeted my question. "Who ever heard of mosquitoes in Siberia?"
Well, the fact is that while there are a few in the tropics, there are
swarms of these pests all over Siberia. In the tropics their size
prevents them from doing much damage, except as malaria carriers. In
Siberia they take the shape of big, ugly winged spiders, which will suck
your blood through a thick blanket as easily as if you had nothing on.
They have a knack of fixing themselves in one's hair below the cap and
raising swollen ridges round one's head until it is painful to wear any
headgear at all. In my case my wrists were puffed out level with my
hands. After sleeping, one woke unable to open one's eyes. The absence
of any protection wore out the patience and nerves of the men, and the
searching Bolshevik shells were accepted as a welcome diversion.
No blame was attached to my chiefs; I was fully equipped as a B1
Garrison battalion, and as such I was dispatched to Vladivostok. I was
sent there to perform a certain duty, but on arrival was at once called
upon to perform another of quite a different character. I had to carry
out the duties of a first-line service battalion with the personnel and
equipment of second grade garrison troops. Whether those with whom the
order originated in London were aware of the nature of the duty I was
expected to perform I do not know; but it is obviously dangerous to send
British troops of any category to an actual scene of operations and
expect them to stand idle, uninterested spectators of the struggles of
their friends. They should either be kept away or sent ready for all
emergencies.