the home demand for agricultural produce. The manufacturing districts
were, he showed, subjected by the Corn Laws to alternate periods of great
excitement and great depression. When corn was very cheap, the mass of
the community had much to spend on other things; when corn was very
dear, they had very little to spend on those things. In consequence, the
producers of ‘other things’ were sometimes stimulated by a great demand,
and at other times deadened by utter slackness. The labouring classes in
the manufacturing districts acquired in periods of plenty a certain taste
for what to them were luxuries, and in periods of scarcity were naturally
soured at being deprived of them. The manufacturers were frequently
induced to invest additional capital by sudden augmentations of demand,
and were often ruined by its sudden cessation. It was therefore
impossible that the manufacturing classes could be steady customers of
the agriculturists, for their own condition was fluctuating and unsteady.
Mr. Wilson also showed that if the landed interest was injured by the
effects of the Corn Laws, this was of itself enough to injure the
manufacturing interests.
‘The connection,’ he wrote, ‘between the manufacturer and
the landed interest in this country is much closer than is
generally admitted or believed; not only is the manufacturer
dependent on the landed interest for the large portion of his
goods which they immediately consume, but also for a very large
portion of what he exports to the most distant countries. All
commerce is, either directly or indirectly, a simple exchange
of the surplus products of one country for those of another. It
is therefore a first essential that we should be able to take
the cotton of America, the sugar and coffee of India, the silk
and teas of China, before they can take our manufactures; and
if this be necessary, then must it follow that in proportion
to the extent to which we can take their produce, will they
be enabled to take our manufactures. Therefore, whatever
portion of these products is consumed in this country by the
landed interest, must to that extent enable the manufacturer
to export his goods in return; and thus any causes which
increase this ability on the part of the landed interest to
consume, must give a corresponding additional ability to the
manufacturers to export. Every pound of coffee or sugar, every
ounce of tea, every article of luxury, the produce of foreign
climes, whether consumed within the castles and halls of
our wealthiest landowners, or in the humble cottages of our
lowliest peasantry, alike represent some portion of the exports
of this country. On the other hand, the dependence of the
landowner is no less twofold on the manufacturer and merchant.
He is not only dependent upon them for their own immediate
consumption, but also for the consumption of whatever food
enters into the cost price of their goods. Although the English
farmer does not export his corn or his other produce in the
exact shape and form in which he produces them, they constitute
not the less on that account a distinct portion of the exports
of this country, and that in the best of all possible forms.
Just as much as the manufacturer exports the wool or the
silk which enters into the fabrics of those materials, does
he export the corn which paid for the labour of spinning and
weaving them. It would be an utter impossibility that this
country could consume its agricultural produce but for our
extensive manufacturing population; or that the value of what
would be consumed could be near its present rate. If without
this aid our agricultural produce were as great as it now is, a
large portion would have to seek a market in distant countries:
it would then have to be exported in the exact form in which it
is produced; the expenses of which being so large would reduce
very greatly from its value and net price, and the landed
interest would be immediately affected thereby. But, as it
is, the produce of the land is exported in the condensed form
of manufactured goods, at a comparatively trifling expense,
which secures a high value to it here. Thus, for example, a few
bales of silk or woollen goods may contain as much wheat in
their value as would freight a whole ship. To this advantage
the landed interest is indebted, exclusively, for the very
superior value of property and produce in this country to any
other; because, by our great manufacturing superiority, a
market is found for our produce over the whole world, conveyed
in the cheapest and most condensed form. While the Chinese,
or Indians, buy our cottons, our silks, or our woollens, they
buy a portion of the grain and other produce of the land of
this country; and therefore the producer here, while indulging
in the delicacies or luxuries of Oriental climes, may only be
consuming a portion of the golden heads of wheat which had
gracefully waved in his own fields at a former day. Is it not,
therefore, sufficiently clear that no circumstance whatever
can either improve or injure one of these interests without
immediately in the same way affecting the other? The connection
is so close that it is impossible to separate or distinguish
them. Any circumstance which limits our commerce must limit our
market for agricultural produce; and any possible circumstance
which deteriorates the condition of our agriculturists must
deteriorate our commerce, by limiting our imports, and
consequently our exports. These are general principles, and are
capable of extension to the whole world, in all places, and at
all times; and the same principle as is thus shown to connect
and combine the different interests of any one country, just
as certainly operates in producing a similar effect between
different countries; and we ardently hope, ere long, to find
not only the petty jealousies between different portions of the
same community entirely removed, but that all countries will
learn that a free and unrestricted co-operation with each other
in matters of commerce can only tend to the general benefit and
welfare of all.’
We do not say that these propositions were exactly discoveries of Mr.
Wilson. During the exciting discussion of a great public question,
the most important truths which relate to it are ‘in the air’ of the
age; many persons see them, or half-see them; and it is impossible to
trace the precise parentage of any of them. But we do say that these
opinions were exactly suited to the broad and practical understanding
of Mr. Wilson; that they were very effectively illustrated by him—more
effectively probably than by any other writer; that he thought them out
for himself with but little knowledge of previous theories; that they,
principally, raised Free Trade from a class question to a national
question; that to them, whether advocated by Mr. Wilson or by others, the
success of the Anti-Corn Law agitation was in a great measure owing; that
whatever doubt may formerly have been felt, an ample trial has now proved
them to be true.
Mr. Wilson’s pamphlet entitled ‘The Revenue; or, What should the
Chancellor do?’ which attracted considerable attention when it was
published in 1841, is worth reading now, though dated so many years ago;
for it contains an outline of the financial policy which Sir Robert
Peel commenced, and which Mr. Gladstone has now almost completed. This
pamphlet, which is not very short (it has 27 moderate pages), was begun
as an article for the _Morning Chronicle_, but proved too long for that
purpose. It was written with almost inconceivable rapidity—nearly all,
we believe, in a single night—though its principles and its many figures
will bear a critical scrutiny even now.
In the briefest memoir of Mr. Wilson it is necessary to say something of
the currency; but it will not be advisable to say very much. If, however,
we could rely on the patience of our readers, we should say a good deal.
On no subject, perhaps, did Mr. Wilson take up a more characteristic
position. He saw certain broad principles distinctly and steadily, and to
these he firmly adhered, no matter what refined theories were suggested,
or what the opinion of others might be.
Mr. Wilson was a stern bullionist. He held that a five-pound note was a
promise to pay five pounds. He answered Sir R. Peel’s question, ‘What
is a pound?’ with Sir Robert’s own answer. He said it was a certain
specified quantity of gold metal. He held that all devices for aiding
industry by issuing inconvertible notes were certainly foolish, and
might perhaps be mischievous. He held that industry could only be really
aided by additional _capital_—by new machines, new instruments, new raw
material; that an addition to a paper _currency_ was as useless to aid
deficient capital as it was to feed a hungry population.
Mr. Wilson held, secondly, that the _sine quâ non_, the great
prerequisite to a good paper currency, was the maintenance of an
adequate reserve by the issuer. He believed that a banker should look
at his liabilities as a whole—the notes which he has in circulation and
the deposits he has in his ledger taken together; and should retain a
sufficient portion of them (say one-third) in cash, or in something
equivalent to cash, in daily readiness to pay them at once. Mr. Wilson
considered that bankers might be trusted to keep such a reserve, as they
would be ruined, sooner or later, if they did not; and if the notes
issued by them were always convertible at the pleasure of the holder, he
believed that the currency would never be depreciated.
He thought, however, that, as bank-notes must pass from hand to hand in
the market, and as in practice most persons—most traders, especially—must
take them in payment whether they wish to do so or not, some special
security might properly be required for their payment. He would have
allowed any one who liked to issue bank-notes on depositing Consols to
a sufficient amount—the amount, that is, of the notes issued, and an
adequate percentage in addition.
Lastly, Mr. Wilson believed that the bank-note circulation exercised
quite a secondary and unimportant influence upon prices and upon
transactions, in comparison with the auxiliary currency of cheques and
credits, which has indefinitely augmented during the last thirty years.
So far from regarding the public as constantly ready for an unlimited
supply of bank-notes, he thought that it was only in times of extreme
panic, when this auxiliary currency is diminished and disturbed, that the
bank-notes in the hands of the public either could or would be augmented.
He believed that the public only kept in their hands as many notes as
they wanted for their own convenience, and that all others were in the
present day paid back to the banker immediately and necessarily.
Unfortunately, however, the currency is not discussed in England with
very exact reference to abstract principles. The popular question of
every thinker is, ‘Are you in favour of Peel’s Bill, or are you against
it?’ And this mode of discussing the subject always placed Mr. Wilson in
a position of some difficulty. He concurred in the aim of Sir R. Peel,
but objected to his procedure. He wished to secure the convertibility
of the bank-note. He believed that the Act of 1844 indirectly induced
the Bank Directors to keep more bullion than they would keep otherwise,
and in so far he thought it beneficial; but he also thought that the
advantages obtained by it were purchased at a needless price; that they
might have been obtained much more cheaply; that the machinery of the
Act aggravated every panic; that it tended to fix the attention of the
public on bank-notes, and so fostered the mischievous delusion that the
augmented issue of paper currency would strengthen industry; that it
neglected to take account of other forms of credit which are equally
important with bank-notes; that, ‘_for one week in ten years_’—the week
of panic—it created needless and intense apprehension, and so tended to
cause the ruin of some solvent commercial men. In brief, though he fully
believed the professed object of Sir R. Peel—the convertibility of the
bank-note—to be beneficial and inestimable, he as fully believed the
special means selected by him to be inconvenient and pernicious.
Opinions akin to Mr. Wilson’s, if not identical with them, are very
commonly now entertained, both by practical men of business and by
professional economists. The younger school of thinkers who have had
before them the working of the Act of 1844 and the events of 1847 and
1857, and are not committed by any of the older controversies, are
especially inclined to them. Yet from peculiar causes they have not been
so popular as Mr. Wilson’s other opinions. His views of finance and of
the effect of Free Trade, which were half heresies when he announced
them, have now become almost axioms. But the truth of his currency theory
is still warmly controverted. The reason is this:—Sir R. Peel’s Act
is a sort of compromise which is suited to the English people. It was
probably intended by its author as a preliminary step; it undoubtedly
suits no strict theory; it certainly has great marks of incompleteness;
but, ‘it works tolerably well;’ if it produces evils at a crisis, ‘crises
come but seldom;’ in ordinary times commerce ‘goes on very fairly.’ The
pressure of practical evil upon the English people has never yet been
so great as to induce them to face the unpleasant difficulties of the
abstract currency question. Mr. Wilson’s opinions have, therefore, never
been considered by practical men for a practical object, and it is only
when so considered that any opinions of his can be duly estimated. Their
essentially moderate character, too, is unfavourable to them—not, indeed,
among careful inquirers, but in the hubbub of public controversy. The
only great party which has as yet attacked Sir Robert Peel’s Bill is
that which desires an extensive issue of inconvertible currency; but
to them Mr. Wilson was as much opposed as Sir Robert Peel himself. The
two watchwords of the controversy are ‘caution’ and ‘expansion:’ the
advocates of the Act of 1844 have seized on the former, the Birmingham
school on the latter; the intermediate, and, as we think, juster opinions
of Mr. Wilson have had no party cry to aid them, and they have not as
yet therefore obtained the practical influence which he never ceased to
anticipate and to hope for them. No more need be said upon the currency
question—perhaps we have already said too much; but to those who knew Mr.
Wilson well, no subject is more connected with his memory: he was so fond
of expounding it, that its very technicalities are, in the minds of some,
associated with his voice and image.
But it was not by mere correctness of economical speculation that Mr.
Wilson was to rise to eminence. A very accurate knowledge of even
the more practical aspects of economical science is not of itself a
productive source of income. By the foundation of the _Economist_ Mr.
Wilson secured for himself, during the rest of his life, competence
and comfort, but it was not solely or simply by writing good political
economy in it. The organisation of a first-rate commercial paper in 1843
required a great inventiveness and also a great discretion. Nothing of
the kind then existed; it was not known what the public most wished to
know on business interests; the best shape of communicating information
had to be invented in detail. The labour of creating such a paper and
of administering it during its early stages is very great; and might
well deter most men even of superior ability from attempting it. At
this period of his life Mr. Wilson used to superintend the whole of
the _Economist_; to write all the important leaders, nearly all of the
unimportant ones; to make himself master of every commercial question
as it arose; to give practical details as to the practical aspects of
it; to be on the watch for every kind of new commercial information; to
spend hours in adapting it to the daily wants of commercial men. He often
worked till far into the morning, and impressed all about him with wonder
at the anxiety, labour, and exhaustion he was able to undergo. As has
been stated, for some months after the commencement of the _Economist_
he was still engaged in his former business; and after he relinquished
that, he used to write the City article and also leaders for the _Morning
Chronicle_, at the very time that he was doing on his own paper far more
than most men would have had endurance of mind or strength of body for.
Long afterwards he used to speak of this period as far more exhausting
than the most exhausting part of a laborious public life. ‘Our public
men,’ he once said, ‘do not know what anxiety means; they have never
known what it is to have their own position dependent on their own
exertions.’ In 1843, and for some time afterwards, he had himself to bear
extreme labour and great anxiety together; and even his iron frame was
worn and tired by the conjunction.
Within seven years from the foundation of the _Economist_, Mr. Wilson
dealt effectively and thoroughly with three first-rate subjects—the
railway mania, the famine in Ireland, and the panic of 1847, in addition
to the entire question of Free Trade, which was naturally the main
topic of economical teaching in those years. On all these three topics
he explained somewhat original opinions, which were novelties, if not
paradoxes then, though they are very generally believed now. To his
writings on the railway mania he was especially fond of recurring, since
he believed that by his warnings, very effectively brought out and very
constantly reiterated, he had ‘saved several men their fortunes’ at that
time.
The success of the _Economist_, and the advantage which the proprietor
of it would derive from a first-hand acquaintance with political life,
naturally led him to think of gaining a seat in Parliament, and an
accidental conversation at Lord Radnor’s table fixed his attention on the
borough of Westbury. After receiving a requisition, he visited the place,
explained his political sentiments at much length ‘from an old cart,’
and believed that he saw sufficient chances of success to induce him to
take a house there. He showed considerable abilities in electioneering,
and a close observer once said of him, ‘Mr. Wilson may or may not be the
best political economist in England, but depend upon it he is the _only_
political economist who would ever come in for the borough of Westbury.’
Though nominally a borough, the constituency is half a rural one, much
under the influence of certain Conservative squires. The Liberal party
were in 1847 only endeavouring to emancipate themselves from a yoke to
which they have now again succumbed. Except for Mr. Wilson’s constant
watchfulness, his animated geniality, his residence on the spot, his
knowledge of every voter by sight, the Liberal party might never have
been successful there. A certain expansive frankness of manner and a
wonderful lucidity in explaining his opinions almost to any one, gave
Mr. Wilson great advantages as a popular candidate; and it was very
remarkable to find these qualities connected with a strong taste for
treating very dry subjects upon professedly abstract principles. So
peculiar a combination had the success which it merited. In the summer of
1847 he was elected to serve in Parliament for Westbury.
Mr. Wilson made his first speech in the House of Commons on the motion
for a Committee to inquire into the commercial distress at that time
prevalent. And it was considered an act of intellectual boldness for
a new member to explain his opinions on so difficult a subject as the
currency, especially as they were definitely opposed to a measure
supported by such overwhelming Parliamentary authority as the Act of
1844 then was. Judging from the report in ‘Hansard,’ and from the
recollections of some who heard it, the speech was a successful one. It
is very clear and distinct, and its tone is very emphatic, without ever
ceasing to be considerate and candid. It contains a sufficient account
of Mr. Wilson’s tenets on the currency—so good an account, indeed, that
when he read it ten years later, in the panic of 1857, he acknowledged
that he did not think he could add a word to it. At the time, however,
the test of its Parliamentary success was not the absolute correctness of
its abstract principles, but, to use appropriate and technical language,
‘its getting a rise out of Peel.’ Sir Robert had used some certainly
inconclusive arguments in favour of his favourite measure, and Mr. Wilson
made that inconclusiveness so very clear that he thought it necessary to
rise ‘and explain,’ which, on such a subject, was deemed at the moment a
great triumph for a first speech.
As might be expected from so favourable a commencement, Mr. Wilson soon
established a Parliamentary reputation. He was not a formal orator,
and did not profess to be so. But he had great powers of exposition,
singular command of telling details upon his own subjects, a very
pleasing voice, a grave but by no means inanimate manner—qualities which
are amply sufficient to gain the respectful attention of the House of
Commons. And Mr. Wilson did gain it. But speaking is but half, and in
the great majority of cases by far the smaller half, of the duties of a
member of Parliament. Mr. Wilson was fond of quoting a saying of Sir R.
Peel’s, ‘That the way to get on in the House of Commons was to take a
place and sit there.’ He adopted this rule himself, was constant in his
attendance at the House, a good listener to other men, and always ready
to take trouble with troublesome matters. These plain and business-like
qualities, added to his acknowledged ability and admitted acquaintance
with a large class of subjects upon which knowledge is rare, gave Mr.
Wilson a substantial influence in the House of Commons in an unusually
short time. The Corn Laws had been repealed, the pitched battle of
Free Trade had been fought and won, but much yet remained to be done in
carrying out its principles with effective precision, in applying them
to articles other than corn, in exposing the fallacies still abundantly
current, and in answering the exceptional case, which every trade in
succession set up for an exceptional protection. These were painful and
complex matters of detail, wearisome to very many persons, and rewarding
with no _éclat_ those who took the trouble to master and explain them.
But Mr. Wilson shrank from no detail. For several years before he
had a seat in the House, he had been used to explain such topics in
countless conversations with the most prominent Free-traders and in the
_Economist_. He now did so in the House of Commons, and his influence
correspondingly increased. He was able to do an important work better
than any one else could do it; and, in English public life, real work
rightly done at the right season scarcely ever fails to meet with a real
reward.
That Mr. Wilson early acquired considerable Parliamentary reputation is
evinced by the best of all proofs. He was offered office before he had
been six months in the House of Commons, though he had, as the preceding
sketch will have made evident, no aristocratic connections—though he was
believed to be a poorer man than he really was—though writing political
articles for newspapers has never been in England the sure introduction
to political power which it formerly was in France—though, on the
contrary, it has in general been found a hindrance. In a case like Mr.
Wilson’s, the prize of office was a sure proof of evident prowess in the
Parliamentary arena.