After Bagehot had taken his Master’s degree, and while he was still

reading Law in London, and hesitating between the Bar and the family

bank, there came as Principal to University Hall (which is a hall of

residence in connection with University College, London, established by

the Presbyterians and Unitarians after the passing of the Dissenters’

Chapel Act), the man who had, I think, a greater intellectual fascination

for Bagehot than any of his contemporaries—Arthur Hugh Clough, Fellow

of Oriel College, Oxford, and author of various poems of great genius,

more or less familiar to the public, though Clough is perhaps better

known as the subject of the exquisite poem written on his death in

1861, by his friend Matthew Arnold—the poem to which he gave the name

of ‘Thyrsis’—than by even the most popular of his own. Bagehot had

subscribed for the erection of University Hall, and took an active

part at one time on its council. Thus he saw a good deal of Clough,

and did what he could to mediate between that enigma to Presbyterian

parents—a college-head who held himself serenely neutral on almost

all moral and educational subjects interesting to parents and pupils,

except the observance of disciplinary rules—and the managing body who

bewildered him and were by him bewildered. I don’t think either Bagehot

or Clough’s other friends were very successful in their mediation, but

he at least gained in Clough a cordial friend, and a theme of profound

intellectual and moral interest to himself which lasted him his life, and

never failed to draw him into animated discussion long after Clough’s

own premature death; and I think I can trace the effect which some of

Clough’s writings had on Bagehot’s mind to the very end of his career.

There were some points of likeness between Bagehot and Clough, but many

more of difference. Both had the capacity for boyish spirits in them,

and the florid colour which usually accompanies a good deal of animal

vigour; both were reserved men, with a great dislike of anything like

the appearance of false sentiment, and both were passionate admirers of

Wordsworth’s poetry; but Clough was slightly lymphatic, with a great

tendency to unexpressed and unacknowledged discouragement, and to the

paralysis of silent embarrassment when suffering from such feelings,

while Bagehot was keen, and very quickly evacuated embarrassing

positions, and never returned to them. When however, Clough was happy

and at ease, there was a calm and silent radiance in his face, and his

head was set with a kind of stateliness on his shoulders, that gave him

almost an Olympian air; but this would sometimes vanish in a moment into

an embarrassed taciturnity that was quite uncouth. One of his friends

declares that the man who was said to be ‘a cross between a schoolboy

and a bishop,’ must have been like Clough. There was in Clough, too, a

large Chaucerian simplicity and a flavour of homeliness, so that now

and then, when the light shone into his eyes, there was something, in

spite of the air of fine scholarship and culture, which reminded one of

the best likenesses of Burns. It was of Clough, I believe, that Emerson

was thinking (though, knowing Clough intimately as he did, he was of

course speaking mainly in joke) when he described the Oxford of that day

thus:—‘“Ah,” says my languid Oxford gentleman, “nothing new, and nothing

true, and no matter.”’ No saying could misrepresent Clough’s really

buoyant and simple character more completely than that; but doubtless

many of his sayings and writings, treating, as they did, most of the

greater problems of life as insoluble, and enjoining a self-possessed

composure under the discovery of their insolubility, conveyed an

impression very much like this to men who came only occasionally in

contact with him. Bagehot, in his article on Crabb Robinson, says that

the latter, who in those days seldom remembered names, always described

Clough as ‘that admirable and accomplished man—you know whom I mean—the

one who never says anything.’ And certainly Clough was often taciturn to

the last degree, or if he opened his lips, delighted to open them only

to scatter confusion by discouraging, in words at least, all that was

then called earnestness—as, for example, by asking, ‘Was it ordained that

twice two should make four, simply for the intent that boys and girls

should be cut to the heart that they do not make five? Be content; when

the veil is raised, perhaps they will make five! Who knows?’[10]

Clough’s chief fascination for Bagehot was, I think, that he had as

a poet in some measure rediscovered, at all events realised, as few

ever realised before, the enormous difficulty of finding truth—a

difficulty which he somewhat paradoxically held to be enhanced rather

than diminished by the intensity of the truest modern passion for it.

The stronger the desire, he teaches, the greater is the danger of

illegitimately satisfying that desire by persuading ourselves that what

we _wish_ to believe, is true, and the greater the danger of ignoring the

actual confusions of human things:—

‘Rules baffle instincts, instincts rules,

Wise men are bad, and good are fools,

Facts evil, wishes vain appear,

We cannot go, why are we here?

‘Oh, may we, for assurance’ sake,

Some arbitrary judgment take,

And wilfully pronounce it clear,

For this or that ’tis, we are here?

‘Or is it right, and will it do

To pace the sad confusion through,

And say, it does not yet appear

What we shall be—what we are here?’

This warning to withhold judgment and not cheat ourselves into beliefs

which our own imperious desire to believe had alone engendered, is given

with every variety of tone and modulation, and couched in all sorts of

different forms of fancy and apologue, throughout Clough’s poems. He

insists on ‘the _ruinous_ force of the will’ to persuade us of illusions

which please us; of the tendency of practical life to give us beliefs

which suit that practical life, but are none the truer for that; and is

never weary of warning us that a firm belief in a falsity can be easily

generated:—

‘_Action will furnish belief_,—but will that belief be the true one?

This is the point, you know. However, it doesn’t much matter.

What one wants, I suppose, is to predetermine the action,

So as to make it entail, not a chance belief, but the true one.’

This practical preaching, which Clough urges in season and out of season,

met an answering chord in Bagehot’s mind, not so much in relation to

religious belief as in relation to the over-haste and over-eagerness of

human conduct, and I can trace the effect of it in all his writings,

political and otherwise, to the end of his life. Indeed, it affected him

much more in later days than in the years immediately following his first

friendship with Clough. With all his boyish dash, there was something

in Bagehot even in youth which dreaded precipitancy, and not only

precipitancy itself, but those moral situations tending to precipitancy

which men who have no minds of their own to make up, so often court. In

later life he pleased himself by insisting that, on Darwin’s principle,

civilised men, with all the complex problems of modern life to puzzle

them, suspend their judgment so little, and are so eager for action,

only because they have inherited from the earlier, simpler, and more

violent ages, an excessive predisposition to action unsuited to our epoch

and dangerous to our future development. But it was Clough, I think,

who first stirred in Bagehot’s mind this great dread of ‘the ruinous

force of the will,’ a phrase he was never weary of quoting, and which

might almost be taken as the motto of his ‘Physics and Politics,’ the

great conclusion of which is that in the ‘age of discussion,’ grand

policies and high-handed diplomacy and sensational legislation of all

kinds will become rarer and rarer, because discussion will point out all

the difficulties of such policies in relation to a state of existence

so complex as our own, and will in this way tend to repress the excess

of practical energy handed down to us by ancestors to whom life was a

sharper, simpler, and more perilous affair.

But the time for Bagehot’s full adoption of the suspensive principle in

public affairs was not yet. In 1851 he went to Paris, shortly before

the _coup d’état_. And while all England was assailing Louis Napoleon

(justly enough, as I think) for his perfidy, and his impatience of

the self-willed Assembly he could not control, Bagehot was preparing

a deliberate and very masterly defence of that bloody and high-handed

act. Even Bagehot would, I think, if pressed judiciously in later life,

have admitted—though I can’t say he ever _did_—that the _coup d’état_

was one of the best illustrations of ‘the ruinous force of the will’ in

engendering, or at least crystallising, a false intellectual conclusion

as to the political possibilities of the future, which recent history

could produce. Certainly he always spoke somewhat apologetically of

these early letters, though I never heard him expressly retract their

doctrine. In 1851 a knot of young Unitarians, of whom I was then one,

headed by the late Mr. J. Langton Sanford—afterwards the historian of

the Great Rebellion, who survived Bagehot barely four months—had engaged

to help for a time in conducting the _Inquirer_, which then was, and

still is, the chief literary and theological organ of the Unitarian

body. Our _régime_ was, I imagine, a time of great desolation for the

very tolerant and thoughtful constituency for whom we wrote; and many of

them, I am confident, yearned, and were fully justified in yearning, for

those better days when this tyranny of ours should be overpast. Sanford

and Osler did a good deal to throw cold water on the rather optimist and

philanthropic politics of the most sanguine, because the most benevolent

and open-hearted of Dissenters. Roscoe criticised their literary work

from the point of view of a devotee of the Elizabethan poets; and I

attempted to prove to them in distinct heads, first, that their laity

ought to have the protection afforded by a liturgy against the arbitrary

prayers of their ministers; and next, that at least the great majority

of their sermons ought to be suppressed, and the habit of delivering

them discontinued almost altogether. Only a denomination of ‘just men’

trained in tolerance for generations, and in that respect, at least,

made all but ‘perfect,’ would have endured it at all; but I doubt if

any of us caused the Unitarian body so much grief as Bagehot, who never

was a Unitarian, but who contributed a series of brilliant letters on

the _coup d’état_, in which he trod just as heavily on the toes of his

colleagues as he did on those of the public by whom the _Inquirer_ was

taken. In those letters he not only, as I have already shown, eulogised

the Catholic Church, but he supported the Prince-President’s military

violence, attacked the freedom of the Press in France, maintained

that the country was wholly unfit for true Parliamentary government,

and—worst of all perhaps—insinuated a panegyric on Louis Napoleon

himself, asserting that he had been far better prepared for the duties of

a statesman by gambling on the turf, than he would have been by poring

over the historical and political dissertations of the wise and the good.

This was Bagehot’s day of cynicism. The seven letters which he wrote on

the _coup d’état_ were certainly very exasperating, and yet they were

not caricatures of his real thought, for his private letters at the time

were more cynical still. Crabb Robinson, in speaking of him, used ever

afterwards to describe him to me as ‘that friend of yours—you know whom

I mean, you rascal!—who wrote those abominable, those most disgraceful

letters on the _coup d’état_—I did not forgive him for years after.’ Nor

do I wonder, even now, that a sincere friend of constitutional freedom

and intellectual liberty, like Crabb Robinson, found them difficult to

forgive. They were light and airy, and even flippant on a very grave

subject. They made nothing of the Prince’s perjury; and they took

impertinent liberties with all the dearest prepossessions of the readers

of the _Inquirer_, and assumed their sympathy just where Bagehot knew

that they would be most revolted by his opinions. Nevertheless, they had

a vast deal of truth in them, and no end of ability, and I hope that

there will be many to read them with interest now that they are here

republished. There is a good deal of the raw material of history in

them, and certainly I doubt if Bagehot ever again hit the satiric vein

of argument so well. Here is a passage that will bear taking out of its

context, and therefore not so full of the shrewd malice of these letters

as many others, but which will illustrate their ability. It is one in

which Bagehot maintained for the first time the view (which I believe he

subsequently almost persuaded English politicians to accept, though in

1852 it was a mere flippant novelty, a paradox, and a heresy) that free

institutions are apt to succeed with a stupid people, and to founder with

a ready-witted and vivacious one. After broaching this, he goes on:—

‘I see you are surprised. You are going to say to me as

Socrates did to Polus, “My young friend, _of course_ you are

right, but will you explain what you mean, as you are not yet

intelligible?” I will do so as well as I can, and endeavour to

make good what I say, not from a prior demonstration of my own,

but from the details of the present and the facts of history.

Not to begin by wounding any present susceptibilities, let me

take the Roman character, for, with one great exception—I need

not say to whom I allude—they are the great political people

of history. Now is not a certain dulness their most visible

characteristic? What is the history of their speculative

mind? A blank. What their literature? A copy. They have left

not a single discovery in any abstract science, not a single

perfect or well-formed work of high imagination. The Greeks,

the perfection of human and accomplished genius, bequeathed

to mankind the ideal forms of self-idolising art; the Romans

imitated and admired. The Greeks explained the laws of nature;

the Romans wondered and despised. The Greeks invented a system

of numerals second only to that now in use; the Romans counted

to the end of their days with the clumsy apparatus which

we still call by their name. The Greeks made a capital and

scientific calendar; the Romans began their month when the

Pontifex Maximus happened to spy out the new moon. Throughout

Latin literature this is the perpetual puzzle—Why are we free

and they slaves?—we prætors and they barbers? Why do the stupid

people always win and the clever people always lose? I need

not say that in real sound stupidity the English people are

unrivalled. You’ll have more wit, and better wit, in an Irish

street-row than would keep Westminster Hall in humour for five

weeks.... These valuable truths are no discoveries of mine.

They are familiar enough to people whose business it is to

know them. Hear what a douce and aged attorney says of your

peculiarly promising barrister. “Sharp? Oh! yes, yes: he’s too

sharp by half. He isn’t _safe_, not a minute, isn’t that young

man.” “What style, sir,” asked of an East India Director some

youthful aspirant for literary renown, “is most to be preferred

in the composition of official despatches?” “My good fellow,”

responded the ruler of Hindostan, “the style _as we_ like, is

the Humdrum.”’[11]

The permanent value of these papers is due to the freshness of their

impressions of the French capital, and their true criticisms of Parisian

journalism and society; their perverseness consists in this, that

Bagehot steadily ignored in them the distinction between the duty of

resisting anarchy, and the assumption of the Prince-President that this

could only be done by establishing his own dynasty, and deferring _sine

die_ that great constitutional experiment which is now once more, no

thanks to him or his Government, on its trial; an experiment which, for

anything we see, had at least as good a chance then as now, and under

a firm and popular chief of the executive like Prince Louis, would

probably have had a better chance then than it has now under MacMahon.

I need hardly say that in later life Bagehot was by no means blind to

the political shortcomings of Louis Napoleon’s _régime_, as the article

republished from the _Economist_, in the second appendix to this volume,

sufficiently proves. Moreover, he rejoiced heartily in the moderation

of the republican statesmen during the severe trials of the months

which just preceded his own death, in 1877, and expressed his sincere

belief—confirmed by the history of the last year and a half—that the

existing Republic has every prospect of life and growth.

During that residence in Paris, Bagehot, though, as I have said, in a

somewhat cynical frame of mind, was full of life and courage, and was

beginning to feel his own genius, which perhaps accounts for the air of

recklessness so foreign to him, which he never adopted either before

or since. During the riots he was a good deal in the streets, and from

a mere love of art helped the Parisians to construct some of their

barricades, notwithstanding the fact that his own sympathy was with those

who shot down the barricades, not with those who manned them. He climbed

over the rails of the Palais Royal on the morning of December 2nd to

breakfast, and used to say that he was the only person who did breakfast

there on that day. Victor Hugo is certainly wrong in asserting that no

one expected Louis Napoleon to use force, and that the streets were as

full as usual when the people were shot down, for the gates of the Palais

Royal were shut quite early in the day. Bagehot was very much struck by

the ferocious look of the Montagnards.

‘Of late,’ he wrote to me, ‘I have been devoting my entire

attention to the science of barricades, which I found amusing.

They have systematised it in a way which is pleasing to the

cultivated intellect. We had only one good day’s fighting,

and I naturally kept out of cannon-shot. But I took a quiet

walk over the barricades in the morning, and superintended the

construction of three with as much keenness as if I had been

clerk of the works. You’ve seen lots, of course, at Berlin, but

I should not think those Germans were up to a real Montagnard,

who is the most horrible being to the eye I ever saw,—sallow,

sincere, sour fanaticism, with grizzled moustaches, and a

strong wish to shoot you rather than not. The Montagnards are a

scarce commodity, the real race—only three or four, if so many,

to a barricade. If you want a Satan any odd time, they’ll do;

only I hope that _he_ don’t believe in human brotherhood. It

is not possible to respect any one who does, and I should be

loth to confound the notion of _our_ friend’s solitary grandeur

by supposing him to fraternise,’ &c. ‘I think M. Buonaparte is

entitled to great praise. He has very good heels to his boots,

and the French just want treading down, and nothing else—calm,

cruel, business-like oppression, to take the dogmatic conceit

out of their heads. The spirit of generalisation which, John

Mill tells us, honourably distinguishes the French mind, has

come to this, that every Parisian wants his head _tapped_ in

order to get the formulæ and nonsense out of it. And it would

pay to perform the operation, for they are very clever on what

is within the limit of their experience, and all that can be

“expanded” in terms of it, but beyond, it is all generalisation

and folly.... So I am for any carnivorous government.’

And again, in the same letter:—

‘Till the Revolution came I had no end of trouble to find

conversation, but now they’ll talk against everybody, and

against the President like mad—and they talk immensely well,

and the language is like a razor, capital if you are skilful,

but sure to cut you if you aren’t. A fellow can talk German

in crude forms, and I don’t see it sounds any worse, but this

stuff is horrid unless you get it _quite_ right. A French lady

made a striking remark to me:—“_C’est une révolution qui a

sauvé la France. Tous mes amis sont mis en prison_.” She was

immensely delighted that such a pleasing way of saving her

country had been found.’

Of course the style of these familiar private letters conveys a gross

caricature not only of Bagehot’s maturer mind, but even of the judgment

of the published letters, and I quote them only to show that at the time

when he composed these letters on the _coup d’état_, Bagehot’s mood was

that transient mood of reckless youthful cynicism through which so many

men of genius pass. I do not think he had at any time any keen sympathy

with the multitude, _i.e._, with masses of unknown men. And that he ever

felt what has since then been termed ‘the enthusiasm of humanity,’ the

sympathy with ‘the toiling millions of men sunk in labour and pain,’

he himself would strenuously have denied. Such sympathy, even when men

really desire to feel it, is, indeed, very much oftener coveted than

actually felt by men as a living motive; and I am not quite sure that

Bagehot would have even wished to feel it. Nevertheless, he had not the

faintest trace of real hardness about him towards people whom he knew

and understood. He could not bear to give pain; and when, in rare cases

by youthful inadvertence, he gave it needlessly, I have seen how much

and what lasting vexation it caused him. Indeed, he was capable of great

sacrifices to spare his friends but a little suffering.

It was, I think, during his stay in Paris that Bagehot finally decided

to give up the notion of practising at the Bar, and to join his father

in the Somersetshire Bank and in his other business as a merchant and

ship-owner. This involved frequent visits to London and Liverpool, and

Bagehot soon began to take a genuine interest in the larger issues of

commerce, and maintained to the end that ‘business is much more amusing

than pleasure.’ Nevertheless, he could not live without the intellectual

life of London, and never stayed more than six weeks at a time in the

country without finding some excuse for going to town; and long before

his death he made his home there. Hunting was the only sport he really

cared for. He was a dashing rider, and a fresh wind was felt blowing

through his earlier literary efforts, as though he had been thinking

in the saddle, an effect wanting in his later essays, where you see

chiefly the calm analysis of a lucid observer. But most of the ordinary

amusements of young people he detested. He used to say that he wished he

could think balls _wicked_, being so stupid as they were, and all ‘the

little blue and pink girls, so like each other,’—a sentiment partly due,

perhaps, to his extreme shortness of sight.

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