EQUALIZING OF THE FACILITIES OF PRODUCTION.
The protectionists often use the following argument:
"It is our belief that protection should correspond to, should be the
representation of, the difference which exists between the price of an
article of home production and a similar article of foreign
production. A protective duty calculated upon such a basis does
nothing more than secure free competition; free competition can only
exist where there is an equality in the facilities of production. In a
horse-race the load which each horse carries is weighed and all
advantages equalized; otherwise there could be no competition. In
commerce, if one producer can undersell all others, he ceases to be a
competitor and becomes a monopolist. Suppress the protection which
represents the difference of price according to each, and foreign
produce must immediately inundate and obtain the monopoly of our
market. Every one ought to wish, for his own sake and for that of the
community, that the productions of the country should be protected
against foreign competition, _whenever the latter may be able to
undersell the former_."
This argument is constantly recurring in all writings of the
protectionist school. It is my intention to make a careful
investigation of its merits, and I must begin by soliciting the
attention and the patience of the reader. I will first examine into
the inequalities which depend upon natural causes, and afterwards into
those which are caused by diversity of taxes.
Here, as elsewhere, we find the theorists who favor protection taking
part with the producer. Let us consider the case of the unfortunate
consumer, who seems to have entirely escaped their attention. They
compare the field of protection to the _turf_. But on the turf, the
race is at once a _means and an end_. The public has no interest in
the struggle, independent of the struggle itself. When your horses are
started in the course with the single object of determining which is
the best runner, nothing is more natural than that their burdens
should be equalized. But if your object were to send an important and
critical piece of intelligence, could you without incongruity place
obstacles to the speed of that one whose fleetness would secure you
the best means of attaining your end? And yet this is your course in
relation to industry. You forget the end aimed at, which is the
_well-being_ of the community; you set it aside; more, you sacrifice
it by a perfect _petitio principii_.
But we cannot lead our opponents to look at things from our point of
view; let us now take theirs: let us examine the question as
producers.
I will seek to prove:
1. That equalizing the facilities of production is to attack the
foundations of mutual exchange.
2. That it is not true that the labor of one country can be crushed by
the competition of more favored climates.
3. That, even were this the case, protective duties cannot equalize
the facilities of production.
4. That freedom of trade equalizes these conditions as much as
possible; and
5. That the countries which are the least favored by nature are those
which profit most by mutual exchange.
1. _Equalizing the facilities of production is to attack the
foundations of mutual exchange._ The equalizing of the facilities of
production, is not only the shackling of certain articles of commerce,
but it is the attacking of the system of mutual exchange in its very
foundation principle. For this system is based precisely upon the very
diversities, or, if the expression be preferred, upon the inequalities
of fertility, climate, temperature, capabilities, which the
protectionists seek to render null. If New England sends its
manufactures to the West, and the West sends corn to New England, it
is because these two sections are, from different circumstances,
induced to turn their attention to the production of different
articles. Is there any other rule for international exchanges?
Again, to bring against such exchanges the very inequalities of
condition which excite and explain them, is to attack them in their
very cause of being. The protective system, closely followed up, would
bring men to live like snails, in a state of complete isolation. In
short, there is not one of its sophisms, which, if carried through by
vigorous deductions, would not end in destruction and annihilation.
2. _It is not true that the labor of one country can be crushed by the
competition of more favored climates._ The statement is not true that
the unequal facility of production, between two similar branches of
industry, should necessarily cause the destruction of the one which is
the least fortunate. On the turf, if one horse gains the prize, the
other loses it; but when two horses work to produce any useful
article, each produces in proportion to his strength; and because the
stronger is the more useful it does not follow that the weaker is good
for nothing. Wheat is cultivated in every section of the United
States, although there are great differences in the degree of
fertility existing among them. If it happens that there be one which
does not cultivate it, it is because, even to itself, such cultivation
is not useful. Analogy will show us, that under the influences of an
unshackled trade, notwithstanding similar differences, wheat would be
produced in every portion of the world; and if any nation were induced
to entirely abandon the cultivation of it, this would only be because
it would _be her interest_ to otherwise employ her lands, her capital,
and her labor. And why does not the fertility of one department
paralyze the agriculture of a neighboring and less favored one?
Because the phenomena of political economy have a suppleness, an
elasticity, and, so to speak, _a self-levelling power_, which seems to
escape the attention of the school of protectionists. They accuse us
of being theoretic, but it is themselves who are so to a supreme
degree, if the being theoretic consists in building up systems upon
the experience of a single fact, instead of profiting by the
experience of a series of facts. In the above example, it is the
difference in the value of lands which compensates for the difference
in their fertility. Your field produces three times as much as mine.
Yes. But it has cost you ten times as much, and therefore I can still
compete with you: this is the sole mystery. And observe how the
advantage on one point leads to disadvantage on the other. Precisely
because your soil is more fruitful it is more dear. It is not
_accidentally_ but _necessarily_ that the equilibrium is established,
or at least inclines to establish itself: and can it be denied that
perfect freedom in exchanges is of all systems the one which favors
this tendency?
I have cited an agricultural example; I might as easily have taken one
from any trade. There are tailors at Barnegat, but that does not
prevent tailors from being in New York also, although the latter have
to pay a much higher rent, as well as higher price for furniture,
workmen, and food. But their customers are sufficiently numerous not
only to reëstablish the balance, but also to make it lean on their
side.
When, therefore, the question is about equalizing the advantages of
labor, it would be well to consider whether the natural freedom of
exchange is not the best umpire.
This self-levelling faculty of political phenomena is so important,
and at the same time so well calculated to cause us to admire the
providential wisdom which presides over the equalizing government of
society, that I must ask permission a little longer to turn to it the
attention of the reader.
The protectionists say, Such a nation has the advantage over us, in
being able to procure cheaply, coal, iron, machinery, capital; it is
impossible for us to compete with it.
We must examine this proposition under other aspects. For the
present, I stop at the question, whether, when an advantage and a
disadvantage are placed in juxtaposition, they do not bear in
themselves, the former a descending, the latter an ascending power,
which must end by placing them in a just equilibrium?
Let us suppose the countries A and B. A has every advantage over B;
you thence conclude that labor will be concentrated upon A, while B
must be abandoned. A, you say, sells much more than it buys; B buys
much more than it sells. I might dispute this, but I will meet you
upon your own ground.
In the hypothesis, labor being in great demand in A, soon rises in
value; while labor, iron, coal, lands, food, capital, all being little
sought after in B, soon fall in price.
Again: A being always selling and B always buying, cash passes from B
to A. It is abundant in A, very scarce in B.
But where there is abundance of cash, it follows that in all purchases
a large proportion of it will be needed. Then in A, _real dearness_,
which proceeds from a very active demand, is added to _nominal
dearness_, the consequence of a superabundance of the precious metals.
Scarcity of money implies that little is necessary for each purchase.
Then in B, a _nominal cheapness_ is combined with _real cheapness_.
Under these circumstances, industry will have the strongest possible
motives for deserting A to establish itself in B.
Now, to return to what would be the true course of things. As the
progress of such events is always gradual, industry from its nature
being opposed to sudden transits, let us suppose that, without
waiting the extreme point, it will have gradually divided itself
between A and B, according to the laws of supply and demand; that is
to say, according to the laws of justice and usefulness.
_I do not advance an empty hypothesis when I say, that were it
possible that industry should concentrate itself upon a single point,
there must, from its nature, arise spontaneously, and in its midst_,
AN IRRESISTIBLE POWER OF DECENTRALIZATION.
We will quote the words of a manufacturer to the Chamber of Commerce
at Manchester (the figures brought into his demonstration being
suppressed):
"Formerly we exported goods; this exportation gave way to that of
thread for the manufacture of goods; later, instead of thread, we
exported machinery for the making of thread; then capital for the
construction of machinery; and lastly, workmen and talent, which are
the source of capital. All these elements of labor have, one after the
other, transferred themselves to other points, where their profits
were increased, and where the means of subsistence being less
difficult to obtain, life is maintained at less cost. There are at
present to be seen in Prussia, Austria, Saxony, Switzerland, and
Italy, immense manufacturing establishments, founded entirely by
English capital, worked by English labor, and directed by English
talent."
We may here perceive that Nature, with more wisdom and foresight than
the narrow and rigid system of the protectionists can suppose, does
not permit the concentration of labor, and the monopoly of advantages,
from which they draw their arguments as from an absolute and
irremediable fact. It has, by means as simple as they are infallible,
provided for dispersion, diffusion, mutual dependence, and
simultaneous progress; all of which, your restrictive laws paralyze as
much as is in their power, by their tendency towards the isolation of
nations. By this means they render much more decided the differences
existing in the conditions of production; they check the
self-levelling power of industry, prevent fusion of interests,
neutralize the counterpoise, and fence in each nation within its own
peculiar advantages and disadvantages.
3. _Even were the labor of one country crushed by the competition of
more favored climates (which is denied), protective duties cannot
equalize the facilities of production._ To say that by a protective
law the conditions of production are equalized, is to disguise an
error under false terms. It is not true that an import duty equalizes
the conditions of production. These remain after the imposition of the
duty just as they were before. The most that law can do is to equalize
the _conditions of sale_. If it should be said that I am playing upon
words, I retort the accusation upon my adversaries. It is for them to
prove that _production_ and _sale_ are synonymous terms, which if they
cannot do, I have a right to accuse them, if not of playing upon
words, at least of confounding them.
Let me be permitted to exemplify my idea.
Suppose that several New York speculators should determine to devote
themselves to the production of oranges. They know that the oranges of
Portugal can be sold in New York at one cent each, whilst on account
of the boxes, hot-houses, &c., which are necessary to ward against
the severity of our climate, it is impossible to raise them at less
than a dollar apiece. They accordingly demand a duty of ninety-nine
cents upon Portugal oranges. With the help of this duty, say they, the
_conditions of production_ will be equalized. Congress, yielding as
usual to this argument, imposes a duty of ninety-nine cents on each
foreign orange.
Now I say that the _relative conditions of production_ are in no wise
changed. The law can take nothing from the heat of the sun in Lisbon,
nor from the severity of the frosts in New York. Oranges continuing to
mature themselves _naturally_ on the banks of the Tagus, and
artificially upon those of the Hudson, must continue to require for
their production much more labor on the latter than the former. The
law can only equalize the _conditions of sale_. It is evident that
while the Portuguese sell their oranges here at a dollar apiece, the
ninety-nine cents which go to pay the tax are taken from the American
consumer. Now look at the whimsicality of the result. Upon each
Portuguese orange, the country loses nothing; for the ninety-nine
cents which the consumer pays to satisfy the impost tax, enter into
the treasury. There is improper distribution; but no loss. But upon
each American orange consumed, there will be about ninety-nine cents
lost; for while the buyer very certainly loses them, the seller just
as certainly does not gain them; for, even according to the
hypothesis, he will receive only the price of production, I will leave
it to the protectionists to draw their conclusion.
4. _But freedom of trade equalizes these conditions as much as is
possible._ I have laid some stress upon this distinction between the
conditions of production and those of sale, which perhaps the
prohibitionists may consider as paradoxical, because it leads me on to
what they will consider as a still stranger paradox. This is: If you
really wish to equalize the facilities of production, leave trade
free.
This may surprise the protectionists; but let me entreat them to
listen, if it be only through curiosity, to the end of my argument. It
shall not be long. I will now take it up where we left off.
If we suppose for the moment, that the common and daily profits of
each American amount to one dollar, it will indisputably follow that
to produce an orange by _direct_ labor in America, one day's work, or
its equivalent, will be requisite; whilst to produce the cost of a
Portuguese orange, only one-hundredth of this day's labor is required;
which means simply this, that the sun does at Lisbon what labor does
at New York. Now is it not evident, that if I can produce an orange,
or, what is the same thing, the means of buying it, with one-hundredth
of a day's labor, I am placed exactly in the same condition as the
Portuguese producer himself, excepting the expense of the
transportation? It therefore follows that freedom of commerce
equalizes the conditions of production direct or indirect, as much as
it is possible to equalize them; for it leaves but the one inevitable
difference, that of transportation.
I will add that free trade equalizes also the facilities for attaining
enjoyments, comforts, and general consumption; the last, an object
which is, it would seem, quite forgotten, and which is nevertheless
all-important; since, in fine, consumption is the main object of all
our industrial efforts. Thanks to freedom of trade, we would enjoy
here the results of the Portuguese sun, as well as Portugal itself;
and the inhabitants of New York would have in their reach, as well as
those of London, and with the same facilities, the advantages which
nature has in a mineralogical point of view conferred upon Cornwall.
5. _Countries least favored by nature (countries not yet cleared of
forests, for example) are those which profit most by mutual exchange._
The protectionists may suppose me in a paradoxical humor, for I go
further still. I say, and I sincerely believe, that if any two
countries are placed in unequal circumstances as to advantages of
production, _the one of the two which is the less favored by nature,
will gain more by freedom of commerce_. To prove this, I will be
obliged to turn somewhat aside from the form of reasoning which
belongs to this work. I will do so, however; first, because the
question in discussion turns upon this point; and again, because it
will give me the opportunity of exhibiting a law of political economy
of the highest importance, and which, well understood, seems to me to
be destined to lead back to this science all those sects which, in our
days, are seeking in the land of chimeras that social harmony which
they have been unable to discover in nature. I speak of the law of
consumption, which the majority of political economists may well be
reproached with having too much neglected.
Consumption is the _end_, the final cause of all the phenomena of
political economy, and, consequently, in it is found their final
solution.
No effect, whether favorable or unfavorable, can be vested permanently
in the producer. His advantages and disadvantages, derived from his
relations to nature and to society, both pass gradually from him; and
by an almost insensible tendency are absorbed and fused into the
community at large--the community considered as consumers. This is an
admirable law, alike in its cause and its effects; and he who shall
succeed in making it well understood, will have a right to say, "I
have not, in my passage through the world, forgotten to pay my tribute
to society."
Every circumstance which favors the work of production is of course
hailed with joy by the producer, for its _immediate effect_ is to
enable him to render greater services to the community, and to exact
from it a greater remuneration. Every circumstance which injures
production, must equally be the source of uneasiness to him; for its
_immediate effect_ is to diminish his services, and consequently his
remuneration. This is a fortunate and necessary law of nature. The
immediate good or evil of favorable or unfavorable circumstances must
fall upon the producer, in order to influence him invisibly to seek
the one and to avoid the other.
Again: when an inventor succeeds in his labor-saving machine, the
_immediate_ benefit of this success is received by him. This again is
necessary, to determine him to devote his attention to it. It is also
just; because it is just that an effort crowned with success should
bring its own reward.
But these effects, good and bad, although permanent in themselves, are
not so as regards the producer. If they had been so, a principle of
progressive and consequently infinite inequality would have been
introduced among men. This good, and this evil, both therefore pass
on, to become absorbed in the general destinies of humanity.
How does this come about? I will try to make it understood by some
examples.
Let us go back to the thirteenth century. Men who gave themselves up
to the business of copying, received for this service _a remuneration
regulated by the general rate of the profits_. Among them is found
one, who seeks and finds the means of rapidly multiplying copies of
the same work. He invents printing. The first effect of this is, that
the individual is enriched, while many more are impoverished. At the
first view, wonderful as the discovery is, one hesitates in deciding
whether it is not more injurious than useful. It seems to have
introduced into the world, as I said above, an element of infinite
inequality. Guttenberg makes large profits by this invention, and
perfects the invention by the profits, until all other copyists are
ruined. As for the public--the consumer--it gains but little, for
Guttenberg takes care to lower the price of books only just so much as
is necessary to undersell all rivals.
But the great Mind which put harmony into the movements of celestial
bodies, could also give it to the internal mechanism of society. We
will see the advantages of this invention escaping from the
individual, to become for ever the common patrimony of mankind.
The process finally becomes known. Guttenberg is no longer alone in
his art; others imitate him. Their profits are at first considerable.
They are recompensed for being the first who made the effort to
imitate the processes of the newly-invented art. This again was
necessary, in order that they might be induced to the effort, and thus
forward the great and final result to which we approach. They gain
largely; but they gain less than the inventor, for _competition_ has
commenced its work. The price of books now continually decreases. The
gains of the imitators diminish in proportion as the invention becomes
older; and in the same proportion imitation becomes less meritorious.
Soon the new object of industry attains its normal condition; in other
words, the remuneration of printers is no longer an exception to the
general rules of remuneration, and, like that of copyists formerly, it
is only regulated _by the general rate of profits_. Here then the
producer, as such, holds only the old position. The discovery,
however, has been made; the saving of time, labor, effort, for a fixed
result, for a certain number of volumes, is realized. But in what is
this manifested? In the cheap price of books. For the good of whom?
For the good of the consumer--of society--of humanity. Printers,
having no longer any peculiar merit, receive no longer a peculiar
remuneration. As men--as consumers--they no doubt participate in the
advantages which the invention confers upon the community; but that is
all. As printers, as producers, they are placed upon the ordinary
footing of all other producers. Society pays them for their labor, and
not for the usefulness of the invention. _That_ has become a
gratuitous benefit, a common heritage to mankind.
The wisdom and beauty of these laws strike me with admiration and
reverence.
What has been said of printing, can be extended to every agent for the
advancement of labor--from the nail and the mallet, up to the
locomotive and the electric telegraph. Society enjoys all, by the
abundance of its use, its consumption; and it _enjoys all
gratuitously_. For as their effect is to diminish prices, it is
evident that just so much of the price as is taken off by their
intervention, renders the production in so far _gratuitous_. There
only remains the actual labor of man to be paid for; and the
remainder, which is the result of the invention, is subtracted; at
least after the invention has run through the cycle which I have just
described as its destined course. I send for a workman; he brings a
saw with him; I pay him two dollars for his day's labor, and he saws
me twenty-five boards. If the saw had not been invented, he would
perhaps not have been able to make one board, and I would none the
less have paid him for his day's labor. The _usefulness_, then, of the
saw, is for me a gratuitous gift of nature, or rather, is a portion of
the inheritance which, _in common_ with my brother men, I have
received from the genius of my ancestors. I have two workmen in my
field; the one directs the handle of a plough, the other that of a
spade. The result of their day's labor is very different, but the
price is the same, because the remuneration is proportioned, not to
the usefulness of the result, but to the effort, the [time, and] labor
given to attain it.
I invoke the patience of the reader, and beg him to believe, that I
have not lost sight of free trade: I entreat him only to remember the
conclusion at which I have arrived: _Remuneration is not proportioned
to the usefulness of the articles brought by the producer into the
market, but to the [time and] labor required for their production._[B]
[Footnote B: It is true that [time and] labor do not receive a uniform
remuneration; because labor is more or less intense, dangerous,
skilful, &c., [and time more or less valuable.] Competition
establishes for each category a price current: and it is of this
variable price that I speak.]
I have so far taken my examples from human inventions, but will now go
on to speak of natural advantages.
In every article of production, nature and man must concur. But the
portion of nature is always gratuitous. Only so much of the usefulness
of an article as is the result of human labor becomes the object of
mutual exchange, and consequently of remuneration. The remuneration
varies much, no doubt, in proportion to the intensity of the labor, of
the skill, which it requires, of its being _à-propos_ to the demand of
the day, of the need which exists for it, of the momentary absence of
competition, &c. But it is not the less true in principle, that the
assistance received from natural laws, which belongs to all, counts
for nothing in the price.
We do not pay for the air we breathe, although so useful to us, that
we could not live two minutes without it. We do not pay for it,
because nature furnishes it without the intervention of man's labor.
But if we wish to separate one of the gases which compose it for
instance, to fill a balloon, we must take some [time and] labor; or if
another takes it for us, we must give him an equivalent in something
which will have cost us the trouble of production. From which we see
that the exchange is between efforts, [time and] labor. It is
certainly not for hydrogen gas that I pay, for this is everywhere at
my disposal, but for the work that it has been necessary to accomplish
in order to disengage it; work which I have been spared, and which I
must refund. If I am told that there are other things to pay for, as
expense, materials, apparatus, I answer, that still in these things it
is the work that I pay for. The price of the coal employed is only the
representation of the [time and] labor necessary to dig and transport
it.
We do not pay for the light of the sun, because nature alone gives it
to us. But we pay for the light of gas, tallow, oil, wax, because here
is labor to be remunerated;--and remark, that it is so entirely [time
and] labor and not utility to which remuneration is proportioned, that
it may well happen that one of these means of lighting, while it may
be much more effective than another, may still cost less. To cause
this, it is only necessary that less [time and] human labor should be
required to furnish it.
When the water-boat comes to supply my ship, were I to pay in
proportion to the _absolute utility_ of the water, my whole fortune
would not be sufficient. But I pay only for the trouble taken. If more
is required, I can get another boat to furnish it, or finally go and
get it myself. The water itself is not the subject of the bargain, but
the labor required to obtain the water. This point of view is so
important, and the consequences that I am going to draw from it so
clear, as regards the freedom of international exchanges, that I will
still elucidate my idea by a few more examples.
The alimentary substance contained in potatoes does not cost us very
dear, because a great deal of it is attainable with little work. We
pay more for wheat, because, to produce it, Nature requires more labor
from man. It is evident that if Nature did for the latter what she
does for the former, their prices would tend to the same level. It is
impossible that the producer of wheat should permanently gain more
than the producer of potatoes. The law of competition cannot allow it.
Again, if by a happy miracle the fertility of all arable lands were to
be increased, it would not be the agriculturist, but the consumer, who
would profit by this phenomenon; for the result of it would be
abundance and cheapness. There would be less labor incorporated into
an acre of grain, and the agriculturist would be therefore obliged to
exchange it for less labor incorporated into some other article. If,
on the contrary, the fertility of the soil were suddenly to
deteriorate, the share of nature in production would be less, that of
labor greater, and the result would be higher prices.
I am right then in saying that it is in consumption, in mankind, that
at length all political phenomena find their solution. As long as we
fail to follow their effects to this point, and look only at
_immediate_ effects, which act but upon individual men or classes of
men _as producers_, we know nothing more of political economy than the
quack does of medicine, when instead of following the effects of a
prescription in its action upon the whole system, he satisfies himself
with knowing how it affects the palate and the throat.
The tropical regions are very favorable to the production of sugar and
coffee; that is to say, Nature does most of the business and leaves
but little for labor to accomplish. But who reaps the advantage of
this liberality of Nature? NOT THESE REGIONS, for they are
forced by competition to receive remuneration simply for their labor.
It is MANKIND who is the gainer; for the result of this
liberality is _cheapness_, and cheapness belongs to the world.
Here in the temperate zone, we find coal and iron ore on the surface
of the soil; we have but to stoop and take them. At first, I grant,
the immediate inhabitants profit by this fortunate circumstance. But
soon comes competition, and the price of coal and iron falls, until
this gift of nature becomes gratuitous to all, and human labor is only
paid according to the general rate of profits.
Thus, natural advantages, like improvements in the process of
production, are, or have, a constant tendency to become, under the law
of competition, the common and _gratuitous_ patrimony of consumers, of
society, of mankind. Countries, therefore, which do not enjoy these
advantages, must gain by commerce with those which do; because the
exchanges of commerce are between _labor and labor_, subtraction being
made of all the natural advantages which are combined with these
labors; and it is evidently the most favored countries which can
incorporate into a given labor the largest proportion of these
_natural advantages_. Their produce representing less labor, receives
less recompense; in other words, is _cheaper_. If then all the
liberality of Nature results in cheapness, it is evidently not the
producing, but the consuming country, which profits by her benefits.
Hence we may see the enormous absurdity of the consuming country,
which rejects produce precisely because it is cheap. It is as though
we should say: "We will have nothing of that which Nature gives you.
You ask of us an effort equal to two, in order to furnish ourselves
with produce only attainable at home by an effort equal to four. You
can do it because with you Nature does half the work. But we will have
nothing to do with it; we will wait till your climate, becoming more
inclement, forces you to ask of us a labor equal to four, and then we
can treat with you _upon an equal footing_!"
A is a favored country; B is maltreated by Nature. Mutual traffic then
is advantageous to both, but principally to B, because the exchange is
not between _utility_ and _utility_, but between _value_ and _value_.
Now A furnishes a greater _utility in a similar value_, because the
utility of any article includes at once what Nature and what labor
have done; whereas the value of it only corresponds to the portion
accomplished by labor. B then makes an entirely advantageous bargain;
for by simply paying the producer from A for his labor, it receives in
return not only the results of that labor, but in addition there is
thrown in whatever may have accrued from the superior bounty of
Nature.
We will lay down the general rule.
Traffic is an exchange of _values_; and as value is reduced by
competition to the simple representation of labor, traffic is the
exchange of equal labors. Whatever Nature has done towards the
production of the articles exchanged, is given on both sides
_gratuitously_; from whence it necessarily follows, that the most
advantageous commerce is transacted with those countries which are
the least favored by Nature.
The theory of which I have attempted in this chapter to trace the
outlines, deserves a much greater elaboration. But perhaps the
attentive reader will have perceived in it the fruitful seed which is
destined in its future growth to smother Protectionism, at once with
the various other isms whose object is to exclude the law of
COMPETITION from the government of the world. Competition, no
doubt, considering man as producer, must often interfere with his
individual and _immediate_ interests. But if we consider the great
object of all labor, the universal good, in a word, Consumption, we
cannot fail to find that Competition is to the moral world what the
law of equilibrium is to the material one. It is the foundation of
true gratification, of true Liberty and Equality, of the equality of
comforts and condition, so much sought after in our day; and if so
many sincere reformers, so many earnest friends to public right, seek
to reach their end by _commercial legislation_, it is only because
they do not yet understand _commercial freedom_.