(498) It had been Grant's intention to make Gen. Sheridan field
commander in the campaign now about to begin. But, for reasons not
necessary to name, Hunter wishing to be relieved of command, was
accordingly relieved, and Sheridan put in command of the Army of the
Shenandoah. He arrived at Monocacy on the 6th, and Grant returned to
Washington the same day. The next day by an order from the War
Department, a Military Division was made of the Departments of
Pennsylvania, Washington, Maryland, and West Virginia under Sheridan's
command.
(499) Sheridan's army was now August 10th, 30,000 strong. On this day
he moved from Halltown up the Valley to give battle to the enemy.
Passing through Berryville and Winchester from which latter point the
enemy retreated before him our force arrived at Cedar Creek, forty
miles from Halltown on the 12th. At this point the enemy was disposed
to make a stand. That evening the Twelfth and First charged upon and
drove the Rebel skirmishes east of the pike across the creek. Crook's
command did not cross, but the next day the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps
crossed the creek on the right of the pike driving the enemy before
them for a mile or two.
(500) The next day, the 14th, a detail of two officers, Capt. Prichard
and Lieut. Hewitt, and 60 men of the Twelfth was sent under command of
Capt. Prichard to Massanutten Mountain just across Cedar Creek to
guard a signal corps there. This guard and signal corps had, however,
not been on the mountain more than a few hours until they were
attacked by a large force 800 men, a man of our captured, afterward
stated, and driven off, with a loss to us of three or four men killed
and wounded.
(501) All the next day there was considerable skirmishing between the
opposing forces, but Sheridan having received intelligence from Grant
on the 14th, that reinforcements were on the way to Early began
preparing for a retreat, the Nineteenth Corps starting the night of
the 15th. The next day a part of Anderson's force crossing the
Shenandoah river on the Front Royal road was met by Devin's and
Custer's brigades of cavalry and driven back across the river with a
Rebel loss of 300 prisoners. This night, the 16th, the Sixth Corps and
the Eighth, the latter Crook's command, retreated down the Valley
breakfasting at Winchester, then pushing on to the position taken near
Berryville.
(502) The morning of the 17th, Early started in hot pursuit. Our
cavalry with our small brigade of infantry of the Sixth Corps having
been left at Winchester were attacked by the enemy in the afternoon,
but the brigade of infantry and a portion of the cavalry held them in
check all afternoon. At length after night our men were forced back
with a loss of 350 to us, mainly of the infantry, 200 of the latter
being taken prisoners. On the 20th, Sheridan having been enjoined by
Grant to be cautious, and not desiring to give battle until he should
know more definitely the strength of the enemy, fell back to near
Charlestown the lines being formed with the Sixth Corps on the right,
the Nineteenth on the left and the Eighth in the centre.
(503) It appears that Early had planned to attack Sheridan the next
day. His forces moved on two different roads with that purpose,
Anderson on one road and Early on the other. The latter attacked the
Sixth Corps which at first gave ground, but afterward regained it at
night fall, with a loss on our side of 260 killed and wounded. The
other corps were formed in line ready for battle, but Anderson not
getting up, the fight was soon over, Early concluding to draw off, for
the present at least. That night Sheridan desiring to act on the
defensive for the present, also to have a better position and to bide
his time which was surely coming when the clouds of disappointment and
doubt which had hung over this field too long should be rifted, and
the sun of success and bright promise shine through, fell back to
Halltown forming line from the Shenandoah on the left to the Potomac
on the right. We made breast works of fence rails, railroad ties and
so forth the next day. In the meantime there was considerable
skirmishing and some cannonading between the opposing forces, the
enemy having followed us up.
(504) Early demonstrated against us for three days, when the 25th, a
large part of his infantry marched to Shepherdstown on the Potomac,
and a considerable body of his cavalry to Williamsport. Our forces
captured a few prisoners in our front today. The next day the Twelfth
went on the skirmish line. And two brigades of the First Division and
one of the Second, Crook's command, Lowell's cavalry co-operating,
went to our front to reconnoitre. They broke the Rebel skirmish line,
burnt some stacks from behind which the Rebels had skirmished, and
drove two brigades from their breast works, our loss being 141 killed
and wounded. That night, Anderson, who had been left in command here,
while Early had moved to Shepherdstown and Williamsport, not having
sufficient force to hold his ground, fell back to Stephensons Depot,
five miles east of Winchester.
(505) Sheridan's force did not move for two days when the 28th, the
army marched to Charlestown. The next day from the position of the
infantry could be heard cannonading all day. This resulted from the
Rebel infantry's driving Merritt's cavalry from Smithfield, some six
miles west of Charlestown, which former town was then occupied by the
enemy's cavalry and from further fighting when later Ricketts'
division of the Sixth Corps drove the enemy's cavalry out and Merritt
reoccupied the town. Along about this time the soldiers in camp ate,
slept, wrote letters and did whatever else they had to do within the
almost constant sound of cannon or musketry.
(506) The main portion of the army remained near Charlestown for the
next five days. During this time the Twelfth was paid six months pay.
And now our sutter reappeared upon the scene. It was a good time for
him to be on hand; for now, was his harvest season. At the end of five
days or on the morning of the 3rd of September, Sheridan desiring to
extend his lines to Berryville, ordered the Eighth Corps to that
place. We arrived there in the evening, and the boys immediately began
making coffee but they had hardly more than begun to do so, when there
was a few musket shots to our front toward Winchester. Right away the
boys of the Twelfth began to discuss the matter of what the probable
cause of the firing was. Some saying that they thought the butchers
were killing beeves; others were doubtful about it but soon, the shots
increasing in frequency, they were about making up their minds that a
fight was on hand when Col. Ely commanding the brigade hastily gave
the order: "Fall in, fall in!" and soon Crook's command was in line to
the right and left of the Berryville pike to meet the enemy which was
there in considerable force.
(507) The firing first heard was caused by an attack upon the First
Virginia, which had only been put on picket about a half hour before,
on the Berryville pike. The fight lasted till after dark. We held our
ground on the night, while Duval's division on the left drove the
enemy capturing about 60 prisoners. Crook's loss in this affair was
166. While the fighting was going on wagons were heard driving rapidly
down the Valley on the road crossing the Berryville pike just to our
rear. These belonged to a force of our cavalry that had been on a
reconnoissance up the Valley. After dark the Rebels threw some shells
over our heads which seemed to fall pretty close to the passing wagon
train. The next day some of the cavalry said that we of the infantry
had saved them from being cut off in their return down the Valley, for
the Rebels would have had to go only a short distance until they would
have been across the cavalrymen's road. Crook's command held its
position till near morning when it drew back toward Charlestown about
two miles. And Sheridan's whole force began to intrench.
(508) Just why this fight at Berryville took place, so far as the
purpose and movement of the enemy brought it on, was not at the time
understood among our men. The impression seemed to be that Crook's
force was there to hold the Berryville pike, while the cavalry were
making a reconnoissance up the Valley and the Rebels moving on that
road with the purpose of cutting off their return had encountered us,
and that was the reason it was thought the fight took place. But the
fact is the fight resulted, so far as the enemy was responsible, from
a part of his force in the Valley having started on that evening on
the return to Richmond by way of Berryville. Something over two weeks
before this Early received, as before stated, reinforcements from Lee,
consisting mainly of Anderson's division of Longstreet's corps, which
corps was now commanded by Anderson, who had come into the Valley with
the division. Lee being hard pressed by Grant at this time had called
for the return of these troops, and it was they whom Crook had
encountered that evening. The fight was a mutual surprise. Crook's men
were getting supper when the enemy attacked the First Virginia on
picket sending them back precipitately: thus bringing on the fight.
This unexpected engagement delayed the departure of this Rebel force
for some days.
(509) After the Berryville battle there was no general movement of the
Union forces for more than two weeks. On the 8th, however, Crook's
corps was moved from its position on the left of the lines to Summit
Point on the right. The status of things on our side was maintained in
the main, for the next ten days. Maj. Brown, who was captured about
seven weeks before at Winchester, and had escaped from the Rebels at
Harrisburg, returned to the Twelfth from home on the 10th.
(510) On the 13th, Gen. McIntosh of Wilson's division of cavalry
reconnoitering on the Berryville road in the direction of Winchester,
captured a South Carolina regiment of infantry, the whole of it,
however, being only a little over 100 men and 30 other prisoners. The
news of the capture spread through the camp and had an inspiriting
effect, no doubt upon the army; and perhaps was regarded as presaging
further victory.
(511) There having been of late great urgency to have the Baltimore
and Ohio railroad opened, and a pressure generally to have the people
north of the Potomac freed from the menace of Early's army. Gen. Grant
paid Sheridan a visit on the 16th to talk over the situation and see
what should be done. Just two days before this, Anderson's division
had again started to return to Richmond; this time moving through
Chester Gap farther south, and thus the condition, the withdrawal of a
part of Early's force, that Grant and Sheridan had been waiting for,
had come about. So when Grant asked Sheridan on that Friday if he
could be ready to attack Early on the next Tuesday he did not want,
like McClellan, to delay awaiting reinforcements, or plead lack of
means of transportation or supplies, or some other difficulty, but he
answered like a man who meant business, that he could be ready the
following Monday; thus showing so far as this instance would indicate,
not that "There is luck in leisure," but rather that there is a bright
promise in promptitude. For by attacking on Monday he took the enemy
somewhat at a disadvantage, his forces then being scattered along the
Martinsburg pike, thus rendering victory certain for Sheridan, while
if the attack had been delayed till Tuesday Early's forces would have
been concentrated, they being on the move on Monday for that purpose,
and the result of the battle might have been otherwise.
(512) Sheridan having decided to attack Early on the memorable 19th of
September, had sent his unnecessary trains and the sutlers to the rear
the day before; and accordingly on the eventful Monday he moved to the
attack before day. Our brigade consisting at this time of the First,
Fourth and Twelfth West Virginia Infantry, then under the command of
Lieut. Col. Northcott marched at 5 o'clock P.M., the body of the
troops having started earlier. The serious character of the work that
the men of the Twelfth believed to be before them had a sobering
effect upon them; but they marched bravely forward that morning
willing to do their part in the coming struggle. Nearing the
Berryville ford of the Opeguon, over which all the infantry had to
pass, and between which and Winchester, five miles distant, the battle
was fought, we heard heavy skirmishing. The battle was opening. The
Twelfth and in fact our whole brigade, was lucky that day, if it may
be regarded as fortunate to escape the chance of being killed or
wounded. And it may be said, the regiment was rather favored by
fortune in this regard from this time to the end of our service.
(513) When we reached the ford to our not very sorrowful surprise--for
the boys had got over being eager for a fight--it was announced to us
that our brigade was detached to guard the wagon train and field
hospital to be established at that point. Lieut. Col. Northcott was
mortified and vexed that his brigade should be left out of the fight,
and he inquired of Col. Thoburn, commanding the division, the reason
of it. Thoburn answered that he, Thoburn, had no choice in the matter,
his orders being to detach his smallest brigade to be left as a guard
at the ford. And thus we were left out of the battle. However, it is
not always safe to be in the rear, as is shown by the fact that
Sheridan intended to attack Early in the rear that morning, but
changed his plan when he learned that the enemy's forces were then
strung along the Martinsburg pike. As it was, we had to be on the
alert, for there were guerrillas hovering about us ready to pounce on
any small squad that might become detached from the command.
(514) It was nearly noon before the battle, because general, and for
four or five hours thereafter we could see, from our position at the
ford, the smoke of the conflict rolling up beyond the woods in our
front, and hear the roar of the battle. There we stayed and during all
this time we were unable to determine from the sound how the battle
was going. In the meantime the men and officers were debating as to
the probable result. Adjt. Caldwell of the Twelfth saying that
Sheridan had about 40,000 men and the enemy presumably not so many,
thought that we would win the day. At length toward evening the Eighth
Corps (ours) struck the enemy on their left flank and soon their rout
became general. They were sent through Winchester on the run. And the
news of our victory soon reached us at the ford.
(515) This was a bloody battle. The total Union lost being about
5,000, there being 4,300 killed and wounded. The total Rebel loss from
the best obtainable data was about 4,000. Of this number about 2,000
were prisoners. If the data are correct, there was a great disparity
in the losses of the two armies in killed and wounded. Early's losses
in these lists being less than half of Sheridan's. This fact may be
explained by reason of the enemy's having the protection of trees,
rocks and other shelter during most of the battle. Besides the
prisoners, Sheridan captured five pieces of artillery and seven battle
flags.
(516) At the time of this battle of Winchester or the Opequon,
Sheridan had in the Valley an army of 4,300 men, in round numbers;
while according to Pond's "Shenandoah Valley," the Rebel records show
Early's force in that battle to be less than half that number.
However, there are some facts which point to the conclusion that the
Rebel force was under estimated. Grant puts Early's strength at the
time Sheridan was put in command of the Union forces in the Valley,
August 7th at about 30,000; and he was somewhat stronger at the time
of the battle with Anderson's division absent, than he was at the date
to which Grant refers. Greeley says in his _American Conflict_ that,
in a newspaper controversy between Sheridan and Early in 1865,
Sheridan stated "that the prisoners taken by him from Early (during
the Valley campaign) exceeded the number to which that general limited
his entire command."
(517) Sheridan was a dashing, rushing and seemingly reckless kind of
man, with no pretense of pomp or polish. So when he sent his dispatch
to Washington announcing his victory, he did not say, "_Winchester
is ours and fairly won_," as the illustrious Gen. Sherman would
perhaps have said, or that "_Victory had perched upon our banners
and we have sent the traitor hosts vanquished and vanquishing up the
Valley_," or anything of the kind; but he simply said: "We have
just sent them whirling through Winchester." The following dispatch
was received by Sheridan:
(518) "Have just heard of your great victory. God bless you all,
officers and men. Strongly inclined to come up and see you. A.
LINCOLN."
(519) Here is a characteristic incident showing somewhat the style of
man Sheridan was: In his first movement up the Valley in August, when
we had reached Cedar Creek where the enemy was, the First and Twelfth,
it will be recollected, were ordered to charge some Rebel skirmishers,
one company of the Twelfth having previously been put upon our
skirmish line. Just as the two regiments were in the act of charging,
Sheridan and Crook, passing from the right to the left along the
skirmish line to take in the situation, had come opposite the charging
troops; when Crook seemed inclined to stop and watch the result.
Sheridan, however, appeared to be in a hurry, wanting to pass on; so
he said: "Come on Crook, never mind, they'll give them h--ll." Perhaps
because of the character of Sheridan as indicated by this incident,
and as shown by his dispatch to Washington as given, and the
observations in connection therewith, he was popular with the
soldiers. But by, more than all else in gaining the victory at the
Opeguon he gained their abiding confidence and admiration; which fact
gave promise of future victory.
(520) The Twelfth with its brigade remained at the Berryville ford
till the 22nd, when we marched, following the army up the Valley. We
passed through Winchester. From there we guarded a wagon train of
supplies up to Cedar Creek reaching there about sun down, just as our
army was driving Early's from Fisher's Hill, in sight from the creek.
Sheridan employed the same tactics in this battle that he did in the
battle of the Opequon, sending Crook's, (the Eighth) Corps to attack
the enemy on the flank. Sheridan's loss in this battle was only about
400; while Early's was between 1,300 and 1,400 mostly prisoners. This
time the enemy's loss was much the heavier making the losses in each
army in the two battles about 5,400. Sheridan captured 16 cannons at
Fisher's Hill.
(521) After Early's rout his army retreated up the Valley, followed by
Sheridan's after night for 12 miles to Woodstock. It was perhaps an
unprecedented thing in the annals of the war for one army to follow
another opposing army after dark on the same road, as was done in this
instance. Our men had been dropping out of ranks all along the road to
rest or sleep; and as the Twelfth passed along, it looked as though
there was a string of those dropped out soldiers all along the 12
miles from Strasburg to Woodstock. When our regiment reached this
latter town there was not more than the equal of a company left in the
ranks, the most of the Twelfth having fallen out of ranks too. Those
of the regiment remaining in ranks, marched 35 miles that day and
night. The Rebels were followed so sharply, that many of them to
escape took to the mountains. It was said also that, in this right
pursuit of the enemy, in some instances, a Union soldier becoming
tired and sleepy and seeing some one lying by the road side, would
stop there for company; and in the morning he would discover a Johnny
by his side, who of course, would be made a prisoner.
(522) The Twelfth remained at Woodstock one day with its corps, then
pushing on after the bulk of the army to Harrisonburg, about 25 miles
from Staunton, arrived there the 25th, the cavalry going as far as
Staunton and Waynesboro destroying arms, ammunition and so forth at
the latter place, and in accordance with Grant's orders all the mills,
barns and stacks of hay and grain were burned, and the stock driven
off in the Valley from Staunton down to Harrisonburg. The Sixth Corps
and Nineteenth marched up to Mount Crawford on the 29th, and back to
Harrisonburg the next day in support of the burning operations.
(523) The army remained at Harrisonburg till October the 6th; when the
whole force marched down the Valley, arriving at Strasburg the 8th.
All the way down to this place as we marched, the smoke could be seen
rolling up behind us from the burning barns, mills and so forth. It
was said that in many instances, in burning barns, reports of fire
arms hidden in them and discharged by the heat were heard. Early
reinforced by Anderson's division and Rosser's cavalry followed us
down the Valley to Strasburg. The cavalry styled themselves the
Saviors of the Valley, and were particularly aggressive. Sheridan got
tired of their annoyance and determined to dispose of these new found
"Saviors of the Valley." He directed Torbet accordingly to start out
at daylight on the morning of the 9th and "whip the Rebel cavalry or
get whipped himself." Our cavalry promptly to time attacked Lomax's
cavalry on the pike and Rosser's on the back road and after a fight of
about two hours routed them on both roads, capturing about 330
prisoners, 11 guns--all they had but one--and 47 wagons--"everything
on wheels." The Rebels were run about 26 miles up the Valley on the
jump. After the battle for the rest of the day, about all the saving
the Johnnys wanted to do was to "save their bacon." Sheridan was very
enthusiastic over this victory offering, it is said, $50 for the other
piece of artillery.
(524) The second day after this battle of Tom's Brook, as it is
called, the 11th, our brigade started from Cedar Creek for Martinsburg
as a guard, with a wagon train and the captured property. Near Newton,
which is about eight miles from Cedar Creek, we met two or three
cavalrymen coming at a headlong rate. They belonged to a party of 25
that had been guarding an ambulance conveying some officers and mail
matters, which had just been attacked a little farther on by Mosby.
This was a very bloody affair with our men nearly half of them being
killed or wounded. Lieut. Col. Northcott stopped the command, and
scoured the woods nearby, to see if there were any Rebels about; but
it was too late. Mosby had got off with nearly all the unwounded and
the ambulance. We camped that night at Winchester where we met Col.
Curtis returning from a leave of absence, who now took command of the
brigade. The next morning we marched for Martinsburg arriving there
after dark.
(525) We remained at Martinsburg two days. During this time Mosby
captured a train of cars at Kearnysville, a town between former town
and Harpers Ferry. On the afternoon of the 15th, we started to the
front again with a wagon train arriving at Winchester the next day, at
which place we were told to pitch our tents, as we were likely to
remain there for a few days. Accordingly the tents were put up.
(526) As before stated Early had followed Sheridan down the Valley
from Staunton to Strasburg; but it was only the cavalry that came all
the way, his infantry having halted at New Market. Sheridan believed
the enemy would not again attempt to come down in force and therefore
he had ordered the Sixth Corps to return to the Army of the Potomac in
accordance with Grant's desire to have a part of the Valley force sent
to him as soon as it could be spared. This corps had started to return
about the time we had left Cedar Creek for Martinsburg. But there was
an unexpected turn in affairs. Early on the 13th had arrived with his
whole army at Fisher's Hill, and without halting sent a reconnoitering
force to Cedar Creek, which threw some shells into Thoburn's camp
while the men were at dinner. Thoburn's men were almost as much
surprised as if the shells had dropped from the clouds; for a
reconnoitering party had been up the Valley the day before, ten or
twelve miles, and reported that no enemy had been sen. Thoburn's
division was soon formed, and he undertook to capture the Rebel
artillery, the command crossing the creek to attack it but, the enemy
being in strong force he failed. Thoburn's loss in this engagement was
200 or 300. The gallant Col. Wells of the Thirty-fourth Massachusetts
was killed in this fight. After Early's demonstration in Sheridan's
front, the Sixth Corps on its way to Grant by way of Washington,
having got as far as the Shenandoah beyond Front Royal, was ordered
back, arriving at Cedar Creek, the 14th.
(527) The next day Sheridan received a message concerning the desired
destruction of the Virginia Central railroad from Grant about which
he, Grant, had been anxious for some time, and accordingly Merritt's
division of cavalry was sent that night as far as Front Royal with the
intention of reinforcing it by another division, the design being to
employ these troops to break the road just referred to and also the
James River Canal or at least to threaten them. Sheridan went with the
cavalry to Front Royal, being on his way to Washington, going there at
the urgent request of the authorities at the capitol to have a
conference with them. But just before leaving Front Royal for
Washington he received the following dispatch from Wright, copied from
the Rebel signal flag on Massanutten Mountain in sight of our camp:
"_To Lieutenant General Early:_
_Be ready to move as soon as my forces join you, and we will
crush Sheridan._
_Longstreet, Lieutenant General._"
(528) Sheridan suspected this to be a trick of the enemy, which it
was, but in order to be on the safe side, he ordered the cavalry
back to Cedar Creek. In this instance the enemy in his strategy
over-reached himself, and three days later on account of this trick,
he had to fight two more divisions of cavalry than he would otherwise
have had to do. Sheridan continued his journey from Front Royal to
Washington, stopping on the way some hours at Rectortown to telegraph
to and get an answer from Halleck as to whether he had any information
that Longstreet was or was not moving as indicated by the Rebel
dispatch. Finally Halleck, after communicating with Grant at City
Point answered: "General Grant says that Longstreet brought no troops
with him from Richmond," adding some less important intelligence.
After getting the telegram from Halleck Sheridan again pushed on
toward the capitol.
(529) Coming back to our brigade with the wagon train at Winchester,
we remained there just two days, when by orders we were to guard the
train on up to Cedar Creek, to start on the memorable morning of the
19th of October, 1864. The soldiers generally of Sheridan's army by
this time had settled down to the conviction that the campaign of
severe fighting was ended in the Valley for that year. And we at
Winchester were at that time ignorant of the changed condition of
things at the front; so we lay down to sleep the night before we were
to start for Cedar Creek, little dreaming of what was in store for our
army there, or of the pregnant events of the coming day. But the dawn
of another day has come, and hark! what thunderous sound from the
south is that? "'Tis the cannons opening roar." The fair Valley is to
be the scene of another day of blood and carnage; the last battle for
its possession.
(530) Notwithstanding there was fighting going on at the front we
started for Cedar Creek some 15 miles distant but we had not gone far
when we met, at about 9 o'clock some stragglers and wagon trains
retreating from Cedar Creek. Col. Curtis then ordered his train to be
parked. And now there was about to take place one of the most marked
extraordinary and dramatic incidents or events, taken in connection
with the outcome of it, in the annals of our country. Indeed it may be
said it is imparalleled in the history of American warfare. It was
Sheridan's Ride from Winchester to the army in front "to save the
day." He rode up the pike past our brigade on his famous black horse
at a brisk trot with a small escort following, at or soon after 9
o'clock in the forenoon, and every soldier of the brigade had a chance
to witness the immortal scene.
(531) When the stragglers were met. Col. Curtis threw a line of men
across the road to stop them, and put them under guard. There have
been statements saying, or leaving the impression, that the number of
stragglers getting back to or near Winchester was quite large, but as
well as is remembered, there were not more than 100 or 200 of them.
Col. Curtis says that when Sheridan passing to the front came to where
our brigade was noticed the demoralized stragglers, he rode up to
them, and standing straight in his stirrups and gritting his teeth as
he looked at them, shouted at the top of his voice: "Boys if you don't
want to fight yourselves, come back and look at others fighting. We
will whip them out of their boots before 4 o'clock." He then ordered
Col. Curtis to organize the stragglers into a battalion put officers
in command of them and move immediately to the front with his entire
force. This the Colonel proceeded to do, bringing up his wagon train.
He had gone but a short distance, however, when he received another
order from Sheridan to return to Winchester and protect that place
from an apprehended attack by Rebel cavalry. Accordingly the command
returned with the train to the town.
(532) Our army at Cedar Creek had met with a surprise attack mainly
against its left flank. The Eighth Corps (Crook's) being farthest to
the front and left, was struck first, just at break of dawn, before
the men were all out of their tents, and being attacked almost
simultaneously in front, flank and rear it was soon routed losing
heavily in killed and wounded and prisoners, the loss in prisoners
being quite large. Our army was forced back by the suddenness and
vigor of the Rebel attack and principally by the necessity of having
to give ground, in order to clear its flanks about four miles from
Crook's camp by 11 o'clock A.M. It gave no further ground. And it
appears that from about 9 o'clock it being that time before all our
previously unengaged infantry had been engaged, the attacks of the
enemy were feeble. This fact may be explained by the reason that they
had been marching and fighting from near midnight, and because many of
them had fallen out of ranks it seems, to plunder our camps. When
Sheridan came up at about half past eleven A.M., the only parts of
our force engaged were one division of the Sixth Corps and the
cavalry, and they not heavily. There was a lull before the
counter-storm.
(533) Sheridan came upon the field about half past eleven o'clock
A.M. As he was approaching our army, tremendous cheers were heard in
the rear. The cheering came from the stragglers that, though there
were not many of them far in the rear, were two or more thousand in
number, from all the corps a mile or two in the rear. They were
cheering the returning commander. And one of the singular and
surprising incidents of this remarkable battle was that the stream of
these stragglers now turned toward the front. It is not probable that
any other commander in the Union army could have inspired so telling
moral effect. When Sheridan reached the line of battle along which he
rode swinging his hat, he was hailed by the men with throwing their
hats and tempestuous cheering. While his arrival had an encouraging
effect on our men, it would tend no doubt to have a discouraging
effect on the enemy, causing them to think that our army was getting
reinforcements it may be.
(534) Just before Sheridan came upon the field, the Rebels had been
repulsed in an attack upon our left made to seize the pike. As soon as
he observed the situation he resolved to drive the enemy from the
field; and he rode along the lines telling the men that they would
sleep in their old quarters that night. He at once set about reforming
his lines and strengthening his left. At about 1 o'clock P.M., Early
made an attack upon our left, but it was easily repulsed. Three hours
later our lines being formed mainly on the northwest side of the pike
and at right angle to it, Sheridan ordered an advance upon the enemy
by a left half-wheel which was gallantly responded to by the whole
line. The left of the enemy gave way first; the rest of their line did
not stand long, and soon their whole force was a flying mob. Our army
pursued the routed Rebels capturing 1,200 prisoners, 24 guns, and much
other property, besides retaking 24 guns lost in the morning. The
field was won; the day was saved; our army had retaken its old camps;
Sheridan had made good his promise that the men should sleep in their
old quarters that night, and thus was made the single instance in our
history as a people of an army being thoroughly worsted in the
morning, gaining a signal victory in the afternoon. Sheridan will go
down to history as a unique and illustrious warrior.
(535) Our loss in men in this battle of Cedar Creek was 5,764 in
killed, wounded and prisoners, 1,429 being prisoners. Col. Thoburn of
the First Virginia Infantry commanding a division, a gallant and
highly esteemed officer, and Capt. Philip G. Bier were among the
officers killed in this battle. This latter officer was enlisted by
Col. Curtis as a private in Company D, of the Twelfth and appointed
Orderly Sergeant of the company, January 17th, 1863, he was promoted
to Second Lieutenant and assigned to Company A. On the recommendation
of Gen. Sullivan and others he was, in January, 1864, commissioned as
a Captain and A.A.G., and assigned to duty on Gen. Hunter's staff.
He remained on his staff during the Hunter raid against Lynchburg and
until Hunter was relieved; when he was transferred to Gen. Crook's
staff. Acting in the discharge of his duty in trying, during the
battle to save the wagon and ambulance trains, he was mortally
wounded, and died the following night. The officers of the Twelfth,
for the high regard which they had for their gallant dead comrade, had
his body embalmed and sent to Wheeling where it was buried.
(536) According to Early's account of his loss in this battle was
1,860 in killed and wounded. Our army captured 1,200 prisoners. If his
account of his loss in killed and wounded is correct his total loss
was 3,060. Assuming that Early's statement of his loss in killed and
wounded is correct, our loss in this battle was almost double that of
the enemy. This could reasonably be accounted for by the fact that our
army had been surprised and taken at great disadvantage.
(537) This battle of Cedar Creek shows, in matter of moment, how
important it is that the first step, the initial movement should be
sure and right. When Sheridan was put in command in the Valley, he
patiently bided his time, when he could, as he did, take the enemy at
a disadvantage in the battle of the Opequon, gaining a great victory
thereby, and thus paved the way for the strong confidence the
unbounded faith in him, on the part of his army, which enabled him to
snatch victory from defeat in this latter memorable battle. Sheridan
won a major general's commission in the regular army by this victory.
In tendering the commission a few weeks later, President Lincoln said
in part, that it was "for a brilliant victory achieved over the Rebels
for the third time in pitched battle within thirty days."
(538) The next morning after the battle our brigade left Winchester at
about 2 o'clock for Cedar Creek arriving there the same morning at
about 8 o'clock with the wagon train. When we arrived on the battle
field some of the Rebel dead were yet unburied. The following day the
21st, the Twelfth with its brigade marched down the pike about seven
miles to Newtown to guard the temporary hospital at that place. We
remained at this town for over two weeks. On the 25th, the soldiers
here who were citizens of West Virginia voted for President. An old
diary written at the time says that there were only four or five votes
for McClellan; whether in the brigade or our regiment it does not say.
The next day Gen. Duffie was captured between Winchester and
Martinsburg.
(539) During the stay at Newtown, Mosby was around in the vicinity
twice, one time capturing a forage train within a mile or two of town,
and getting off with the mules. Both times the Twelfth went out after
him, but saw nothing of him. It was useless to send infantry after
mounted men. On the 13th the First Virginia left for Cumberland, Md.