CHAPTER II

TRUE HISTORY OF A TRAMP

He awoke in the Dark Ages and smelt dawn in the dark, and knew he was

not wholly a slave. It was as if, in some tale of Hans Andersen, a

stick or a stool had been left in the garden all night and had grown

alive and struck root like a tree. For this is the truth behind the

old legal fiction of the servile countries, that the slave is a

"chattel," that is a piece of furniture like a stick or a stool. In

the spiritual sense, I am certain it was never so unwholesome a fancy

as the spawn of Nietzsche suppose to-day. No human being, pagan or

Christian, I am certain, ever thought of another human being as a

chair or a table. The mind cannot base itself on the idea that a comet

is a cabbage; nor can it on the idea that a man is a stool. No man was

ever unconscious of another's presence--or even indifferent to

another's opinion. The lady who is said to have boasted her

indifference to being naked before male slaves was showing off--or she

meant something different. The lord who fed fishes by killing a slave

was indulging in what most cannibals indulge in--a satanist

affectation. The lady was consciously shameless and the lord was

consciously cruel. But it simply is not in the human reason to carve

men like wood or examine women like ivory, just as it is not in the

human reason to think that two and two make five.

But there was this truth in the legal simile of furniture: that the

slave, though certainly a man, was in one sense a dead man; in the

sense that he was _moveable_. His locomotion was not his own: his

master moved his arms and legs for him as if he were a marionette. Now

it is important in the first degree to realise here what would be

involved in such a fable as I have imagined, of a stool rooting itself

like a shrub. For the general modern notion certainly is that life and

liberty are in some way to be associated with novelty and not standing

still. But it is just because the stool is lifeless that it moves

about. It is just because the tree is alive that it does stand still.

That was the main difference between the pagan slave and the Christian

serf. The serf still belonged to the lord, as the stick that struck

root in the garden would have still belonged to the owner of the

garden; but it would have become a _live_ possession. Therefore the

owner is forced, by the laws of nature, to treat it with _some_

respect; something becomes due from him. He cannot pull it up without

killing it; it has gained a _place_ in the garden--or the society. But

the moderns are quite wrong in supposing that mere change and holiday

and variety have necessarily any element of this life that is the only

seed of liberty. You may say if you like that an employer, taking all

his workpeople to a new factory in a Garden City, is giving them the

greater freedom of forest landscapes and smokeless skies. If it comes

to that, you can say that the slave-traders took negroes from their

narrow and brutish African hamlets, and gave them the polish of

foreign travel and medicinal breezes of a sea-voyage. But the tiny

seed of citizenship and independence there already was in the serfdom

of the Dark Ages, had nothing to do with what nice things the lord

might do to the serf. It lay in the fact that there were some nasty

things he could not do to the serf--there were not many, but there

were some, and one of them was eviction. He could not make the serf

utterly landless and desperate, utterly without access to the means of

production, though doubtless it was rather the field that owned the

serf, than the serf that owned the field. But even if you call the

serf a beast of the field, he was not what we have tried to make the

town workman--a beast with no field. Foulon said of the French

peasants, "Let them eat grass." If he had said it of the modern London

proletariat, they might well reply, "You have not left us even grass

to eat."

There was, therefore, both in theory and practice, _some_ security for

the serf, because he had come to life and rooted. The seigneur could

not wait in the field in all weathers with a battle-axe to prevent the

serf scratching any living out of the ground, any more than the man in

my fairy-tale could sit out in the garden all night with an umbrella

to prevent the shrub getting any rain. The relation of lord and serf,

therefore, involves a combination of two things: inequality and

security. I know there are people who will at once point wildly to all

sorts of examples, true and false, of insecurity of life in the Middle

Ages; but these are people who do not grasp what we mean by the

characteristic institutions of a society. For the matter of that,

there are plenty of examples of equality in the Middle Ages, as the

craftsmen in their guild or the monks electing their abbot. But just

as modern England is not a feudal country, though there is a quaint

survival called Heralds' College--or Ireland is not a commercial

country, though there is a quaint survival called Belfast--it is true

of the bulk and shape of that society that came out of the Dark Ages

and ended at the Reformation, that it did not care about giving

everybody an equal position, but did care about giving everybody a

position. So that by the very beginning of that time even the slave

had become a slave one could not get rid of, like the Scotch servant

who stubbornly asserted that if his master didn't know a good servant

he knew a good master. The free peasant, in ancient or modern times,

is free to go or stay. The slave, in ancient times, was free neither

to go nor stay. The serf was not free to go; but he was free to stay.

Now what have we done with this man? It is quite simple. There is no

historical complexity about it in that respect. We have taken away his

freedom to stay. We have turned him out of his field, and whether it

was injustice, like turning a free farmer out of his field, or only

cruelty to animals, like turning a cow out of its field, the fact

remains that he is out in the road. First and last, we have simply

destroyed the security. We have not in the least destroyed the

inequality. All classes, all creatures, kind or cruel, still see this

lowest stratum of society as separate from the upper strata and even

the middle strata; he is as separate as the serf. A monster fallen

from Mars, ignorant of our simplest word, would know the tramp was at

the bottom of the ladder, as well as he would have known it of the

serf. The walls of mud are no longer round his boundaries, but only

round his boots. The coarse, bristling hedge is at the end of his

chin, and not of his garden. But mud and bristles still stand out

round him like a horrific halo, and separate him from his kind. The

Martian would have no difficulty in seeing he was the poorest person

in the nation. It is just as impossible that he should marry an

heiress, or fight a duel with a duke, or contest a seat at

Westminster, or enter a club in Pall Mall, or take a scholarship at

Balliol, or take a seat at an opera, or propose a good law, or protest

against a bad one, as it was impossible to the serf. Where he differs

is in something very different. He has lost what was possible to the

serf. He can no longer scratch the bare earth by day or sleep on the

bare earth by night, without being collared by a policeman.

Now when I say that this man has been oppressed as hardly any other

man on this earth has been oppressed, I am not using rhetoric: I have

a clear meaning which I am confident of explaining to any honest

reader. I do not say he has been treated worse: I say he has been

treated differently from the unfortunate in all ages. And the

difference is this: that all the others were told to do something, and

killed or tortured if they did anything else. This man is not told to

do something: he is merely forbidden to do anything. When he was a

slave, they said to him, "Sleep in this shed; I will beat you if you

sleep anywhere else." When he was a serf, they said to him, "Let me

find you in this field: I will hang you if I find you in anyone else's

field." But now he is a tramp they say to him, "You shall be jailed if

I find you in anyone else's field: _but I will not give you a field_."

They say, "You shall be punished if you are caught sleeping outside

your shed: _but there is no shed_." If you say that modern

magistracies could never say such mad contradictions, I answer with

entire certainty that they do say them. A little while ago two tramps

were summoned before a magistrate, charged with sleeping in the open

air when they had nowhere else to sleep. But this is not the full fun

of the incident. The real fun is that each of them eagerly produced

about twopence, to prove that they could have got a bed, but

deliberately didn't. To which the policeman replied that twopence

would not have got them a bed: that they could not possibly have got a

bed: and _therefore_ (argued that thoughtful officer) they ought to

be punished for not getting one. The intelligent magistrate was much

struck with the argument: and proceeded to imprison these two men for

not doing a thing they could not do. But he was careful to explain

that if they had sinned needlessly and in wanton lawlessness, they

would have left the court without a stain on their characters; but as

they could not avoid it, they were very much to blame. These things

are being done in every part of England every day. They have their

parallels even in every daily paper; but they have no parallel in any

other earthly people or period; except in that insane command to make

bricks without straw which brought down all the plagues of Egypt. For

the common historical joke about Henry VIII. hanging a man for being

Catholic and burning him for being Protestant is a symbolic joke only.

The sceptic in the Tudor time could do something: he could always

agree with Henry VIII. The desperate man to-day can do nothing. For

you cannot agree with a maniac who sits on the bench with the straws

sticking out of his hair and says, "Procure threepence from nowhere

and I will give you leave to do without it."

If it be answered that he can go to the workhouse, I reply that such

an answer is founded on confused thinking. It is true that he is free

to go to the workhouse, but only in the same sense in which he is free

to go to jail, only in the same sense in which the serf under the

gibbet was free to find peace in the grave. Many of the poor greatly

prefer the grave to the workhouse, but that is not at all my argument

here. The point is this: that it could not have been the general

policy of a lord towards serfs to kill them all like wasps. It could

not have been his standing "Advice to Serfs" to say, "Get hanged." It

cannot be the standing advice of magistrates to citizens to go to

prison. And, precisely as plainly, it cannot be the standing advice of

rich men to very poor men to go to the workhouses. For that would mean

the rich raising their own poor rates enormously to keep a vast and

expensive establishment of slaves. Now it may come to this, as Mr.

Belloc maintains, but it is not the theory on which what we call the

workhouse does in fact rest. The very shape (and even the very size)

of a workhouse express the fact that it was founded for certain quite

exceptional human failures--like the lunatic asylum. Say to a man, "Go

to the madhouse," and he will say, "Wherein am I mad?" Say to a tramp

under a hedge, "Go to the house of exceptional failures," and he will

say with equal reason, "I travel because I have no house; I walk

because I have no horse; I sleep out because I have no bed. Wherein

have I failed?" And he may have the intelligence to add, "Indeed, your

worship, if somebody has failed, I think it is not I." I concede, with

all due haste, that he might perhaps say "me."

The speciality then of this man's wrong is that it is the only

historic wrong that has in it the quality of _nonsense_. It could only

happen in a nightmare; not in a clear and rational hell. It is the top

point of that anarchy in the governing mind which, as I said at the

beginning, is the main trait of modernity, especially in England. But

if the first note in our policy is madness, the next note is certainly

meanness. There are two peculiarly mean and unmanly legal mantraps in

which this wretched man is tripped up. The first is that which

prevents him from doing what any ordinary savage or nomad would

do--take his chance of an uneven subsistence on the rude bounty of

nature.

There is something very abject about forbidding this; because it is

precisely this adventurous and vagabond spirit which the educated

classes praise most in their books, poems and speeches. To feel the

drag of the roads, to hunt in nameless hills and fish in secret

streams, to have no address save "Over the Hills and Far Away," to be

ready to breakfast on berries and the daybreak and sup on the sunset

and a sodden crust, to feed on wild things and be a boy again, all

this is the heartiest and sincerest impulse in recent culture, in the

songs and tales of Stevenson, in the cult of George Borrow and in the

delightful little books published by Mr. E.V. Lucas. It is the one

true excuse in the core of Imperialism; and it faintly softens the

squalid prose and wooden-headed wickedness of the Self-Made Man who

"came up to London with twopence in his pocket." But when a poorer but

braver man with less than twopence in his pocket does the very thing

we are always praising, makes the blue heavens his house, we send him

to a house built for infamy and flogging. We take poverty itself and

only permit it with a property qualification; we only allow a man to

be poor if he is rich. And we do this most savagely if he has sought

to snatch his life by that particular thing of which our boyish

adventure stories are fullest--hunting and fishing. The extremely

severe English game laws hit most heavily what the highly reckless

English romances praise most irresponsibly. All our literature is full

of praise of the chase--especially of the wild goose chase. But if a

poor man followed, as Tennyson says, "far as the wild swan wings to

where the world dips down to sea and sands," Tennyson would scarcely

allow him to catch it. If he found the wildest goose in the wildest

fenland in the wildest regions of the sunset, he would very probably

discover that the rich never sleep; and that there are no wild things

in England.

In short, the English ruler is always appealing to a nation of

sportsmen and concentrating all his efforts on preventing them from

having any sport. The Imperialist is always pointing out with

exultation that the common Englishman can live by adventure anywhere

on the globe, but if the common Englishman tries to live by adventure

in England, he is treated as harshly as a thief, and almost as harshly

as an honest journalist. This is hypocrisy: the magistrate who gives

his son "Treasure Island" and then imprisons a tramp is a hypocrite;

the squire who is proud of English colonists and indulgent to English

schoolboys, but cruel to English poachers, is drawing near that deep

place wherein all liars have their part. But our point here is that

the baseness is in the idea of _bewildering_ the tramp; of leaving

him no place for repentance. It is quite true, of course, that in the

days of slavery or of serfdom the needy were fenced by yet fiercer

penalties from spoiling the hunting of the rich. But in the older case

there were two very important differences, the second of which is our

main subject in this chapter. The first is that in a comparatively

wild society, however fond of hunting, it seems impossible that

enclosing and game-keeping can have been so omnipresent and efficient

as in a society full of maps and policemen. The second difference is

the one already noted: that if the slave or semi-slave was forbidden

to get his food in the greenwood, he was told to get it somewhere

else. The note of unreason was absent.

This is the first meanness; and the second is like unto it. If there

is one thing of which cultivated modern letters is full besides

adventure it is altruism. We are always being told to help others, to

regard our wealth as theirs, to do what good we can, for we shall not

pass this way again. We are everywhere urged by humanitarians to help

lame dogs over stiles--though some humanitarians, it is true, seem to

feel a colder interest in the case of lame men and women. Still, the

chief fact of our literature, among all historic literatures, is human

charity. But what is the chief fact of our legislation? The great

outstanding fact of modern legislation, among all historic

legislations, is the forbidding of human charity. It is this

astonishing paradox, a thing in the teeth of all logic and

conscience, that a man that takes another man's money with his leave

can be punished as if he had taken it without his leave. All through

those dark or dim ages behind us, through times of servile stagnation,

of feudal insolence, of pestilence and civil strife and all else that

can war down the weak, for the weak to ask for charity was counted

lawful, and to give that charity, admirable. In all other centuries,

in short, the casual bad deeds of bad men could be partly patched and

mended by the casual good deeds of good men. But this is now

forbidden; for it would leave the tramp a last chance if he could beg.

Now it will be evident by this time that the interesting scientific

experiment on the tramp entirely depends on leaving him _no_ chance,

and not (like the slave) one chance. Of the economic excuses offered

for the persecution of beggars it will be more natural to speak in the

next chapter. It will suffice here to say that they are mere excuses,

for a policy that has been persistent while probably largely

unconscious, with a selfish and atheistic unconsciousness. That policy

was directed towards something--or it could never have cut so cleanly

and cruelly across the sentimental but sincere modern trends to

adventure and altruism. Its object is soon stated. It was directed

towards making the very poor man work for the capitalist, for any

wages or none. But all this, which I shall also deal with in the next

chapter, is here only important as introducing the last truth touching

the man of despair. The game laws have taken from him his human

command of Nature. The mendicancy laws have taken from him his human

demand on Man. There is one human thing left it is much harder to take

from him. Debased by him and his betters, it is still something

brought out of Eden, where God made him a demigod: it does not depend

on money and but little on time. He can create in his own image. The

terrible truth is in the heart of a hundred legends and mysteries. As

Jupiter could be hidden from all-devouring Time, as the Christ Child

could be hidden from Herod--so the child unborn is still hidden from

the omniscient oppressor. He who lives not yet, he and he alone is

left; and they seek his life to take it away.

Eugenics and Other Evils · 第 2 / 9 章