[After his unsuccessful contest for a seat in the House of
Commons for Huntingdon in 1826, Lord John Russell drafted a
measure for the prevention of bribing and sent it to Lord Althorp
with a letter which was published in "The Times " and attracted
much notice. The following passages are extracted.]
Bribery is clearly forbidden by the law, and it is competent for
every British subject to petition the House of Commons, praying
them to inquire into any particular instance of that offense
which may have occurred under his own observation. The House may,
if it thinks fit, refer such a petition to the Committee of
Privileges, or to any other committee it may choose to appoint
for the purpose.
Bribery in a candidate, however, makes void the election, and a
petition complaining of bribery committed, with a view to the
last election in a borough, is properly an election petition. But
a term of fourteen days is the limited period within which a
petition of this nature can be presented, and various onerous
duties are imposed upon the petitioner--he must enter into a
recognizance to pursue his complaint, and must incur an expense
of some hundreds or even some thousands in prosecuting the
inquiry.
Still this mode of inquiry is now so established that when upon
two or three occasions complaints have been sent to me of bribery
in a particular borough, I feared to bring them before the House
of Commons lest I should be told that the petition was an
election petition which could not otherwise be entertained.
. . .
From this state of things great impunity has been allowed to
gross acts of corruption. A gentleman from London goes down to a
borough of which he scarcely before knew the existence. The
electors do not ask his political opinions; they do not inquire
into his private character; they only require to be satisfied of
the impurity of his intentions. If he is elected no one, in all
probability, contests the validity of his return. His opponents
are as guilty as he is and no other person will incur the expense
of a petition for the sake of a public benefit. Fifteen days
after the meeting of Parliament a handsome reward is distributed
to each of the worthy and independent electors.
This is the practice against which the resolutions of the late
House of Commons were directed. They pledge the House to inquiry
not on a question between two rivals contending for a seat, but
on a question affecting the character and purity of Parliament.
They allow complaints to be made not only against the sitting
member, but against the borough; they enlarge the time within
which such complaints may be made, and instead of deterring
petitioners by expense, they provide that a specific complaint,
if fit to be inquired into, shall be inquired into for the sake
of the public at the public cost.
Such is the proposition approved by the late House of Commons,
and which I venture to think not unworthy of being countenanced
by a Whig reformer. There are many other abuses in our present
mode of elections, to which local remedies might, I think, be
successfully applied; nor is there any one more fit or more able
than yourself to conduct such measures. Undoubtedly many
obstacles would be raised to delay our progress, especially on
the part of "the presiding genius of the House of Lords." But I
am persuaded that reformers in general have never made a
sufficient estimate of the support they would receive, or set a
sufficient value on the objects they might attain, by a vigorous
attack on particular abuses.