CHAPTER XXX

ARGUMENT ON PROPOSED CHANGE OF REPRESENTATION IN CONVENTION

In addition to the reasons already given there are many others that

might be urged against the proposed change of representation.

In the first place, the present plan is based upon the sound and stable

principle upon which the Government was organized. Representation in

Congress is not based upon votes or voters, but upon population. The

same is true of the different State Legislatures. All political

parties,--or, at any rate, the principal ones,--have adopted the same

system in the make-up of their State and National Conventions. The

membership of the National Convention being based upon each State's

representation in Congress, the State Conventions, with perhaps a few

exceptions, are based upon the representation in the State Legislatures

from each county, parish, or other civil division. It is the fairest,

safest, best, and most equitable plan that can be devised or adopted.

Under this plan or system, no State, section or locality can gain or

lose representation in any party convention through the application of

extraneous or questionable methods, either by the action of the

government or of a political party. The representation in Congress and

in the different State Legislatures, which is based upon population,

fixes the representation from each State in the different National

Conventions and in many of the State Conventions. Any other plan or

system,--especially that which is based upon the number of votes cast

for the candidates of the party as officially ascertained and

declared,--would have a tendency to work serious injustice to certain

States and sections. In fact, it would have a tendency to sectionalize

the party by which the change is made.

Under the present system, for instance, Pennsylvania and Texas have the

same representation in a National Democratic Convention that they have

in a National Republican Convention, although one is usually Republican

in National elections and the other Democratic. And why should not the

representation from those States be the same in both conventions? Why

should Texas, because it is believed to be safely Democratic, have more

power and influence in a Democratic Convention on that account than the

Republican State of Pennsylvania? The answer may be because one is a

Democratic and the other a Republican State--because one can be relied

upon to give its electoral votes to the candidates of the Democratic

party while the other cannot. But this is not in harmony with our

governmental system. Representation in Congress being based upon

population, every State, section and locality has its relative weight

and influence in the government in accordance with the number of its

inhabitants.

That this is the correct principle will not be seriously questioned when

it is carefully considered. What is true of Pennsylvania and Texas in a

National Democratic Convention is equally true of the same States in a

National Republican Convention, and for the same reasons. The argument

that Pennsylvania should have relatively a larger representation in a

National Republican Convention than Texas, because the former is

reliably Republican while the latter is hopelessly Democratic, is just

as fallacious in this case as in the other. But it is said that

delegates from States that cannot contribute to the success of the

ticket should not have a potential voice in nominating a ticket that

other States must be depended upon to elect. Then why not exclude them

altogether, and also those from the territories and the District of

Columbia?

The argument is unsound, and unreasonable; a State may be reliably

Republican at one election and yet go Democratic at the next. In 1872

General Grant, the Republican candidate for President, carried nearly

every State in the Union, in the South as well as in the North. Four

years later Governor Hayes, the Republican candidate for President,

came within one vote of being defeated in the electoral college; and

even then his election was made possible only through the decision of

the Electoral Commission. In 1880 General Garfield, the Republican

candidate for President, carried New York, and was elected; while four

years later Mr. Blaine, the candidate of the same party, lost it and was

defeated. In 1888 Harrison, the Republican Presidential candidate,

carried New York, and was elected; four years later he not only lost New

York, but also such important States as Indiana and Illinois, and came

within a few votes of losing Ohio. This was due to a slump in the

Republican vote throughout the country, which would have made a very

radical change in the National Convention of 1896 if the apportionment

of delegates to that convention had been based upon the votes cast for

Harrison in 1892. While McKinley, the Republican Presidential candidate,

was elected by a large majority in 1896, he lost such important Western

States as Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, Montana, Washington and Nevada.

While he was reëlected four years later by an increased majority, he

again lost some of the same States. While Roosevelt, the Republican

Presidential candidate in 1904, carried every State that McKinley

carried in 1900, and several others besides, Mr. Bryan, the Democratic

candidate in 1908, though defeated by a large majority, regained some

of the Western States that Roosevelt carried in 1904,--notably his own

State of Nebraska.

There was a time when such States as Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia,

Kentucky, Missouri, and Tennessee were as safely Democratic as Texas and

Georgia. Will anyone assert that such is true of them now? There also

was a time when such States as Nebraska, Colorado and Nevada were as

reliably Republican as Pennsylvania and Vermont. Is that true of them

now? In addition to these, taking into consideration important elections

that have been held since 1880, the Republicans cannot absolutely rely

upon the support of such States as Massachusetts, Maine, Connecticut,

New York, New Jersey, Indiana, Illinois, Kansas, and even Ohio. Even the

strong Republican State of Pennsylvania has occasionally gone Democratic

in what is called an "off year." Other Republican States,--or States

that usually go Republican,--have gone Democratic when it was not an off

year,--Illinois, for instance, in 1892. All of this goes to prove how

unreliable, unsafe, unsatisfactory, unjust and unfair would be the

change in the basis of representation as thus proposed.

Another argument in support of the proposed change is that delegates

from Democratic States are, as a rule, controlled by the administration

then in power, if Republican, and that such delegates can be depended

upon to support the administration candidate whoever he may be,

regardless of merit, strength or availability. This argument, of course,

is based upon the assumption that what is true of Democratic States in

this respect is not true of Republican States. The slightest

investigation will easily establish the fallacy of this assumption. The

truth is that the federal office-holders--especially those holding

appointive offices,--can, with a few exceptions, always be depended upon

to support the Administration candidate, whoever he may be. The only

difference between the North and the South in this respect is that in

some of the Southern States, where but one party is allowed to

exist,--the Democratic party,--the Republican office-holders can more

easily manipulate and control the conventions of their party in such

States. But that the office-holders of all sections constitute an

important factor in the election of delegates to the National

Conventions will not be denied by those who are familiar with the facts,

and are honest enough to admit them.

For purposes of illustration we will take the National Republican

Convention of 1908, which nominated Judge Taft. It was known that Judge

Taft was the man whose candidacy was supported by the Administration.

The proceedings of the Convention revealed the fact that outside of five

States that had what were called "favorite son" candidates of their

own, there were perhaps not more than fifty votes in the whole

Convention that were opposed to the administration candidate, although

it is more than probable that Judge Taft would not have been nominated

but for the fact that he was the choice of the administration.

I am sure no fair-minded person will assert that, in thus voting, the

delegates from the Democratic States were influenced by the

administration, while those from Republican States were not. It is not

my purpose to assert or even intimate that any questionable methods were

used to influence the election, or control the votes of the delegates in

the interest of any one candidate. Nothing of that sort was necessary,

since human nature is the same the world over.

That the office-holders should be loyal to the administration to which

they belong is perfectly natural. That those who wish to become

office-holders should be anxious to be on the winning side is also

natural, and that, too, without regard to the locality or section in

which they live. It is a fact, therefore, that up to 1908 no candidate

has ever been nominated by a Republican National Convention who did not

finally receive a sufficient number of votes from all sections of the

country to make his nomination practically the choice of the party

without regard to sectional lines.

If, then, it be a fact that in 1908, for instance, delegates to the

National Republican Convention were elected and controlled through

administration influences in the interest of any one candidate, such

influences were no less potential in Republican than in Democratic

States. Outside of the administration candidate there were at that

Convention five very important States that presented candidates of their

own. They were New York, Indiana, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.

That the delegation from each of said States were practically solid in

the support of its "favorite son" was due largely to the wise decision

of the managers of the administration candidate to concede to each of

said "favorite sons" the delegation from his own State without a

contest. But for this decision, which was wisely made in the interest of

party harmony, no one of those "favorite sons" would have had the solid

delegation from his own State. As it was, a large majority of the

delegates from the five States named was not unfriendly to the

Administration candidate. These delegates voted for their "favorite

sons" simply because they knew that in doing so they were not

antagonizing the administration. There never was a time, therefore, when

they could have been united upon any one candidate in opposition to the

one that had at his back the powerful support of the Administration. Our

government has reached that point in its growth, where it is not only

possible, but comparatively easy, for an administration to secure the

nomination of the one by whom it desires to be succeeded,--especially

under the present system of electing delegates. It was in anticipation

of this, and to prevent any one man from perpetuating himself in power,

that Washington established the precedent against a third successive

term.

If the advocates of this proposed change are to be believed, and if they

wish to be consistent, they should include the National Committee. The

composition of that body is somewhat similar to that of the United

States Senate. In the Senate Nevada and Delaware have the same

representation as New York and Pennsylvania. In the National Committee

each State, territory, and the District of Columbia has one vote. If any

change in the interest of reform is necessary, the National Republican

Committee is the organization where it should first be made; for it

often happens that that committee can not only shape the policy of the

party but control the nomination as well,--especially when the result

between opposing candidates is close and doubtful. In such a contest the

candidate that has the support of a majority of the National Committee

has a decided advantage over his rivals for the nomination. If the

result should be close that advantage will be more than likely to secure

him the nomination.

The National Committee prepares the roll of the delegates to the

Convention, and, in doing so, it decides primarily every contested

seat. If the contests thus decided should give any one candidate a

majority, that majority will be sure to retain the advantage thus

secured. It will thus be seen that if any change is necessary this is

the place where it should first be made. It occurs to me that instead of

changing the basis of representation the most effective remedy for the

evils now complained of is to have the delegates to National Conventions

elected at popular primaries, instead of by State and district

conventions.

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