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THE FACTS OF RECONSTRUCTION
John R. Lynch
Copyright, 1913, by The Neale Publishing Company
[Illustration: John R. Lynch]
CONTENTS
PREFACE
CHAPTER
I THE PART PLAYED BY MISSISSIPPI IN THE EARLY DAYS OF
RECONSTRUCTION
II REORGANIZATION OF THE STATE DEPARTMENTS DURING GOVERNOR
ALCORN'S ADMINISTRATION
III THE REPUBLICAN COUNTY CONVENTION OF 1869
IV IMPORTANT EDUCATIONAL AND POLITICAL MEASURES OF THE NEW
LEGISLATURE
V THE CONTEST FOR SPEAKER OF THE MISSISSIPPI HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
VI FUSION OF DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS IN THE STATE ELECTION
OF 1873. REPUBLICAN VICTORY
VII MISSISSIPPI SENDS B.K. BRUCE TO THE UNITED STATES SENATE
VIII IMPROVED FINANCIAL CONDITION OF MISSISSIPPI UNDER THE AMES
ADMINISTRATION
IX WHAT CONSTITUTES "NEGRO DOMINATION"
X OVERTHROW OF THE REPUBLICAN STATE GOVERNMENT IN MISSISSIPPI
XI RISE OF DEMOCRATIC RADICALISM IN THE SOUTH
XII EVENTFUL DAYS OF THE FORTY-THIRD CONGRESS
XIII STATE CAMPAIGN OF 1875. REPUBLICAN VICTORY
XIV INTERVIEW BETWEEN THE AUTHOR AND THE PRESIDENT REGARDING
STATE APPOINTMENTS
XV THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1876 AND ITS RESULTS
XVI EFFECTS OF THE REFORM ADMINISTRATION IN MISSISSIPPI
XVII THE HAYES-TILDEN CONTEST. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION
XVIII ATTITUDE OF THE HAYES ADMINISTRATION TOWARD THE SOUTH
XIX QUESTION OF THE VALIDITY OF SENATOR LAMAR'S ELECTION
XX REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION OF 1880. NOMINATION OF THE
COMPROMISE CANDIDATE, GARFIELD
XXI STORY OF THE MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN GARFIELD AND CONKLING
XXII THE NATIONAL CAMPAIGN OF 1884
XXIII THE ELECTION OF GROVER CLEVELAND
XXIV INTERVIEW WITH SECRETARY LAMAR ON THE RETAINING OF COLORED
MEN IN OFFICE
XXV THE FEDERAL ELECTIONS BILL
XXVI MISSISSIPPI AND THE NULLIFICATION OF THE FIFTEENTH
AMENDMENT
XXVII EFFECT OF THE MCKINLEY TARIFF BILL ON BOTH POLITICAL PARTIES
XXVIII INTERVIEW BETWEEN THE AUTHOR AND PRESIDENT CLEVELAND AND
SECRETARY GRESHAM
XXIX THE NATIONAL REPUBLICAN CONVENTION OF 1900
XXX ARGUMENT ON PROPOSED CHANGE OF REPRESENTATION IN CONVENTION
XXXI COMPARISON OF BRYAN AND CLEVELAND
XXXII THE SOLID SOUTH. FUTURE OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
PREFACE
The author of this book is one of the few remaining links in the chain
by which the present generation is connected with the reconstruction
period,--the most important and eventful period in our country's
history.
What is herein recorded is based upon the author's own knowledge,
contact and experience. Very much, of course, has been written and
published about reconstruction, but most of it is superficial and
unreliable; and, besides, nearly all of it has been written in such a
style and tone as to make the alleged facts related harmonize with what
was believed to be demanded by public sentiment. The author of this work
has endeavored to present _facts_ as they were and are, rather than as
he would like to have them, and to set them down without the slightest
regard to their effect upon the public mind, except so far as that mind
may be influenced by the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the
truth. In his efforts along these lines he has endeavored to give
expression to his ideas, opinions and convictions in language that is
moderate and devoid of bitterness, and entirely free from race
prejudice, sectional animosity, or partisan bias. Whether or not he has
succeeded in doing so he is willing to leave to the considerate
judgment and impartial decision of those who may take the time to read
what is here recorded. In writing what is to be found in these pages,
the author has made no effort to draw upon the imagination, nor to
gratify the wishes of those whose chief ambition is to magnify the
faults and deficiencies in some and to extol the good and commendable
traits and qualities in others. In other words, his chief purpose has
been to furnish the readers and students of the present generation with
a true, candid and impartial statement of material and important facts
based upon his own personal knowledge and experience, with such comments
as in his judgment the occasion and circumstances warranted.
Was the enfranchisement of the black men at the South by act of Congress
a grave mistake?
Were the reconstructed State Governments that were organized as a result
thereof a disappointment and a failure?
Was the Fifteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution premature and
unwise?
An affirmative answer to the above questions will be found in nearly
everything that has been written about Reconstruction during the last
quarter of a century. The main purpose of this work is to present the
other side; but, in doing so, the author indulges the hope that those
who may read these chapters will find that no extravagant and
exaggerated statements have been made, and that there has been no
effort to conceal, excuse, or justify any act that was questionable or
wrong. It will be seen that the primary object the author has sought to
accomplish, is to bring to public notice those things that were
commendable and meritorious, to prevent the publication of which seems
to have been the primary purpose of nearly all who have thus far written
upon that important subject.
But again, the question may be asked, if the reconstructed State
Governments that were organized and brought into existence under the
Congressional Plan of Reconstruction were not a disappointment and a
failure, why is it that they could not and did not stand the test of
time? The author hopes and believes that the reader will find in one of
the chapters of this book a complete and satisfactory answer to that
question.
It will be seen that the State of Mississippi is made the pivotal one in
the presentation of the facts and historical points touched upon in this
work; but that is because Mississippi was the field of the author's
political activities. That State, however, was largely typical, hence
what was true of that one was, in the main, true of all the other
reconstructed States.
The author was a member of Congress during the settlement of the
controversy between Hayes and Tilden for the Presidency of the United
States, resulting from the close and doubtful election of 1876,--a
controversy that was finally decided through the medium of the
Electoral Commission. The reader will find in the chapter on that
subject many important facts and incidents not heretofore published.
Why was it that the able and brilliant statesman from Maine, James G.
Blaine, died, as did Henry Clay, without having reached the acme of his
ambition,--the Presidency of the United States? Why was he defeated for
the Republican Presidential nomination in 1876,--the only time when it
was possible for him to be elected, and defeated for the election in
1884,--the only time when it was possible for him to be nominated? The
answer to these questions will be found in this book.
Then the interviews between the author and Presidents Grant and
Cleveland, and Secretaries Blaine, Lamar, and Gresham will no doubt be
interesting, if not instructive.
If, in writing this book, the author shall have succeeded in placing
before the public accurate and trustworthy information relative to
Reconstruction, his highest ambition will have been fully gratified, his
sense of justice entirely satisfied.
JOHN R. LYNCH.
THE FACTS OF RECONSTRUCTION
CHAPTER I
THE PART PLAYED BY MISSISSIPPI IN THE EARLY DAYS OF RECONSTRUCTION
The year 1866 was an eventful one in the history of this country. A
bitter war was in progress between Congress and President Andrew Johnson
over the question of the reconstruction of the States lately in
rebellion against the National Government. The President had inaugurated
a policy of his own that proved to be very unpopular at the North. He
had pardoned nearly all the leaders in the rebellion through the medium
of amnesty proclamations. In each rebel State he had appointed a
provisional governor under whose direction Legislatures, State officers,
and members of Congress had been chosen, and the Legislatures thus
chosen elected the United States Senators for the Southern States in
accordance with the President's plan of reconstruction. To make
restoration to the Union full and complete nothing remained to be done
but to admit to their seats the Senators and Representatives that had
been chosen. In the mean time these different Legislatures had enacted
laws which virtually re-enslaved those that had been emancipated in
their respective States. For this the North would not stand. Sentiment
in that section demanded not only justice and fair treatment for the
newly emancipated race but also an emancipation that should be thorough
and complete, not merely theoretical and nominal.
The fact was recognized and appreciated that the colored people had been
loyal to the Union and faithful to the flag of their country and that
they had rendered valuable assistance in putting down the rebellion.
From a standpoint of gratitude, if not of justice, the sentiment of the
North at that time was in favor of fair play for the colored people of
the South. But the President would not yield to what was generally
believed to be the dominant sentiment of the North on the question of
reconstruction. He insisted that the leaders of the Republican party in
Congress did not represent the true sentiment of the country, so he
boldly determined to antagonize the leaders in Congress, and to present
their differences to the court of public opinion at the approaching
Congressional elections. The issue was thus joined and the people were
called upon to render judgment in the election of members of Congress
in the fall of 1866. The President, with the solid support of the
Democrats and a small minority of the Republicans, made a brave and
gallant fight. The result, however, was a crushing defeat for him and a
national repudiation of his plan of reconstruction.
Notwithstanding this defeat the President refused to yield, continuing
the fight with Congress which finally resulted in his impeachment by the
House of Representatives for high Crimes and Misdemeanors in office and
in his trial by the Senate sitting as a High Court for that purpose.
When the vote of the court was taken the President was saved from
conviction and from removal from office by the narrow margin of one
vote,--a sufficient number of Republican Senators having voted with the
Democrats to prevent conviction. It was believed by many at the time
that some of the Republican Senators that voted for acquittal did so
chiefly on account of their antipathy to the man who would succeed to
the Presidency in the event of the conviction of the President. This man
was Senator Benjamin Wade, of Ohio,--President _pro tem._ of the
Senate,--who, as the law then stood, would have succeeded to the
Presidency in the event of a vacancy in that office from any cause.
Senator Wade was an able man, but there were others who were much more
brilliant. He was a strong party man. He had no patience with those who
claimed to be Republicans and yet refused to abide by the decision of
the majority of the party organization unless that decision should be
what they wanted. In short, he was an organization Republican,--what has
since been characterized by some as a machine man,--the sort of active
and aggressive man that would be likely to make for himself enemies of
men in his own organization who were afraid of his great power and
influence, and jealous of him as a political rival. That some of his
senatorial Republican associates should feel that the best service they
could render their country would be to do all in their power to prevent
such a man from being elevated to the Presidency was, perhaps, perfectly
natural: for while they knew that he was a strong and able man, they
also knew that, according to his convictions of party duty and party
obligations, he firmly believed that he who served his party best served
his country best. In giving expression to his views and convictions, as
he usually did with force and vigor, he was not always considerate of
the wishes and feelings of those with whom he did not agree. That he
would have given the country an able administration is the concurrent
opinion of those who knew him best.
While President Johnson was retained in office he was practically shorn
of the greater part of the power and patronage that attaches to the
office. This was done through the passage of a bill, over the
president's veto, known as the Tenure of Office Act. The
constitutionality of this act, which greatly curtailed the power of the
President to make removals from office, was seriously questioned at the
time, but it was passed as a political necessity,--to meet an unusual
and unexpected emergency that seemed to threaten the peace and
tranquillity of the country and practically to nullify the fruits of the
victory which had been won on the field of battle. The law was repealed
or materially modified as soon as President Johnson retired from office.
The President also vetoed all the reconstruction bills,--bills
conferring suffrage on the colored men in the States that were to be
reconstructed,--that passed Congress; but they were promptly passed over
the veto.
The rejection by the country of the Johnson plan of reconstruction, had
clearly demonstrated that no halfway measures were possible. If the
colored men were not enfranchised then the Johnson plan might as well be
accepted. The Republican or Union white men at the South were not
sufficient in numbers to make their power or influence felt. The
necessities of the situation, therefore, left no alternative but the
enfranchisement of the blacks. It was ascertained and acknowledged that
to make possible the reconstruction of the States lately in rebellion,
in accordance with the plan which had met with the emphatic approval of
the North, the enfranchisement of the blacks in the States to be
reconstructed was an absolute necessity.
The first election held in Mississippi under the Reconstruction Acts
took place in 1867, when delegates to a Constitutional Convention were
elected to frame a new Constitution. The Democrats decided to adopt what
they declared to be a policy of "Masterly Inactivity," that is, to
refrain from taking any part in the election and to allow it to go by
default. The result was that the Republicans had a large majority of the
delegates, only a few counties having elected Democratic delegates. The
only reason that there were any Democrats in the Convention at all was
that the party was not unanimous in the adoption of the policy of
"Masterly Inactivity," and consequently did not adhere to it. The
Democrats in a few counties in the State rejected the advice and
repudiated the action of the State Convention of their party on this
point. The result was that a few very able men were elected to the
convention as Democrats,--such men, for instance, as John W.C. Watson,
and William M. Compton, of Marshall County, and William L. Hemingway, of
Carroll, who was elected State Treasurer by the Democrats in 1875, and
to whom a more extended reference will be made in a subsequent chapter.
The result of the election made it clear that if the Democratic
organization in the State had adopted the course that was pursued by
the members of that party in the counties by which the action of their
State Convention was repudiated, the Democrats would have had at least a
large and influential minority of the delegates, which would have
resulted in the framing of a constitution that would have been much more
acceptable to the members of that party than the one that was finally
agreed upon by the majority of the members of that body. But the
Democratic party in the State was governed and controlled by the radical
element of that organization,--an element which took the position that
no respectable white Democrat could afford to participate in an election
in which colored men were allowed to vote. To do so, they held, would
not only be humiliating to the pride of the white men, but the
contamination would be unwise if not dangerous. Besides, they were firm
in the belief and honest in the conviction that the country would
ultimately repudiate the Congressional Plan of Reconstruction, and that
in the mean time it would be both safe and wise for them to give
expression to their objections to it and abhorrence of it by pursuing a
course of masterly inactivity. The liberal and conservative element in
the party was so bitterly opposed to this course that in spite of the
action of the State Convention several counties, as has been already
stated, bolted the action of the convention and took part in the
election.
Of the Republican membership of the Constitutional Convention a large
majority were white men,--many of them natives of the State and a number
of others, though born elsewhere, residents in the State for many years
preceding the war of the Rebellion. My own county, Adams (Natchez), in
which the colored voters were largely in the majority, and which was
entitled to three delegates in the convention, elected two white
men,--E.J. Castello, and Fred Parsons,--and one colored man, H.P.
Jacobs, a Baptist preacher. Throughout the State the proportion was
about the same. This was a great disappointment to the dominating
element in the Democratic party, who had hoped and expected, through
their policy of "Masterly Inactivity" and intimidation of white men,
that the convention would be composed almost exclusively of illiterate
and inexperienced colored men. Although a minor at that time, I took an
active part in the local politics of my county, and, being a member of a
Republican club that had been organized at Natchez, I was frequently
called upon to address the members at its weekly meetings.
When the State Constitution was submitted to a popular vote for
ratification or rejection I took an active part in the county campaign
in advocacy of its ratification. In this election the Democrats pursued
a course that was just the opposite of that pursued by them in the
election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention. They decided
that it was no longer unwise and dangerous for white men to take part in
an election in which colored men were allowed to participate. This was
due largely to the fact that the work of the convention had been far
different from what they had anticipated. The newly framed Constitution
was, taken as a whole, such an excellent document that in all
probability it would have been ratified without serious opposition but
for the fact that there was an unfortunate, unwise and unnecessary
clause in it which practically disfranchised those who had held an
office under the Constitution of the United States and who, having taken
an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States, had
afterwards supported the cause of the Confederacy. This clause caused
very bitter and intense opposition to the ratification of the
Constitution. When the election was over it was found that the
Constitution had been rejected by a small majority. This result could
not be fairly accepted as an indication of the strength of the two
parties in the State, for it was a well-known fact that the Republican
party had a clear majority of about 30,000.
Notwithstanding the large Republican majority in the State, which was
believed to be safe, sure and reliable, there were several causes that
contributed to the rejection of the newly framed Constitution. Among the
causes were:
First. In consequence of the bitterness with which the ratification of
the Constitution had been fought, on account of the objectionable clause
referred to, intimidating methods had been adopted in several counties
in which there was a large colored vote, resulting in a loss of several
thousand votes for the Constitution.
Second. There were several thousand Republicans both white and
colored,--but chiefly colored,--who were opposed to that offensive and
objectionable clause, believing the same to be unjust, unnecessary, and
unwise; hence, many of that class refused to vote either way.
Third. There were thousands of voters, the writer being one of that
number, who favored ratification because the Constitution as a whole was
a most excellent document, and because its ratification would facilitate
the readmittance of Mississippi into the Union; after which the one
objectionable clause could be stricken out by means of an amendment.
While all of this class favored and advocated ratification for the
reasons stated, yet their known attitude towards the clause proved to be
a contributary cause of the rejection of the Constitution.
The reader may not understand why there were any colored men, especially
at that time and in that section, that would have any sympathy for the
white men who would have been victims of this clause had the new
Constitution been ratified. But if the reader will closely follow what
this writer will set down in subsequent chapters of this work, he will
find the reasons why there was and still is a bond of sympathy between
the two races at the South,--a bond that the institution of slavery with
all its horrors could not destroy, the Rebellion could not wipe out,
Reconstruction could not efface, and subsequent events have not been
able to change. The writer is aware of the fact that thousands of
intelligent people are now laboring under the impression that there
exists at the South a bitter feeling of antagonism between the two races
and that this has produced dangerous and difficult problems for the
country to solve. That some things have occurred that would justify such
a conclusion, especially on the part of those who are not students of
this subject, will not be denied.
After the rejection of the Constitution no further effort was made to
have Mississippi readmitted into the Union until after the Presidential
and Congressional elections of 1868. The Democratic party throughout the
country was solid in its support of President Andrew Johnson, and was
bitter in its opposition to the Congressional Plan of Reconstruction.
Upon a platform that declared the Reconstruction Acts of Congress to be
unconstitutional, revolutionary, and void, the Democrats nominated for
President and Vice-President, Ex-Governor Horatio Seymour, of New York,
and General Frank P. Blair, of Missouri. The Republicans nominated for
President General U.S. Grant, of Illinois, and for Vice-President
Speaker Schuyler Colfax, of Indiana. These candidates were nominated
upon a platform which strongly supported and indorsed the Congressional
Plan of Reconstruction.
On this issue the two parties went before the people for a decision. The
Republicans were successful, but not by such a decisive majority as in
the Congressional election of 1866. In fact, if all the Southern States
that took part in that election had gone Democratic, the hero of
Appomattox would have been defeated. It was the Southern States, giving
Republican majorities through the votes of their colored men, that saved
that important national election to the Republican party. To the very
great surprise of the Republican leaders the party lost the important
and pivotal State of New York. It had been confidently believed that the
immense popularity of General Grant and his prestige as a brilliant and
successful Union general would save every doubtful State to the
Republicans, New York, of course, included. But this expectation was not
realized. The result, it is needless to say, was a keen and bitter
disappointment, for no effort had been spared to bring to the attention
of the voters the strong points in General Grant. A vote against Grant,
it was strongly contended, was virtually a vote against the Union.
Frederick Douglass, who electrified many audiences in that campaign,
made the notable declaration that "While Washington had given us a
country, it was Grant who had saved us a country." And yet the savior of
our country failed in that election to save to the Republican party the
most important State in the Union. But, notwithstanding the loss of New
York, the Republicans not only elected the President and Vice-President,
but also had a safe majority in both branches of Congress.
One of the first acts of Congress after the Presidential election of
1868 was one authorizing the President to submit Mississippi's rejected
Constitution once again to a popular vote. The same act authorized the
President to submit to a separate vote such clause or clauses of said
Constitution as in his judgment might be particularly obnoxious to any
considerable number of the people of the State. It was not and could not
be denied that the Constitution as a whole was a most admirable
document. The Democrats had no serious objection to its ratification if
the clause disfranchising most of their leaders were eliminated. When it
became known that this clause would be submitted to a separate vote, and
that the Republican organization would not insist upon its retention, no
serious opposition to the ratification of the Constitution was
anticipated. And, indeed, none was made.
The time fixed for holding the election was November, 1869. In the mean
time the State was to be under military control. General Adelbert Ames
was made Military Governor, with power to fill by appointment every
civil office in the State. Shortly after General Ames took charge as
Military Governor the Republican club at Natchez agreed upon a slate to
be submitted to the Military Governor for his favorable consideration,
the names upon said slate being the choice of the Republican
organization of the county for county and city officials. Among the
names thus agreed upon was that of the Rev. H.P. Jacobs for Justice of
the Peace. It was then decided to send a member of the club to Jackson,
the State capital, to present the slate to the Governor in person in
order to answer questions that might be asked or to give any information
that might be desired about any of the persons whose names appeared on
the slate. It fell to my lot to be chosen for that purpose; the
necessary funds being raised by the club to pay my expenses. I accepted
the mission, contingent upon my employer's granting me leave of absence.
Natchez at that time was not connected with Jackson by railroad, so that
the only way for me to reach the capital was to go by steamer from
Natchez to Vicksburg or to New Orleans, and from there by rail to
Jackson. The trip, therefore, would necessarily consume the greater part
of a week. My employer,--who was what was known as a Northern man,
having come there after the occupation of the place by the Federal
troops,--not only granted me leave of absence but agreed to remain in
the city and carry on the business during my absence.
When I arrived at the building occupied by the Governor and sent up my
card, I had to wait only a few minutes before I was admitted to his
office. The Governor received me cordially and treated me with marked
courtesy, giving close attention while I presented as forcibly as I
could the merits and qualifications of the different persons whose names
were on the slate. When I had concluded my remarks the Governor's only
reply was that he would give the matter his early and careful
consideration. A few weeks later the appointments were announced; but
not many of the appointees were persons whose names I had presented.
However, to my great embarrassment I found that my own name had been
substituted for that of Jacobs for the office of Justice of the Peace. I
not only had no ambition in that direction but was not aware that my
name was under consideration for that or for any other office. Besides,
I was apprehensive that Jacobs and some of his friends might suspect me
of having been false to the trust that had been reposed in me, at least
so far as the office of Justice of the Peace was concerned. At first I
was of the opinion that the only way in which I could disabuse their
minds of that erroneous impression was to decline the appointment. But I
found out upon inquiry that in no event would Jacobs receive the
appointment. I was also reliably informed that I had not been
recommended nor suggested by any one, but that the Governor's action was
the result of the favorable impression I had made upon him when I
presented the slate. For this, of course, I was in no way responsible.
In fact the impression of my fitness for the office that my brief talk
had made upon the Governor was just what the club had hoped I would be
able to accomplish in the interest of the whole slate. That it so
happened that I was the beneficiary of the favorable impression that my
brief talk had made upon the Governor may have been unfortunate in one
respect, but it was an unconscious act for which I could not be
censured. After consulting, therefore, with a few personal friends and
local party leaders, I decided to accept the appointment although, in
consequence of my youth and inexperience, I had serious doubts as to my
ability to discharge the duties of the office which at that time was one
of considerable importance.
Then the bond question loomed up, which was one of the greatest
obstacles in my way, although the amount was only two thousand dollars.
How to give that bond was the important problem I had to solve, for, of
course, no one was eligible as a bondsman who did not own real estate.
There were very few colored men who were thus eligible, and it was out
of the question at that time to expect any white property owner to sign
the bond of a colored man. But there were two colored men willing to
sign the bond for one thousand dollars each who were considered eligible
by the authorities. These men were William McCary and David Singleton.
The law, having been duly satisfied in the matter of my bond, I was
permitted to take the oath of office in April, 1869, and to enter upon
the discharge of my duties as a Justice of the Peace, which office I
held until the 31st of December of the same year when I resigned to
accept a seat in the lower branch of the State Legislature to which I
had been elected the preceding November.
When I entered upon the discharge of my duties as a Justice of the Peace
the only comment that was made by the local Democratic paper of the town
was in these words: "We are now beginning to reap the ravishing fruits
of Reconstruction."