all authority in that nation; as free to transact their common concerns
by any agents they think proper; to change these agents individually, or
the organization of them in form or function whenever they please; that
all the acts done by these agents under the authority of the nation,
are the acts of the nation, are obligatory to them and enure to their
use, and can in no wise be annulled or affected by any change in the
form of the government, or of the persons administering it, consequently
the treaties between the United States and France, were not treaties
between the United States and Louis Capet, but between the two nations of
America and France; and the nations remaining in existence, though both
of them have since changed their forms of government, the treaties are
not annulled by these changes. The law of nations, by which this question
is to be determined, is composed of three branches. 1. The moral law of
our nature. 2. The usages of nations. 3. Their special conventions. The
first of these only concerns this question, that is to say the moral
law to which man has been subjected by his creator, and of which his
feelings or conscience, as it is sometimes called, are the evidence with
which his creator has furnished him. The moral duties which exist between
individual and individual in a state of nature, accompany them into a
state of society, and the aggregate of the duties of all the individuals
composing the society constitutes the duties of that society towards any
other; so that between society and society the same moral duties exist
as did between the individuals composing them, while in an unassociated
state, and their maker not having released them from those duties on
their forming themselves into a nation. Compacts then, between nation
and nation, are obligatory on them by the same moral law which obliges
individuals to observe their compacts. There are circumstances, however,
which sometimes excuse the non-performance of contracts between man and
man; so are there also between nation and nation. When performance,
for instance, becomes _impossible_, non-performance is not immoral;
so if performance becomes _self-destructive_ to the party, the law of
self-preservation overrules the laws of obligation in others. For the
reality of these principles I appeal to the true fountains of evidence,
the head and heart of every rational and honest man. It is there nature
has written her moral laws, and where every man may read them for
himself. He will never read there the permission to annul his obligations
for a time, or forever, whenever they become dangerous, useless, or
disagreeable; certainly not when merely useless or disagreeable, as seems
to be said in an authority which has been quoted, (Vattel, p. 2, 197) and
though he may, under certain degrees of danger, yet the danger must be
imminent, and the degree great. Of these, it is true, that nations are
to be judges for themselves; since no one nation has a right to sit in
judgment over another, but the tribunal of our consciences remains, and
that also of the opinion of the world. These will revise the sentence
we pass in our own case, and as we respect these, we must see that in
judging ourselves we have honestly done the part of impartial and rigorous
judges.
But reason which gives this right of self-liberation from a contract in
certain cases, has subjected it to certain just limitations.
I. The danger which absolves us must be great, inevitable and imminent.
Is such the character of that now apprehended from our treaties with
France? What is that danger? 1st. Is it that if their government issues
in a military despotism, an alliance with them may taint us with despotic
principles? But their government when we allied ourselves to it, was
perfect despotism, civil, and military, yet the treaties were made in
that very state of things, and, therefore, that danger can furnish no
just cause.
2d. Is it that their government may issue in a republic, and too much
strengthen our republican principles? But this is the hope of the great
mass of our constituents, and not their dread. They do not look with
longing to the happy mean of a limited monarchy.
3d. But, says the doctrine I am combatting, the change the French are
undergoing, may possibly end in something we know not what, and may bring
on us danger we know not whence. In short, it may end in a Raw-head and
bloody bones in the dark. Very well--let Raw-head and bloody bones come.
We shall be justified in making our peace with him by renouncing our
ancient friends and his enemies; for observe, it is not the _possibility
of danger_ which absolves a party from his contract for that possibility
always exists, and in every case. It existed in the present one, at the
moment of making the contract. If _possibilities_ would void contracts,
there never could be a valid contract, for possibilities hang over
everything. Obligation is not suspended till the danger is become real,
and the moment of it so imminent, that we can no longer avoid decision
without forever losing the opportunity to do it. But can a danger which
has not yet taken its shape, which does not yet exist, and never may
exist which cannot therefore be defined--can such a danger, I ask, be
so imminent that if we fail to pronounce on it in this moment, we can
never have another opportunity of doing it?
4. As to the danger apprehended, Is it that (the treaties remaining
valid) the clause guaranteeing their West Indian lands will engage us
in the war? But does the guarantee engage us to enter into the war on
any event? Are we to enter into it before we are called on by our allies?
Have we been called on by them? Shall we ever be called on?
Is it their interest to call on us?
Can they call on us before their islands are invaded, or immediately
threatened?
If they can save them themselves, have they a right to call on us?
Are we obliged to go to war at once, without trying peaceable negotiations
with their enemy?
If all these questions are against us, there are still others left behind.
Are we in a condition to go to war?
Can we be expected to begin before we are in condition?
Will the islands be lost if we do not save them?
Have we the means of saving them?
If we cannot save them, are we bound to go to war for a desperate object?
Many, if not most of these questions offer grounds of doubt whether the
clause of guarantee will draw us into the war. Consequently, if this
be danger apprehended, it is not yet certain enough to authorize us in
sound morality to declare, at this moment, the treaties null.
5. Is danger apprehended from the 17th article of the treaty of commerce,
which admits French ships of war and privateers to come and go freely,
with prizes made on their enemies, while their enemies are not to have the
same privilege with prizes made on the French? But Holland and Prussia
have approved of this article in our treaty with France, by subscribing
to an express salvo of it in our treaties with them. (Dutch treaty 22,
convention 6. Prussian treaty 19.) And England, in her last treaty with
France, (Art. 40,) has entered into the same stipulation verbatim, and
placed us in her ports on the same footing in which she is in ours, in
case of a war of either of us with France. If we are engaged in such a
war, England must receive prizes made on us by the French, and exclude
those made on the French by us. Nay, further; in this very article of
her treaty with France, is a salvo of any similar article in any anterior
treaty of either party; and ours with France being anterior, this salvo
confirms it expressly. Neither of these three powers, then, have a right
to complain of this article in our treaty.
6. Is the danger apprehended from the 22d article of our treaty of
commerce, which prohibits the enemies of France from fitting out
privateers in our posts, or selling their prizes here; but we are free
to refuse the same thing to France, there being no stipulation to the
contrary; and we ought to refuse it on principles of fair neutrality.
7. But the reception of a minister from the republic of France, without
qualifications, it is thought, will bring us into danger; because this,
it is said, will determine the continuance of the treaty, and take
from us the right of self-liberation, when at any time hereafter our
safety would require us to use it. The reception of the minister at
all, (in favor of which Colonel Hamilton has given his opinion, though
reluctantly, as he confessed,) is an acknowledgment of the legitimacy
of their government; and if the qualifications meditated are to deny
that legitimacy, it will be a curious compound which is to admit and
to deny the same thing. But I deny that the reception of a minister has
any thing to do with the treaties. There is not a word in either of them
about sending ministers. This has been done between us under the common
usage of nations, and can have no effect either to continue or annul
the treaties.
But how can any act of election have the effect to continue a treaty
which is acknowledged to be going on still?--for it was not pretended
the treaty was void, but only voidable if we choose to declare it so.
To make it void, would require an act of election, but to let it go on,
requires only that we should do nothing; and doing nothing can hardly
be an infraction of peace or neutrality.
But I go further and deny that the most explicit declaration made at this
moment that we acknowledge the obligation of the treaties, could take
from us the right of non-compliance at any future time, when compliance
would involve us in great and inevitable danger.
I conclude, then, that few of these sources threaten any danger at all;
and from none of them is it inevitable; and consequently, none of them
give us the right at this moment of releasing ourselves from our treaties.
II. A second limitation on our right of releasing ourselves, is that we
are to do it from so much of the treaties only as is bringing great and
inevitable danger on us, and not from the residue, allowing the other
party a right at the same time, to determine whether on our non-compliance
with that part, they will declare the whole void. This right they would
have, but we should not. Vattel, 2. 202. The only part of the treaty
which can really lead us into danger, is the clause of guarantee. That
clause is all that we could suspend in any case, and the residue will
remain or not at the will of the other party.
III. A third limitation is that when a party from necessity or danger
withholds compliance with part of a treaty, it is bound to make
compensation where the nature of the case admits and does not dispense
with it. 2 Vattel, 324. Wolf, 270. 443. If actual circumstances excuse
us from entering into the war under the clause of guarantee, it will be
a question whether they excuse us from compensation. Our weight in the
war admits of an estimate; and that estimate would form the measure of
compensation.
If, in withholding a compliance with any part of the treaties we do it
without just cause or compensation, we give to France a cause of war,
and so become associated in it on the other side. An injured friend is
the bitterest of foes, and France has not discovered either timidity,
or over-much forbearance on the late occasions. Is this the position
we wish to take for our constituents? It is certainly not the one they
would take for themselves.
I will proceed now to examine the principal authority which has been
relied on for establishing the right of self-liberation; because though
just in part, it would lead us far beyond justice, if taken in all the
latitude of which his expressions would admit. Questions of natural right
are triable by their conformity with the moral sense and reason of man.
Those who write treatises of natural law, can only declare what their
own moral sense and reason dictate in the several cases they state. Such
of them as happen to have feelings and a reason coincident with those
of the wise and honest part of mankind, are respected and quoted as
witnesses of what is morally right or wrong in particular cases. Grotius,
Puffendorf, Wolf, and Vattel are of this number. Where they agree their
authority is strong; but where they differ, (and they often differ,) we
must appeal to our own feelings and reason to decide between them. The
passages in question shall be traced through all these writers; that we
may see wherein they concur, and where that concurrence is wanting. It
shall be quoted from them in the order in which they wrote, that is to
say, from Grotius first, as being the earliest writer, Puffendorf next,
then Wolf, and lastly Vattel, as latest in time.
GROTIUS 2. 16. 16.
Hither must be referred the common question concerning personal and
real treaties. If indeed it be with a free people, there can be no doubt
but that the engagement is in its nature real, because the subject is a
permanent thing, and even though the government of the State be changed
into a kingdom, the treaty remains; because the same body remains though
the head is changed; and as it was before now, the government which is
exercised by a king does not cease to be the government of the people.
There is an exception when the object seems peculiar to the government,
as if free cities contract a league for the defence of their freedom.
PUFFENDORF 8. 9. 6.
It is certain that every alliance made with a republic is real in its
nature, and continues consequently to the terms agreed on by the treaty,
although the magistrates who concluded it be dead before, so that the
form of government is changed even from a democracy to a monarchy, for
in this case the people do not cease to be the same, and the king, in
the case supposed, being established by the consent of the people who
abolished the republican government, is understood to accept the crown
with all the engagements which the people confessing it had contracted
as being free and governing themselves. There must nevertheless be
an exception of the alliances contracted with a view to preserve the
present government; as if two republics league for mutual defence against
those who would undertake to invade their liberty; for if one of these
two people consent afterwards voluntarily to change the form of the
government, the alliance ends of itself, because the reason on which it
was founded no longer subsists.
WOLF 1146.
The alliance which is made with a free people, or with a popular
government, is a real alliance; and as when the form of government
changes, the people remain the same (for it is the association which
forms the people, and not the manner of administering the government).
This alliance subsists, though the form of government changes, _unless_,
as is evident, the reason of the alliance was particular to the popular
state.
VATTEL 2. 197.
The same question presents itself in real alliances, and in general on
every alliance made with a State, and not in particular with a king for
the defence of his person. We ought, without doubt, to defend our ally
against all invasion, against all foreign violence, and even against
rebel subjects. We ought, in like manner, to defend a republic against
the enterprises of an oppressor of the public liberty. But we ought to
recollect that we are the ally of the state or of the nation, and not
its judge. If the nation has deposed its king in form; if the people of a
republic have driven away its magistrates, and have established themselves
free, or if they have acknowledged the authority of an usurper, whether
expressly or tacitly, to oppose these domestic arrangements--to contest
their justice or validity--would be to meddle with the government of the
nation, and to do it an injury. The ally remains the ally of the state,
notwithstanding the change which has taken place; _but if this change
renders the alliance useless, dangerous, or disagreeable to it, it is
free to renounce it; for it may say with truth, that it would not have
allied itself with this nation, if it had been under the present form
of its government_.
The doctrine then of Grotius, Puffendorf, and Wolf is, that "treaties
remain obligatory, notwithstanding any change in the form of government,
except in the single case, where the preservation of that form was the
object of the treaty;" there the treaty extinguishes, not by the election
or declaration of the party remaining in _statu quo_, but independently
of that, by the evanishment of the object. Vattel lays down in fact the
same doctrine, that treaties continue obligatory, notwithstanding a change
of government by the will of the other party;--that to oppose that will
would be a wrong; and that the ally remains an ally, notwithstanding the
change. So far he concurs with all the previous writers:--but he then
adds what they had not said nor could say; but if this change renders
the alliance _useless_, _dangerous_ or _disagreeable_ to it, it is free to
renounce it. It was unnecessary for him to have specified the exception
of _danger_ in this particular case, because the exception exists in all
cases, and its extent has been considered; but when he adds that, because
a contract is become merely _useless_ or _disagreeable_ we are free to
renounce it,--he is in opposition to Grotius, Puffendorf, and Wolf, who
admit no such license against the obligation of treaties, and he is in
opposition to the morality of every honest man to whom we may safely
appeal to decide whether he feels himself free to renounce a contract
the moment it becomes _merely useless_ or _disagreeable_ to him. We may
appeal to Vattel himself in those parts of his book where he cannot be
misunderstood, and to his known character, as one of the most zealous
and constant advocates for the preservation of good faith in all our
dealings. Let us hear him on other occasions; and first where he shows
what degree of danger or injury will authorize self-liberation from a
treaty: "If simple lesion," (lesion--the loss sustained by selling a
thing for less than half value, which degree of loss renders the sale
void by the Roman law,) "if simple lesion," says he, "or some degree of
disadvantage in a treaty does not suffice to render it invalid, it is
not so as to inconvenience which would go to the _ruin_ of the nation.
As every treaty ought to be made by sufficient power, a treaty pernicious
to the State is null, and not at all obligatory. No governor of a nation
having power to engage things capable of _destroying_ the State, for
the safety of which the empire entrusts to him, the nation itself, bound
necessarily to whatever its preservation and safety require, cannot enter
into engagements contrary to its indispensable obligations." Here then
we find that the degree of injury or danger which he deems sufficient to
liberate us from a treaty, is that which would go to the absolute ruin or
destruction of the State;--not simply the lesion of the Roman law, not
merely the being disadvantageous or dangerous; for as he himself says,
Section 158, "lesion cannot render a treaty invalid. It is his duty who
enters into engagements, to weigh well all things before he concludes. He
may do with his property what he pleases. He may relinquish his rights
or renounce his advantages, as he judges proper. The acceptant is not
obliged to inform himself of his motives nor to weigh then just value.
If we could free ourselves from a compact because we find ourselves
injured by it, there would be nothing firm in the contracts of nations.
Civil laws may set limits to lesion, and determine the degree capable
of producing a nullity of the contract; but sovereigns acknowledge no
judge. How establish lesion among them? Who will determine the degree
sufficient to invalidate a treaty? The happiness and peace of nations
require manifestly that their treaties should not depend on a means of
nullity so vague and so dangerous."
Let us hear him again on the general subject of the observation of
treaties, Section 163: "It is demonstrated in natural law that he who
promises another, confers on him a perfect right to require the thing
promised, and that consequently, not to observe a perfect promise is to
violate the right of another; it is as manifest injustice as to plunder
any one of their right. All the tranquillity, the happiness and security
of mankind, rest on justice or the obligation to respect the rights of
others. The respect of others for our right of domain and property is
the security of our actual possessions. The faith of promises is the
security for the things which cannot be delivered or executed on the spot.
No more security, no more commerce among men, if they think themselves
not bound to preserve faith, to keep their word. This obligation, then,
is as necessary as it is natural and indubitable among nations who live
together in a state of nature, and who acknowledge no superior on earth.
To maintain order and peace in their society, nations and their governors
then ought to observe inviolably their promises and their treaties. This
is a great truth, although too often neglected in practice, is generally
acknowledged by all nations, the reproach of perfidy is a bitter affront
among sovereigns. Now he who does not observe a treaty is assuredly
perfidious, since he violates his faith. On the contrary, nothing is
so glorious to a prince and his nation as the reputation of inviolable
fidelity to his word." Again, Section 219, "Who will doubt that treaties
are of the things sacred among nations? They decide matters the most
important; they impose rules on the pretensions of sovereigns, they
cause the rights of nations to be acknowledged; they assume their most
precious interests. Among political bodies, sovereigns, who acknowledge
no superior on earth, treaties are the only means of adjusting their
different pretensions; of establishing a rule, to know on what to
count, on what to depend. But treaties are but vain words, if nations
do not consider them as respectable engagements, as rules inviolable for
sovereigns, and sacred through the whole earth." Section 220: "The faith
of treaties, that firm and sincere will, that invincible constancy in
fulfilling engagements, of which a declaration is made in a treaty, is
then holy and sacred among nations, whose safety and repose it ensures;
and if nations will not be wanting to themselves, they will load with
infamy whoever violates his faith."
After evidence so copious and explicit of the respect of this author
for the sanctity of treaties, we should hardly have expected that his
authority would have been resorted to for a wanton invalidation of them
whenever they should become merely _useless or disagreeable_. We should
hardly have expected that, rejecting all the rest of his book, this
scrap would have been culled and made the hook whereon to hang such a
chain of immoral consequences. Had the passage accidentally met our eye,
we should have imagined it had fallen from the author's pen under some
momentary view, not sufficiently developed to found a conjecture what
he meant, and we may certainly affirm that a fragment like this cannot
weigh against the authority of all other writers; against the uniform
and systematic doctrine of the very work from which it is torn; against
the moral feelings and the reason of all honest men. If the terms of the
fragment are not misunderstood, they are in full contradiction to all the
written and unwritten evidences of morality. If they are misunderstood,
they are no longer a foundation for the doctrines which have been built
on them.
But even had this doctrine been as true as it is manifestly false, it
would have been asked, to whom is it that the treaties with France have
become _disagreeable_? How will it be proved that they are _useless_?
The conclusion of the sentence suggests a reflection too strong to be
suppressed, "for the party may say with truth that it would not have
allied itself with this nation if it had been under the present form of
its government." The republic of the United States allied itself with
France when under a despotic government. She changes her government, and
declares it shall be a republic; prepares a form of republic extremely
free, and in the meantime is governing herself as such. And it is proposed
that America shall declare the treaties void, because it may say with
truth that it would not have allied itself with that nation if it had
been under the present form of its government. Who is the American who
can say with truth that he would not have allied himself to France if
she had been a republic? Or that a republic of any form would be as
_disagreeable_ as her ancient despotism?
Upon the whole I conclude, that the treaties are still binding,
notwithstanding the change of government in France; that no part of them
but the clause of guarantee holds up _danger_, even at a distance, and
consequently that a liberation from no other part would be prepared in
any case; that if that clause may ever bring _danger_, it is neither
extreme nor imminent, nor even probable that the authority for renouncing
a treaty, when _useless or disagreeable_, is either misunderstood or in
opposition to itself, to all other writers, and to every moral feeling;
that were it not so, these treaties are in fact neither useless or
disagreeable; that the receiving a minister from France at this time is
an act of no significance with respect to the treaties, amounting neither
to an admission nor denial of them, forasmuch as he comes not under any
stipulation in them; that were it an explicit admission, or were it an
express declaration of their obligation now to be made, it would not take
from us that right which exists at all times, of liberating ourselves
when an adherence to the treaties would be _ruinous_ or _destructive_ to
the society; and that the not renouncing the treaties now is so far from
being a breach of neutrality, that the doing it would be the breach, by
giving just cause of war to France.
XXXVI.--_Opinion relative to granting of passports to American vessels._
May 3, 1793.
It has been stated in our treaties with the French, Dutch and Prussians,
that when it happens that either party is at war, and the other neutral,
the neutral shall give passports of a certain tenor to the _vessels
belonging to their subjects_, in order to avoid dissension; and it
has been thought that passports of such high import to the persons and
property of our citizens should have the highest sanction; that of the
signature of the President, and seal of the United States. The authority
of Congress also, in the case of sea letters to East India vessels, was
in favor of this sanction. It is now become a question whether these
passports shall be given only to ships _owned and built_ in the United
States, or may be given also to those _owned_ in the United States,
though _built_ in foreign countries.
The persons and property of our citizens are entitled to the protection
of our government in all places where they may lawfully go. No laws
forbid a merchant to buy, own, and use a _foreign-built_ vessel. She is,
then, his lawful property, and entitled to the protection of his nation
whenever he is lawfully using her.
The laws indeed, for the encouragement of ship building, have given to
home-built vessels the exclusive privilege of being registered and paying
lighter duties. To this privilege, therefore, the foreign-built vessel,
though owned at home, does not pretend. But the laws have not said that
they withdraw their protection from the foreign-built vessel. To this
protection, then, she retains her title, notwithstanding the preference
given to the home-built vessel as to duties. It would be hard indeed
because the law has given one valuable right to home-built vessels, to
infer that it had taken away all rights from those foreign-built.
In conformity with the idea that all the vessels of a State are entitled
to its protection, the treaties before mentioned have settled that
passports shall be given, not merely to the vessels _built_ in the United
States, but to the vessels belonging to them; and when one of these
nations shall take a vessel, if she has not such a passport, they are
to conclude she does not _belong_ to the United States, and is therefore
lawful prize; so that to refuse these passports to foreign-built vessels
_belonging_ to our merchants, is to give them up to capture with their
cargoes. The most important interests of the United States hang upon this
question. The produce of the earth is their principle source of wealth.
Our _home-built_ vessels would suffice for the transportation of a very
small part of this produce to market, and even a part of these vessels
will be withdrawn by high premiums to other lines of business. All the
rest of our produce, then, must remain on our hands, or have its price
reduced by a war insurance. Many descriptions of our produce will not
bear this reduction, and would, therefore, remain on hand.
We shall lose also a great proportion of the profits of navigation. The
great harvest for these is when other nations are at war, and our flag
neutral. But if we can augment our stock of shipping only by the slow
process of building, the harvest will be over while we are only preparing
instruments to reap it. The moment of breeding seamen will be lost for
want of bottoms to embark them in.
France and Holland permit our vessels to be neutralized with them; not
even to suffer theirs to be purchased here might give them just cause to
revoke the privilege of naturalization given to ours, and would inflict
on the ship-building States and artizans a severe injury.
_Objection._ To protect foreign-built vessels will lessen the demand
for ship building here.
_Answer._ Not at all; because as long as we can build cheaper than other
nations, we shall be employed in preference to others; besides, shall
we permit the greatest part of the produce of our fields to rot on our
hands, or lose half its value by subjecting it to high insurance, merely
that our ship builders may have brisker employ? Shall the whole mass of
our farmers be sacrificed to the class of ship wrights?
_Objection._ There will be collusive transfers of foreign ships to our
merchants, merely to obtain for them the cover of our passports.
_Answer._ The same objection lies to giving passports to home-built
vessels. They may be owned, and are owned by foreigners, and may be
collusively re-transferred to our merchants to obtain our passports.
To lessen the danger of collusion, however, I should be for delivering
passports in our own ports only, if they were to be sent blank to foreign
ports to be delivered there, the power of checking collusion would be
small, and they might be employed to cover purposes of no benefit to
us (which we ought not to countenance), and to throw our vessels out
of business; but if issued only to vessels in our own ports, we can
generally be certain that the vessel is our property; and always that
the _cargo_ is of our produce. State the case that it shall be found
that all our shipping, home-built and foreign-built, is inadequate to
the transportation of our produce to market; so that after all these
are loaded, there shall yet remain produce on hand. This must be put
into vessels owned by foreigners. Should these obtain collusively the
protection of our passport, it will cover their _vessel_ indeed, but
it will cover also our _cargo_. I repeat it then, that if the issuing
passports be confined to our ports, it will be our own _vessels_ for
the most part, and always our _cargoes_ which will be covered by them.
I am, therefore, of opinion, that passports ought to be issued to all
vessels _belonging_ to citizens of the United States, but only on their
clearing out from our own ports, and for that voyage only.
XXXVII.--_Opinion relative to case of a British vessel captured by a
French vessel, purchased by French citizens, and fitted out as a Privateer
in one of our ports._
May 16, 1793.
The facts suggested, or to be taken for granted, because the contrary
is not known, in the case now to be considered, are, that a vessel was
purchased at Charleston, and fitted out as a privateer by French citizens,
manned with foreigners chiefly, but partly with citizens of the United
States. The command given to a French citizen by a regular commission
from his government; that she has made prize of an English vessel in the
open sea, and sent her into Philadelphia. The British minister demands
restitution, and the question is, whether the Executive of the United
States shall undertake to make it?
This transaction may be considered, 1st, as an offence against the United
States; 2d, as an injury to Great Britain.
In the first view it is not now to be taken up. The opinion being, that it
has been an act of disrespect to the jurisdiction of the United States,
of which proper notice is to be taken at a proper time.
Under the second point of view, it appears to me wrong on the part of the
United States (where not constrained by treaties) to permit one party in
the present war to do what cannot be permitted to the other. We cannot
permit the enemies of France to fit out privateers in our ports, by the
22d article of our treaty. We ought not, therefore, to permit France
to do it; the treaty leaving us free to refuse, and the refusal being
necessary to preserve a fair neutrality. Yet considering that the present
is the first case which has arisen; that it has been in the first moment
of the war, in one of the most distant ports of the United States, and
before measures could be taken by the government to meet all the cases
which may flow from the infant state of our government, and novelty of
our position, it ought to be placed by Great Britain among the accidents
of loss to which a nation is exposed in a state of war, and by no means
as a premeditated wrong on the part of the government. In the last
light it cannot be taken, because the act from which it results placed
the United States with the offended, and not the offending party. Her
minister has seen himself that there could have been on our part neither
permission or connivance. A very moderate apology then from the United
States ought to satisfy Great Britain.
The one we have made already is ample, to wit, a pointed disapprobation
of the transaction, a promise to prosecute and punish according to law
such of our citizens as have been concerned in it, and to take effectual
measures against a repetition. To demand more would be a wrong in Great
Britain; for to demand satisfaction _beyond_ what is adequate, is wrong.
But it is proposed further to take the prize from the captors and restore
her to the English. This is a very serious proposition.
The dilemma proposed in our conferences, appears to me unanswerable.
Either the commission to the commander of the privateer was good, or not
good. If not good, then the tribunals of the country will take cognizance
of the transaction, receive the demand of the former owner, and make
restitution of the capture; and there being, on this supposition, regular
remedy at law, it would be irregular for the government to interpose. If
the commission be good, then the capture having been made on the high
seas, under a valid commission from a power at war with Great Britain,
the British owner has lost all his right, and the prize would be deemed
good, even in his own courts, were the question to be brought before his
own courts. He has now no more claim on the vessel than any stranger
would have who never owned her, his whole right being transferred by
the laws of war to the captor.
The legal right then being in the captors, on what ground can we take
it from him? Not on that of _right_, for the right has been transferred
to him. It can only be by an act of _force_, that is to say, of reprisal
for the offence committed against us in the port of Charleston. But the
making reprisal on a nation is a very serious thing. Remonstrance and
refusal of satisfaction ought to precede; and when reprisal follows, it
is considered as an act of war, and never yet failed to produce it in the
case of a nation able to make war; besides, if the case were important
enough to require reprisal, and ripe for that step, Congress must be
called on to take it; the right of reprisal being expressly lodged with
them by the Constitution, and not with the Executive.
I therefore think that the satisfaction already made to the _government_
of Great Britain is quite equal to what ought to be desired in the
present case; that the property of the British _owner_ is transferred by
the laws of war to the _captor_; that for us to take it from the captor
would be an act of force or reprisal, which the circumstances of the
case do not justify, and to which the powers of the Executive are not
competent by the Constitution.
XXXVIII.-_Opinion on the proposition of the Secretary of the Treasury
to open a new Loan._
June 5, 1793.
Instructions having been given to borrow two millions of florins in
Holland, and the Secretary of the Treasury proposing to open a further
loan of three millions of florins, which he says "a comprehensive view
of the affairs of the United States, in various relations, appears to
him to recommend," the President is pleased to ask whether I see any
objections to the proposition?
The power to borrow money is confided to the President by the two acts
of the 4th and 12th of August, 1790, and the monies, when borrowed, are
appropriated to two purposes only: to wit, the twelve millions to be
borrowed under the former, are appropriated to discharge the arrears
of interest and instalments of the foreign debt; and the two millions,
under the latter, to the purchase of the public debt, under direction
of the trustees of the sinking fund.
These appropriations render very simple the duties of the President in
the discharge of this trust. He has only to look to the _payment_ of the
foreign debt, and the purchase of the general one. And in order to judge
for himself of the necessity of the loan proposed for effecting these
two purposes, he will need from the treasury the following statements:--
A. A statement of the nett amount of the loans already made under these
acts, adding to that the two millions of florins now in course of being
borrowed. This will form the _debit_ of the trust.
The _credit_ side of the account will consist of the following statements,
to wit:--
B. Amount of the principal and interest of foreign debt, paid and payable,
to the close of 1792.
C. Ditto, payable to the close of 1793.
D. Ditto, payable to the close of 1794 (for I think our preparations
should be a year beforehand).
E. Amount of monies necessary for the sinking fund to the end of 1794.
If the amount of the four last articles exceeds the first, it will prove
a further loan necessary, and to what extent.
The treasury alone can furnish these statements with perfect accuracy.
But to show that there is probable cause to go into the examination, I
will hazard a statement from materials which, though perhaps not perfectly
exact, are not much otherwise.
_Report of January 3, 1793. New Edition._
Dr.
The trust for loans.
A. To nett amount of loans to June 1, 1792, as stated
in the treasury report, to wit, 18,678,000 florins,
at 99 florins to $40, the treasury exchange $7,545,912
To loan now going on for 2,000,000 florins 808,080
----------
$8,353,992
Cr.
Florins.
B. By charges on remittances to France 10,073 1
By reimbursement to Spain 680,000
By interest paid to foreign officers 105,000
----------
795,093 1 = $321,239 46
By principal paid to foreign officers 191,316 90
By amount of French debt, principal and Livres.
interest, payable to end of 1791 26,000,000
By ditto, for 1792 3,450,000
----------
29,450,000 = 5,345,171
C. By ditto, for 1793 3,410,000 = 618,915
D. By ditto, for 1794 3,250,000 = 569,876
E. By necessary for sinking fund at $50,000 a
month, from July 1, 1793, to Dec. 31, 1794 900,000
Balance which will remain in hands of the
trust, at end of 1794 387,474 64
-------------
$8,353,992 60
So that instead of an additional loan being necessary, the monies
already borrowed will suffice for all the purposes to which they can be
legally applied to the end of 1794, and leave a surplus of $387 474 64
to cover charges and errors. And as, on account of the unsettled state
of the French government, it is not proposed to pay in advance, or but
little so, any further sum would be lying at a dead interest and risk.
Perhaps it might be said that new monies must be borrowed for the current
domestic service of the year. To this I should answer, that no law has
authorized the opening of a loan for this purpose.
If it should be said that the monies heretofore borrowed are so far put
out of our power that we cannot command them before an instalment will
be due, I should answer, that certainly I would rather borrow than fail
in a payment; but if borrowing will secure a payment in time, the two
millions of florins now borrowing are sufficient to secure it. If we
cannot get this sum in time, then we cannot get an additional sum in time.
The above account might be stated in another way, which might, perhaps,
be more satisfactory, to wit:
Dr.
The trust for loans.
To nett amount of loans to June 1, 1792. 18,678,000 florins,
at 99 florins to $40 $7,545,912
Cr.
Florins
By charges on remittances to France 10,073 1
By reimbursement to Spain 680,000
By interest paid to foreign officers 105,000
---------
795,073 1 = $321,239 46
By principal paid to foreign officers 191,316 90
By payments to France 10,073,043 8 = 4,069,918 54
Livres.
By ditto to St. Domingo 4,000,000 = 726,000
By ditto to do. 3,000,000 = 544,500
By do. to Mr. Ternant [I state this by
memory] 24,000 = 4,356
Balance in hand to be carried to new debit 1,688,581 10
-------------
$7,545,912 00
Dr.
The trust for loans.
To balance as per contra $1,688,581 10
To two millions of florins, new loan, when effected 808,080
-------------
$2,496,661 10
Cr.
By the following payments when made, to wit:
Balance due to France, to close of year 1792
Livres.
($5,345,171-$5,344,774 54) $396 46
Instalments and interest to close of year
1793 3,410,000 == 618,915
do. do
1794 3,250,000 == 589,875
Necessary for sinking fund from July 1, 1793,
to December 31, 1794 900,000
Balance will then be in hand to be carried to
new debit 387,474 64
-------------
$2,496,661 10
By this statement, it would seem as if all the payments to France,
hitherto made and ordered, would not acquit the year 1792. So that we
have never yet been clear of arrears to her.
The amount of the French debt is stated according to the convention, and
the interest is calculated accordingly. Interest on the ten million loan
is known to have been paid for the years 1784, 1785, and is therefore
deducted. It is not known whether it was paid on the same loan for the
years 1786-7-8-9, previous to the payment of December 3, 1790, or whether
it was included in that payment; therefore this is not deducted. But
if, in fact, it was paid before that day, it will then have lessened
the debt so much, to wit, 400,000 livres a year, for four years, making
1,600,000 florins, equal to $290,400, which sum would put us in advance
near half of the instalments of 1793. Note,--livres are estimated at
18/100 cents, proposed by the Secretary of the Treasury to the French
ministry as the par of the metals, to be the rate of conversion.
This uncertainty with respect to the true state of our account with
France, and the difference of the result from what has been understood,
shows that the gentlemen who are to give opinions on this subject, must
do it in the dark, and suggests to the President the propriety of having
an exact statement of the account with France communicated to them,
as the ground on which they are to give opinions. It will probably be
material in that about to be given on the late application of Mr. Genet,
on which the Secretary of the Treasury is preparing a report.
XXXIX.--_Opinion relative to the policy of a new loan._
June 17, 1793
I cannot see my way clear in the case which the President has been
pleased to ask my opinion, but by recurring to these leading questions:
Of the $7,898,999 88 borrowed, or rather of the $7,545,912, nett proceeds
thereof, how much has been applied to the _payment_ of the _foreign_,
and _purchase_ of the _general_ debt?
To the balance thereof, which should be on hand, and the two millions
of florins now borrowing, is any and what addition necessary, _for the
same objects_, for the years 1793, 1794?
The statement furnished by the Secretary of the Treasury does not answer
these questions. It only shows what has been done with somewhat less
than three millions out of near eight millions of dollars which have been
borrowed, and in so doing it takes credit for two sums which are not to
come out of this sum, and therefore not to be left in the account. They
are the following:
1. A sum of $284,901 89 expended in purchases of the public debt. In the
general report of the trustees of the sinking fund, made to Congress
the 23d of February last, and printed, it appears, page 29, that the
whole amount of monies laid out by them was $1,302,407 64, from which
were to be deducted, as is mentioned in the note there subjoined, the
purchases made out of the interest fund (then about $50,000 as well as I
recollect). Call the sum paid then $1,252,407 64. By the Treasury report,
p. 38, (new edition,) it appears that the surplus of domestic revenue to
the end of 1790, appropriated to this object, was $1,374,656 40, and p.
34, that the monies drawn from Europe on account of the foreign loans,
were not the instrument of these purchases; and in some part, to which
I am not able just now to turn, I recollect pretty certainly that it is
said these purchases were actually carried to account, as was proper,
against the domestic surplus, consequently they are not to be allowed
in the foreign account also. Or if allowed in this, the sum will then be
due from the surplus account, and so must lessen the sum to be borrowed
for the sinking fund, which amounts to the same.
2. The 1st instalment due to the bank $200,000. Though the first payment
of the subscription of the United States to the bank might have been made,
in the first instant, out of the foreign monies to be immediately repaid
to them by the money borrowed of the bank, yet this useless formality
was avoided, and it was a mere operation of the pen on paper, without
the displacement of a single dollar. See reports p. 12. And, in any
event, the final reimbursement was never to be made out of the foreign
fund, which was appropriated solely to the _payment_ of the _foreign_,
and _purchase_ of the _general_ debt.
These two sums, therefore, of $284,901 89 and $200,000 are to be added
to the balance of $575,484 28 subject to future disposition, and will
make $1,050,386 17 actually here, and still to be applied to the proper
appropriation.
However, this account, as before observed, being only of a part of the
monies borrowed, no judgment can be formed from it of the expediency of
borrowing more; nor should I have stopped to make a criticism on it, but
to show why no such sums as the two above mentioned, were inserted in
the general account sketched for the President, June 5. I must add that
the miscellaneous sum of $49,400 in this account, is probably covered
by some other articles of that as far as it is chargeable on this fund;
because that account, under one form or another, takes up all the articles
chargeable on this fund which had appeared in the printed reports.
I must, therefore, proceed to renew my statement of June 5, inserting
therein the 1st instalment of the Dutch loan of $404,040 40 payable this
month, which not having been mentioned in any of the reports heretofore
published, was not inserted in my statement. I will add a like sum for
the year 1794, because I think we should now prepare for the whole of
that year.
As the Secretary of the Treasury does not seem to contemplate the
furnishing any fixed sum for the sinking fund, I shall leave that article
out of the account. The President can easily add to its result any sum
he may decide to have furnished to that fund. The account, so corrected,
will stand thus:
Dr.
The trust for loans.
To nett amount of loans to June 1, 1792 $7,545,912
To loan now going on for 2,000,000 florins 808,080
----------
$8,353,992
Cr.
Florins.
By charges on remittances to France 10,073 1
By reimbursement to Spain 680,000
By interest paid to foreign officers 105,000
-------
795,073 1==$321,239 46
By principal paid to foreign officers 191,316 90
By amount of French debt, principal and interest Livres.
payable to end of 1791 26,000,000
By ditto for 1792 3,450,000
----------
29,450,000 ==5,345,171
By ditto for 1793 3,410,000 == 618,915
By 1st instalment of Dutch debt due June 1793 404,040 40
By instalments and interest to France for
1794 3,250,000 == 569,875
By instalment to Holland for 1794 404,040 40
Balance will then remain in hands of the trust, 499,393 84
------------
$8,353,992 00
So that it appears there would be a balance in the hands of this trust,
at the close of 1794, of $499,393 84, were no monies to be furnished in
the meantime to the sinking fund; but should the President determine to
furnish that with the $900,000 proposed in my statement of June 5, then
a loan would be necessary for about $400,000, say in near round numbers,
1,000,000 of guilders, in addition to the 2,000,000 now borrowing. I am,
_individually_, of opinion that that sum ought to be furnished to the
sinking fund, and consequently that an additional loan, to this extent,
should be made, considering the subject in a _legal point of view_ only.
The reasons in favor of the extension are,
The apprehension of the extension of our war to other Indian nations,
and perhaps to Europe itself.
The disability this might produce to borrow at all, [this is, in my
judgment, a weighty consideration.]
The possibility that the government of France may become so settled
as that we may hazard the anticipation of payment, and so avoid dead
interest.
The reasons against it are,
The possibility that France may continue, for some time yet, so unsettled
as to render an anticipation of payments hazardous.
The risk of losing the capital borrowed by a successful invasion of the
country of deposit, if it be left in Europe; or by an extension of the
bankruptcies now shaking the most solid houses; and when and where they
will end we know not.
The loss of interest on the dead sum, if the sum itself be safe.
The execution of a power for one object, which was given to be executed
but for a very different one.
The commitment of the President, on this account, to events, or to the
criticisms of those who, though the measures should be perfectly wise,
may misjudge it through error or passion.
The apprehension that the head of the department means to provide idle
money to be lodged in the banks ready for the corruption of the next
legislature, as it is believed the late ones were corrupted, by gratifying
particular members with vast discounts for objects of speculation.
I confess that the last reasons have most weight with me.
XL.--_Report on the privileges and restrictions on the commerce of the
United States in foreign countries._
December 16, 1793.
SIR,--According to the pleasure of the House of Representatives, expressed
in their resolution of February 23, 1791, I now lay before them a report
on the privileges and restrictions on the commerce of the United States
in foreign countries. In order to keep the subject within those bounds
which I supposed to be under the contemplation of the House, I have
restrained my statements to those countries only with which we carry on
a commerce of some importance, and to those articles also of our produce
which are of sensible weight in the scale of our exports; and even these
articles are sometimes grouped together, according to the degree of
favor or restriction with which they are received in each country, and
that degree expressed in general terms without detailing the exact duty
levied on each article. To have gone fully into these minutiæ, would have
been to copy the tariffs and books of rates of the different countries,
and to have hidden, under a mass of details, those general and important
truths, the extraction of which, in a simple form, I conceived would best
answer the inquiries of the House, by condensing material information
within those limits of time and attention, which this portion of their
duties may justly claim. The plan, indeed, of minute details which have
been impracticable with some countries, for want of information.
Since preparing this report, which was put into its present form in
time to have been given in to the last session of Congress, alterations
of the conditions of our commerce with some foreign nations have taken
place--some of them independent of war; some arising out of it.
France has proposed to enter into a new treaty of commerce with us,
on liberal principles; and has, in the meantime, relaxed some of the
restraints mentioned in the report. Spain has, by an ordinance of June
last, established New Orleans, Pensacola, and St. Augustine into free
ports, for the vessels of friendly nations _having treaties of commerce_
with her, provided they touch for a permit at Corcubion in Gallicia,
or at Alicant; and our rice is, by the same ordinance, excluded from
that country. The circumstances of war have necessarily given us freer
access to the West Indian islands, whilst they have also drawn on our
navigation vexations and depredations of the most serious nature.
To have endeavored to describe all these, would have been as impracticable
as useless, since the scenes would have been shifting while under
description. I therefore think it best to leave the report as it was
formed, being adapted to a particular point of time, when things were
in their settled order, that is to say, to the summer of 1792. I have
the honor to be, &c.
_To the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the United States of
America._
The Secretary of State, to whom was referred, by the House of
Representatives, the report of a committee on the written message of
the President of the United States, of the 14th of February, 1791, with
instruction to report to Congress the nature and extent of the privileges
and restrictions of the commercial intercourse of the United States with
foreign nations, and the measures which he should think proper to be
adopted for the improvement of the commerce and navigation of the same,
has had the same under consideration, and thereupon makes the following
Report:
The countries with which the United States have their chief commercial
intercourse are Spain, Portugal, France, Great Britain, the United
Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden, and their American possessions; and
the articles of export, which constitute the basis of that commerce,
with their respective amounts, are,
Bread-stuff, that is to say, bread grains, meals,
and bread, to the annual amount of $7,649,887
Tobacco 4,349,567
Rice 1,753,796
Wood 1,263,534
Salted fish 941,696
Pot and pearl ash 839,093
Salted meats 599,130
Indigo 537,379
Horses and mules 339,753
Whale oil 252,591
Flax seed 236,072
Tar, pitch and turpentine 217,177
Live provisions 137,743
Ships
Foreign goods 620,274
To descend to articles of smaller value than these, would lead into a
minuteness of detail neither necessary nor useful to the present object.
The proportions of our exports, which go to the nations before mentioned,
and to their dominions, respectively, are as follows:
To Spain and its dominions $2,005,907
Portugal and its dominions 1,283,462
France and its dominions 4,698,735
Great Britain and its dominions 9,363,416
The United Netherlands and their dominions 1,963,880
Denmark and its dominions 224,415
Sweden and its dominions 47,240
Our imports from the same countries, are,
Spain and its dominions 335,110
Portugal and its dominions 595,763
France and its dominions 2,068,348
Great Britain and its dominions 15,285,428
United Netherlands and their dominions 1,172,692
Denmark and its dominions 351,364
Sweden and its dominions 14,325
These imports consist mostly of articles on which industry has been
exhausted.
Our _navigation_, depending on the same commerce, will appear by the
following statement of the tonnage of our own vessels, entering in our
ports, from those several nations and their possessions, in one year;
that is to say; from October, 1789, to September, 1790, inclusive, as
follows:
Tons.
Spain 19,695
Portugal 23,576
France 116,410
Great Britain 43,580
United Netherlands 58,858
Denmark 14,655
Sweden 750
Of our commercial objects, Spain receives favorably our bread-stuff,
salted fish, wood, ships, tar, pitch, and turpentine. On our meals,
however, as well as on those of other foreign countries, when re-exported
to their colonies, they have lately imposed duties of from half-a-dollar
to two dollars the barrel, the duties being so proportioned to the
current price of their own flour, as that both together are to make the
constant sum of nine dollars per barrel.
They do not discourage our rice, pot and pearl ash, salted provisions, or
whale oil; but these articles, being in small demand at their markets, are
carried thither but in a small degree. Their demand for rice, however, is
increasing. Neither tobacco nor indigo are received there. Our commerce
is permitted with their Canary islands under the same conditions.
Themselves, and their colonies, are the actual consumers of what they
receive from us.
Our navigation is free with the kingdom of Spain; foreign goods being
received there in our ships on the same conditions as if carried in
their own, or in the vessels of the country of which such goods are the
manufacture or produce.
_Portugal_ receives favorably our grain and bread, salted fish, and
other salted provisions, wood, tar, pitch, and turpentine.
For flax-seed, pot and pearl ash, though not discouraged, there is little
demand.
Our ships pay 20 per cent. on being sold to their subjects, and are then
free-bottoms.
Foreign goods (except those of the East Indies) are received on the
same footing in our vessels as in their own, or any others; that is to
say, on general duties of from 20 to 28 per cent., and, consequently,
our navigation is unobstructed by them. Tobacco, rice, and meals, are
prohibited.
Themselves and their colonies consume what they receive from us.
These regulations extend to the Azores, Madeira, and the Cape de Verd
islands, except that in these, meals and rice are received freely.
_France_ receives favorably our bread-stuffs, rice, wood, pot and pearl
ashes.
A duty of 5 sous the quintal, or nearly 4½ cents, is paid on our tar,
pitch, and turpentine. Our whale oils pay 6 livres the quintal, and
are the only foreign whale oils admitted. Our indigo pays 5 livres the
quintal, their own 2½; but a difference of quality, still more than a
difference of duty, prevents its seeking that market.
Salted beef is received freely for re-exportation; but if for home
consumption, it pays five livres the quintal. Other salted provisions
pay that duty in all cases, and salted fish is made lately to pay the
prohibitory one of twenty livres the quintal.
Our ships are free to carry thither all foreign goods which may be
carried in their own or any other vessels, except tobaccoes not of our
own growth; and they participate with theirs, the exclusive carriage of
our whale oils and tobaccoes.
During their former government, our tobacco was under a monopoly, but paid
no duties; and our ships were freely sold in their ports, and converted
into national bottoms. The first national assembly took from our ships
this privilege. They emancipated tobacco from its monopoly, but subjected
it to duties of eighteen livres, fifteen sous the quintal, carried in
their own vessels, and five livres carried in ours--a difference more
than equal to the freight of the article.
They and their colonies consume what they receive from us.
_Great Britain_ receives our pot and pearl ashes free, whilst those of
other nations pay a duty of two shillings and three pence the quintal.
There is an equal distinction in favor of our bar iron; of which article,
however, we do not produce enough for our own use. Woods are free from
us, whilst they pay some small duty from other countries. Indigo and flax
seed are free from all countries. Our tar and pitch pay eleven pence,
sterling, the barrel. From other alien countries they pay about a penny
and a third more.
Our tobacco, for their own consumption, pays one shilling and three
pence, sterling, the pound, custom and excise, besides heavy expenses
of collection; and rice, in the same case, pays seven shillings and
fourpence, sterling, the hundred weight; which, rendering it too dear, as
an article of common food, it is consequently used in very small quantity.
Our salted fish and other salted provisions, except bacon, are prohibited.
Bacon and whale oils are under prohibitory duties; so are our grains,
meals, and bread, as to internal consumption, unless in times of such
scarcity as may raise the price of wheat to fifty shillings, sterling,
the quarter, and other grains and meals in proportion.
Our ships, though purchased and navigated by their own subjects, are
not permitted to be used, even in their trade with us.
While the vessels of other nations are secured by standing laws, which
cannot be altered but by the concurrent will of the three branches of
the British legislature, in carrying thither any produce or manufacture
of the country to which they belong, which may be lawfully carried
in any vessels, ours, with the same prohibition of what is foreign,
are further prohibited by a standing law, (12 Car. 2, 18, sect. 3,)
from carrying thither all and any of our own domestic productions and
manufactures. A subsequent act, indeed, has authorized their executive
to permit the carriage of our own productions in our own bottoms, at
its sole discretion; and the permission has been given from year to
year by proclamation, but subject every moment to be withdrawn on that
single will; in which event, our vessels having anything on board, stand
interdicted from the entry of all British ports. The disadvantage of a
tenure which may be so suddenly discontinued, was experienced by our
merchants on a late occasion,[33] when an official notification that
this law would be strictly enforced, gave them just apprehensions for
the fate of their vessels and cargoes despatched or destined for the
ports of Great Britain. The minister of that court, indeed, frankly
expressed his personal conviction, that the words of the order went
farther than was intended, and so he afterwards officially informed
us; but the embarrassments of the moment were real and great, and the
possibility of their renewal lays our commerce to that country under
the same species of discouragement as to other countries, where it is
regulated by a single legislator; and the distinction is too remarkable
not to be noticed, that our navigation is excluded from the security of
fixed laws, while that security is given to the navigation of others.
Our vessels pay in their ports one shilling and nine pence, sterling,
per ton, light and trinity dues, more than is paid by British ships,
except in the port of London, where they pay the same as British.
The greater part of what they receive from us, is re-exported to other
countries, under the useless charges of an intermediate deposit, and
double voyage. From tables published in England, and composed, as is
said, from the books of their customhouses, it appears, that of the indigo
imported there in the years 1773, '4, '5, one-third was re-exported; and
from a document of authority, we learn, that of the rice and tobacco
imported there before the war, four-fifths were re-exported. We are
assured, indeed, that the quantities sent thither for re-exportation
since the war, are considerably diminished, yet less so than reason and
national interest would dictate. The whole of our grain is re-exported
when wheat is below fifty shillings the quarter, and other grains in
proportion.
The _United Netherlands_ prohibit our pickled beef and pork, meals and
bread of all sorts, and lay a prohibitory duty on spirits distilled from
grain.
All other of our productions are received on varied duties, which may
be reckoned, on a medium, at about three per cent.
They consume but a small proportion of what they receive. The residue
is partly forwarded for consumption in the inland parts of Europe, and
partly re-shipped to other maritime countries. On the latter portion
they intercept between us and the consumer, so much of the value as is
absorbed in the charges attending an intermediate deposit.
Foreign goods, except some East India articles, are received in vessels
of any nation.
Our ships may be sold and neutralized there, with exceptions of one or
two privileges, which somewhat lessen their value.
_Denmark_ lays considerable duties on our tobacco and rice, carried in
their own vessels, and half as much more, if carried in ours; but the
exact amount of these duties is not perfectly known here. They lay such
as amount to prohibitions on our indigo and corn.
_Sweden_ receives favorably our grains and meals, salted provisions,
indigo, and whale oil.
They subject our rice to duties of sixteen mills the pound weight, carried
in their own vessels, and of forty per cent. additional on that, or
twenty-two and four-tenths mills, carried in ours or any others. Being
thus rendered too dear as an article of common food, little of it is
consumed with them. They consume some of our tobaccoes, which they take
circuitously through Great Britain, levying heavy duties on them also;
their duties of entry, town duties, and excise, being 4.34 dollars the
hundred weight, if carried in their own vessels, and of forty per cent.
on that additional, if carried in our own or any other vessels.
They prohibit altogether our bread, fish, pot and pearl ashes, flax-seed,
tar, pitch, and turpentine, wood, (except oak timber and masts,) and
all foreign manufactures.
Under so many restrictions and prohibitions, our navigation with them
is reduced to almost nothing.
With our neighbors, an order of things much harder presents itself.
_Spain_ and _Portugal_ refuse, to all those parts of America which
they govern, all direct intercourse with any people but themselves. The
commodities in mutual demand between them and their neighbors, must be
carried to be exchanged in some port of the dominant country, and the
transportation between that and the subject state, must be in a domestic
bottom.
_France_, by a standing law, permits her West India possessions to
receive directly our vegetables, live provisions, horses, wood, tar,
pitch, turpentine, rice, and maize, and prohibits our other bread
stuff; but a suspension of this prohibition having been left to the
colonial legislatures, in times of scarcity, it was formerly suspended
occasionally, but latterly without interruption.
Our fish and salted provisions (except pork) are received in their islands
under a duty of three colonial livres the quintal, and our vessels are
as free as their own to carry our commodities thither, and to bring away
rum and molasses.
_Great Britain_ admits in her islands our vegetables, live provisions,
horses, wood, tar, pitch, and turpentine, rice and bread stuff, by a
proclamation of her executive, limited always to the term of a year, but
hitherto renewed from year to year. She prohibits our salted fish and
other salted provisions. She does not permit our vessels to carry thither
our own produce. Her vessels alone may take it from us, and bring in
exchange rum, molasses, sugar, coffee, cocoa-nuts, ginger, and pimento.
There are, indeed, some freedoms in the island of Dominica, but, under
such circumstances, as to be little used by us. In the British continental
colonies, and in Newfoundland, all our productions are prohibited, and
our vessels forbidden to enter their ports. Their governors, however,
in times of distress, have power to permit a temporary importation of
certain articles in their own bottoms, but not in ours.
Our citizens cannot reside as merchants or factors within any of the
British plantations, this being expressly prohibited by the same statute
of 12 Car. 2, c. 18, commonly called the navigation act.
In the _Danish American_ possessions a duty of 5 per cent. is levied on
our corn, corn meal, rice, tobacco, wood, salted fish, indigo, horses,
mules and live stock, and of 10 per cent. on our flour, salted pork and
beef, tar, pitch and turpentine.
In the American islands of the _United Netherlands_ and Sweden, our
vessels and produce are received, subject to duties, not so heavy as to
have been complained of; but they are heavier in the Dutch possessions
on the continent.
To sum up these restrictions, so far as they are important:
FIRST. In Europe--
Our bread stuff is at most times under prohibitory duties in England,
and considerably dutied on re-exportation from Spain to her colonies.
Our tobaccoes are heavily dutied in England, Sweden and France, and
prohibited in Spain and Portugal.
Our rice is heavily dutied in England and Sweden, and prohibited in
Portugal.
Our fish and salted provisions are prohibited in England, and under
prohibitory duties in France.
Our whale oils are prohibited in England and Portugal.
And our vessels are denied naturalization in England, and of late in
France.
SECOND. In the West Indies--
All intercourse is prohibited with the possessions of Spain and Portugal.
Our salted provisions and fish are prohibited by England.
Our salted pork and bread stuff (except maize) are received under
temporary laws only, in the dominions of France, and our salted fish
pays there a weighty duty.
THIRD. In the article of navigation--
Our own carriage of our own tobacco is heavily dutied in Sweden, and
lately in France.
We can carry no article, not of our own production, to the British ports
in Europe. Nor even our own produce to her American possessions.
Such being the restrictions on the commerce and navigation of the United
States; the question is, in what way they may best be removed, modified
or counteracted?
As to commerce, two methods occur. 1. By friendly arrangements with
the several nations with whom these restrictions exist: Or, 2. By the
separate act of our own legislatures for countervailing their effects.
There can be no doubt but that of these two, friendly arrangement is
the most eligible. Instead of embarrassing commerce under piles of
regulating laws, duties and prohibitions, could it be relieved from all
its shackles in all parts of the world, could every country be employed
in producing that which nature has best fitted it to produce, and each
be free to exchange with others mutual surplusses for mutual wants, the
greatest mass possible would then be produced of those things which
contribute to human life and human happiness; the numbers of mankind
would be increased, and their condition bettered.
Would even a single nation begin with the United States this system
of free commerce, it would be advisable to begin it with that nation;
since it is one by one only that it can be extended to all. Where the
circumstances of either party render it expedient to levy a revenue,
by way of impost, on commerce, its freedom might be modified, in that
particular, by mutual and equivalent measures, preserving it entire in
all others.
Some nations, not yet ripe for free commerce in all its extent, might
still be willing to mollify its restrictions and regulations for us, in
proportion to the advantages which an intercourse with us might offer.
Particularly they may concur with us in reciprocating the duties to be
levied on each side, or in compensating any excess of duty by equivalent
advantages of another nature. Our commerce is certainly of a character
to entitle it to favor in most countries. The commodities we offer are
either necessaries of life, or materials for manufacture, or convenient
subjects of revenue; and we take in exchange, either manufactures, when
they have received the last finish of art and industry, or mere luxuries.
Such customers may reasonably expect welcome and friendly treatment
at every market. Customers, too, whose demands, increasing with their
wealth and population, must very shortly give full employment to the
whole industry of any nation whatever, in any line of supply they may
get into the habit of calling for from it.
But should any nation, contrary to our wishes, suppose it may better
find its advantage by continuing its system of prohibitions, duties and
regulations, it behooves us to protect our citizens, their commerce and
navigation, by counter prohibitions, duties and regulations, also. Free
commerce and navigation are not to be given in exchange for restrictions
and vexations; nor are they likely to produce a relaxation of them.
Our navigation involves still higher considerations. As a branch of
industry, it is valuable, but as a resource of defence, essential.
Its value, as a branch of industry, is enhanced by the dependence of
so many other branches on it. In times of general peace it multiplies
competitors for employment in transportation, and so keeps that at its
proper level; and in times of war, that is to say, when those nations
who may be our principal carriers, shall be at war with each other, if
we have not within ourselves the means of transportation, our produce
must be exported in belligerent vessels, at the increased expense of
war-freight and insurance, and the articles which will not bear that,
must perish on our hands.
But it is as a resource of defence that our navigation will admit neither
neglect nor forbearance. The position and circumstances of the United
States leave them nothing to fear on their land-board, and nothing to
desire beyond their present rights. But on their seaboard, they are open
to injury, and they have there, too, a commerce which must be protected.
This can only be done by possessing a respectable body of citizen-seamen,
and of artists and establishments in readiness for ship-building.
Were the ocean, which is the common property of all, open to the industry
of all, so that every person and vessel should be free to take employment
wherever it could be found, the United States would certainly not set
the example of appropriating to themselves, exclusively, any portion of
the common stock of occupation. They would rely on the enterprise and
activity of their citizens for a due participation of the benefits of
the seafaring business, and for keeping the marine class of citizens
equal to their object. But if particular nations grasp at undue shares,
and, more especially, if they seize on the means of the United States,
to convert them into aliment for their own strength, and withdraw them
entirely from the support of those to whom they belong, defensive and
protecting measures become necessary on the part of the nation whose
marine resources are thus invaded; or it will be disarmed of its defence;
its productions will lie at the mercy of the nation which has possessed
itself exclusively of the means of carrying them, and its politics may
be influenced by those who command its commerce. The carriage of our own
commodities, if once established in another channel, cannot be resumed in
the moment we may desire. If we lose the seamen and artists whom it now
occupies, we lose the present means of marine defence, and time will be
requisite to raise up others, when disgrace or losses shall bring home
to our feelings the error of having abandoned them. The materials for
maintaining our due share of navigation, are ours in abundance. And, as
to the mode of using them, we have only to adopt the principles of those
who put us on the defensive, or others equivalent and better fitted to
our circumstances.
The following principles, being founded in reciprocity, appear perfectly
just, and to offer no cause of complaint to any nation:
1. Where a nation imposes high duties on our productions, or prohibits
them altogether, it may be proper for us to do the same by theirs;
first burdening or excluding those productions which they bring here,
in competition with our own of the same kind; selecting next, such
manufactures as we take from them in greatest quantity, and which, at
the same time, we could the soonest furnish to ourselves, or obtain from
other countries; imposing on them duties lighter at first, but heavier
and heavier afterwards, as other channels of supply open. Such duties
having the effect of indirect encouragement to domestic manufactures of
the same kind, may induce the manufacturer to come himself into these
States, where cheaper subsistence, equal laws, and a vent of his wares,
free of duty, may ensure him the highest profits from his skill and
industry. And here, it would be in the power of the State governments
to co-operate essentially, by opening the resources of encouragement
which are under their control, extending them liberally to artists in
those particular branches of manufacture for which their soil, climate,
population and other circumstances have matured them, and fostering
the precious efforts and progress of _household_ manufacture, by some
patronage suited to the nature of its objects, guided by the local
informations they possess, and guarded against abuse by their presence
and attentions. The oppressions on our agriculture, in foreign ports,
would thus be made the occasion of relieving it from a dependence on the
councils and conduct of others, and of promoting arts, manufactures and
population at home.
2. Where a nation refuses permission to our merchants and factors to
reside within certain parts of their dominions, we may, if it should be
thought expedient, refuse residence to theirs in any and every part of
ours, or modify their transactions.
3. Where a nation refuses to receive in our vessels any productions
but our own, we may refuse to receive, in theirs, any but their own
productions. The first and second clauses of the bill reported by the
committee, are well formed to effect this object.
4. Where a nation refuses to consider any vessel as ours which has
not been built within our territories, we should refuse to consider as
theirs, any vessel not built within their territories.
5. Where a nation refuses to our vessels the carriage even of our own
productions, to certain countries under their domination, we might refuse
to theirs of every description, the carriage of the same productions to
the same countries. But as justice and good neighborhood would dictate
that those who have no part in imposing the restriction on us, should
not be the victims of measures adopted to defeat its effect, it may be
proper to confine the restriction to vessels owned or navigated by any
subjects of the same dominant power, other than the inhabitants of the
country to which the said productions are to be carried. And to prevent
all inconvenience to the said inhabitants, and to our own, by too sudden
a check on the means of transportation, we may continue to admit the
vessels marked for future exclusion, on an advanced tonnage, and for
such length of time only, as may be supposed necessary to provide against
that inconvenience.
The establishment of some of these principles by Great Britain, alone, has
already lost us in our commerce with that country and its possessions,
between eight and nine hundred vessels of near 40,000 tons burden,
according to statements from official materials, in which they have
confidence. This involves a proportional loss of seamen, shipwrights,
and ship-building, and is too serious a loss to admit forbearance of
some effectual remedy.
It is true we must expect some inconvenience in practice from the
establishment of discriminating duties. But in this, as in so many other
cases, we are left to choose between two evils. These inconveniences are
nothing when weighed against the loss of wealth and loss of force, which
will follow our perseverance in the plan of indiscrimination. When once
it shall be perceived that we are either in the system or in the habit
of giving equal advantages to those who extinguish our commerce and
navigation by duties and prohibitions, as to those who treat both with
liberality and justice, liberality and justice will be converted by all
into duties and prohibitions. It is not to the moderation and justice
of others we are to trust for fair and equal access to market with our
productions, or for our due share in the transportation of them; but
to our own means of independence, and the firm will to use them. Nor do
the inconveniences of discrimination merit consideration. Not one of the
nations before mentioned, perhaps not a commercial nation on earth, is
without them. In our case one distinction alone will suffice: that is
to say, between nations who favor our productions and navigation, and
those who do not favor them. One set of moderate duties, say the present
duties, for the first, and a fixed advance on these as to some articles,
and prohibitions as to others, for the last.
Still, it must be repeated that friendly arrangements are preferable
with all who will come into them; and that we should carry into such
arrangements all the liberality and spirit of accommodation which the
nature of the case will admit.
France has, of her own accord, proposed negotiations for improving, by
a new treaty on fair and equal principles, the commercial relations of
the two countries. But her internal disturbances have hitherto prevented
the prosecution of them to effect, though we have had repeated assurances
of a continuance of the disposition.
Proposals of friendly arrangement have been made on our part, by the
present government, to that of Great Britain, as the message states;
but, being already on as good a footing in law, and a better in fact,
than the most favored nation, they have not, as yet, discovered any
disposition to have it meddled with.
We have no reason to conclude that friendly arrangements would be declined
by the other nations, with whom we have such commercial intercourse
as may render them important. In the meanwhile, it would rest with the
wisdom of Congress to determine whether, as to those nations, they will
not surcease _ex parte_ regulations, on the reasonable presumption that
they will concur in doing whatever justice and moderation dictate should
be done.
FOOTNOTE:
[33] April 12, 1792.
XLI.--_Report on the Mint. Communicated to the Senate, December 31, 1793._
PHILADELPHIA, December 30, 1793.
SIR,--I am informed, by the Director of the Mint, that an impediment
has arisen to the coinage of the precious metals, which it is my duty
to lay before you.
It will be recollected, that, in pursuance of the authority vested in the
President, by Congress, to procure artists from abroad, if necessary, Mr.
Drost, at Paris, so well known by the superior style of his coinage, was
engaged for our mint; but that, after occasioning to us a considerable
delay, he declined coming. That thereupon, our minister at London,
according to the instructions he had received, endeavored to procure,
there, a chief coiner and assayer; that, as to the latter, he succeeded
in sending over a Mr. Albion Coxe, for that office, but that he could
procure no person there more qualified to discharge the duties of chief
coiner, than might be had here; and, therefore, did not engage one. The
duties of this last office have consequently been, hitherto, performed,
and well performed, by Henry Voight, an artist of the United States,
but the law requiring these officers to give a security, in the sum
of ten thousand dollars each, neither is able to do it. The coinage of
the precious metals has, therefore, been prevented for some time past,
though, in order that the mint might not be entirely idle, the coinage
of copper has been going on; the trust in that, at any one point of
time, being of but small amount.
It now remains to determine how this difficulty is to be got over. If by
discharging these officers, and seeking others, it may well be doubted
if any can be found in the United States, equally capable of fulfilling
their duties; and to seek them from abroad, would still add to the
delay; and if found either at home or abroad, they must still be of the
description of artists whose circumstances and connections rarely enable
them to give security in so large a sum. The other alternative would
be to lessen the securityship in money, and to confide that it will be
supplied by the vigilance of the director, who, leaving as small masses
of metal in the hands of the officers, at any one time, as the course
of their process will admit, may reduce the risk to what would not be
considerable.
To give an idea of the extent of the trust to the several officers, both
as to sum and time, it may be proper to state the course of the business,
according to what the director is of opinion it should be. The treasurer,
he observes, should receive the bullion; the assayer, by an operation on
a few grains of it, is to ascertain its fineness. The treasurer is then
to deliver it to the refiner, to be melted and mixed to the standard
fineness; the assayer here, again, examining a few grains of the melted
mass, and certifying when it is of due fineness; the refiner then delivers
it to the chief coiner, to be rolled and coined, and returns it, when
coined, to the treasurer. By this it appears, that a few grains only,
at a time, are in the hands of the assayer, the mass being confided,
for operation, to the refiner and chief coiner. It is to be observed
that the law has not taken notice of the office of refiner, though so
important an officer ought, it should seem, to be of the President's
nomination, and ought to give a security nearly equal to that required
from the chief coiner.
I have thought it my duty to give this information under an impression
that it is proper to be communicated to the Legislature, who will decide,
in their wisdom, whether it will be expedient to make it the duty of
the treasurer to receive and keep the bullion before coinage;
To lessen the pecuniary security required from the chief coiner and
assayer; and
To place the office of the refiner under the same nomination with that
of the other chief officers; to fix his salary, and require due security.
I have the honor to be, with the most perfect respect and attachment,
sir, your most obedient and most humble servant.
END OF VOL. VII.
INDEX TO VOL. VII.
ADAMS, JOHN--His estimate of life, 30.
His reading, 59, 69.
His religious opinions, 59, 68, 219, 280.
Calumnies of Pickering against, 58, 62.
His views of metaphysics, 71.
His views of Bonaparte, 71.
Letter of condolence to, from Mr. Jefferson, 107.
Oldest signer of the Declaration of Independence, 218, 219.
ADAMS, J. Q.--Made Secretary of State, 85.
ALEXANDER, EMPEROR--His character and views, 20.
ADVICE--Letter of, 401.
ANATOMY--Experiments in, 388.
ANGLO SAXON--The language, 416.
APOCALYPSE, THE--View of, 394.
ASTRONOMY--New method of finding longitude, 223, 226.
BANKS--Evils of the Banking system, 64, 111, 115.
Suspension of, 142.
Distress resulting therefrom, 151.
Jefferson's plan for reducing circulating medium, 146.
BARBARY STATES--Their piracies, 250.
Efforts to redeem Algerine prisoners, 532.
BOLINGBROKE, LORD--His writings, 197.
BONAPARTE--His character, 275.
BOOKS--Should be imported free of duty, 220.
CAMPBELL, COL.--Hero of King's Mountain, 268.
CAPITOL--Whether there should be any inscription on new one, 41.
CHEMISTRY--Progress of, 259.
CINCINNATI SOCIETY--History of, 368.
CLASSICS--The study of, 131.
CLIMATE--Of western country, 375.
COINAGE--Report on copper coinage, 462.
Report on coins, weights and measures, 472.
COLONIZATION OF NEGROES--Views on, 332.
COMMERCE--Treaties with European powers, 436.
Our Mediterranean trade, 519.
Restriction and privileges of our foreign commerce, 636.
Free Trade, how far practicable, 646.
COMMITTEES OF CORRESPONDENCE--Origin of, 120.
COMPENSATION LAW--Unpopularity of, 78.
CONGRESS--Whether it has a right to adjourn to a new place of
meeting without consent of President, 495.
CONSOLIDATION--Dangers of, 223, 293, 430.
Rapid strides towards, 426, 430.
CONSTITUTION--Rules for interpreting, 296, 336, 342, 358.
Distribution of powers between State and Federal governments, 297,
358.
Who the final arbiter between State and Federal governments, 298,
358.
Should be easily amendable, 323, 336.
Similarity of Constitutions of different States, 323.
COURTS, COUNTY--Magistrates of, should be elected by the people, 12,
18.
CUBA--Should not be allowed to pass to England, 288, 299.
People of, how affected, 299.
Should belong to the U. States, 316.
DAVID, KING--His description of a good man, 337.
DEBT, FOREIGN--How it should be managed, 506.
DRAWBACKS--Should be repealed, 6.
EDUCATION--General plan of, 98, 187, 322, 398.
Female education, 101.
Northern teachers and professors, 187.
Common school system of Virginia a failure, 256.
ELOQUENCE--Models of, 231.
EMBARGO--Circumstances under which, resorted to, 373.
Circumstances which led to its repeal, 425, 431.
Treasonable conduct of Massachusetts in relation to, 425, 431.
ENGLAND--Feeling of towards U. States, 42, 519.
Debt of, 43.
Condition and prospects of, 45, 48, 232.
Constitution of, 48.
Parties in, 50.
Discontents in, 196.
Origin of her constitution, 355.
Effects of Norman conquest, 413.
Indemnity for slaves carried off by, during Revolutionary war, 518.
Commercial relations of, with United States, 518.
EUROPE--Condition of, 182, 193, 217, 244, 288.
Revolutions in, 307.
EXPATRIATION--Exists as a natural right, 72.
FRANCE--Condition of, 66, 76.
Return to, of Louis XVIII., 82.
Constitution of, 86.
Allied powers depart, 109.
Her revolution, 302.
Her progress in science, 323.
Whether our treaties with, remain Obligatory after her revolution,
611.
Not allowed to equip privateers in our ports, 226.
FRANKLIN, BENJAMIN--Calumnies against, 108.
FISHERIES--Report on Cod fisheries, 588.
History of Cod fisheries, 538.
History of whale fisheries, 544.
GENERATIONS--One has no right to bind another, 16, 19, 311, 359.
GOVERNMENT--Views on, 3, 263, 307, 318, 357.
Should reflect will of people in all its departments, 9, 319.
Is progressive, 15.
Should be remodelled from time to time, 14, 19.
Principle of representation, 32.
Must be adapted to each particular people, 56.
Majority must govern, 75.
Europe cannot bear republican government, 325.
GREEK--Pronunciation of, 112, 137.
The ablative case in, 272, 340.
GRIEF--Its uses and abuses, 33, 37.
HAMILTON, A.--His monarchical principles, 389.
HISTORY--Course of, indicated for University of Virginia, 412.
IMPROVEMENT, INTERNAL--Progress of, 75, 422.
Power of, does not belong to federal government, 79.
INDEPENDENCE, DECLARATION OF--Its history, 122, 304.
Jefferson's opinion of Mecklenburg Declaration, 128.
Authorship of, 407.
Original rough draft of, 409.
The house in which written, 410.
Celebration of 50th anniversary of, 450.
INDIANS--Their language, 96, 400.
Plan for civilizing, 233.
The right to extinguish Indian titles belongs to federal and
not State governments, 467.
JAY, JOHN--Why he did not sign Declaration of Independence, 308.
JEFFERSON, THOMAS--His estimate of life, 25, 421.
Decay of his faculties, 52, 179, 327.
Resigned to death, 52, 243.
Oppressed by correspondence, 54, 254.
His occupations in his old age, 111, 116.
His habits of life, 116.
Materials for his biography, 117.
Application for his portrait, 203.
Complains of publication of his letters, 222.
Settlements of his accounts on his return from France, 239, 246.
His relations with J. Adams, 314.
Calumnies of Pickering, 362.
His relations with Washington unaffected by the Mazzei letter,
364.
Their friendship uninterrupted to the last, 370.
His losses by security debt, 433.
JUDICIARY, FEDERAL--Decisions of, do not bind other departments
of the government, 134, 177.
Each department decides for itself, 134, 177.
Danger to our system from encroachments of, 192, 199, 216,
256, 278, 293, 321, 403.
KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS--Drawn by Jefferson, 229.
KOSCIUSKO--His will, 98.
His services to United States, 106.
LA FAYETTE--His visit to United States, 378, 379.
LANDS, PUBLIC--Settlements on, 83.
LANGDON, GOVERNOR--His relations with Jefferson, 154.
LANGUAGE--Is progressive, 174, 418.
LAW--Course of reading in, 207.
Common law no part of law of United States, 251.
Christianity no part of common law, 359.
Origin of common law, 381.
LAW, INTERNATIONAL--Principle of free ships make free goods &c.,
not law of nations, 270.
LEE, R. H.--Biography of, 422.
LEWIS AND CLARKE--Journal of their expedition, 91.
LIVINGSTON, E.--His code, 383, 483.
LOAN--Proposition for new loan, 629.
LOTTERIES--Jefferson applies for leave to sell his property by
lottery, 434.
LOUISIANA--Boundaries of, 51.
MANUFACTURES--Whether a mark should be secured to each by law, 563.
MATERIALISM--Views on, 153, 175.
MAZZEI LETTER--History and explanation of, 364.
METAPHYSICS--Views on, 153, 175.
MINISTERS--Senate has no right to negative the _grade_ of a
minister, it can only negative the _person_ appointed by
the Executive, 465.
MISSIONS, RELIGIOUS--To foreign States objectionable, 287.
MINT--The coiner at the mint unable to give security, 651.
MISSISSIPPI RIVER--Our right to navigate, 568.
MISSOURI QUESTION--150, 151, 194, 200.
Evil of a geographical line, 151, 158, 159, 180, 182, 194.
MONROE, JAMES--His election to Presidency, 80.
NAVY--Origin of navy of United States, 261, 264.
NEUTRALITY--A neutral nation may refuse belligerents right to
pass through its territory, 509.
NOVELS--Evil of, 102.
OFFICES--Rotation in, 190.
OPTICS--Views on, suggested, 258.
ORATORY--Defects of modern, 347.
PAINE, THOMAS--His writings, 197.
PARTIES--History of, in U. S., 277, 290.
Original views of federal and republican, 290.
Republican party becomes federalized, 325, 342.
Necessity of, 376.
A strong monarchical party at the beginning of our government,
390.
POSTS, NORTH-WESTERN--England refuses to surrender, 518.
QUAKERS--Character of, 66.
RANDOLPH, PEYTON--Character of, 20.
RELIGION--Jefferson's views on, 28, 61, 127, 164, 170, 185, 210,
245, 252, 257, 266, 269, 281.
System of Jesus compared with ancient philosophers, 138, 156,
164, 185.
Jesus as a reformer, 164.
Modern fanaticism, 170.
Religious intolerance, 396.
REPRESENTATION--Bill apportioning, 594.
REVOLUTION, THE--Who begun it, 99, 103, 121.
Circumstances attending Declaration of Independence, 122.
REVOLUTIONARY DEBT--Those due soldiers of North Carolina and
Virginia should be paid to themselves and not their assignees,
469.
ROMAN PEOPLE AND CONSTITUTION--148, 150.
SCIENCES--Distribution of, 339.
Progress of France in, 327.
SLAVES--Not entitled to be represented, 36.
Emancipation of, 58, 310.
Amelioration of condition of, 403, 437.
Re-capture of slaves escaped to Florida, 601.
SOCIETY--Its progress, 377.
SOUTH AMERICAN PROVINCES--Incapable of self-government, 67, 75,
104, 210.
SPAIN--Treaty with, rejected, 160.
TAYLOR, JOHN--Jefferson's opinion of his "constitution
construed," 213, 216.
TRACY, DESTUTT--His works, 38, 55.
UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA--Organization of, 81, 161, 173, 196,
329, 392, 441.
Religious objections to appointment of Dr. Cooper in, 156,
162, 171.
Difficulties surrounding, 201, 204, 237, 392.
Necessity for a southern University, 205.
Arrangement for religious worship, 267.
Students allowed to select tickets, 300.
Difficulties of discipline, 301.
Progress of, 309.
Selection of professors for, 348.
Inculcation of federal doctrines in, should be guarded
against, 397.
Necessity for an Anatomical Hall, 393, 398.
Appointment of foreign professors, 415.
Library of, 432.
Establishment of school of Botany, 438, 441.
UNITED STATES--True policy of, 6.
Animosity to England growing out of last war, 22.
Relations of, with European powers, 288.
Relations of, with England, 22.
Danger of dissolution of Union, 182.
Should disconnect their policy from that of Europe, 183, 315.
Dangers which threaten them, 211, 214.
VANDER KEMP--History of, 29.
VIRGINIA--Programme of new constitution for, 9.
Arnold's invasion of, 144, 444.
Historical documents of, 312.
Her first constitution, 344.
Defects in, 315.
Authorship of bill of rights, constitution of, 405, 407.
WAR--Benefits of the last war, 66.
WARDS--Counties should be divided into, 35.
WASHINGTON, GEN.--Authorship of Farewell Address, 291.
No unkind feeling between him and Jefferson on account of
Mazzei letter, 364.
Forms and ceremonies adopted during his administration, 367.
He was a true republican, 371.
WASHINGTON CITY--Locating of, 512, 561.
WATER--Report on methods of obtaining fresh water from salt, 455.
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES--A standard of, 87.
Report on, 472.
WHISKEY--Evils of its cheapness, 285.
WILLIAM AND MARY COLLEGE--Its foundation, 328.
Proposition to consolidate it with University, 350, 384.
Its charter is under the power of the legislature, 350, 384.
WINES--Use of beneficial, 110.