Secretary of the Treasury's answer to it, and the draught of powers and
instructions to him, I am of opinion, as I always have been, that the
purchase of our debt to France by private speculators, would have been
an operation extremely injurious to our credit; and that the consequence
foreseen by our banker, that the purchasers would have been obliged, in
order to make good their payments, to deluge the markets of Amsterdam
with American paper of all sorts, and to sell it at any price, was a
probable one. And the more so, as we know that the particular individuals
who were engaged in that speculation, possess no means of their own
adequate to the payments they would have had to make. While we must
not doubt that these motives, together with a proper regard for the
credit of the United States, had real and full weight with our bankers,
towards inducing them to counterwork these private speculations; yet, to
ascribe their industry in this business wholly to these motives, might
lead to a too great and dangerous confidence in them. It was obviously
their interest to defeat all such speculations, because they tended to
take out of their hands, or at least to divide with them, the profits
of the great operation of transferring the French debt to Amsterdam, an
object of first rate magnitude to them, and on the undivided enjoyments
of which they might count, if private speculators could be baffled. It
has been a contest of dexterity and cunning, in which our champions have
obtained the victory. The manœuvre of opening a loan of three millions
of florins, has, on the whole, been useful to the United States, and
though unauthorized, I think should be confirmed. The measure proposed
by the Secretary of the Treasury, of sending a superintendent of their
future operations, will effectually prevent their doing the like again,
and the funding laws leave no danger that such an expedient might at
any future time be useful to us.
The report of the Secretary of the Treasury, and the draught of
instructions, present this plan to view: First, to borrow on the best
terms we can, not exceeding those limited by the law, such a sum as may
answer all demands of principal or interest of the foreign debts, due,
or to become due before the end of 1791. [This I think he supposes will
be about three and a half millions of dollars.] Second, to consider two
of the three millions of florins already borrowed by our bankers as,
so far, an execution of this operation; consequently, that there will
remain but about two and a half millions of dollars to be borrowed on
the old terms. Third, to borrow no more as yet, towards completing the
transfer of the French debt to Amsterdam, unless we can do it on more
advantageous terms. Fourth, to consider the third millions of florins
already borrowed by our bankers, as, so far, an execution of the powers
given the President to borrow two millions of dollars, by the act of the
12th of August. The whole of this appears to me to be wise. If the third
million be employed in buying up our _foreign paper_, on the exchange
of Amsterdam, by creating a demand for that species of paper, it will
excite a cupidity in the monied men to obtain more of it by new loans,
and consequently enable us to borrow more and on lower terms. The saving
of interest, too, on the sum so to be bought, may be applied in buying
up more principal, and thereby keep this salutary operation going.
I would only take the liberty of suggesting the insertion of some
such clause as the following, into the instructions: "The agents to be
employed shall never open a loan for more than one million of dollars at
a time, nor open a new loan till the preceding one has been filled, and
expressly approved by the President of the United States." A new man,
alighting on the exchange of Amsterdam, with powers to borrow twelve
millions of dollars, will be immediately beset with bankers and brokers,
who will pour into his ear, from the most unsuspected quarters, such
informations and suspicions as may lead him exactly into their snares.
So wonderfully dexterous are they in wrapping up and complicating their
propositions, they will make it evident, even to a clear-headed man, (not
in the habit of this business,) that two and two make five. The agent,
therefore, should be guarded, even against himself, by putting it out
of his power to extend the effect of any erroneous calculation beyond
one million of dollars. Were he able, under a delusive calculation, to
commit such a sum as twelve millions of dollars, what would be said of the
government? Our bankers told me themselves that they would not choose,
in the conduct of this great loan, to open for more than two or three
millions of florins at a time, and certainly never for more than five.
By contracting for only one million of dollars at a time, the agent will
have frequent occasions of trying to better the terms. I dare say that
this caution, though not expressed in the instructions, is intended by
the Secretary of the Treasury to be carried into their execution. But,
perhaps, it will be desirable for the President, that his sense of it
also should be expressed in writing.
XII.--_Opinion upon the question what the answer of the President
should be in case Lord Dorchester should apply for permission to march
troops through the territory of the United States, from Detroit to the
Mississippi._
GEORGE WASHINGTON TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.
UNITED STATES, August 27, 1790.
Provided the dispute between Great Britain and Spain should come to
the decision of arms, from a variety of circumstances (individually
unimportant and inconclusive, but very much the reverse when compared
and combined,) there is no doubt in my mind, that New Orleans, and
the Spanish posts above it on the Mississippi, will be among the first
attempts of the former; and that the reduction of them will be undertaken
by a combined operation from Detroit.
The _consequences_ of having so formidable and enterprizing a people
as the British on both our flanks and rear, with their navy in front,
as they respect our western settlements which may be seduced thereby,
as they regard the security of the Union and its commerce with the West
Indies, are too obvious to need enumeration.
What then should be the answer of the Executive of the United States to
Lord Dorchester, in case he should apply for permission to march troops
through the territory of the said States from Detroit to the Mississippi?
What notice ought be taken of the measure, if it should be undertaken
without leave, which is the most probable proceeding of the two?
The opinion of the Secretary of State is requested in writing upon the
above statements.
_Opinion on the questions stated in the President's note of August 27th,
1790._
August 28, 1790.
I am so deeply impressed with the magnitude of the dangers which will
attend our government, if Louisiana and the Floridas be added to the
British empire, that, in my opinion, we ought to make ourselves parties
in the _general war_ expected to take place, should this be the only
means of preventing the calamity.
But I think we should defer this step as long as possible; because war is
full of chances, which may relieve us from the necessity of interfering;
and if necessary, still the later we interfere, the better we shall be
prepared.
It is often indeed more easy to prevent the capture of a place, than
to retake it. Should it be so in the case in question, the difference
between the two operations of preventing and retaking, will not be so
costly as two, three, or four years more of war.
So that I am for preserving neutrality as long, and entering into the
war as late, as possible.
If this be the best course, it decides, in a good degree, what should
be our conduct, if the British ask leave to march troops through our
territory, or march them without leave.
It is well enough agreed, in the laws of nations, that for a neutral power
to give or refuse permission to the troops of either belligerent party
to pass through their territory, is no breach of neutrality, provided
the same refusal or permission be extended to the other party.
If we give leave of passage then to the British troops, Spain will have
no just cause of complaint against us, provided we extend the same leave
to her when demanded.
If we refuse, (as indeed we have a right to do,) and the troops should
pass notwithstanding, of which there can be little doubt, we shall stand
committed. For either we must enter immediately into the war, or pocket
an acknowledged insult in the face of the world; and one insult pocketed
soon produces another.
There is indeed a middle course, which I should be inclined to prefer;
that is, to avoid giving any answer. They will proceed notwithstanding,
but to do this under our silence, will admit of palliation, and produce
apologies, from military necessity; and will leave us free to pass it
over without dishonor, or to make it a handle of quarrel hereafter, if
we should have use for it as such. But, if we are obliged to give an
answer, I think the occasion not such as should induce us to hazard that
answer which might commit us to the war at so early a stage of it; and
therefore that the passage should be permitted.
If they should pass without having asked leave, I should be for expressing
our dissatisfaction to the British court, and keeping alive an altercation
on the subject, till events should decide whether it is most expedient
to accept their apologies, or profit of the aggression as a cause of war.
XIII.--_Opinion on the question whether it will be expedient to notify to
Lord Dorchester the real object of the expedition preparing by Governor
St. Clair._
August 29, 1790.
On considering more fully the question whether it will be expedient to
notify to Lord Dorchester the real object of the expedition preparing
by Governor St. Clair, I still think it will not be expedient. For,
if the notification be early, he will get the Indians out of the way,
and defeat our object. If it be so late as not to leave him time to
withdraw them before our stroke be struck, it will then be so late also
as not to leave him time to withdraw any secret aids he may have sent
them. And the notification will betray to him that he may go on without
fear in his expedition against the Spaniards, and for which he may yet
have sufficient time after our expedition is over. On the other hand,
if he should suspect our preparations are to prevent his passing our
territory, these suspicions may induce him to decline his expedition,
as, even should he think he could either force or steal a passage, he
would not divide his troops, leaving (as he would suppose) an enemy
between them able to take those he should leave, and cut off the return
of those he should carry. These suspicions, too, would mislead both him
and the Indians, and so enable us to take the latter more completely by
surprise, and prevent him from sending secret aid to those whom he would
not suppose the objects of the enterprise; thus effecting a double purpose
of preventing his enterprise, and securing our own. Might it not even
be expedient, with a view to deter his enterprise, to instruct Governor
St. Clair either to continue his pursuit of the Indians till the season
be too far advanced for Lord Dorchester to move; or, on disbanding his
militia, to give them general orders (which might reach the ears of Lord
Dorchester) to be ready to assemble at a moment's warning, though no
such assembly be really intended?
Always taking care neither to say nor do, against their passage, what
might directly commit either our peace or honor.
XIV.--_Opinion on proceedings to be had under the Residence act._
November 29, 1790.
A territory not exceeding ten miles square (or, I presume, one hundred
square miles in any form) to be located by metes and bounds.
Three commissioners to be appointed. I suppose them not entitled to any
salary.
[If they live near the place they may, in some instances, be influenced
by self interest, and partialities; but they will push the work with
zeal. If they are from a distance, and northwardly, they will be more
impartial, but may affect delays.]
The commissioners to purchase or accept "such quantity of land on the
east side of the river as the President shall deem _proper for the United
States_," viz., for the federal Capitol, the offices, the President's
house and gardens, the town house, market house, public walks and
hospital. For the President's house, offices and gardens, I should think
two squares should be consolidated. For the Capitol and offices, one
square. For the market, one square. For the public walks, nine squares
consolidated.
The expression "such quantity of land as the President shall deem _proper
for the United States_," is vague. It may therefore be extended to the
acceptance or purchase of land enough for the town; and I have no doubt
it is the wish, and perhaps expectation. In that case, it will be to
be laid out in lots and streets. I should propose these to be at right
angles, as in Philadelphia, and that no street be narrower than one
hundred feet, with foot ways of fifteen feet. Where a street is long and
level, it might be one hundred and twenty feet wide. I should prefer
squares of at least two hundred yards every way, which will be about
eight acres each.
The commissioners should have some taste in architecture, because they
may have to decide between different plans.
They will, however, be subject to the President's direction in every point.
When the President shall have made up his mind as to the spot for the
town, would there be any impropriety in his saying to the neighboring
land holders, "I will fix the town here if you will join and purchase
and give the lands." They may well afford it by the increase of value
it will give to their own circumjacent lands.
The lots to be sold out in breadths of fifty feet; their depths to extend
to the diagonal of the square.
I doubt much whether the obligation to build the houses at a given
distance from the street, contributes to its beauty. It produces a
disgusting monotony; all persons make this complaint against Philadelphia.
The contrary practice varies the appearance, and is much more convenient
to the inhabitants.
In Paris it is forbidden to build a house beyond a given height; and it
is admitted to be a good restriction. It keeps down the price of ground,
keeps the houses low and convenient, and the streets light and airy.
Fires are much more manageable where houses are low.
XV.--_Report by the Secretary of State to the President of the United
States on the Report of the Secretary of the Government north-west of
the Ohio._
December 14, 1790.
The Secretary of State having had under his consideration the report
made by the Secretary of the Government north-west of the Ohio, of his
proceedings for carrying into effect the resolution of Congress of August
29th, 1788, respecting the lands of the inhabitants of Port Vincennes,
makes the following report thereon to the President of the United States:
The resolution of Congress of August 29th, 1788, had confirmed in their
possessions and titles the French and Canadian inhabitants and other
settlers at that post, who, in or before the year 1783, had settled
there, and had professed themselves citizens of the United States or
any of them, and had made a donation to every head of a family, of the
same description of four hundred acres of land, part of a square to be
laid off adjoining the improvements at the post.
The Secretary of the north-western government, in the absence of the
Governor, has carried this resolution into effect, as to all the claims
to which he thought it could be clearly applied: there remain, however,
the following description of cases, on which he asks further instructions:
1. Certain cases within the letter of the resolution, but rendered
doubtful by the condition annexed, to the grants of lands in the Illinois
country. The cases of these claimants, fifteen in number, are specially
stated in the papers hereto annexed, number 2, and the lands are laid
off for them but remain ungranted till further orders.
2. Certain persons who, by removals from one part of the territory to
another, are not of the letter of the resolutions, but within its equity,
as they conceive.
3. Certain heads of families, who became such soon after the year 1783,
who petition for a participation of the donation, and urge extraordinary
militia service to which they are exposed.
4. One hundred and fifty acres of land within the village granted under
the former government of that country, to the Piankeshaw Indians, and
on their removal sold by them in parcels to individual inhabitants, who
in some instances have highly improved them both before and since the
year 1783.
5. Lands granted both before and after 1783, by authority from the
commandant of the post, who, according to the usage under the French
and British governments, thinking himself authorized to grant lands,
delegated that authority to a court of civil and criminal jurisdiction,
whose grants before 1783, amount to twenty-six thousand acres, and between
that and 1787, (when the practice was stopped,) to twenty-two thousand
acres. They are generally in parcels from four hundred acres down to
the size of house lots; and some of them under considerable improvement.
Some of the tenants urge that they were induced by the court itself to
come and settle these lands under assurance of their authority to grant
them, and that a loss of the lands and improvements will involve them in
ruin. Besides these small grants, there are some much larger, sometimes
of many leagues square, which a sense of their impropriety has prevented
the grantees from bringing forward. Many pretended grants, too, of this
class are believed to be forgeries, and are, therefore, to be guarded
against.
6. Two thousand four hundred acres of good land, and three thousand acres
of sunken land, held under the French, British, and American governments,
as commons for the use of the inhabitants of the village generally, and
for thirty years past kept under inclosure for these purposes.
The legislature alone being competent to authorize the grant of lands
in cases as yet unprovided for by the laws. The Secretary of State is of
opinion that the report of the Secretary of the north-western government,
with the papers therein referred to, should be laid before Congress for
their determination. Authentic copies of them are herewith enclosed to
the President of the United States.
XVI.--_Opinion on certain proceedings of the Executive in the
North-western Territory._
December 14, 1790.
The Secretary of State having had under his consideration, the journal
of the proceedings of the Executive in the North-western Territory,
thinks it his duty to extract therefrom, for the notice of the President
of the United States, the articles of April 25th, June 6th, 28th, and
29th. Some of which are hereto annexed.
Conceiving that the regulations, purported in these articles, are
beyond the competence of the executive of the said government, that they
amount, in fact, to laws, and as such, could only flow from its regular
legislature. That it is the duty of the general government to guard its
subordinate members from the encroachments of each other, even when they
are made through error or inadvertence, and to cover its citizens from
the exercise of powers not authorized by the law. The Secretary of State
is of opinion that the said articles be laid before the Attorney General
for consideration, and if he finds them to be against law, that his
opinion be communicated to the Governor of the North-western Territory,
for his future conduct.
[The following are the extracts alluded to above.]
_Extracts from the Journal of the Proceedings in the Executive
Department of government in the Territory of the United States, north-west
of the Ohio, reported to the President of the United States, by Winthrop
Sargent, Secretary._
April 25, 1790.--The governor was pleased to issue the following order,
viz.: All the inhabitants are forbidden to entertain any strangers, white,
Indian, or negro, let them come from whatsoever place, without acquainting
the officer commanding the troops, of the names of such strangers, and
the place from whence they came. And every stranger arriving at Cahokia,
is ordered to present himself to said officer within two hours after
his arrival, on pain of imprisonment.
June 6, 1790.--The Governor at Kaskaskias, was pleased to make the
following proclamation:
The practice of selling spirituous liquors to the Indians in the villages
being attended with very ill consequences, it is expressly prohibited;
and all and every person transgressing this order, will be liable to
be tried and fined at the pleasure of the court of quarter sessions of
the peace. And as it may be necessary that spirituous liquors should be
vended in small quantities to white travellers and others; to prevent
all danger of imposition and extortion, no person whosoever shall sell
in any of the villages or their environs, spirituous liquors to any
white person, traveller, or inhabitant, in any quantity less than one
quart at one time, without obtaining a license from the governor, which
license shall not be granted but upon the recommendation of the Justices
of the Peace in their court of quarter sessions, and on his or their
giving security in the sum of two hundred dollars, to abide by all the
regulations made by law respecting retailers of spirituous liquors,
and the orders of the said court of quarter sessions in the premises
in the meantime. And for every offence, he or they shall be liable to
prosecution by indictment and fine at the pleasure of the court, and to
the forfeiture of their bonds.
Nor shall any person undertake or exercise the calling or occupation of
an Inn-holder or Tavern-keeper, without obtaining in the same manner,
and under the same restrictions and penalties, a license for so doing.
PROCLAMATION.--Whereas, his Excellency, Arthur St. Clair, Esq., governor
and commander-in-chief of this Territory, did by proclamation given
at the Kaskaskias the 10th instant, strictly prohibit all persons, not
citizens of the United States or the Territory, from hunting or killing
any kind of game within the same, either for the flesh or skins, upon
penalty _not only_ of forfeiting the flesh and skins which they might
acquire, but also prosecution and punishment as trespassers.
And it appearing to me to be particularly essential to the interests
of this country, that an observance of the order and prohibition should
be obtained, I do hereby call upon all civil and military officers, who
now are, or hereafter may be appointed, to use their best endeavors for
detecting and bringing to justice every person who shall violate the
same. And, whereas, it appears to me to be expedient that government
should receive information of all characters, foreigners and others,
coming into the Territory, I do hereby order and direct that any person
arriving at this, or any of the military posts of the United States
within the same, should present himself to the commanding officer of
the troops in two hours next after his arrival; and the inhabitants are
hereby forbidden to entertain such characters, whether whites, Indians,
or negroes, without immediate information thereof to the said commanding
officers.
Given under my hand and seal at the town of Post Vincennes, and county
of Knox, this 28th day of June, A. D. 1790, and of the Independence of
the United States, the fourteenth.
(Signed,)
WINTHROP SARGENT.
June 29, 1790.--It is to be considered as a standing order hereafter,
that no person enrolled in the militia shall leave the village or
stations, for a longer absence than twenty-four hours, without informing
him (Mayor Hamtramck) or the commanding officer for the time being, of
their intention. And all intelligence or discoveries of Indians, to be
immediately reported.
(Signed,)
WINTHROP SARGENT.
XVII.--_Report on certain letters from the President to Mr. Gouverneur
Morris, and from Mr. Morris to the President, relative to our difficulties
with England_--1790.
December 15, 1790.
The Secretary of State having had under consideration the two letters
of October 13th, 1789, from the President of the United States, to Mr.
Gouverneur Morris; and those of Mr. Morris to the President, of January
22d, April 7th, 13th, May 1st, 29th, July 3d, August 16th, and September
18th, referred to him by the President, makes the following report
thereon:
The President's letter of January 22d, authorized Mr. Morris to enter
into conference with the British ministers in order to discover their
sentiments on the following subjects:
1. Their retention of the western posts contrary to the treaty of peace.
2. Indemnification for the negroes carried off against the stipulations
of the same treaty.
3. A treaty for the regulation of the commerce between the two countries.
4. The exchange of a minister.
The letters of Mr. Morris before mentioned, state the communications,
oral and written, which have passed between him and the ministers; and
from these the Secretary of State draws the following inferences:
1. That the British court is decided not to surrender the posts in any
event; and that they will urge as a pretext that though our courts of
justice are now open to British subjects, they were so long shut after
the peace as to have defeated irremedially the recovery of debts in many
cases. They suggest, indeed, the idea of an indemnification on our part.
But probably were we disposed to admit their right to indemnification,
they would take care to set it so high as to insure a disagreement.
2. That as to indemnification for the negroes, their measures for
concealing them were in the first instance so efficacious, as to reduce
our demand for them, so far as we can support it by direct proof, to be
very small indeed. Its smallness seems to have kept it out of discussion.
Were other difficulties removed, they would probably make none of this
article.
3. That they equivocate on every proposal of a treaty of commerce, and
authorize in their communications with Mr. Morris the same conclusions
which have been drawn from those they had had from time to time with
Mr. Adams, and those through Mayor Beckwith; to wit, that they do not
mean to submit their present advantages in commerce to the risk which
might attend a discussion of them, whereon some reciprocity could not
fail to be demanded. Unless, indeed, we would agree to make it a treaty
of _alliance_ as well as _commerce_, so as to undermine our obligations
with France. This method of stripping that rival nation of its alliances,
they tried successfully with Holland, endeavored at it with Spain, and
have plainly and repeatedly suggested to us. For this they would probably
relax some of the rigors they exercise against our commerce.
4. That as to a minister, their Secretary for foreign affairs is disposed
to exchange one, but meets with opposition in his cabinet, so as to
render the issue uncertain.
From the whole of which, the Secretary of State is of opinion that Mr.
Morris' letters remove any doubts which might have been entertained as
to the intentions and dispositions of the British cabinet.
That it would be dishonorable to the United States, useless and even
injurious, to renew the propositions for a treaty of commerce, or for
the exchange of a minister; and that these subjects should now remain
dormant, till they shall be brought forward earnestly by them.
That the demands of the posts, and of indemnification for the negroes,
should not be again made till we are in readiness to do ourselves the
justice which may be refused.
That Mr. Morris should be informed that he has fulfilled the object of his
agency to the satisfaction of the President, inasmuch as he has enabled
him to judge of the real views of the British cabinet, and that it is
his pleasure that the matters committed to him be left in the situation
in which the letter shall find them.
That a proper compensation be given to Mr. Morris for his services herein,
which having been begun on the 22d of January, and ended the 18th of
September, comprehend a space of near eight months; that the allowance
to an agent may be properly fixed anywhere between the half and the
whole of what is allowed to a Chargé d'affaires; which, according to the
establishment of the United States at the time of this appointment, was
at the rate of $3,000 a year; consequently, that such a sum of between
one and two thousand dollars be allowed him as the President shall deem
proper, on a view of the interference which this agency may have had
with Mr. Morris' private pursuits in Europe.
XVIII.--_Report relative to the Mediterranean trade._
December 28, 1790.
The Secretary of State, to whom was referred by the House of
Representatives so much of the speech of the President of the United
States to both Houses of Congress, as relates to the trade of the United
States in the Mediterranean, with instructions to report thereupon to
the House, has had the same under consideration, and thereupon makes
the following report:
The loss of the records of the custom houses in several of the States,
which took place about the commencement and during the course of the
late war, has deprived us of official information, as to the extent of
our commerce and navigation in the Mediterranean sea. According to the
best which may be obtained from other sources meriting respect, it may be
concluded that about one-sixth of the wheat and flour exported from the
United States, and about one-fourth in value of their dried and pickled
fish, and some rice, found their best markets in the Mediterranean ports;
that these articles constituted the principal part of what we sent into
that sea; that that commerce loaded outwards from eighty to one hundred
ships, annually, of twenty thousand tons, navigated by about twelve
hundred seamen. It was abandoned early in the war. And after the peace
which ensued, it was obvious to our merchants, that their adventures
into that sea would be exposed to the depredations of the piratical
States on the coast of Barbary. Congress, too, was very early attentive
to this danger, and by a commission of the 12th of May, 1784, authorized
certain persons, named ministers plenipotentiary for that purpose, to
conclude treaties of peace and amity with the Barbary powers. And it
being afterwards found more expedient that the negotiations should be
carried on at the residences of those powers. Congress, by a farther
commission, bearing date the 11th of March, 1785, empowered the same
ministers plenipotentiary to appoint agents to repair to the said powers
at their proper residences, and there to negotiate such treaties. The
whole expenses were limited to eighty thousand dollars. Agents were
accordingly sent to Morocco and Algiers.
Before the appointment of the one to Morocco, it was known that a
cruiser of that State had taken a vessel of the United States; and that
the emperor, on the friendly interposition of the court of Madrid had
liberated the crew, and made restitution of the vessel and cargo, as
far as their condition admitted. This was a happy presage of the liberal
treaty he afterwards concluded with our agent, still under the friendly
mediation of Spain, and at an expense of between nine and ten thousand
dollars only. On his death, which has taken place not long since, it
becomes necessary, according to their usage, to obtain immediately a
recognition of the treaty by his successor, and consequently, to make
provision for the expenses which may attend it. The amount of the former
furnishes one ground of estimate; but the character and dispositions of
the successor, which are unknown here, may influence it materially. The
friendship of this power is important, because our Atlantic as well as
Mediterranean trade is open to his annoyance, and because we carry on
a useful commerce with his nation.
The Algerines had also taken two vessels of the United States, with
twenty-one persons on board, whom they retained as slaves. On the arrival
of the agent sent to that regency, the dey refused utterly to treat of
peace on any terms, and demanded 59,496 dollars for the ransom of our
captives. This mission therefore proved ineffectual.
While these negotiations were on foot at Morocco and Algiers, an
ambassador from Tripoli arrived in London. The ministers plenipotentiary
of the United States met him in person. He demanded for the peace of that
State, thirty thousand guineas; and undertook to engage that of Tunis
for a like sum. These demands were beyond the limits of Congress, and
of reason, and nothing was done. Nor was it of importance, as, Algiers
remaining hostile, the peace of Tunis and Tripoli was of no value, and
when that of the former should be obtained, theirs would soon follow.
Our navigation, then, into the Mediterranean, has not been resumed at
all since the peace. The sole obstacle has been the unprovoked war of
Algiers; and the sole remedy must be to bring that war to an end, or to
palliate its effects. Its effects may, perhaps, be palliated by insuring
our ships and cargoes destined for that sea, and by forming a convention
with the regency, for the ransom of our seamen, according to a fixed
tariff. That tariff will, probably, be high, and the rate of insurance
so settled, in the long run, as to pay for the vessels and cargoes
captured, and something more. What proportion will be captured nothing
but experience can determine. Our commerce differs from that of most of
the nations with whom the predatory States are in habits of war. Theirs
is spread all over the face of the Mediterranean, and therefore must
be sought for all over its face. Ours must all enter at a strait only
five leagues wide; so that their cruisers, taking a safe and commanding
position near the strait's mouth, may very effectually inspect whatever
enters it. So safe a station, with a certainty of receiving for their
prisoners a good and stated price, may tempt their cupidity to seek our
vessels particularly. Nor is it certain that our seamen could be induced
to engage in that navigation, though with the security of Algerine faith
that they would be liberated on the payment of a fixed sum. The temporary
deprivation of liberty, perhaps chains, the danger of the pest, the perils
of the engagement preceding their surrender, and possible delays of the
ransom, might turn elsewhere the choice of men, to whom all the rest of
the world is open. In every case, these would be embarrassments which
would enter into the merchants' estimate, and endanger the preference of
foreign bottoms not exposed to them. And upon the whole, this expedient
does not fulfil our wish of a complete re-establishment of our commerce
in that sea.
A second plan might be to obtain peace by purchasing it. For this we
have the example of rich and powerful nations, in this instance counting
their interest more than their honor. If, conforming to their example,
we determine to purchase a peace, it is proper to inquire what a peace
may cost. This being merely a matter of conjecture, we can only compare
together such opinions as have been obtained, and from them form one
for ourselves.
Mr. Wolf, a respectable Irishman, who had resided very long at Algiers,
thought a peace might be obtained from that regency, and the redemption of
our captives included, for sixty or seventy thousand pounds sterling.[25]
His character and opinion both merited respect. Yet his estimate being the
lowest of all who have hazarded an opinion on this subject, one is apt
to fear his judgment might have been biassed by the hope he entertained
that the United States would charge him with this negotiation.
Captain O'Brien, one of our captives, who had been in Algiers four years
and a half at the date of his last letter, a very sensible man, and to
whom we are indebted for very minute information, supposes that peace
alone, might be bought for that sum, that is to say, for three hundred
and twenty-two thousand dollars.
The Tripoline ambassador, before mentioned, thought that peace could be
made with the three smaller powers for ninety thousand pounds sterling, to
which were to be added the expenses of the mission and other incidental
expenses. But he could not answer for Algiers; they would demand more.
The ministers plenipotentiary, who conferred with him, had judged that
as much must be paid to Algiers as to the other three powers together;
and consequently, that according to this measure, the peace of Algiers
would cost from an hundred to an hundred and twenty-five thousand pounds
sterling; or from four hundred and sixty to five hundred and seventy-five
thousand dollars.
The latter sum seemed to meet the ideas of the Count de Vergennes, who,
from a very long residence at Constantinople, was a good judge of what
related to the porte, or its dependencies.
A person whose name is not free to be mentioned here, a native of the
continent of Europe, who had long lived, and still lives at Algiers,
with whom the minister plenipotentiary of the United States, at Paris,
had many and long conversations, and found his information full, clear,
and consistent, was of opinion the peace of Algiers could not be bought
by the United States for less than one million of dollars. And when that
is paid, all is not done. On the death of a dey, (and the present one is
between seventy and eighty years of age,) respectable presents must be
made to the successor, that he may recognize the treaty and very often
he takes the liberty of altering it. When a consul is sent or changed,
new presents must be made. If these events leave a considerable interval,
occasion must be made of renewing presents. And with all this they must
see that we are in condition to chastise an infraction of the treaty;
consequently some marine force must be exhibited in their harbor from
time to time.
The late peace of Spain with Algiers is said to have cost from three
to five millions of dollars. Having received the money, they take the
vessels of that nation on the most groundless pretexts; counting, that
the same force which bound Spain to so hard a treaty, may break it with
impunity.
Their treaty with France, which had expired, was about two years ago
renewed for fifty years. The sum given at the time of renewal is not
known. But presents are to be repeated every ten years, and a tribute
of one hundred thousand dollars to be annually paid. Yet perceiving that
France, embarrassed at home with her domestic affairs, was less capable
of acting abroad, they took six vessels of that nation in the course of
the last year, and retain the captives, forty-four in number, in slavery.
It is the opinion of Captain O'Brien, that those nations are best treated
who pay a smaller sum in the beginning, and an annual tribute afterwards.
In this way he informs us that the Dutch, Danes, Swedes, and Venetians
pay to Algiers, from twenty-four to thirty thousand dollars a year,
each; the two first in naval stores, the two last chiefly in money. It
is supposed, that the peace of the Barbary States costs Great Britain
about sixty thousand guineas, or two hundred and eighty thousand dollars
a year. But it must be noted that these facts cannot be authentically
advanced; as from a principle of self-condemnation, the governments keep
them from the public eye as much as possible.
Nor must we omit finally to recollect, that the Algerines, attentive
to reserve always a sufficient aliment for their piracies, will never
extend their peace beyond certain limits, and consequently, that we may
find ourselves in the case of those nations to whom they refuse peace
at any price.
The third expedient is to repel force by force. Several statements are
hereto annexed of the naval force of Algiers, taken in 1785, 1786, 1787,
1788, and 1789, differing in small degrees, but concurring in the main.
From these it results that they have usually had about nine chebecs,
from ten to thirty-six guns, and four galleys, which have been reduced
by losses to six chebecs and four galleys. They have a forty-gun frigate
on the stocks, and expect two cruisers from the grand seignior. The
character of their vessels is, that they are sharp built and swift, but
so light as not to stand the broadside of a good frigate. Their guns are
of different calibres, unskilfully pointed and worked. The vessels illy
manœuvred, but crowded with men, one third Turks, the rest Moors, of
determined bravery, and resting their sole hopes on boarding. But two of
these vessels belong to the government, the rest being private property.
If they come out of the harbor together, they separate immediately in
quest of prey; and it is said they were never known to act together
in any instance. Nor do they come out at all, when they know there are
vessels cruising for them. They perform three cruises a year, between
the middle of April and November, when they unrig and lay up for the
winter. When not confined within the straits, they rove northwardly to
the channel, and westwardly to the westward islands.
They are at peace at present, with France, Spain, England, Venice, the
United Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark; and at war with Russia, Austria,
Portugal, Naples, Sardinia, Genoa, and Malta.
Should the United States propose to vindicate their commerce by arms,
they would, perhaps, think it prudent to possess a force equal to the
whole of that which may be opposed to them. What that equal force would
be, will belong to another department to say.
At the same time it might never be necessary to draw out the whole at
once, nor perhaps any proportion of it, but for a small part of the
year; as it is reasonable to presume that a concert of operation might
be arranged among the powers at war with the Barbary States, so as that,
each performing a tour of given duration, and in given order, a constant
cruise during the eight temperate months of every year, may be kept
up before the harbor of Algiers, till the object of such operations be
completely obtained. Portugal has singly, for several years past, kept
up such a cruise before the straits of Gibraltar, and by that means has
confined the Algerines closely within. But two of their vessels have
been out of the straits in the last five years. Should Portugal effect a
peace with them, as has been apprehended for some time, the Atlantic will
immediately become the principal scene of their piracies; their peace
with Spain having reduced the profits of their Mediterranean cruises
below the expenses of equipment.
Upon the whole, it rests with Congress to decide between war, tribute,
and ransom, as the means of re-establishing our Mediterranean commerce.
If war, they will consider how far our own resources shall be called
forth, and how far they will enable the Executive to engage, in the
forms of the constitution, the co-operation of other powers. If tribute
or ransom, it will rest with them to limit and provide the amount; and
with the Executive, observing the same constitutional forms, to take
arrangements for employing it to the best advantage.
No. 1.--_Extract of a letter from Richard O'Brien, one of the American
captives at Algiers, to Congress. Algiers, December 26, 1789._
"It was the opinion of Mr. John Wolf, who resided many years in this
city, that the United States of America may obtain a peace for one hundred
years with this regency, for the sum of sixty or seventy thousand pounds
sterling, and the redemption of fifteen Americans included. Mr. Wolf was
the British _chargé des affaires_ in Algiers, and was much the friend
of America, but he is no more.
"I have now been four years and a half in captivity, and I have much
reason to think, that America may obtain a peace with Algiers for the sum
of sixty-five or seventy thousand pounds, considering the present state
of Algiers. That this regency would find it their interest to take two
or three American cruisers in part payment for making a peace; and also
would take masts, yards, plank, scantling, tar, pitch, and turpentine,
and Philadelphia iron, as a part payment; all to be regulated at a
certain fixed price by treaty."
No. 2.--_Extract of a letter from the Honorable John Adams, Minister
Plenipotentiary for the United States at London, to the Honorable John
Jay, Secretary for Foreign Affairs. London, February 22, 1786_
"On Monday evening another conference was held with the Tripolitan
ambassador. When he began to explain himself concerning his demands, he
said they would be different according to the duration of the treaty.
If that were perpetual, they would be greater; if for a term of years,
less; his advice was that it should be perpetual. Once signed by the
bashaw, dey, and other officers, it would be indissoluble and binding
forever upon all their successors. But if a temporary treaty were made,
it might be difficult and expensive to revive it. For a perpetual treaty,
such as they now had with Spain, a sum of thirty thousand guineas must
be paid upon the delivery of the articles signed by the dey and other
officers. If it were agreed to, he would send his secretary by land to
Marseilles, and from thence, by water, to Tripoli, who should bring it
back by the same route, signed by the dey, &c. He had proposed so small
a sum in consideration of the circumstances, but declared it was not
half of what had been lately paid them by Spain. If we chose to treat
upon a different plan, he would make a treaty perpetual upon the payment
of twelve thousand five hundred guineas for the first year, and three
thousand guineas annually, until the thirty thousand guineas were paid. It
was observed that these were large sums, and vastly beyond expectation;
but his excellency answered, that they never made a treaty for less.
Upon the arrival of a prize, the dey and other officers are entitled,
by their laws, to large shares, by which they might make greater profits
than those sums amounted to, and they never would give up this advantage
for less.
"He was told, that although there was full power to treat, the American
ministers were limited to a much smaller sum; so that it would be
impossible to do anything until we wrote to Congress and know their
pleasure. Colonel Smith was present at this, as he had been at the
last conference, and agreed to go to Paris, to communicate all to Mr.
Jefferson, and persuade him to come here, that we may join in farther
conferences, and transmit the result to Congress.
"The ambassador believed that Tunis and Morocco would treat upon the
same terms, but could not answer for Algiers. They would demand more.
When Mr. Jefferson arrives, we shall insist upon knowing the ultimatum,
and transmit it to Congress.
"Congress will perceive that one hundred and twenty thousand guineas will
be indispensable to conclude with the four powers at this rate, besides
a present to the ambassadors, and their incidental charges. Besides
this, a present of five hundred guineas is made, upon the arrival of
a consul in each State. No man wishes more fervently that the expense
could be less, but the fact cannot be altered, and the truth ought not
to be concealed.
"It may be reasonably concluded that this great affair cannot be finished
for much less than two hundred thousand pounds sterling."
No. 3.--_Extract of a Letter from the Honorable Thomas Jefferson, Minister
Plenipotentiary for the United States at Paris, to the Honorable John
Jay, Secretary for foreign Affairs. Paris, May 23, 1786._
"Letters received both from Madrid and Algiers, while I was in London,
having suggested that treaties with the States of Barbary would be much
facilitated by a previous one with the Ottoman Porte, it was agreed
between Mr. Adams and myself, that on my return I should consult, on this
subject, the Count De Vergennes, whose long residence at Constantinople
rendered him the best judge of its expediency. Various circumstances
have put it out of my power to consult him till to-day. I stated to him
the difficulties we were likely to meet with at Algiers, and asked his
opinion, what would be the probable expense of a diplomatic mission
to Constantinople, and what its effects at Algiers. He said that the
expense would be very great; for that presents must be made at that
court, and every one would be gaping after them; and that it would not
procure us a peace at Algiers one penny the cheaper. He observed that
the Barbary States acknowledged a sort of vassalage to the Porte, and
availed themselves of that relation when anything was to be gained by
it; but that whenever it subjected them to the demand from the Porte,
they totally disregarded it; that money was the sole agent. He cited the
present example of Spain, which, though having a treaty with the Porte,
would probably be obliged to buy a peace at Algiers, at the expense of
upwards of six millions of livres. I told him we had calculated, from
the demands and information of the Tripoline ambassador at London, that
to make peace with the four Barbary States would cost us between two
and three hundred thousand guineas, if bought with money.
"The sum did not seem to exceed his expectations. I mentioned to him, that
considering the uncertainty of a peace, when bought, perhaps Congress
might think it more eligible to establish a cruise of frigates in the
Mediterranean, and even blockade Algiers. He supposed it would require
ten vessels, great and small. I observed to him that M. De Massiac had
formerly done it with five; he said it was true, but that vessels of
relief would be necessary. I hinted to him that I thought the English
capable of administering aid to the Algerines. He seemed to think it
impossible, on account of the scandal it would bring on them. I asked him
what had occasioned the blockade by M. De Massiac, he said an infraction
of their treaty by the Algerines."
No. 4.--_Extract of a Letter from Richard O'Brien to the Hon. Thomas
Jefferson. Algiers, April 28, 1787._
"It seems the Neapolitan ambassador had obtained a truce with this
regency for three months; and the ambassador wrote his court of his
success; but about the 1st of April, when the cruisers were fitting out,
the ambassador went to the dey, and hoped the dey would give the necessary
orders to the captains of his cruisers not to take the Neapolitan vessels.
The dey said the meaning of the truce was not to take the Neapolitan
cruisers, but if his chebecks should meet the Neapolitan merchantmen to
take them and send them for Algiers. The ambassador said, the Neapolitan
cruisers would not want a pass on those terms. The dey said, if his
chebecks should meet either men of war or merchant vessels, to take them;
so gave orders accordingly. The Algerines sailed the 9th instant, and
are gone, I believe, off the coast of Italy. This shows there is very
little confidence to be put in the royal word. No principle of national
honor will bind those people; and I believe not much confidence to be
put in them in treaties. The Algerines are not inclinable to a peace
with the Neapolitans. I hear of no negotiation. When the two frigates
arrive with the money for the ransom of the slaves, I believe they are
done with the Neapolitans."
_Extract of a Letter from Richard O'Brien to the Hon. Thomas Jefferson.
Algiers, June 13, 1789._
"The cruisers had orders to take the Danes; but I believe Denmark,
suspecting that on account of their alliance with Russia, that the grand
seignior would order the regency of Algiers to make war against the
Danes; accordingly, the Danes have evacuated the Mediterranean seas,
until the affairs of Europe are more settled. The Danish ship with
the tribute is shortly expected. She is worth fifty thousand dollars;
so that the Algerines will not make known publicly their intention of
breaking with Denmark, until this ship arrives with the tribute. I am
very sure that Mr. Robindar is very sensible of the intention of those
sea-robbers, the terror and scourge of the Christians. The reason the
Algerines have not committed any depredations on the English, is, that
the cruisers have not met with any of them richly loaded; for if they
had met a rich ship from London for Livorna, they would certainly have
brought her into port, and said that such ship was loaded for the enemy
of Algiers at Livorna; but if that was not a sufficient excuse, hove
overboard or clipt the pass.
"Consul Logie has been treated with much contempt by the Algerine
ministry; and you may depend, that when the dey goes to his long home,
that his successor will not renew the peace with Great Britain, without
a large sum of money is paid, and very valuable presents. This I well
know; the whole ministry says, that the peace with the English is very
old, and that the English must conform to the custom of other nations,
in giving the government here money and presents. In fact, the Algerines
are trying their endeavors to find some nation to break the peace with
them. I think, if they had treated the English in such a manner as they
have the French, that the English would resent it."
_Extract of a Letter from Richard O'Brien to the Hon. Thomas Jefferson.
Algiers, June 13, 1789._
"What dependence or faith could be given to a peace with the Algerines,
considering their present haughtiness, and with what contempt and
derision do they treat all nations; so that, in my opinion, until the
Algerines more strictly adhere to the treaties they have already made,
it would be impolitic in any nation to try to make a peace here; for I
see they take more from the nations they are at peace with, than from
those they are at declared war with. The Portuguese, I hope, will keep
the Algerines inside the straits; for only consider the bad consequence
of the Algerines going into the mar Grandi. Should the Portuguese make
a sudden peace with this regency, the Algerines would immediately go
out of the straits, and of course, take many an American."
No. 5.--_Extract of a Letter from the Hon. John Adams, Esq., Minister
Plenipotentiary of the United States at the Court of Great Britain, to
the Hon. John Jay, Esq., Secretary for Foreign Affairs. February 16,
1786._
"The American commerce can be protected from these Africans only
by negotiation, or by war. If presents should be exacted from us, as
ample as those which are given by England, the expense may amount to
sixty thousand pounds sterling a year, an enormous sum to be sure; but
infinitely less than the expense of fighting. Two frigates of 30 guns
each would cost as much to fit them for the sea, besides the accumulating
charges of stores, provisions, pay, and clothing. The powers of Europe
generally send a squadron of men of war with their ministers, and offer
battle at the same time that they propose treaties and promise presents."
No. 6.--_Several statements of the Marine force of Algiers.--Public and
private_
May 20, 1786.--Mr. Lamb says it consists of
9 Chebecs } from 36 to 8 guns; manned, the largest with 400 men,
10 Row Galleys} and so in proportion.
May 27, 1787.--Mr. Randall furnishes two statements, viz.:
A more general one--1 Setye of 34 guns.
2 " " 32 "
1 " " 26 "
1 " " 24 "
1 Chebec 20 "
1 " " 18 "
1 " " 10 "
---
8
4 half-galleys, carrying from 120 to 130 Moors.
3 galliots of 70, 60, and 50 Moors.
A more particular one as follows:
1 of 32 guns, viz. 2 eighteens, 24 nines, 6 fours, and 450 men.
1 of 28 " " 2 twelves, 24 " 2 sixes, " 400 "
1 of 24 " " 20 fours, " 350 "
1 of 20 " " 20 sixes, " 300 "
2 of 18 " " 18 " " 260 "
1 of 16 " " 16 " " 250 "
2 small craft.
---
9
55 gun-boats, carrying 1 twelve pounder each, for defence of the
harbor.
June 8, 1786.--A letter from the three American captains, O'Brien,
Coffin, and Stephens, state them
as 1 of 32
1 of 30
3 of 24
3 of 18
1 of 12
---
9 and 55 gun-boats.
September 25, 1787.--Captain O'Brien furnishes the following statement
1 of 30 guns, 400 men, 106 feet length, straight keel.
1 of 26 " 320 " 96 " " " "
2 of 22 " 240 " 80 " " " "
1 of 22 " 240 " 75 " " " "
1 of 22 " 240 " 70 " " " "
1 of 18 " 200 " 70 " " " "
1 of 16 " 180 " 64 " " " "
1 of 12 " 150 " 50 " " " "
---
9
Galleys 1 of 4 " 70 " 40 " " " "
2 of 2 " 46 " 32 " " " "
1 of 2 " 40 " 32 " " " "
February 5, 1788.--Statement by the inhabitants of Algiers, spoken of
in the report.
9 vessels from 36 down to 20 guns.
4 or 5 smaller.
About this date the Algerines lost two or three vessels, stranded or taken.
December, 1789.--Captain O'Brien furnishes the latest statement.
1 ship of 24 guns, received lately from France.
5 large cruisers.
---
6 3 galleys, and 60 gun-boats.
In the fall of 1789, they laid the keel of a 40 gun frigate, and they
expect two cruisers from the grand seignior.
No. 7.--_Translation of a Letter from Count D'Estaing to the Hon. Thomas
Jefferson, Esq. Paris, May 17, 1784._
SIR,--In giving you an account of an opinion of Mr. Massiac, and
which absolutely corresponds with my own, I cannot too much observe how
great a difference may take place in the course of forty years between
the means which he required and those which political circumstances,
that I cannot ascertain, may exact.
This Secretary of State, afterwards vice-Admiral, had the modesty, when a
captain, to propose a means for the reduction of Algiers, less brilliant
to himself, but more sure and economical than the one government was
about to adopt. They wanted him to undertake a bombardment; he proposed
a simple blockade. All the force he requested was a single man-of-war,
two strong frigates, and two sloops-of-war.
I am convinced, that by blocking up Algiers by cross-anchoring, and with
a long tow, that is to say, with several cables spliced to each other,
and with iron chains, one might, if necessary, always remain there, and
there is no Barbarian power thus confined, which would not sue for peace.
During the war before last the English remained, even in winter, at
anchor before Morbian, on the coast of Brittany, which is a much more
dangerous coast. Expeditious preparation for sailing of the vessels
which form the blockade, which should be of a sufficient number to
prevent anything from entering or going out, while the rest remain at
their stations, the choice of these stations, skilful manœuvres, strict
watch during the night, every precaution against the element which every
seaman ought to be acquainted with; also, against the enemy to prevent
the sudden attack of boats, and to repel them in case they should make
an attack by boats prepared for the purpose, frequent refreshments for
the crews, relieving the men, an unshaken constancy and exactness in
service, are the means, which in my opinion, would render the event
indubitable. Bombardments are but transitory. It is, if I may so express
myself, like breaking glass windows with guineas. None have produced
effect against the barbarians. Even an imperfect blockade, were one
to have the patience and courage to persist therein, would occasion a
perpetual evil, it would be insupportable in the long run. To obtain the
end proposed no advantage ought to be lost. If several powers would come
to a good understanding, and pursue a plan formed on the principles of
humanity; if they were not counteracted by others, it would require but
a few years to compel the barbarians to cease being pirates; they would
become merchants in spite of themselves. It is needless to observe, that
the unsuccessful attempts of Spain, and those under which the republic
of Venice, perhaps, hides other views, have increased the strength as
well as the self-love of all the barbarians. We are assured that the
Algerines have fitted out merchantmen with heavy cannon. This would
render it necessary to block the place with two ships, so that one of
the two might remain moored near the bar, while the other might prepare
to support such of the frigates as should give chase. But their chebecs,
even their frigates, and all their vessels, although overcharged with
men, are moreover so badly armed and manœuvred that assistance from
without would be most to be feared.
Your excellency has told me the only true means of bringing to terms the
only people who can take a pleasure in disturbing our commerce. You see,
I speak as an American citizen; this title, dear to my heart, the value
of which I justly prize, affords me the happy opportunity of offering,
still more particularly, the homage, the sincere attachment, and the
respect with which I have the honor to be, &c.
ESTAING.
FOOTNOTE:
[25] See No. 1 accompanying this report.
XIX.--_Report on the Algerine Prisoners._
December 28, 1790.
The Secretary of State, having had under consideration the situation
of the citizens of the United States in captivity at Algiers, makes the
following report thereupon to the President of the United States:
When the House of Representatives, at their late session, were pleased to
refer to the Secretary of State, the petition of our citizens in captivity
at Algiers, there still existed some expectation that certain measures,
which had been employed to effect their redemption, the success of which
depended on their secrecy, might prove effectual. Information received
during the recess of Congress has so far weakened those expectations, as
to make it now a duty to lay before the President of the United States,
a full statement of what has been attempted for the relief of these our
suffering citizens, as well before, as since he came into office, that
he may be enabled to decide what further is to be done.
On the 25th of July, 1785, the schooner Maria, Captain Stevens, belonging
to a Mr. Foster, of Boston, was taken off Cape St. Vincents, by an
Algerine corsair; and, five days afterwards, the ship Dauphin, Captain
O'Brien, belonging to Messieurs Irvins of Philadelphia, was taken by
another Algerine, about fifty leagues westward of Lisbon. These vessels,
with their cargoes and crews, twenty-one persons in number, were carried
into Algiers.
Congress had some time before commissioned ministers plenipotentiary for
entering into treaties of amity and commerce with the Barbary Powers, and
to send to them proper agents for preparing such treaties. An agent was
accordingly appointed for Algiers, and his instructions prepared, when
the Ministers Plenipotentiary received information of these captures.
Though the ransom of captives was not among the objects expressed in
their commissions, because at their dates the case did not exist, yet
they thought it their duty to undertake that ransom, fearing that the
captives might be sold and dispersed through the interior and distant
countries of Africa, if the previous orders of Congress should be waited
for. They therefore added a supplementary instruction to the agent to
negotiate their ransom. But, while acting thus without authority, they
thought themselves bound to offer a price so moderate as not to be
disapproved. They therefore restrained him to two hundred dollars a man;
which was something less than had been just before paid for about three
hundred French captives, by the Mathurins, a religious order of France,
instituted in ancient times for the redemption of Christian captives
from the infidel Powers. On the arrival of the agent at Algiers, the dey
demanded fifty-nine thousand four hundred and ninety-six dollars for the
twenty-one captives, and could be brought to abate but little from that
demand. The agent, therefore, returned in 1786, without having effected
either peace or ransom.
In the beginning of the next year, 1787, the Minister Plenipotentiary of
the United States at Paris procured an interview with the general of the
religious order of Mathurins, before mentioned, to engage him to lend
his agency, at the expense of the United States, for the redemption of
their captive citizens. He proffered at once all the services he could
render, with the liberality and the zeal which distinguish his character.
He observed, that he had agents on the spot, constantly employed in
seeking out and redeeming the captives of their own country; that these
should act for us, as for themselves; that nothing could be accepted for
their agency; and that he would only expect that the price of redemption
should be ready on our part, so as to cover the engagement into which he
should enter. He added, that, by the time all expenses were paid, their
last redemption had amounted to near two thousand five hundred livres
a man, and that he could by no means flatter us that they could redeem
our captives as cheap as their own. The pirates would take advantage of
its being out of their ordinary line. Still he was in hopes they would
not be much higher.
The proposition was then submitted to Congress, that is to say, in
February, 1787, and on the 19th of September, in the same year, their
Minister Plenipotentiary at Paris received their orders to embrace the
offers of the Mathurins. This he immediately notified to the general,
observing, however, that he did not desire him to enter into any
engagements till a sufficient sum to cover them should be actually
deposited in Paris. The general wished that the whole might be kept
rigorously secret, as, should the barbarians suspect him to be acting for
the United States, they would demand such sums as he could never agree to
give, even with our consent, because it would injure his future purchases
from them. He said he had information from his agent at Algiers, that our
captives received so liberal a daily allowance as to evince that it came
from a public source. He recommended that this should be discontinued;
engaging that he would have an allowance administered to them, much
short indeed of what they had hitherto received, but such as was given
to his own countrymen, quite sufficient for physical necessities, and
more likely to prepare the opinion, that as they were subsisted by his
charity, they were to be redeemed by it also. These ideas, suggested to
him by the danger of raising his market, were approved by the Minister
Plenipotentiary; because, this being the first instance of a redemption
by the United States, it would form a precedent, because a high price
given by us might induce these pirates to abandon all other nations in
pursuit of Americans; whereas, the contrary would take place, could our
price of redemption be fixed at the lowest point.
To destroy, therefore, every expectation of a redemption by the United
States, the bills of the Spanish consul at Algiers, who had made the kind
advances before spoken of for the sustenance of our captives, were not
answered. On the contrary, a hint was given that these advances had better
be discontinued, as it was not known that they would be reimbursed. It
was necessary even to go further, and to suffer the captives themselves
and their friends to believe for awhile, that no attention was paid
to them, no notice taken of their letters. They are still under this
impression. It would have been unsafe to trust them with a secret, the
disclosure of which might forever prevent their redemption, by raising
the demands of the captors to sums which a due regard for our seamen,
still in freedom, would forbid us to give. This was the most trying of
all circumstances, and drew from them the most afflicting reproaches.
It was a twelvemonth afterwards before the money could be deposited in
Paris, and the negotiation be actually put into train. In the meantime
the general had received information from Algiers of a very considerable
change of prices there. Within the last two or three years the Spaniards,
the Neapolitans, and the Russians, had redeemed at exorbitant sums.
Slaves were become scarce, and would hardly be sold at any price. Still
he entered on the business with an assurance of doing the best in his
power; and he was authorized to offer as far as three thousand livres,
or five hundred and fifty-five dollars a man. He wrote immediately to
consult a confidential agent at Marseilles, on the best mode of carrying
this business into effect; from whom he received the answer No. 2, hereto
annexed.
Nothing further was known of his progress or prospects, when the House
of Representatives were pleased, at their last session, to refer the
petition of our captives at Algiers to the Secretary of State. The
preceding narrative shows that no report could have then been made without
risking the object, of which some hopes were still entertained. Later
advices, however, from the chargé des affaires of the United States, at
Paris, informs us, that these measures, though not yet desperate, are
not to be counted on. Besides the exorbitance of price, before feared,
the late transfer of the lands and revenues of the clergy in France
to the public, by withdrawing the means, seems to have suspended the
proceedings of the Mathurins in the purposes of their institution.
It is time, therefore, to look about for something more promising,
without relinquishing, in the meanwhile, the chance of success through
them. Endeavors to collect information, which have been continued a
considerable time, as to the ransoms which would probably be demanded
from us, and those actually paid by other nations, enable the Secretary
of State to lay before the President the following short view, collected
from original papers now in his possession, or from information delivered
to him personally. Passing over the ransoms of the Mathurins, which are
kept far below the common level by special circumstances:
In 1786, the dey of Algiers demanded from our agent $59,496 for twenty-one
captives, which was $2,833 a man. The agent flattered himself they could
be ransomed for $1,200 apiece. His secretary informed us, at the same
time, that Spain had paid $1,600.
In 1787, the Russians redeemed at $1,546 a man.
In 1788, a well-informed inhabitant of Algiers assured the Minister
Plenipotentiary of the United States at Paris, that no nation had
redeemed, since the Spanish treaty, at less than from £250 to £300
sterling, the medium of which is $1,237. Captain O'Brien, at the same
date, thinks we must pay $1,800, and mentions a Savoy captain, just
redeemed at $4,074.
In 1789, Mr. Logie, the English consul at Algiers, informed a person who
wished to ransom one of our common sailors, that he would cost from £450
to £500 sterling, the mean of which is $2,137. In December of the same
year, Captain O'Brien thinks our men will now cost $2,290 each, though
a Jew merchant believes he could get them for $2,264.
In 1790, July 9th, a Mr. Simpson, of Gibraltar, who, at some particular
request, had taken pains to find for what sum our captives could be
redeemed, finds that the fourteen will cost $34,79,228, which is $2,485
a man. At the same date, one of them, a Scotch boy, a common mariner,
was actually redeemed at 8,000 livres, equal to $1,481, which is within
nineteen dollars of the price Simpson states for common men; and the
chargé des affaires of the United States at Paris is informed that
the whole may be redeemed at that rate, adding fifty per cent. on the
captains, which would bring it to $1,571 a man.
It is found then that the prices are 1,200, 1,237, 1,481, 1,546, 1,571,
1,600, 1,800, 2,137, 2,264, 2,485, 2,833, and 2,920 dollars a man, not
noticing that of $4,074, because it was for a captain.
In 1786, there were 2,200 captives in Algiers, which, in 1789, had been
reduced by death or ransom to 655. Of ours six have died, and one has
been ransomed by his friends.
From these facts and opinions, some conjecture may be formed of the
terms on which the liberty of our citizens may be obtained.
But should it be thought better to repress force by force, another
expedient for their liberation may perhaps offer. Captures made on the
enemy may perhaps put us into possession of some of their mariners, and
exchange be substituted for ransom. It is not indeed a fixed usage with
them to exchange prisoners. It is rather their custom to refuse it.
However, such exchanges are sometimes effected, by allowing them more
or less of advantage. They have sometimes accepted of two Moors for a
Christian, at others they have refused five or six for one. Perhaps
Turkish captives may be objects of greater partiality with them, as
their government is entirely in the hands of Turks, who are treated in
every instance as a superior order of beings. Exchange, too, will be more
practicable in our case, as our captives have not been sold to private
individuals, but are retained in the hands of the Government.
The liberation of our citizens has an intimate connection with
the liberation of our commerce in the Mediterranean, now under the
consideration of Congress. The distresses of both proceed from the same
cause, and the measures which shall be adopted for the relief of the
one, may, very probably, involve the relief of the other.
XX.--_The Secretary of State, to whom was referred by the House of
Representatives, the representation from the General Court of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, on the subjects of the cod and whale
fisheries, together with the several papers accompanying it, has had
the same under consideration, and thereupon makes the following report_:
February 1, 1791.
The representation sets forth that, before the late war, about four
thousand seamen, and about twenty-four thousand tons of shipping, were
annually employed from that State, in the whale fishery, the produce
whereof was about three hundred and fifty thousand pounds lawful money
a year.
That, previous to the same period, the cod fishery of that State employed
four thousand men, and twenty-eight thousand tons of shipping, and
produced about two hundred and fifty thousand pounds a year.
That these branches of business, annihilated during the war, have been,
in some degree, recovered since; but that they labor under many and
heavy embarrassments, which, if not removed, or lessened, will render
the fisheries every year less extensive and important.
That these embarrassments are, heavy duties on their produce abroad,
and bounties on that of their competitors; and duties at home on several
articles, particularly used in the fisheries.
And it asks that the duties be taken off; that bounties be given to
the fishermen; and the national influence be used abroad, for obtaining
better markets for their produce.
The cod and whale fisheries, carried on by different persons, from
different ports, in different vessels, in different seas, and seeking
different markets, agree in one circumstance, in being as unprofitable
to the adventurer, as important to the public. A succinct view of their
rise, progress, and present state, with different nations, may enable
us to note the circumstances which have attended their prosperity, and
their decline; to judge of the embarrassments which are said to oppress
ours; to see whether they depend on our own will, and may, therefore,
be remedied immediately by ourselves, or, whether depending on the will
of others, they are without the reach of remedy from us, either directly
or indirectly.
Their history being as unconnected as their practice, they shall be
separately considered.
Within twenty years after the supposed discovery of Newfoundland, by
the Cabots, we find that the abundance of fish on its banks, had already
drawn the attention of the people of Europe. For, as early as 1517, or
1519, we are told of fifty ships being seen there at one time. The first
adventurers in that fishery were the Biscayans, of Spain, the Basques
and Bas-Bretons, of France, all united anciently in language, and still
in habits, and in extreme poverty. The last circumstance enabled them
long to retain a considerable share of the fishery. In 1577, the French
had one hundred and fifty vessels there; the Spaniards had still one
hundred, and the Portuguese fifty, when the English had only fifteen.
The Spaniards and Portuguese seem at length to have retired silently, the
French and English claiming the fishery exclusively, as an appurtenance
to their adjacent colonies, and the profits being too small for nations
surcharged with the precious metals proceeding from their mines.
Without materials to trace the intermediate progress, we only know that,
so late as 1744, the French employed there five hundred and sixty-four
ships, and twenty-seven thousand five hundred seamen, and took one million
two hundred and forty-six thousand quintals of fish, which was three
times the extent to which England and her colonies together, carried
this fishery at that time.
The English, in the beginning of the seventeenth century, had employed,
generally, about one hundred and fifty vessels in the Newfoundland
fishery. About 1670 we find them reduced to eighty, and one hundred,
the inhabitants of New England beginning now to supplant them. A little
before this, the British Parliament perceiving that their citizens were
unable to subsist on the scanty profits which sufficed for their poorer
competitors, endeavored to give them some advantage by prohibiting the
importation of foreign fish; and, at the close of the century, they
formed some regulations for their government and protection, and remitted
to them some duties. A successful war enabled them, in 1713, to force
from the French a cession of the Island of Newfoundland; under these
encouragements, the English and American fisheries began to thrive. In
1731 we find the English take two hundred thousand quintals of fish,
and the Americans two hundred and thirty thousand, besides the refuse
fish, not fit for European markets. They continue to gain ground, and
the French to lose it, insomuch that, about 1755, they are said to
have been on a par; and, in 1768, the French have only two hundred and
fifty-nine vessels, of twenty-four thousand four hundred and twenty tons,
nine thousand seven hundred and twenty-two seamen, taking two hundred
thousand quintals, while America alone, for some three or four years
before that, and so on, to the commencement of the late war, employed
six hundred and sixty-five vessels, of twenty-five thousand six hundred
and fifty tons, and four thousand four hundred and five seamen, and
took from three hundred and fifty thousand to upwards of four hundred
thousand quintals of fish, and England a still greater quantity, five
hundred and twenty-six thousand quintals, as is said.
Spain had formally relinquished her pretensions to a participation in
these fisheries, at the close of the preceding war; and, at the end
of this, the adjacent continent and islands being divided between the
United States, the English and French, (for the last retained two small
islands merely for this object,) the right of fishing was appropriated
to them also.
France, sensible of the necessity of balancing the power of England on the
water, and, therefore, of improving every resource for raising seamen, and
seeing that her fishermen could not maintain their competition without
some public patronage, adopted the experiment of bounties on her own
fish, and duties on that of foreign nations brought into her markets.
But, notwithstanding this, her fisheries dwindle, from a change taken
place, insensibly, in the character of her navigation, which, from being
the most economical, is now become the most expensive. In 1786, she is
said to have employed but seven thousand men in this fishery, and to have
taken four hundred and twenty-six thousand quintals; and, in 1787, but
six thousand men, and one hundred and twenty-eight thousand quintals.
She seems not yet sensible that the unthriftiness of her fisheries
proceeds from the want of economy, and not the want of markets; and that
the encouragement of our fishery abridges that of a rival nation, whose
power on the ocean has long threatened the loss of all balance on that
element.
The plan of the English Government, since the peace, has been to prohibit
all foreign fish in their markets, and they have given from eighteen to
fifty thousand pounds sterling on every fishing vessel complying with
certain conditions. This policy is said to have been so far successful,
as to have raised the number of seamen employed in that business, in
1786, to fourteen thousand, and the quantity of fish taken, to 732,000
quintals.
* * * * *
The fisheries of the United States, annihilated during the war; their
vessels, utensils, and fishermen destroyed; their markets in the
Mediterranean and British America lost, and their produce dutied in those
of France; their competitors enabled by bounties to meet and undersell
them at the few markets remaining open, without any public aid, and,
indeed, paying aids to the public;--such were the hopeless auspices under
which this important business was to be resumed. Yet it was resumed, and,
aided by the mere force of natural advantages, they employed, during
the years 1786, 1787, 1788, and 1789, on an average, five hundred and
thirty-nine vessels, of nineteen thousand one hundred and eighty-five
tons, three thousand two hundred and eighty-seven seamen, and took
two hundred and fifty thousand six hundred and fifty quintals of fish.
* * * * * And an official paper * * * * * shows that, in the last of
those years, our exportation amounted to three hundred and seventy-five
thousand and twenty quintals, and thirty thousand four hundred and
sixty-one barrels; deduction made of three thousand seven hundred and
one quintals, and six thousand three hundred and forty-three barrels of
foreign fish, received and re-exported. * * * * * Still, however, the
calculations * * * * * which accompany the representation, show that
the profits of the sales in the years 1787 and 1788, were too small to
afford a living to the fishermen, and on those of 1789, there was such
a loss as to withdraw thirty-three vessels, of the town of Marblehead
alone, from the further pursuit of this business; and the apprehension
is, that, without some public aid, those still remaining will continue
to withdraw, and this whole commerce be engrossed by a single nation.
This rapid view of the cod fishery enables us to discern under what
policy it has nourished or declined in the hands of other nations, and
to mark the fact, that it is too poor a business to be left to itself,
even with the nation most advantageously situated.
It will now be proper to count the advantages which aid, and the
disadvantages which oppose us, in this conflict.
Our advantages are--
1. The neighborhood of the great fisheries, which permits our fishermen
to bring home their fish to be salted by their wives and children.
2. The shore fisheries, so near at hand, as to enable the vessels to run
into port in a storm, and so lessen the risk, for which distant nations
must pay insurance.
3. The winter fisheries, which, like household manufactures employ
portions of time, which would otherwise be useless.
4. The smallness of the vessels, which the shortness of the voyage enables
us to employ, and which, consequently, require but a small capital.
5. The cheapness of our vessels, which do not cost above the half of
the Baltic fir vessels, computing price and duration.
6. Their excellence as sea boats, which decreases the risk and quickens
the return.
7. The superiority of our mariners in skill, activity, enterprise,
sobriety, and order.
8. The cheapness of provisions.
9. The cheapness of casks, which, of itself, is said to be equal to an
extra profit of fifteen per cent.
These advantages are of such force, that, while experience has proved
that no other nation can make a mercantile profit on the Newfoundland
fishery, nor can support it without national aid, we can make a living
profit, if vent for our fish can be procured.
Of the disadvantages opposed to us, those which depend on ourselves, are--
Tonnage and naval duties on the vessels employed in the fishery.
Impost duties on salt.
On tea, rum, sugar, molasses, hooks, lines, and leads, duck, cordage, and
cables, iron, hemp, and twine, used in the fishery; coarse woollens, worn
by the fishermen, and the poll tax levied by the State on their persons.
The statement No. 6, shows the amount of these, exclusive of the State
tax and drawback on the fish exported, to be $5 25 per man, or $57 75
per vessel of sixty-five tons. When a business is so nearly in equilibrio
that one can hardly discern whether the profit be sufficient to continue
it or not, smaller sums than these suffice to turn the scale against
it. To these disadvantages, add ineffectual duties on the importation
of foreign fish. In justification of these last, it is urged that the
foreign fish received, is in exchange for the produce of agriculture.
To which it may be answered, that the thing given, is more merchantable
than that received in exchange, and agriculture has too many markets to
be allowed to take away those of the fisheries. It will rest, therefore,
with the wisdom of the Legislature to decide, whether prohibition should
not be opposed to prohibition, and high duty to high duty, on the fish
of other nations; whether any, and which, of the naval and other duties
may be remitted, or an equivalent given to the fisherman, in the form of
a drawback, or bounty; and whether the loss of markets abroad, may not,
in some degree, be compensated, by creating markets at home; to which
might contribute the constituting fish a part of the military ration,
in stations not too distant from navigation, a part of the necessary
sea stores of vessels, and the encouraging private individuals to let
the fishermen share with the cultivator, in furnishing the supplies of
the table. A habit introduced from motives of patriotism, would soon be
followed from motives of taste; and who will undertake to fix the limits
to this demand, if it can be once excited, with a nation which doubles,
and will continue to double, at very short periods?
Of the disadvantages which depend on others, are--
1. The loss of the Mediterranean markets.
2. Exclusions from the markets of some of our neighbors.
3. High duties in those of others; and,
4. Bounties to the individuals in competition with us.
The consideration of these will find its place more aptly, after a
review of the condition of our whale fishery shall have led us to the
same point. To this branch of the subject, therefore, we will now proceed.
The whale fishery was first brought into notice of the southern nations of
Europe, in the fifteenth century, by the same Biscayans and Basques who
led the way to the fishery of Newfoundland. They began it on their own
coasts, but soon found that the principal residence of the whale was in
the Northern seas, into which, therefore, they pursued him. In 1578 they
employed twenty-five ships in that business. The Dutch and Hamburghers
took it up after this, and about the middle of the seventeenth century
the former employed about two hundred ships, and the latter about three
hundred and fifty.
The English endeavored also to participate of it. In 1672, they offered
to their own fishermen a bounty of six shillings a ton, on the oil
they should bring home, and instituted, at different times, different
exclusive companies, all of which failed of success. They raised their
bounty, in 1733, to twenty shillings a ton, on the admeasurement of the
vessel. In 1740, to thirty shillings, with a privilege to the fishermen
against being impressed. The Basque fishery, supported by poverty alone,
had maintained but a feeble existence, before competitors aided by the
bounties of their nation, and was, in fine, annihilated by the war of
1745, at the close of which the English bounty was raised to forty
shillings. From this epoch, their whale fishery went on between the
limits of twenty-eight and sixty-seven vessels, till the commencement
of the last war.
The Dutch, in the meantime, had declined gradually to about one hundred
and thirty ships, and have, since that, fallen down to less than half that
number. So that their fishery, notwithstanding a bounty of thirty florins
a man, as well as that of Hamburg, is now nearly out of competition.
In 1715, the Americans began their whale fishery. They were led to it
at first by the whales which presented themselves on their coasts. They
attacked them there in small vessels of forty tons. As the whale, being
infested, retired from the coast, they followed him farther and farther
into the ocean, still enlarging their vessels with their adventures, to
sixty, one hundred, and two hundred tons. Having extended their pursuit
to the Western Islands, they fell in, accidentally, with the spermaceti
whale, of a different species from that of Greenland, which alone had
hitherto been known in commerce: more fierce and active, and whose oil
and head matter was found to be more valuable, as it might be used in
the interior of houses without offending the smell. The distinction now
first arose between the Northern and Southern fisheries: the object of
the former being the Greenland whale, which frequents the Northern coasts
and seas of Europe and America; that of the latter being the spermaceti
whale, which was found in the Southern seas, from the Western Islands
and coast of Africa, to that of Brazil, and still on to the Falkland
Islands. Here, again, within soundings, on the coast of Brazil, they
found a third species of whale, which they called the black or Brazil
whale, smaller than the Greenland, yielding a still less valuable
oil, fit only for summer use, as it becomes opaque at 50 degrees of
Fahrenheit's termometer, while that of the spermaceti whale is limpid
to 41, and of the Greenland whale to 36, of the same thermometer. It is
only worth taking, therefore, when it falls in the way of the fishermen,
but not worth seeking, except when they have failed of success against
the spermaceti whale, in which case, this kind, easily found and taken,
serves to moderate their loss.
In 1771 the Americans had one hundred and eighty-three vessels, of
thirteen thousand eight hundred and twenty tons, in the Northern fishery,
and one hundred and twenty-one vessels, of fourteen thousand and twenty
tons, in the Southern, navigated by four thousand and fifty-nine men.
At the beginning of the late war, they had one hundred and seventy-seven
vessels in the Northern, and one hundred and thirty-two in the Southern
fishery. At that period, our fishery being suspended, the English
seized the opportunity of pushing theirs. They gave additional bounties
of £500, £400, £300, £200, £100 sterling, annually, to the five ships
which should take the greatest quantities of oil. The effect of which
was such, as, by the year 1786, to double the quantity of common oil
necessary for their own consumption. Finding, on a review of the subject,
at that time, that their bounties had cost the Government £13 10_s._
sterling a man, annually, or sixty per cent. on the cargoes, a part of
which went consequently to ease the purchases of this article made by
foreign nations, they reduced the northern bounty from forty to thirty
shillings the ton of admeasurement.
They had, some little time before, turned their attention to the Southern
fishery, and given very great bounties in it, and had invited the
fishermen of the United States to conduct their enterprises. Under their
guidance, and with such encouragement, this fishery, which had only begun
with them in 1784 or 1785, was rising into value. In 1788 they increased
their bounties, and the temptations to our fishermen, under the general
description of _foreigners who had been employed in the whale fishery_,
to pass over with their families and vessels to the British dominions,
either in America or Europe, but preferably to the latter. The effect of
these measures had been prepared, by our whale oils becoming subject,
in their market, to the foreign duty of £18 5_s._ sterling the ton,
which, being more than equal to the price of the common oil, operated
as a prohibition on that, and gave to their spermaceti oil a preference
over ours to that amount.
* * * * *
The fishermen of the United States, left without resource, by the loss
of their market, began to think of accepting the British invitation,
and of removing, some to Nova Scotia, preferring smaller advantages in
the neighborhood of their ancient country and friends, others to Great
Britain, postponing country and friends to high premiums.
The Government of France could not be inattentive to these proceedings.
They saw the danger of letting four or five thousand seamen, of the
best in the world, be transferred to the marine strength of another
nation, and carry over with them an art, which they possessed almost
exclusively. To give time for a counterplan, the Marquis de Lafayette,
the valuable friend and citizen of this, as well as that country, wrote
to a gentleman in Boston, to dissuade the fishermen from accepting
the British proposals, and to assure them that their friends in France
would endeavor to do something for them. A vessel was then arrived from
Halifax at Nantucket, to take off those who had proposed to remove. Two
families had gone abroad, and others were going. In this moment, the
letter arriving, suspended their designs. Not another went abroad, and
the vessel returned to Halifax with only the two families.
The plan adopted by the French ministry, very different from that of
the first mover, was to give a counter invitation to the Nantucket men
to remove and settle in Dunkirk, offering them a bounty of fifty livres
(between nine and ten dollars) a ton on the admeasurement of the vessels
they should equip for the whale fishery, with some other advantages.
Nine families only, of thirty-three persons, accepted the invitation.
This was in 1785. In 1786, the ministry were led to see that their
invitation would produce but little effect, and that the true means
of preventing the emigration of our fishermen to the British dominions
would be to enable them still to follow their calling from their native
country, by giving them a new market for their oils, instead of the old
one they had lost. The duties were, therefore, abated on American whale
oil immediately, and a further abatement promised by the letter No. 8,
and, in December, 1787, the arrêt No. 9 was passed.
The rival fishermen immediately endeavored to turn this measure to
their own advantage, by pouring their whale oils into the markets of
France, where they were enabled, by the great premiums received from
their Government, perhaps, too, by extraordinary indemnifications, to
undersell both the French and American fishermen. To repel this measure,
France shut her ports to all foreign fish oils whatever, by the arrêt
No. 10. The British whale fishery fell, in consequence, the ensuing year
from two hundred and twenty-two to one hundred and seventy-eight ships.
But this general exclusion has palsied our fishery also. On the 7th of
December, 1788, therefore, by the arrêt No. 11, the ports of France still
remaining shut to all other nations, were again opened to the produce
of the whale fisheries of the United States, continuing, however, their
endeavors to recover a share in this fishery themselves, by the aid of
our fishermen. In 1784, 1785, 1786, they had had four ships. In 1787,
three. In 1788, seventeen in the two fisheries of four thousand five
hundred tons. These cost them in bounty 225,000 livres, which divided
on one thousand five hundred and fifty tons of oil, the quantity they
took, amounted to 145 livres (near twenty-seven dollars) the ton, and,
on about one hundred natives on board the seventeen ships, (for there
were one hundred and fifty Americans engaged by the voyage) came to
2,225 livres, or about 416⅔ dollars a man.
We have had, during the years 1787, 1788 and 1789, on an average,
ninety-one vessels, of five thousand eight hundred and twenty tons, in
the northern, and thirty-one of four thousand three hundred and ninety
tons in the southern fishery. * * * * *
These details will enable Congress to see with what a competition we
have to struggle for the continuance of this fishery, not to say its
increase. Against prohibitory duties in one country, and bounties to
the adventurers in both of those which are contending with each other
for the same object, ours have no auxiliaries, but poverty and rigorous
economy. The business, unaided, is a wretched one. The Dutch have
peculiar advantages for the northern fishery, as being within six or
eight days' sail of the grounds, as navigating with more economy than any
other nation in Europe, their seamen content with lower wages, and their
merchants with lower profit. Yet the memorial No. 13, from a committee of
the whale merchants to the States General of Holland, in the year 1775,
states that fourteen millions of guilders, equal to five million six
hundred thousand dollars, has been lost in that fishery in forty-seven
years, being about one hundred and twenty thousand dollars a year. The
States General, thereupon, gave a bounty of thirty guilders a man to
the fishermen. A person immediately acquainted with the British whale
fishery, and whose information merits confidence, has given assurance
that the ships employed in their northern fishery, in 1788, sunk £800
each, on an average, more than the amount of the produce and bounties.
An English ship of three hundred tons and forty-two seamen, in this
fishery, generally brings home, after a four months' voyage, twenty-five
tons of oil, worth £437 10_s._ sterling; but the wages of the officers
and seamen will be £400; there remain but £37 10_s._, not worth taking
into account, towards the outfit and merchants' profit. These, then,
must be paid by the Government; and it is on this idea that the British
bounty is calculated.
Our vessels for the northern fishery average sixty-four tons, and cost,
when built, fitted out, and victualled for the first voyage, about
three thousand dollars. They have taken, on an average, the three last
years, according to the statement No. 12, eighteen tons of oil, worth,
at our market, nine hundred dollars, which are to pay all expenses, and
subsist the fishermen and merchant. Our vessels for the southern fishery
average one hundred and forty tons, and cost, when built, fitted out,
and victualled, for their first voyage, about six thousand five hundred
dollars. They have taken on an average, the three last years, according
to the same statement, thirty-two tons of oil each, worth at our market
three thousand two hundred dollars, which are, in like manner, to pay
all expenses, and subsist the owners and navigators. These expenses
are great, as the voyages are generally of twelve months' duration. No
hope can arise of their condition being bettered by an augmentation of
the price of oil. This is kept down by the competition of the vegetable
oils, which answer the same purposes, not quite so well, but well enough
to become preferable, were the price to be raised, and so well, indeed,
as to be more generally used than the fish oils for lighting houses and
cities.
The American whale fishery is principally followed by the inhabitants
of the island of Nantucket--a sand bar of about fifteen miles long, and
three broad, capable of maintaining, by its agriculture, about twenty
families; but it employed in these fisheries, before the war, between
five or six thousand men and boys; and, in the only harbor it possesses,
it had one hundred and forty vessels, one hundred and thirty-two of which
were of the larger kind, as being employed in the southern fishery. In
agriculture, then, they have no resource; and, if that of their fishery
cannot be pursued from their own habitations, it is natural they should
seek others from which it can be followed, and preferably those where
they will find a sameness of language, religion, laws, habits, and
kindred. A foreign emissary has lately been among them, for the purpose
of renewing the invitations to a change of situation. But, attached to
their native country, they prefer continuing in it, if their continuance
there can be made supportable.
This brings us to the question, what relief does the condition of this
fishery require?
1. A remission of duties on the articles used for their calling.
2. A retaliating duty on foreign oils, coming to seek a competition with
them in or from our ports.
3. Free markets abroad.
1. The remission of duties will stand on nearly the same ground with
that to the cod fishermen.
2. The only nation whose oil is brought hither for competition with our
own, makes ours pay a duty of about eighty-two dollars the ton, in their
ports. Theirs is brought here, too, to be reshipped fraudulently, under
our flag, into ports where it could not be received under theirs, and
ought not to be covered by ours, if we mean to preserve our own admission
into them.
The 3d and principal object is to find markets for the vent of oil.
Portugal, England, Holland, Sweden, Denmark, Prussia, Russia, the Hanse
towns, supply themselves and something more. Spain and Italy receive
supplies from England, and need the less, as their skies are clearer.
France is the only country which can take our surplus, and they take
principally of the common oil; as the habit is but commencing with
them of ascribing a just value to spermaceti whale. Some of this,
however, finds its vent there. There was, indeed, a particular interest
perpetually soliciting the exclusion of our oils from their markets. The
late government there saw well that what we should lose thereby would be
gained by others, not by themselves. And we are to hope that the present
government, as wise and friendly, will also view us, not as rivals,
but as co-operators against a common rival. Friendly arrangements with
them, and accommodation to mutual interest, rendered easier by friendly
dispositions existing on both sides, may long secure to us this important
resource for our seamen. Nor is it the interest of the fisherman alone,
which calls for the cultivation of friendly arrangements with that
nation; besides five-eights of our whale oil, and two-thirds of our salted
fish, they take from us one-fourth of our tobacco, three-fourths of our
live stock * * * * * a considerable and growing portion of our rice,
great supplies, occasionally, of other grain; in 1789, which, indeed,
was extraordinary, four millions of bushels of wheat, and upwards of
a million of bushels of rye and barley * * * * * and nearly the whole
carried in our own vessels. * * * * * They are a free market now, and
will, in time, be a valuable one for ships and ship timber, potash, and
peltry.
England is the market for the greatest part of our spermaceti oil. They
impose on all our oils a duty of eighteen pounds five shillings sterling
the ton, which, as to the common kind, is a prohibition, as has been
before observed, and, as to the spermaceti, gives a preference of theirs
over ours to that amount, so as to leave, in the end, but a scanty benefit
to the fishermen; and, not long since, by a change of construction,
without any change of law, it was made to exclude our oils from their
ports, when carried in our vessels. On some change of circumstance,
it was construed back again to the reception of our oils, on paying
always, however, the same duty of eighteen pounds five shillings. This
serves to show that the tenure by which we hold the admission of this
commodity in their markets, is as precarious as it is hard. Nor can it
be announced that there is any disposition on their part to arrange this
or any other commercial matter, to mutual convenience. The _ex parte_
regulations which they have begun for mounting their navigation on the
ruins of ours, can only be opposed by counter regulations on our part.
And the loss of seamen, the natural consequence of lost and obstructed
markets for our fish and oil, calls, in the first place, for serious and
timely attention. It will be too late when the seaman shall have changed
his vocation, or gone over to another interest. If we cannot recover and
secure for him these important branches of employment, it behooves us to
replace them by others equivalent. We have three nurseries for forming
seamen:
1. Our coasting trade, already on a safe footing.
2. Our fisheries, which, in spite of natural advantages, give just cause
of anxiety.
3. Our carrying trade, our only resource of indemnification for what we
lose in the other. The produce of the United States, which is carried
to foreign markets, is extremely bulky. That part of it which is now
in the hands of foreigners, and which we may resume into our own,
without touching the rights of those nations who have met us in fair
arrangements by treaty, or the interests of those who, by their voluntary
regulations, have paid so just and liberal a respect to our interests,
as being measured back to them again, places both parties on as good
ground, perhaps, as treaties could place them--the proportion, I say,
of our carrying trade, which may be resumed without affecting either of
these descriptions of nations, will find constant employment for ten
thousand seamen, be worth two millions of dollars, annually, will go
on augmenting with the population of the United States, secure to us a
full indemnification for the seamen we lose, and be taken wholly from
those who force us to this act of self protection in navigation.
Hence, too, would follow, that their Newfoundland ships, not receiving
provisions from us in their bottoms, nor permitted (by a law of their
own) to receive in ours, must draw their subsistence from Europe, which
would increase that part of their expenses in the proportion of four to
seven, and so far operate as a duty towards restoring the level between
them and us. The tables No. 2 and 12, will show the quantity of tonnage,
and, consequently, the mass of seamen whose interests are in distress;
and No. 17, the materials for indemnification.
If regulations exactly the counterpart of those established against
us, would be ineffectual, from a difference of circumstances, other
regulations equivalent can give no reasonable ground of complaint to any
nation. Admitting their right of keeping their markets to themselves,
ours cannot be denied of keeping our carrying trade to ourselves. And
if there be anything unfriendly in this, it was in the first example.
The loss of seamen, unnoticed, would be followed by other losses in a long
train. If we have no seamen, our ships will be useless, consequently our
ship timber, iron, and hemp; our ship building will be at an end, ship
carpenters go over to other nations, our young men have no call to the
sea, our produce, carried in foreign bottoms, be saddled with war-freight
and insurance in times of war; and the history of the last hundred years
shows, that the nation which is our carrier has three years of war for
every four years of peace. (No. 18.) We lose, during the same periods,
the carriage for belligerent powers, which the neutrality of our flag
would render an incalculable source of profit; we lose at this moment
the carriage of our own produce to the annual amount of two millions
of dollars, which, in the possible progress of the encroachment, may
extend to five or six millions, the worth of the whole, with an increase
in the proportion of the increase of our numbers. It is easier, as well
as better, to stop this train at its entrance, than when it shall have
ruined or banished whole classes of useful and industrious citizens.
It will doubtless be thought expedient that the resumption suggested
should take effect so gradually, as not to endanger the loss of
produce for the want of transportation; but that, in order to create
transportation, the whole plan should be developed, and made known at
once, that the individuals who may be disposed to lay themselves out
for the carrying business, may make their calculations on a full view
of all circumstances.
On the whole, the historical view we have taken of these fisheries,
proves they are so poor in themselves, as to come to nothing with distant
nations, who do not support them from their treasury. We have seen that
the advantages of our position place our fisheries on a ground somewhat
higher, such as to relieve our treasury from giving them support; but not
to permit it to draw support from them, nor to dispense the government
from the obligation of effectuating free markets for them; that, for
the great proportion of our salted fish, for our common oil, and a part
of our spermaceti oil, markets may perhaps be preserved, by friendly
arrangements towards those nations whose arrangements are friendly to
us, and the residue be compensated by giving to the seamen thrown out
of business the certainty of employment in another branch, of which we
have the sole disposal.
XXI.--_Opinion against the constitutionality of a National Bank._
February 15, 1791.
The bill for establishing a National Bank undertakes among other things:--
1. To form the subscribers into a corporation.
2. To enable them in their corporate capacities to receive grants of
land; and so far is against the laws of _Mortmain_.[26]
3. To make alien subscribers capable of holding lands; and so far is
against the laws of _alienage_.
4. To transmit these lands, on the death of a proprietor, to a certain
line of successors; and so far changes the course of _Descents_.
5. To put the lands out of the reach of forfeiture or escheat; and so
far is against the laws of _Forfeiture and Escheat_.
6. To transmit personal chattels to successors in a certain line; and
so far is against the laws of _Distribution_.
7. To give them the sole and exclusive right of banking under the national
authority; and so far is against the laws of Monopoly.
8. To communicate to them a power to make laws paramount to the laws of
the States; for so they must be construed, to protect the institution
from the control of the State legislatures; and so, probably, they will
be construed.
I consider the foundation of the Constitution as laid on this ground:
That "all powers not delegated to the United States, by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States or to the
people." [XIIth amendment.] To take a single step beyond the boundaries
thus specially drawn around the powers of Congress, is to take possession
of a boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of any definition.
The incorporation of a bank, and the powers assumed by this bill,
have not, in my opinion, been delegated to the United States, by the
Constitution.
1. They are not among the powers specially enumerated: for these are:
1st. A power to lay taxes for the purpose of paying the debts of the
United States; but no debt is paid by this bill, nor any tax laid. Were
it a bill to raise money, its origination in the Senate would condemn
it by the Constitution.
2d. "To borrow money." But this bill neither borrows money nor ensures
the borrowing it. The proprietors of the bank will be just as free as any
other money holders, to lend or not to lend their money to the public.
The operation proposed in the bill, first, to lend them two millions,
and then to borrow them back again, cannot change the nature of the
latter act, which will still be a payment, and not a loan, call it by
what name you please.
3. To "regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the States,
and with the Indian tribes." To erect a bank, and to regulate commerce,
are very different acts. He who erects a bank, creates a subject of
commerce in its bills; so does he who makes a bushel of wheat, or digs a
dollar out of the mines; yet neither of these persons regulates commerce
thereby. To make a thing which may be bought and sold, is not to prescribe
regulations for buying and selling. Besides, if this was an exercise
of the power of regulating commerce, it would be void, as extending as
much to the internal commerce of every State, as to its external. For
the power given to Congress by the Constitution does not extend to the
internal regulation of the commerce of a State, (that is to say of the
commerce between citizen and citizen,) which remain exclusively with
its own legislature; but to its external commerce only, that is to say,
its commerce with another State, or with foreign nations, or with the
Indian tribes. Accordingly the bill does not propose the measure as a
regulation of trade, but as "productive of considerable advantages to
trade." Still less are these powers covered by any other of the special
enumerations.
II. Nor are they within either of the general phrases, which are the
two following:--
1. To lay taxes to provide for the general welfare of the United States,
that is to say, "to lay taxes for _the purpose_ of providing for the
general welfare." For the laying of taxes is the _power_, and the general
welfare the _purpose_ for which the power is to be exercised. They are
not to lay taxes _ad libitum for any purpose they please_; but only
to _pay the debts or provide for the welfare of the Union_. In like
manner, they are not _to do anything they please_ to provide for the
general welfare, but only to _lay taxes_ for that purpose. To consider
the latter phrase, not as describing the purpose of the first, but as
giving a distinct and independent power to do any act they please, which
might be for the good of the Union, would render all the preceding and
subsequent enumerations of power completely useless.
It would reduce the whole instrument to a single phrase, that of
instituting a Congress with power to do whatever would be for the good
of the United States; and, as they would be the sole judges of the good
or evil, it would be also a power to do whatever evil they please.
It is an established rule of construction where a phrase will bear either
of two meanings, to give it that which will allow some meaning to the
other parts of the instrument, and not that which would render all the
others useless. Certainly no such universal power was meant to be given
them. It was intended to lace them up straitly within the enumerated
powers, and those without which, as means, these powers could not be
carried into effect. It is known that the very power now proposed _as
a means_ was rejected as _an end_ by the Convention which formed the
Constitution. A proposition was made to them to authorize Congress to
open canals, and an amendatory one to empower them to incorporate. But
the whole was rejected, and one of the reasons for rejection urged in
debate was, that then they would have a power to erect a bank, which
would render the great cities, where there were prejudices and jealousies
on the subject, adverse to the reception of the Constitution.