FRONTIER CAMPAIGN IN THE AFGHAN MOUNTAINS--ITS ORIGIN--POLITICAL AND
MILITARY DIFFICULTIES
In the autumn of 1863 our somewhat tedious devotion to military
administration in all its complicated details was suddenly interrupted
by the outbreak of hostilities on the north-west frontier, which
rapidly and unexpectedly developed into a war of considerable magnitude
in the Afghan mountains. Its origin was of a rather singular and
exceptional character. For many years previously a number of violent
fanatical outlaws, chiefly from the lower provinces of Bengal, hundreds
of miles away, had fled from our territories, and settled amongst the
independent Afghan tribes who live in the countries across the border.
These outlaws, occasionally reinforced by disaffected Mohammedans from
the plains, lived chiefly in a village called 'Sitana' on the lower
slopes of the Mahabun mountain, about forty miles north of the old
Mogul fortress of Attock, and on the western side of the Indus--hence
their name of Sitana fanatics. Their ordinary occupation consisted of
incursions into the plains of Eusofzye, and in robbing and murdering
peaceful traders in our territories. In 1858 the late Sir Sydney Cotton
led an expedition against them and burnt some of their villages; but
as they were harboured, and probably to some extent encouraged, by
their Afghan neighbours, and as the country of their adoption was
devoid of roads and almost inaccessible, they soon re-established
themselves in the large new village of Mulka, high up on the slopes of
the mountain, and re-commenced their depredations. It was under these
circumstances that a fresh expedition was determined on; and as, from
causes which were not foreseen at the outset, it rapidly developed into
a considerable campaign, it will be interesting to take a short survey
of the conditions, military and political, of our north-west border.
[Illustration: SKETCH MAP OF NORTH-WEST FRONTIER]
A glance at the map will show that our frontier in that part of India
is composed of great rugged mountain ridges which, radiating southerly
from the Hindoo Koosh, terminate somewhat abruptly in the plains,
and form, as it were, a great natural boundary of the Empire. These
mountains are inhabited by tribes who, though Afghan in language,
religion, and race, are for the most part independent of the ruler at
Cabul. They are poor but brave, fanatical, and half civilised, and
are governed by native 'jirgahs' or councils; and, although turbulent
and difficult to deal with, still have a great love of their country
and cherish its independence, possessing qualities that we admire in
ourselves, and which deserve consideration and respect. Except in the
narrow and secluded valleys there is little cultivation, and the whole
country is almost devoid of roads, beyond mere goat paths. Military
operations are therefore difficult. The Commander-in-Chief, when the
expedition was under consideration, pointed out that the season was
late, as snow falls in November, and that to march a force through such
a country of scant resources would necessitate careful preparations
and ample transport, and he advised postponement until the following
spring; but his views were disregarded by the Punjab Government,
who entered into the campaign in a somewhat heedless, lighthearted
fashion, which speedily brought its own punishment. It is further to
be remembered that in those days our line of frontier for hundreds of
miles was guarded chiefly by the Punjab Irregular Force, consisting of
about 10,000 men of all arms recruited from the martial races within
our border, many of whom were really Afghans in religion and race.
Strange to relate, also, this army was under the orders of the Punjab
Government, and altogether independent of the Commander-in-Chief.
To guard a long and exposed frontier by native levies raised on the
spot, and to the almost total exclusion of English soldiers, was a
bold and possibly a dangerous policy; but to increase the risk by a
complex division of military authority appears to be a violation of all
commonly received maxims of war.
The force decided on for the Sitana expedition consisted of about 6,000
men, chiefly of the Punjab force just mentioned, to which, however,
was added the 71st Highlanders, the 101st Bengal Fusiliers, and a
battery of Royal Artillery, with its field guns carried on elephants.
The Government were fortunate in one respect, that the expedition was
placed under the command of Sir Neville Chamberlain, an officer of long
experience and of the highest ability and courage. Indeed, it was a
happy circumstance that in the serious complications and hard fighting
which ensued a man of such great qualities should have been at the
head of affairs; and although he was struck down and severely wounded
before the operations came to an end, still it may be admitted, without
disparagement of his successor, that the neck of the confederacy had
been broken by his vigorous measures, and that the tribes were sick at
heart and weary of the combat.
In entering on a campaign against the Sitana fanatics, who doubtless
were tolerated and harboured by the inhabitants, it must still be borne
in mind that in crossing the border we were entering upon foreign
territory; and a question therefore arose as to the light in which our
suspicious Afghan neighbours would regard our advance. There was also
another important point which must not be overlooked. In determining
the exact direction of our march, it was considered, as a matter of
strategy, that instead of moving straight up the mountain, towards the
enemy's stronghold, we should enter the country by the Umbeylah Pass, a
narrow gorge to the west of the Mahabun, and proceed through the Chumla
Valley on its north side (see map); and thus by a flank march, as it
were, attack the fanatics in rear and cut off their line of retreat.
Our intentions in this respect were kept secret. In a military point of
view the proposal had advantages, but politically it had quite another
aspect--it being evident that we were thus entering the territory of
neighbours, many miles distant from the real object of the expedition,
who might, and indeed did, at once take violent exception to our
proceedings. Official documents published afterwards explain this
clearly. Speaking of the intended march through the pass, Colonel
Taylor, the commissioner with the expedition, wrote: 'It was, under the
circumstances, impossible to examine the proposed route by questioning
those of our own territories best acquainted with it, without raising
suspicions as to the line we proposed to take in entering the hills.'
Again, General Chamberlain's first despatch after the advance of
the force, on October 20, said: 'I should here mention that on the
afternoon of the 19th,[55] when it would be too late for the Chumla or
other tribes to make any preparations on a large scale for impeding
the march of the troops through the Umbeylah Pass, a proclamation was
forwarded by the commissioner, to the Chumla and Bonair tribes, stating
the object with which the force was about to enter the Chumla Valley,
and assuring them that it was with no intention of injuring them, or of
interfering with their independence; but solely because it was the most
convenient route by which to reach the Hindostanee fanatics, and to
effect their expulsion from the Mahabun.'
But the question was, in what light were the Bonairs and others likely
to regard our sudden and unexpected arrival at the door of their
house, our purpose having been carefully hid until the time for their
objecting or defending themselves had passed away? The late Major
James, who was the commissioner when peace was made, alluding to these
circumstances, makes a significant remark: 'Even supposing, therefore,'
he says, 'that the proclamations actually reached their destination,
was it likely that a brave race of ignorant men would pause to consider
the purport of a paper they could not read, when the arms of a supposed
invader were glistening at their doors?' It so happened, also, that the
fanatics, when they heard of the assembly of our troops in the plains
and became aware that we were about to call them to account, although
not cognisant of our exact plan, nevertheless wrote a very crafty
letter to their neighbours, which subsequently fell into our hands,
as follows: 'The evil-doing infidels[56] will plunder and devastate
the whole of the hilly tract, especially the provinces of Chumla,
Bonair, Swat, &c., and annex those countries to their dominions, and
then our religion and worldly possessions would entirely be subverted.
Consequently, keeping in consideration a regard for Islam, the dictates
of faith, and worldly affairs, you ought by no means to neglect the
opportunity. The infidels are extremely deceitful and treacherous, and
will by whatever means they can come into these hills, and declare
to the people of the country that they have no concerns with them,
that their quarrel is with the Hindostanees, that they will not molest
the people, even as much as touch a hair of their heads, but will
return immediately after having extirpated the Hindostanees, and that
they will not interfere with their country. They will also tempt the
people with wealth. It is therefore proper for you not to give in to
their deceit, or else, when they should get an opportunity, they will
entirely ruin, torment, and put you to many indignities, appropriate to
themselves your entire wealth and possessions, and injure your faith.'
From the foregoing remarks it will, I think, be evident that our policy
was not only somewhat rash, but was not altogether straightforward. In
the first place, we undertook the expedition with an inadequate force,
chiefly comprised of native troops, raised on the spot, at a late
season of the year, and without sufficient preparations as to supplies
and transport; in the next, we attempted to march through a country
inhabited by tribes with whom we had no cause of quarrel, and from whom
we carefully concealed our intentions. The result of the first day's
march (October 20) brought matters to a climax, and instead of being
able to cut off the 'Sitana' fanatics, we found ourselves face to face
with the Bonair and other tribes, whose territory we had invaded, and
who, scoffing at our professed strategy, at once united and determined
if possible to drive us out of their country. The whole condition
of affairs was thus entirely altered, and General Chamberlain found
himself holding the end of a narrow gorge, with steep mountains running
up several thousand feet on either side, and attacked incessantly day
and night, not only in front, but on either flank.
In the meantime another unfortunate circumstance had occurred. It so
happened that towards the end of October both the Viceroy and Sir Hugh
Rose had left Simla, on short expeditions towards the distant ranges
of the Himalayas. Accidentally I had seen Lord Elgin when he started,
and he appeared to be in good health; soon afterwards, however, owing,
it was supposed, to his having ascended and crossed some high passes,
or whatever the cause, he suddenly became dangerously ill with an
affection of the heart, and when he arrived at Drumsala in the Kangra
Valley, his case was deemed hopeless. Sir Hugh also, for the moment,
was almost out of reach, but on hearing of the untoward development
of the military operations, he at once proceeded to Lahore, where his
staff joined him in November. The successive despatches of General
Chamberlain give a clear account of the altered condition of affairs.
Writing on October 23, he said: 'The Bonair people having thus taken
a hostile part against us is extremely serious, and has altered our
whole position and probably our plan of operations.' He then goes on to
explain the necessity of guarding his communications through the pass,
and asks for reinforcements. Again, on October 25, he writes: 'There
appears to be reason to believe that the Bonair people have applied
to the Akoond of Swat for aid, and should they succeed in enlisting
him in their cause--which is not improbable, as they are his spiritual
followers--the object with which this force took the road to the Chumla
Valley would be still more difficult of attainment.'
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 55: October 19, 1863.]
[Footnote 56: Meaning the English.]