THE FLANK MARCH
On the morning of, September 23 the allied armies left their position
on the Alma, and after a march of about seven miles arrived at the
Katcha, meeting with no opposition, and on the following day reached
the Belbec, a small stream within a short distance of Sebastopol.
From our pickets on the heights we could see the harbour and their
line-of-battle ships at anchor.
Hitherto the intention of the allies had been to attack the forts
on the north side, but the plans were suddenly altered, chiefly in
consequence of the recommendation of Sir John Burgoyne. In a very able
memorandum, written the day after the Alma, he pointed out in the first
place, that the city of Sebastopol, with its docks, wharves, reserve
armaments and stores--in fact, its chief resources--were on the south
side of the harbour, and that the land defences there were imperfect
and incomplete. In the second place, that the harbours of Kameisch and
Balaclava would give the allied forces a safe base of operations, and
free communication with the fleet, whereas on the north they had only
the sea shore to rely on. Under these circumstances he recommended the
abandonment of the north altogether, and establishing ourselves to
the south of the city. The strategical advantages of this course were
apparent, and the plan was adopted, and on September 25 the flank march
began, the English army leading off, and proceeding for some miles in a
south easterly direction through the woods. I remember when the Duke of
Cambridge received the order to march south-east through the forest, he
remarked that he had received many orders in his day, but that was the
first time he had ever marched by compass.
It so happened that on the same morning Prince Menschikoff, ignorant of
our sudden change of plan, was moving a considerable force inland from
Sebastopol, in order to take the allies in flank, and as we emerged
from the woods on the open ground at Mackenzie's farm, our advanced
troops suddenly ran into the rear guard of the Russians. In fact, both
the opposing armies were making a flank march at the same time, and
the head of one came into collision with the tail of the other. Both
sides were taken unawares, but some of our cavalry and Maude's troop
of Horse Artillery at once pursued and captured a few prisoners and a
considerable number of waggons, with ammunition, supplies, and baggage.
This unexpected encounter must have rather mystified the enemy; but
Lord Raglan, knowing that his forces were scattered for some miles on
a long thin line, pushed on, and towards sunset the Light and First
Divisions reached the bridge over the Chernaya on the road leading to
Balaclava, and bivouacked for the night.[6]
The following morning the march was resumed across the plain for two
or three miles to Balaclava, that small fishing village, with its
land-locked harbour scarcely larger than a dock, which was destined
to be the British base throughout the war. As the staff and leading
troops approached the village, a deputation of the inhabitants came
out bearing bread and salt as a token of submission. Almost at the
same time a gun was suddenly fired from the ruins of the old castle on
the heights, and a shell splashed into the marshes close by, followed
by another. Lord Raglan, through an interpreter, asked the deputation
the reason of this unexpected demonstration, as bread and salt and
bursting shells seemed inconsistent with each other; but the only
explanation they could give was that the small garrison had not been
formally summoned to surrender. The troops of the Light Division at
once swarmed up the heights, and half of C troop of Horse Artillery,
under Brandling, came into action; the other half I took, by Lord
Raglan's orders, up the steep hill overlooking the castle. Just as
we got into action, the 'Agamemnon,' with Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons,
arrived off the harbour, and the small garrison, finding themselves
under a converging fire from three sides, hoisted a white handkerchief
on a pole in token of surrender. Their armament consisted of four
antiquated brass mortars. The commandant, an old Greek colonel, had
been wounded in the foot, and was carried down to Balaclava, where he
met the staff who had just ridden in. The commandant's wife, on seeing
her husband's condition, rushed out of her house in a flood of tears,
fell on his neck, and kissed him repeatedly. Lord Raglan, however,
spoke kindly and reassured her. In the meantime some Russian ladies who
had left Sebastopol and taken refuge in Balaclava, terrified by our
sudden arrival, crossed the harbour in a small boat in the vain hope
of escape. Accompanied by another officer I followed them across, and
we tried to reassure them. Knowing nothing of their language this was
a difficulty. We tried 'Buono, Russ buono,' but it was not sufficient.
Fortunately, at length we found one who spoke a little French, and then
they became comforted and returned with us to the village, and were
taken care of. Such was the capture of Balaclava.
Many years after, in 1872, on re-visiting the Crimea with the late
Colonel Charles Gordon of Khartoum, we found that the old commandant
(Colonel Mammoo) was still alive, being over eighty, and we called
on him. He was much pleased to see us and to talk over old days, and
said that he should never forget the kindness he had received from the
English when a prisoner of war. The officers and men of the navy in the
man-of-war which took him to Constantinople treated him, he said, like
a prince.
In the meantime the condition of Marshal Saint-Arnaud had become
critical, and on September 25 he resigned the command of the French
army, and was succeeded by General Canrobert, who was then forty-five
years of age. Saint-Arnaud embarked at Balaclava on board the
'Berthollet,' and was visited by Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons.
He was then almost at the point of death, and his last words to Lord
Raglan were: 'Je vous suivrai toujours par la pensée.'[7] He died on
board on September 29.
At the end of September the allied armies took up their position on the
plateau in front of Sebastopol, the French on the left with their base
at Kameisch; Lord Raglan establishing his head quarters at a farm house.
[Illustration:
SKETCH
showing the position of the
ALLIED ARMIES
before
SEBASTOPOL
Oct. 1854.]
[Illustration: Russian Names.
T. _Malakoff Tower_ _Kornileff Bas._
M. _Mamelon. Gordon's Hill_
R. _Great Redan_ _Bastion No. 3_
D. _Barrack Batteries_
G. _Garden Batteries_
B. _Bastion du mât_ _Bastion No. 4_
C. _Bastion Centrale_ _Bastion No. 5_
L. _Lancaster Battery_
X. _Left Attack. Chapman's Batteries_
Y. _Right Attack. Gordon's Batteries_
S. _Sand bag Battery at Inkerman._
_English_
_French._
References to Balaclava.
_A. B. C. D. E. F._ {_English
{Batteries._
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. {_Redoubts
{manned by Turks._]
The land defences of the city at the time were incomplete and not
continuous. On the east stood a round tower with four guns (the
Malakoff), and on the west a crenelated wall, with another tower
overlooking Quarantine bay, and between these were some earthworks
(called afterwards the Redan, Bastion du Mât, &c.), unfinished and
unarmed. These defences were not formidable, and the idea of an
immediate assault suggested itself and was advocated by some officers
of high rank. On the other hand, the garrison was almost equal in
number to the allies; the approaches were commanded by guns, although
few, of heavy calibre; and the enemy had so placed their line-of-battle
ships in the harbour as to sweep the ravines leading down to the city.
On the whole it was considered more prudent to land the French and
English siege trains, with a view to a bombardment, to be followed by a
general assault.
As to the general plan of attack, Sir John Burgoyne, having, with
Lord Raglan, surveyed the position, drew up a memorandum in which he
indicated the Malakoff as the chief point for consideration. He said:
'On the right, the great tower appears to be the key of the whole
position, and the only work to prevent an assault at any time; a good
site, or sites for not less than eight guns ... must be sought for to
demolish that tower.' The French, however, demurred to this view, and
it was finally decided that the main attack should be made by them on
the Bastion du Mât, an earthwork in their immediate front on the left.
When we remember that at the end of the siege, which lasted nearly a
twelve-month, the city fell chiefly by an assault on the very position
originally indicated by Sir John Burgoyne, we have a striking proof of
the clear insight and great ability of that distinguished soldier.
During the first fortnight of October the allied armies were
incessantly occupied in landing and moving up heavy guns and ammunition
from Kameisch and Balaclava, and in constructing batteries and trenches
in front of Sebastopol, and it was arranged that the bombardment
should open on the 17th, to be followed by a general assault, the
combined fleets simultaneously attacking the forts at the mouth of the
harbour. Lord Raglan's order was as follows: 'The fire upon Sebastopol
to commence at 6.30 A.M. from the French and English batteries, in
co-operation with the allied fleets--the signal to be the discharge of
three mortars by the French. The troops off duty to be ready to fall in
at a moment's notice. Horses of the field batteries to be harnessed.' A
thousand seamen with heavy guns were landed from the British fleet, and
formed a naval brigade to act in co-operation with the Royal Artillery
in the trenches.
The enemy, however, were equally energetic in developing and completing
their earthworks, and, having an almost unlimited supply of heavy
ordnance and munitions close at hand, they were in reality, as the
event proved, able to strengthen their defensive position faster than
the allies could concentrate their powers of attack.
The bombardment commenced at daylight on October 17, the infantry and
field artillery being held in readiness for a general assault during
the day. Our hopes and expectations were, however, destined to a great
and speedy disappointment. The French siege batteries in front of the
Bastion du Mât were soon seen to be in difficulties, being over-matched
by those of the enemy; and early in the morning one of their magazines
exploded, followed by a second, resulting in great loss of life, and
practically putting an end for the time to their fire. The Russians,
having thus gained a considerable advantage in one direction, turned
their attention more immediately towards the English position, and a
vigorous bombardment was maintained on both sides. Lord Raglan, in his
despatch of October 18, alluding to the British batteries, speaks in
high terms of the conduct of the sailors and of the Royal Artillery. He
says that they kept up their fire with unremitting energy throughout
the day, to his own and the general satisfaction, and to the admiration
of the French army.
About three o'clock in the afternoon, a magazine blew up in the Redan,
and for a time the Russian guns were silent. Lord Raglan said that,
under other circumstances, this explosion would have been the proper
moment for assault. The combined fleets during the day also engaged the
sea forts and suffered considerably, but from our inability to take
advantage of their action no decisive results were achieved. In short,
the great bombardment of October 17 was a _coup manqué_, and although
the conflict was still vigorously maintained, and although the French
in a few days partially re-opened fire, it began to be apparent that
the allies were growing weaker by the wearing out of their guns and
carriages and the exhaustion of their ammunition, whilst the Russian
defences were becoming consolidated and their armaments augmented.
General Canrobert did not at first take so gloomy a view of the
position. Writing a few days after, he stated that his means of attack
were concentrated on the Bastion du Mât, and that, assisted by the
English, he hoped soon to gain possession of it. Lord Raglan, however,
writing on the 23rd, said that the fire of the enemy was not seriously
diminished; that, with plenty of men and unlimited resources, they
were able to repair their works, remount guns, and re-open fire from
batteries which had been silenced, and that consequently, he was unable
to say when ulterior measures could be undertaken. The situation was
growing serious.
In the meantime the enemy were also beginning to appear in strength on
the Chernaya, in the direction of Balaclava. Since our arrival, at the
end of September, considerable attention had been given to the defence
of this important base of our operations. Defensive entrenchments were
constructed on the heights immediately surrounding and overlooking the
harbour, armed with guns of position, and held by a force of marines;
whilst the 93rd Highlanders and a battery of artillery were in front
of Kadikoi, the whole under the command of Sir Colin Campbell. In the
plain beyond, and about a mile in advance, a girdle of small detached
hills extended in a curve across the valley, and upon these, several
battalions of Turks were distributed and began to entrench themselves.
As they had no ordnance suitable, some cast-iron howitzers were by Lord
Raglan's direction lent to them for the purpose. Such were the main
outlines of the precautions taken for the defence of Balaclava. They
were by no means too strong; but what with the incessant duties before
Sebastopol and the great extent of ground to be covered, our troops
were overworked, and no more were available for the defence of this
flank of the position, covering, indeed, the sole base of our supplies
of food and munitions.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 6: Lord Raglan's Despatch, September 28, 1854.]
[Footnote 7: Bazancourt, ii. 276.]