COMMENCEMENT OF CRIMEAN WAR--INTERVIEW WITH NAPOLEON III
It is time now to pass on from the early reminiscences of a period of
peace to the more interesting and important events of active service,
in which for some years it was my good fortune to share.
In the spring of 1854, after a peace which in Europe had lasted nearly
forty years, the British navy and army were again called upon to take
part in a great war; and the whole nation soon became deeply absorbed
in the stirring events of the Crimean campaign. Lord Raglan at that
time was Master General of the Ordnance and was also appointed to
command the expedition, and I had the good fortune to be selected as
Brigade Major to the artillery under General Cator.
There is perhaps no operation of war more difficult than that which
this country has to undertake in the embarkation of its army for a
continental campaign. It is not merely as regards its _personnel_;
but large reserves of ammunition and stores, and the armaments and
equipments of the artillery, engineers, medical, commissariat,
clothing, and other departments have to be embarked, and all so
arranged as to be prepared for rapid landing after a long voyage, and
possibly in the face of an enemy. In proceeding to the Crimea eight
batteries of horse and field artillery, several siege train companies,
and large reserves of munitions for the army were embarked in Woolwich
dockyard during March and April. The combined naval and military
arrangements were efficiently carried out; and although the field
artillery were conveyed in sailing vessels, and were several weeks at
sea before arrival at Constantinople, the loss of horses was only 4 per
cent. out of about 1,600 embarked.
Towards the end of April Colonels Strangways and Lake, Captains Patton,
Gordon, and myself (all artillery officers) were directed to proceed
_viâ_ France to Marseilles for Malta. On arrival at Paris, Colonel
Strangways, who was personally known to the Emperor Napoleon, received
a message that his Majesty wished to receive him and his brother
officers at the Tuileries. Strangways informed our ambassador, Lord
Cowley, who, however, said it was not according to etiquette, and that
we ought to attend a levee in the usual way, and declined to go with
us; so we put on our uniforms and drove to the Tuileries in a _fiacre_
without him. The servant at the entrance seemed rather surprised when
we said we had come to see the Emperor; but after conference with a
staff officer, we were conducted through the 'Salle des Maréchaux'
to an inner room, and were received very kindly by Napoleon, who was
in the uniform of a general. He made inquiries about the amount of
artillery we had embarked for the East; spoke about the difficulty
of conveying horses for a long voyage; and expressed a hope that the
French and English armies combined would be able to act decisively--and
then, wishing us prosperity, he invited us to come and see him again on
our return. Alas! we were not destined to do so. Strangways was killed
at Inkerman; Lake, who had a horse shot under him at Alma, and another
at Inkerman, was invalided and died soon after; Captain Patton died
of cholera at Balaclava; and many years elapsed before I had another
interview with Napoleon, under very altered conditions, shortly before
his death at Chiselhurst.
We arrived at Malta about the middle of May. The streets were full of
French soldiers on their way to the East; and there was a great deal of
cheering and enthusiasm. On the 15th we embarked in the 'Medway' for
Constantinople with the 55th regiment. As we approached the Dardanelles
we passed a sailing transport, with part of a cavalry regiment on
board, and as they had been some weeks at sea, and were making no
progress owing to calm weather, we induced our captain to take her
in tow. The officers in the transport made signs of their wish to
communicate, so we lowered a bottle tied to a long string, which they
picked up as it floated past, and we then pulled it back. We expected
their inquiries might be as to the position of the Russians and the
progress of the war, but their message was: 'Can you tell us who won
the Two Thousand Guineas? We have several bets, and are very anxious!'
As we entered the Dardanelles we were boarded by two French officers
from a small transport, who begged assistance, as they were short of
provisions, having only biscuits, and no water. We provided them with
what was requisite, and also took them in tow. They belonged to the
Chasseurs d'Afrique, and had been forty days on passage from Algiers.
Passing Gallipoli, where there were several men-of-war at anchor and
considerable French and English encampments on shore, we arrived at
Constantinople on May 20.
Our troops of the various arms were now arriving daily, and were
accommodated either in the great barrack at Scutari, or encamped on the
plain outside, in close proximity to large Turkish cemeteries. All was
bustle and animation. The scene, however, soon changed, and at the end
of May the Light Division under Sir George Brown re-embarked, entered
the Black Sea, and landed at Varna, followed shortly after by the whole
of the allied armies.
Until my arrival at Constantinople, I had never seen Lord Raglan.
Owing, however, to the failure of General Cator's health almost
immediately on his landing, and to the numerous artillery matters which
required discussion and decision, it so happened that I had from that
time almost daily interviews with the Commander-in-chief. In fact,
during the succeeding twelve months, and until his death in June 1855,
it was my good fortune to be closely associated with Lord Raglan in
the great events which rapidly succeeded each other. General Cator's
advice to me was, never to trouble Lord Raglan more than absolutely
necessary with details, to listen carefully to his remarks, to try and
anticipate his wishes, and at all times to make as light as possible of
difficulties. These excellent suggestions I did my best to carry out.
The original intention in massing the allied armies at Varna was
with a view of an advance to the Danube, although, in regard to
land transport, the English force was but little prepared for rapid
movement. However, the raising of the siege of Silistria towards the
end of June and the retreat of the Russians led to an entire change
of plan, and the expedition to the Crimea was decided on. The Duke
of Newcastle was then Minister for War, and in his despatch to Lord
Raglan, of June 29,[2] he gave instructions that no campaign in the
Principalities should be undertaken, but that measures should at
once be concerted for the siege of Sebastopol.' Lord Raglan's reply
on July 19 said, that 'the descent on the Crimea is decided upon,
more in deference to the views of the British Government than to any
information in the possession of the naval and military authorities as
to the extent of the enemy's forces or to their state of preparation.'
Owing to the continued and severe illness of General Cator he was
invalided home in August, and had to be carried on board ship in
a hammock, being succeeded in command of the artillery by General
Strangways. Lord de Ros, Quartermaster General, went home ill at the
same time. During the month of August incessant preparations were made
for the embarkation of the great expedition. The fleets of the allied
powers arrived, and the bay of Varna was crowded with hundreds of
transports, steam-tugs, flat-bottomed boats, and rafts; and the beach
was strewn with thousands of gabions, fascines, and baggage of all
kinds. Towards the end of the month the troops commenced embarking. One
morning early, whilst superintending the departure of some batteries
from the shore, Lord Raglan came up and spoke to me. He remarked that
the artillery staff was insufficient, and that I had too much to do;
and added, 'If you were a field officer I would appoint you Assistant
Adjutant General, and give you help.' Having heard a rumour that an
officer of high rank was coming from England as chief of the artillery
staff, I ventured to say that I hoped Lord Raglan would not supersede
me. He replied at once: 'Certainly not. I will take good care that you
are not superseded.' The next day he sent for me, and said, 'I have
got the Duke of Newcastle in a corner.' This rather puzzled me for the
moment, but he continued: 'I have requested him at once to give you
either brevet or local rank as a Major, and then the difficulty will be
met.' The result of this was that within a month I was gazetted as a
Major.'
After the expedition had been decided on, and even after it had
embarked, great difference of opinion existed amongst the generals and
admirals of both nations as to its expediency. The late season of the
year, the want of accurate information as to the actual force of the
Russians and of the condition of the defences of Sebastopol, all were
matters of grave concern. The prevalence of cholera and fever--which
had greatly weakened the allied armies and fleets, and which
continued after leaving Varna--also added to the difficulties. These
considerations, however, were not allowed to prevail, and on August
25 Marshal Saint-Arnaud issued a proclamation to the French army, in
which he said that Providence had called them to the Crimea, a country
healthy as France, and that ere long the three united flags should
float over the ramparts of Sebastopol. Lord Raglan also issued his
instructions, which were as follows: 'The invasion of the Crimea having
been determined on, the troops will embark in such ships as shall be
provided for their conveyance.'
Notwithstanding his proclamation, Saint-Arnaud, even when approaching
the shore of the Crimea, remained in a somewhat vacillating condition
of mind. During the voyage across, he made a signal requesting Lord
Raglan and Admiral Dundas to come and see him on board the 'Ville de
Paris.' They proceeded alongside in the 'Caradoc,' but Lord Raglan,
having only one arm, was unable to go on board.[3] Admiral Dundas,
however, visited Saint-Arnaud, who at the time was very ill and in
great pain, and unable to converse. He handed the Admiral a paper
without signature, in which it was urged that it would be too hazardous
to land in face of a powerful enemy having a numerous cavalry; that the
season was too late for a siege of Sebastopol, which, moreover, was
known to be stronger than anticipated; and that consequently it was
necessary to reconsider the situation and the measures to be adopted.
Admiral Dundas, accompanied by some French generals, then returned to
the 'Caradoc,' and a long debate took place with Lord Raglan, who at
length ended the discussion by declaring that he would not now consent
to alter a decision which had been come to after careful consideration
at the last council at Varna. Without doubt the enterprise was a bold
and dangerous one, undertaken at a late period of the year, with troops
that were physically weak from cholera and fever. The orders of the
French and English Governments were, however, peremptory, and therefore
the allied generals had in reality no option in the matter.
On the morning of September 14 the allied fleets and transports arrived
off the coast of the Crimea, and the troops at once commenced landing
on the shore about twenty-five miles from Sebastopol. The French were
very quick in their movements, and, on our part, the Light Division
under Sir George Brown lost no time; by the end of the day almost
the whole of the British infantry, and twenty field guns horsed and
equipped, were on shore. Just as the disembarkation commenced in the
early morning a Russian officer with a Cossack orderly, rode up on some
high ground between the French and English landing places, dismounted,
and leisurely surveyed the scene; and then as our men on landing
approached, he remounted and quietly trotted away. With that solitary
exception, no enemy came near us during the five days occupied in
disembarkation.
The first night on shore it rained heavily, our troops were without
tents or shelter, and the operations on several subsequent days were
considerably retarded by rough weather and a heavy surf, rendering our
position somewhat precarious. It has always appeared inexplicable why
Prince Menschikoff should have allowed so critical an operation on the
part of the allies to be completed, without any attempt on his part to
oppose or delay it; for nothing can be more helpless than an army with
men, horses, and material of all kinds huddled together in boats, and
landing on an open beach. The probabilities are that he was occupied in
concentrating his troops at the strong position on the Alma, and felt
himself unable to disturb our operations. One morning after landing, I
rode with General Strangways inland for a mile or two to get water for
our horses, and found a battalion of the Rifle Brigade in possession of
a large farm. The officers complained that some of the French soldiers
were pillaging the neighbourhood, and driving off the cattle, &c. Sir
George Brown had sent a remonstrance to the French on the subject. As
we left the farm we saw a French staff officer, evidently very angry
and in pursuit of some of his men, and General Strangways recognised
Prince Jerome Napoleon, who was in command of the division close by.
At length, on September 19, all being ready, the allied armies
commenced their celebrated march on Sebastopol. The French were close
to the shore, and the order of march is shown on the following plan.
[Illustration:
English Army. French Army.
Sir Sir de Prince
G. Brown L. Evans Napoleon Canrobert Bosquet
+-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+
|Light| |2nd. | |3rd. | |1st | |2nd. |
|Div. | |Div. | |Div. | |Div. | |Div. |
+-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+
Duke of Sir
Cambridge R. England
+-----+ +-----+ +---------+
|1st. | |3rd. | | Baggage | _Black
|Div. | |Div. | | | Sea_
+-----+ +-----+ +---------+
Earl of Sir
Cardigan G. Cathcart Forey
+---------+ +-----+ +---------+ +-----+
| Cavalry | |4th. | | Baggage | |4th. |
| | |Div. | | | |Div. |
+---------+ +-----+ +---------+ +-----+
+-----+
|Turks|
| |
+-----+
DIAGRAM OF FRENCH AND ENGLISH ARMIES]
The strength of the British Army was approximately as follows:
Officers and men
Cavalry 1,200
Artillery 60 guns 2,000
Infantry 25,000
------
Total 28,200
The French were rather stronger in infantry, but had no cavalry. The
division of Turks was about 6,000 strong.
The troops were in excellent spirits at the prospect of immediate
action. The country was open and undulating; the distant smoke of
burning villages, and the occasional appearance of a few Cossacks
hovering about on the flank, were the only evidences that we were in
an enemy's country. The arrival in the afternoon at the small fresh
stream of the Bulganac was most welcome to the men and horses of the
allies, who for days had suffered from a scanty supply of indifferent
water. Late in the afternoon the enemy's cavalry showed in considerable
force, at a distance almost out of range, beyond the stream, and Lord
Raglan with his staff moved to the front, accompanied by the Light
Cavalry under Lord Cardigan. Suddenly a Russian battery opened fire and
a round shot passed through the Light Cavalry, taking off a man's leg,
and bounding like a cricket ball over the heads of the staff. That was
the first shot of the campaign in the Crimea. Two batteries of Horse
Artillery were at once sent forward, and on their coming into action
the enemy fell back out of range, covered by a cloud of skirmishers.
Our loss was four troopers severely wounded. It was almost dusk, and
Lord Raglan, being anxious to inform Prince Napoleon of what had
occurred, as he was with his division about a mile distant, directed
Colonel Count Lagondie, the French military attaché, to ride over and
give him the necessary information. The French colonel was riding a fat
Flemish mare which he called 'Medore,' and as he cantered leisurely off
the remark was made, 'If Lagondie does not move a little faster it
will be a long time before he comes back.' He never did come back, as
will be explained presently.
Shortly after dusk all staff officers were directed to attend at head
quarters, which were established in a small hut close to the Bulganac.
General Airey, the Quartermaster General received us, and desired that
all general officers should be informed that the enemy in considerable
numbers being in the vicinity, a good look-out must be kept during the
night, and that there should be no sounds of drums or trumpets. He then
went on to say that the Russian army, computed at 45,000 men with a
powerful artillery, occupied a strong entrenched position on heights
beyond the Alma, a few miles distant, and that a general action was
imminent on the morrow. The night passed quietly.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 2: Committee of the House of Commons on the state of the army
before Sebastopol.]
[Footnote 3: This account is taken from a pamphlet written by the
late General Sir W. Brereton, R.A., who was on board Admiral Dundas's
flagship at the time.]