OPERATIONS AGAINST AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: PROPAGANDA’S MOST STRIKING SUCCESS
Anti-German Hapsburg Races: The Secret Treaty of London: Problem of
the Adriatic: Importance of the Rome Congress: Lord Northcliffe’s
Policy against Austria-Hungary: Formation of an Inter-Allied Propaganda
Commission and its Effective Operations: The Final Triumph.
Little time was spent in deciding that, of all enemy countries,
Austria-Hungary would be most susceptible to propaganda. With
the assistance of such authorities as Mr. Wickham Steed and Dr.
Seton-Watson, Lord Northcliffe was soon able to propose a line of sound
policy for the sanction of the Foreign Office.
It is strange that determined action on some such lines had not been
initiated previously by the Allied Governments. They had failed
to profit from the anti-Hapsburg and anti-German sentiment of the
oppressed subject races of the Dual Monarchy. Three-fifths of the
Hapsburg peoples were actually or potentially well disposed to the
Allies, and it was towards this majority that Lord Northcliffe decided
that propaganda must be directed with two objectives, one constructive
and one destructive:--
(1) The moral and active support of the national desires of these
races for independence, with the ultimate aim of forming a strong
non-German chain of Central European and Danubian States.
(2) The encouragement of their disinclination to fight on behalf of
the Central Empires, thus greatly handicapping the Austro-Hungarian
Armies as a fighting force, and seriously embarrassing the German
military leaders.
It will be seen with what success each object was secured.
The nationalities chiefly affected were the Czechs and the Southern
Slavs. There were also lesser numbers of Italians, Poles and Rumanes,
whom it was intended to place under their own national Governments of
Italy, the State of Poland (then projected and now established), and
Rumania, which countries marched with the districts of Austria-Hungary
inhabited by their respective races.
Operations were comparatively straightforward in every case except
that of the Southern Slavs, in which the secret Treaty of London of
April, 1915, presented a serious obstacle. At the beginning of 1918
few people realised the difficulties thus created, but since the
cessation of hostilities the “Adriatic question” has loomed largely in
the public view of international relations and is rightly regarded as
one of the most troublesome problems of world politics. Its bearing on
propaganda lay in the fact that by this treaty Great Britain, France
and Russia had promised to Italy certain Austrian territories inhabited
by Southern Slavs. These territories, moreover, provided trading access
to the sea and were of the highest economic value to any Southern Slav
state which might be formed. So long as that treaty was regarded by
the Southern Slavs as representing Allied policy, it was difficult
to persuade them that Allied sympathies were with them or that the
Allies would secure for them the economic interests necessary to the
establishment of the united Southern Slav state peopled by the Serbs,
Croats, and Slovenes.
With the object of creating a counterpoise to the secret pact,
representatives of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, had assembled
in Corfu, under the leadership of Dr. Trumbitch (president of the
Southern Slav Committee) and M. Pashitch (Prime Minister of Serbia),
and had issued the Southern Slav Unitary Declaration on June 20, 1917,
proclaiming the union of the three peoples and claiming all territory
compactly inhabited by them, which (said the Declaration) “cannot be
mutilated without attaint to the vital interests of the community.
Our nation demands nothing that belongs to others, but only what is
its own.” On the one hand, this was an important counter-step to the
partition of Dalmatia proposed in the Treaty of London; while on
the other, it was a definite advance towards the solidification of
the three peoples into nationhood. Consequently it was not without
effect upon the German military leaders, who foresaw its influence
upon the Southern Slav regiments of the Austro-Hungarian armies, and
it undoubtedly hastened their decision to take direct control of the
forces of the Dual Monarchy.
The next move was made after the Italian armies had recovered from the
disaster of Caporetto and had re-established their line on the Piave.
On the initiative of Mr. Wickham Steed, Dr. Seton-Watson, and other
members of the Serbian Society of Great Britain, conferences took place
in London between leading Italians and Southern Slavs, with the aim of
outlining a solution of the question which would be acceptable to the
two nations. A memorandum of the discussions was given to the Prime
Minister of Italy (Signor Orlando), who was then (January, 1918) in
London. At Mr. Steed’s suggestion, Signor Orlando met Dr. Trumbitch and
they discussed the question at great length, with the result that Dr.
Trumbitch accepted an invitation from the Italian Premier to go to Rome.
Before that visit took place, Dr. Torre, a prominent member of the
Italian Parliament, was sent to London, as representative of an
influential joint committee of the two Italian Houses of Parliament,
to endeavour to establish a definite basis of agreement. After much
negotiation the representatives of the two nations engaged themselves
to settle amicably the various territorial controversies in the
interest of the future good and sincere relations between the two
peoples, on the basis of the principles of nationality and of the right
of peoples to decide their own destiny. The linguistic and economic
interests of such minorities as might have to be included in the
national territory of either party were also guaranteed.
This agreement of principle, made under the stress of war, coincided
approximately with Lord Northcliffe’s entry into office. One of his
first official acts was to dispatch Mr. Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson as a
special mission to Italy. While there, they represented his department
at the Congress of the Oppressed Hapsburg Nationalities which met with
the consent of the Italian Government at Rome on April 7, 8, and 9,
1918. The holding of this Congress was, in itself, an important act of
propaganda. This unprecedented assembly, representing Italians, Poles,
Czecho-Slovaks, Southern Slavs, and Rumanes, resolved upon common
action in the proclamation of the right of national unity of these
peoples and also confirmed, in striking fashion, the decisions arrived
at between Italians and Southern Slavs in London. Signor Orlando,
Signor Bissolati and other Italian Ministers expressed publicly their
adhesion to the resolutions, which were as follows:--
“The representatives of the nationalities subjected in whole or in
part to the rule of Austria-Hungary--the Italians, Poles, Rumanes,
Czechs, and Southern Slavs--join in affirming their principles of
common action as follows:--
“(1) _Each of these peoples proclaims its right to constitute its own
nationality and State unity, or to complete it, and to attain full
political and economic independence._
“(2) _Each of these peoples recognises in the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy the instrument of German domination and the fundamental
obstacle to the realisation of its aspirations and rights._
“(3) _The assembly recognises the necessity of a common struggle
against the common oppressors, in order that each people may attain
complete liberation and national unity within a free State unit._
“The representatives of the Italian people and of the Jugo-Slav
people in particular, agree as follows:--
“(1) _In the relations of the Italian nation and the nation of
the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes--known also under the name of the
Jugo-Slav nation--the representatives of the two peoples recognise
that the unity and independence of the Jugo-Slav nation is a vital
interest of Italy, just as the completion of Italian national unity
is a vital interest of the Jugo-Slav nation. And therefore the
representatives of the two peoples pledge themselves to employ every
effort in order that during the war and at the moment of peace, these
ends of the two nations may be completely attained._
“(2) _They declare that the liberation of the Adriatic Sea and its
defence against every present and future enemy is a vital interest of
the two peoples._
“(3) _They pledge themselves also, in the interest of good and
sincere relations between the two peoples in the future to solve
amicably the various territorial controversies on the basis of the
principles of nationality and of the right of peoples to decide their
own fate, and in such a way as not to injure the vital interests of
the two nations, as they shall be defined at the moment of peace._
“(4) _To such racial groups_ (nuclei) _of one people as it may be
found necessary to include within the frontiers of the other, there
shall be recognised and guaranteed the right of their language,
culture, and moral and economic interests._”
Meanwhile, Lord Northcliffe and his experts had, in accordance with the
principle consistently followed by Crewe House, determined the broad
lines of policy upon which propaganda against Austria-Hungary was to
be based. A memorandum on the subject was prepared and forwarded by
Lord Northcliffe on February 24, 1918, to the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs for his consideration and approval. The following are
the principal points of the memorandum:
“I have long been of opinion that it would be well to concentrate on
Propaganda in Austria.
“I have made a point of seeing every available person who has come
out of Austria, including many Americans who returned to the United
States when I was there. All shared the same view--that the Dual
Monarchy entered the greater war in a halfhearted spirit; is weary of
the war; has endured hardships approaching starvation; and realises
that there is no benefit for Austria arising out of the war.
“The control of the Presses of the various nationalities composing
the Dual Monarchy is so absolute that the real facts of the war are
unknown to the multitude. Germany is not idle in Austria or elsewhere.
“For example, the entrance of the United States into the war has been
belittled, and described as mere American ‘bluff.’ Many subjects of
Austrian nationalities had, before the war, considerable knowledge
of the United States, owing to the great emigration to that country.
They would realise the power of the United States if explained to
them.
“It is submitted with respect, therefore, that one of the first steps
to be taken is to spread, through all available channels, accurate
facts about the American preparations.
“But, before making any beginning in that direction, or any others, I
feel that I must be placed in possession of knowledge of the policy
of the Allies as to the Dual Monarchy.
“I should be greatly obliged if you would give me your opinion on
the following suggestions, which are made after consultation with
those well acquainted with Austria. If they merit your approval, it
is suggested that they be submitted to the United States, France, and
Italy.
“It is suggested that there are two policies for the Department
of Propaganda in Enemy Countries. In order that there may be no
misunderstanding I have recapitulated elementary facts generally
known.
“These two policies are as follows:
“(_a_) To work for a separate peace with the Emperor, the Court,
and the aristocracy, on the principle of not interfering with the
domestic affairs of the Hapsburg Monarchy, and of leaving its
territory almost or quite intact; or
“(_b_) To try to break the power of Austria-Hungary, as the weakest
link in the chain of enemy States, by supporting and encouraging all
anti-German and pro-Ally peoples and tendencies.
“The (_a_) policy has been tried without success. The Hapsburgs are
not free agents. They have not the power, even though they may wish,
to break away from Germany, because--
“(1) They are controlled by the internal structure of their dominions
(the Dual System), which gives Germany decisive leverage over them
through the Germans of Austria and the Magyars of Hungary; and
“(2) Because the Allies cannot offer them acceptable terms without
breaking with Italy.
“It remains to try the (_b_) policy.
“This policy is not primarily, or even, in the last resort,
necessarily anti-Hapsburgian; it is not opposed to the interests of
the Roman Catholic religion; and it is in harmony with the declared
aims of the Allies.
“The Empire of Austria contains some 31,000,000 inhabitants. Of these
less than one-third, _i.e._, the 9,000,000 or 10,000,000 Germans of
Austria, are pro-German. The other two-thirds (including the Poles,
Czecho-Slovaks, Rumanes, Italians, and Southern Slavs) are actively
or passively anti-German.
“The Kingdom of Hungary, including the ‘autonomous’ kingdom of
Croatia-Slavonia has a population of approximately 21,000,000
of which one-half (Magyars, Jews, Saxons, and Swabians) may be
considered pro-German, and the rest (Slovaks, Rumanes, and Southern
Slavs) actively or passively anti-German.
“There are thus in Austria-Hungary, as a whole, some 31,000,000
anti-Germans, and some 21,000,000 pro-Germans. The pro-German
minority rules the anti-German majority. Apart from questions of
democratic principle, the policy of the Allies should evidently be to
help and encourage the anti-Germans.
“The chief means of helping them may be specified thus:
“(1) The Allied Governments and the President of the United States
should insist upon their determination to secure democratic freedom
for the races of Austria-Hungary on the principle of ‘government by
consent of the governed.’ Expressions such as ‘self-government,’
or ‘autonomous development’ should be avoided, because they have
a sinister meaning in Austria-Hungary and tend to discourage the
friends of the Allies.
“(2) For the same reason, statements that the Allies do not wish to
‘dismember Austria’ should be avoided. The war cannot be won without
so radical a transformation of Austria-Hungary as to remove its
peoples from German control. The Hapsburgs may be driven to help
in this transformation if Allied encouragement of the anti-German
Hapsburg peoples is effective. By themselves the Hapsburgs cannot
effect a transformation except in an increasingly pro-German sense.
“(3) For propaganda among the anti-German peoples the agencies
already existing should be utilised. These agencies are chiefly
the Bohemian (Czecho-Slovak) National Alliance, the Southern Slav
Committee, and various Polish organisations.
“(4) The present tendency of the Italian Government to shelve
the policy embodied in the London Convention of April 26, 1915,
and to adopt a policy of agreement with the anti-German races of
Austria-Hungary should be encouraged and stimulated.
“(5) The ultimate aim of Allied policy should be, not to form a
number of small, disjointed States, but to create a non-German
Confederation of Central European and Danubian States.
“(6) The Germans of Austria should be free to join the Confederated
States of Germany. They would, in any case, tend to secede from a
transformed Austria, in which they would no longer be able to rule
over non-German peoples.
“In view of the great amount of cabling that will be necessary
to achieve unity, may I ask you to let me have either your own
suggestions, or your approval of those above mentioned, as speedily
as possible?”
In his reply, Mr. Balfour wrote on February 26, 1918:--
“Your very lucid memorandum raises in one shape or another the
fundamental problem of the Hapsburg Empire. A final and authoritative
answer to the question you put to me can only be given (if given at
all) by the Cabinet, speaking in the name of the Government. But I
offer the following observations on the subject, in the hope that
they may help you in the immediate task for which you have been made
responsible.
“If the two alternative policies of dealing with the Dual Monarchy
set forth in your paper were mutually exclusive, and if they involved
distinct and even opposite methods of propaganda, our position would
be even more difficult than it is. For what we can do with the
Austrian Empire does not wholly depend upon our wishes, but upon
the success of our arms and the views of our Allies, and, as these
elements in our calculations cannot be estimated with certainty, we
should inevitably remain in doubt as to which of the two mutually
exclusive methods of propaganda it would be judicious to adopt.
“Fortunately, however, our position is not quite so embarrassing. As
you point out with unanswerable force, everything which encourages
the anti-German elements in the Hapsburg dominions really helps
to compel the Emperor and the Court to a separate peace, and also
diminishes the efficiency of Austria-Hungary as a member of the
Middle-Europe combination. The Emperor, by these means, might be
induced, or compelled, fundamentally to modify the constitution
of his own State. If he refused to lend himself to such a policy,
the strengthening of the non-German elements might bring about
the same end even more effectually than if he lent his assistance
to the process. But in either case the earlier stages of that
process are the same, and a propaganda which aids the struggle of
the nationalities now subject either to Austrian Germans or to
Magyar Hungarians towards freedom and self-determination, must be
right, whether the complete break-up of the Austrian Empire or
its de-Germanisation under Hapsburg rule be the final goal of our
efforts.”
When acknowledging this prompt reply, Lord Northcliffe pointed out that
his anxiety to move as rapidly as possible was due to the belief of
the Italians that a strong Austrian or Austro-German offensive against
Italy would be launched within the next two months. “If our propaganda
in Austria is to help to weaken this offensive, or to turn it into
a defeat, it ought, in my judgment, to begin at once, and all the
agencies we can command ought to be hard at work within a fortnight.
“The representative of the American Propaganda Department is in London.
The Italian will be here next week, and we could no doubt have a French
representative at the same time.
“As to the memorandum, I am very pleased that you are in substantial
agreement with the policy outlined. The two policies may not be
mutually exclusive in the last resort, but it is very important that
one or the other of them should be given absolute precedence. It would
place me in an awkward predicament if, after basing vigorous propaganda
on the (_b_) policy, I were confronted with some manifestation of the
(_a_) policy on the part of the British or other Allied Government.
For this reason I hope that the War Cabinet will not delay its own
decision, and that it will try to get a decision from France, Italy,
and the United States as quickly as possible.
“It goes without saying that public declarations on behalf of the
British, French, and Allied Governments, and, if possible, on the
part of President Wilson, in the sense of the (_b_) policy would, if
promptly made, greatly facilitate my efforts.”
Obviously the wise course was to place action in carrying out this
policy on an Inter-Allied basis. Lord Northcliffe, therefore, convened
meetings in London which were attended by Italian, French and American
representatives. It was decided to organise a committee to arrange with
France and Italy for united operations on the Italian front against
the Austro-Hungarian armies.
Accordingly, the special mission which Lord Northcliffe had sent
to Italy, and of which Mr. Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson were the
principal members, was entrusted with this task. With the willing
support and co-operation of the Italian Prime Minister, the Italian
Commander-in-Chief, and the British and French Commanders on the
Italian Front, a permanent Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission was
organised at the Italian General Headquarters. Italy provided the
President (Colonel Siciliani) and one commissioner (Captain Ojetti)
and Great Britain and France one commissioner each (Lieutenant-Colonel
B. Granville Baker and Major Gruss respectively). To the Commission
were attached, as a result of representations from Mr. Steed,
representatives of committees of each of the oppressed nationalities.
Mr. Steed, speaking on behalf of Lord Northcliffe, urged that only
representatives of these races were fully qualified to speak to their
co-nationals on the vital subjects which would form the theme of their
propagandist productions.
The Commission began work on April 18, 1918. It acquired a polyglot
printing press at Reggio Emilia. A weekly journal was published
containing news (collected by a special Italian office ably organised
by Professor Borgese at Berne) quadruplicated in the Czech, Polish,
Southern Slav, and Rumanian languages. The assistance of the national
representatives was valuable to the point of indispensability in
ensuring accuracy of translation and suitability of contents.
These representatives also composed leaflet manifestoes. Coloured
reproductions of pictures of a patriotic, or religious, nature which
appealed to the nationalist aspirations and piety of the races,
were made. All this literary matter was dispatched straight to the
front-line armies from the printing press, and distributed by means of
aeroplanes (one per army being detailed for this purpose), rockets,
which were constructed to hold about 30 pamphlets, and grenades, and
also by contact patrols. These patrols were originally formed by
bodies of troops raised on the responsibility of the various Italian
armies, and were composed of deserters of Czecho-Slovak, Southern Slav,
Polish, or Rumanian nationalities who had volunteered for this service
against their hereditary enemy. They were wonderfully successful. The
total number of leaflets and other productions thus distributed ran
into many millions. But this by no means exhausted the channels of
propagandist effort. Gramophone records of Czecho-Slovak and Southern
Slav songs were secured by the British Commissioner and effectively
used for the awakening of the nationalist sentiment among the troops of
these races in the Austrian armies. The instruments were placed in “No
Man’s Land,” and so close to each other were the front trenches of the
opposing armies that the words and music could easily be heard.
The Austro-Hungarian section of Crewe House, of which section Mr.
Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson were the directors, maintained the closest
touch with the Commission. Specimens of literature were exchanged
between the Commission and other sections of Crewe House, and it was
not uncommon for one news leaflet to appear in eight or ten different
languages, with a total circulation of several millions of copies. The
Austro-Hungarian section also necessarily kept in the closest touch
with the Czecho-Slovak, Southern Slav, Polish, and Rumanian leaders and
organisations in Allied and neutral countries. It also co-operated with
Mr. S. A. Guest in the organisation of civil and secret channels in
neutral countries by which propaganda literature could be introduced
into Austria-Hungary.
The effect of the launching of the propaganda leaflet campaign was soon
apparent. Unrest became manifest among the Austro-Hungarian forces.
Deserters belonging to the subject races came over to the Allied lines.
This was one of the chief causes contributory to the postponements of
the Austrian offensive carefully planned for April. When this attack
was eventually made--in June--the Italian commanders, and their Allied
colleagues, had full information concerning enemy plans and positions.
But, unhappily, the propaganda, and, consequently, the military,
campaigns were impaired by reactionary tendencies within the Italian
Government. Had the Italian Government been prepared in May, 1918,
to join with their Allies and Associates in making a joint public
declaration in strong and unmistakable language in favour of the
creation of a united and independent Southern Slav State and in
recognising the Czecho-Slovaks as an Allied and belligerent nation, the
result would undoubtedly have precipitated the collapse of Austria in
the early part of the summer of 1918.
Instead of seizing the opportunity for this united and strong
pronouncement which presented itself at a meeting of the Prime
Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy, held at Versailles, on
June 3, 1918, the following declarations were made:--
(1) The creation of a united and independent Polish State with free
access to the sea constitutes one of the conditions of a solid and
just peace and of the rule of right in Europe.
(2) The Allied Governments have noted with pleasure the declaration
made by the Secretary of State of the United States Government (in
referring to the resolutions of the Rome Congress of Austro-Hungarian
nationalities), and desire to associate themselves in an expression
of earnest sympathy for the nationalistic aspirations towards freedom
of the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo (Southern)-Slav peoples.
The regrettable weakness of the second declaration, which followed very
closely the wording of Mr. Lansing’s earlier announcement on behalf of
the United States Government, was entirely due to the opposition of
Baron Sonnino (Italian Foreign Minister), who rejected the stronger
declarations prepared by Mr. Balfour and the French Foreign Minister,
M. Pichon. It was a retrogressive step by Italy from the position
she had taken at the Rome Congress, at which her Prime Minister had
expressly associated himself with the terms of the Italo-Southern Slav
agreement that recognised the “unity and independence of the Jugo-Slav
nation as a vital Italian interest.” In regard to the Czecho-Slovaks,
the British, French, and Italian Governments had already recognised the
Czecho-Slovak Army, under the Bohemian National Council, as an Allied
force.
Towards the end of June, Mr. Lansing made considerable advance with
a definite statement that the United States aimed at the complete
liberation of all Slav peoples from Austro-German domination.
While Lord Northcliffe and his associates were striving hard in London
to retrieve the opportunities thus wasted, the propaganda organisation
in Italy was making remarkable progress despite the vacillations of
the politicians. Undoubtedly the reactionary attitude of Baron Sonnino
at Versailles influenced adversely the response of the Southern Slav
troops in the Austrian ranks to the appeals made by the propaganda
leaflets. Nevertheless, there was a considerable amount of desertion
from the Austro-Hungarian Army. Among the deserters were numbers of
junior officers, not professional soldiers, but men who in private life
were lawyers, merchants, and so on. These men were all led to come over
by the prospect of liberation which the propaganda held out to them.
Men of other ranks were induced to desert, either in order to join
relatives among their co-nationals fighting in the Italian Army, of
whom news had reached them through the propaganda agency, or else by
the more elementary considerations of food, comfort, and safety. It was
noticeable that nearly all the deserters brought with them copies of
the leaflets distributed by the Allied Commission.
That the propaganda had seriously alarmed the Austro-Hungarian
authorities was made evident by reference to it in Army Orders and
in the Austrian and German Press, which even reproduced some of the
literary efforts, and vilified Lord Northcliffe in their most fervent
manner. It even affected the minor tactics of the Austro-Hungarian
Army, for it necessitated the detachment of machine-gun sections to
deal with attempts at desertion _en masse_ during the Piave offensive,
which was eventually launched by the Austrians at the end of June.
There was at least one authenticated account of a mutiny among Czech
troops being suppressed by Germans and Magyars during that offensive.
Desertions of single men or small parties were frequent before and
during the action, and one case is known of a whole unit having come
over. This was a company composed entirely of Jugo-Slavs. The Company
Commander (Jugo-Slav and strongly Nationalist), on going his rounds
a couple of hours before the attack began, gathered from his men’s
conversation that they had no intention of fighting. He was able to
bring his whole company over.
The delay of the offensive, mainly on account of Allied propaganda,
proved to be very important, because, when it came the Piave rose
behind the Austrian army and converted the attack into something like a
disaster. There is reason to believe that many ammunition dumps behind
the enemy lines were blown up by the Czechs. A rumour was spread in the
Press that the Southern Slavs had been fighting desperately against
Italy, but this was officially denied. The divisions in question were a
mixture of Germans, Magyars, Poles, and Ruthenes. It appeared that the
Southern Slav divisions had been divided up and mixed with “reliable”
troops, which showed that the Austrians were afraid of them. The
prisoners taken, as a rule, expressed willingness to volunteer at once.
Dalmatian prisoners showed great enthusiasm for Jugo-Slavia and the
Allies.
After the Piave battle, members of the Inter-Allied Propaganda
Commission were received and thanked by the Italian Commander-in-Chief.
General Diaz said that the victory was due in considerable measure to
their efforts.
In August the Inter-Allied Conference on Enemy Propaganda, convoked by
Lord Northcliffe, met at Crewe House. In regard to propaganda against
Austria-Hungary, the Committee formed to consider questions of policy
found itself in complete agreement with the scheme of policy sanctioned
by the British Government for purposes of Propaganda, and amplified
by the decisions of the British, French, and Italian Governments at
the time of, or in connection with, the Rome Congress of Oppressed
Austro-Hungarian Nationalities. It recognised that such extensions
of policy, while springing from considerations of Allied principles,
had, in part, corresponded to the real demands of the propaganda
situation, which, in their turn, had sprung from the exigencies of the
military situation and, in particular, from the necessity of utilising
the established principles of the alliance for the purpose of impeding
or hampering the Austro-Hungarian offensive against Italy. Subsequent
acts and declarations on the part of Allied Governments and of the
Government of the United States made it clear that the joint policy of
the Allies was tending increasingly towards the constructive liberation
of the subject Austro-Hungarian races. The main task of the Committee
in relation to propaganda in Austria-Hungary seemed, therefore, to
be one of unifying for propaganda purposes these various acts and
declarations, and of preparing, if possible, the way for a joint
Allied declaration that might complete and render more effective the
work of Allied propaganda both in the interior of Austria-Hungary and
among Austro-Hungarian troops at the front. The Committee resolved to
suggest that the Italian Government take the initiative in promoting
a joint and unanimous public declaration that all the Allies regard
the establishment of a free and united Jugo-Slav State, embracing
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as one of the conditions of a just and
lasting peace, and of the rule of right in Europe. Such a declaration
was actually made by the Italian Government, but so tardily that its
propaganda effect was reduced to a minimum.
Reports from the British Commissioner at Padua chronicled the
uninterrupted continuance of the preparation and distribution of
leaflets. The work was so developed that a distributing capacity of
almost a million leaflets a day was obtained. Proof of the value of
the work was afforded by the arrival of deserters, belonging to the
subject races, in the Italian lines bringing with them the manifestoes
and saying, “I have come because you invited me.” A special leaflet was
prepared in London, with the co-operation of a member of the Southern
Slav Committee, for distribution by aeroplane at various points on the
Dalmatian coast, where Southern Slav insurgents were ascertained to
be gathered in considerable numbers. A detailed description, compiled
from official sources, of the overwhelming character of American
war preparations (which the enemy was constantly belittling) was
telegraphed to Padua for translation into Austro-Hungarian languages,
and for distribution in leaflet form among Austro-Hungarian troops.
Progress was even made among the Magyars who had fought with remarkable
ferocity on the Montello. The agrarian question that had troubled
Hungary for some time was used for propaganda purposes and many Magyar
desertions ensued. The constant efforts exerted an ever-increasing
and cumulative influence on the enemy. The collapse of Bulgaria
opened a new front for operations against Austria-Hungary and a
Propaganda Commission under Lieutenant-Colonel Granville Baker was
quickly organised on the lines of the Padua Commission and dispatched
to Salonika. Operations were promptly started, but it soon became
evident that the end was near. As the Allied armies on the Western
fronts advanced, news of their progress and of Bulgaria’s defection
was continually and promptly sent over the Austrian lines. There is
no doubt that this contributed to the increased amount of desertion
and disorder among the Austrian forces, culminating in the _débâcle_
produced by the final Allied attack in October, which brought down the
military and political organisations of the Dual Monarchy.
Crewe House had every reason to be proud of the success of its
work against Austria-Hungary. The conception of the whole propaganda
campaign--its policy, its scope, its application--was due to Lord
Northcliffe and the co-directors of the Austrian Section of his
department, Mr. Wickham Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson. The results fully
vindicated every basic principle of their propaganda strategy. There
were difficulties to be overcome at every turn, of which political and
personal ambitions abroad were not the least. To keep the work on the
straight metals of uninterrupted progress necessitated unremitting
vigilance and ceaseless consultation with the numerous interests
concerned. The result was the greatest victory achieved by war
propaganda--the culmination of a constructive campaign, which, could
it have been extended to its logical conclusions, would have achieved
a just and lasting peace, liberating millions of our fellow-men from a
tyrannous yoke to the enjoyment of that political freedom which is the
inalienable right of civilised mankind.
[Illustration: MR. H. WICKHAM STEED.
MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE, AND ONE OF THE DIRECTORS OF
THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN SECTION.
_Photo: Russell, London._]
[Illustration: DR. R. W. SETON-WATSON.
CO-DIRECTOR OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN SECTION OF CREWE HOUSE.]
[Illustration: MR. H. G. WELLS.
MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE, AND FIRST DIRECTOR OF GERMAN
SECTION.
_“Daily Mirror” Photograph._]