[Illustration: VISCOUNT NORTHCLIFFE.
DIRECTOR OF PROPAGANDA IN ENEMY COUNTRIES.
_Photo: Hoppé._]
SECRETS OF CREWE HOUSE
_The Story of a Famous Campaign_
BY
SIR CAMPBELL STUART, K.B.E.
HODDER AND STOUGHTON
LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO
MCMXXI
_First Edition printed September, 1920._
_Second Edition printed October, 1920._
_Third Edition printed November, 1920._
_Fourth Edition printed March, 1921._
TO
VISCOUNT NORTHCLIFFE
IN
GRATEFUL AND AFFECTIONATE
APPRECIATION
AUTHOR’S FOREWORD
Some courage is required to add to the already too swollen list of
war books, of the making of which there seems to be no end. The
justification for the present volume, which tells the remarkable story
of British propaganda in enemy countries during 1918, lies in the fact
that it records historic activities, some of which were of a pioneer
character.
Necessarily its publication had to be postponed until the main
principles of the Peace had been decided. The nature of the documents
quoted precluded earlier publication, which might have embarrassed
the Allied Governments. No such embarrassment will be caused at this
late stage. The march of events has removed the need, which existed
during the War and during the peace-making, for withholding from public
knowledge particulars of the organisation and work directed with such
effect from Crewe House.
Much that was interesting, and even dramatic, can never be divulged.
Otherwise, many who did valuable and dangerous service might, by a
breach of faith, be exposed to reprisals.
The activities of Crewe House will stand the test of judgment by
results. German comments on Viscount Northcliffe’s department leave no
room for doubt as to the verdict of enemy countries.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
PROPAGANDA: ITS USES AND ABUSES 1
CHAPTER II
CREWE HOUSE: ITS ORGANISATION AND _PERSONNEL_ 8
CHAPTER III
OPERATIONS AGAINST AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: PROPAGANDA’S
MOST STRIKING SUCCESS 20
CHAPTER IV
OPERATIONS AGAINST GERMANY 50
CHAPTER V
TRIBUTES FROM THE ENEMY 105
CHAPTER VI
OPERATIONS AGAINST BULGARIA AND OTHER ACTIVITIES 134
CHAPTER VII
INTER-ALLIED CO-OPERATION 146
CHAPTER VIII
FROM WAR PROPAGANDA TO PEACE PROPAGANDA 201
CHAPTER IX
_VALE!_ 233
APPENDIX--Facsimile leaflets and translations 237
INDEX 253
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Viscount Northcliffe _Frontispiece_
BETWEEN PAGES
Crewe House 8 and 9
Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald Hall, K.C.M.G.,
C.B., M.P. 8 and 9
Lieutenant-General Sir George Macdonogh,
K.C.M.G., C.B. 16 and 17
The Rt. Hon. Lord Beaverbrook 16 and 17
Mr. H. Wickham Steed 32 and 33
Dr. R. W. Seton-Watson 32 and 33
News of Allied successes on Western Front for
Jugo-Slav soldiers in the Austrian Armies 48 and 49
A manifesto from Dr. Trumbitch distributed
from aeroplanes among Jugo-Slav troops
in the Austrian Army 48 and 49
Mr. H. G. Wells 64 and 65
Leaflet--probably the first--distributed by
British aeroplanes among German troops
in October, 1914. It announced a Russian
victory in East Prussia 64 and 65
Mr. Hamilton Fyfe 64 and 65
Aeroplane distribution of copies of an early
leaflet prepared for the German soldier 64 and 65
Brigadier-General G. K. Cockerill, C.B. 80 and 81
A typical news-sheet for German soldiers 80 and 81
Captain Chalmers Mitchell 96 and 97
“Reporting Progress”--Leaflet which gave
particulars of Allied progress against the
Germans 96 and 97
Diagrammatic representation of the growth of
the American Army in the Field 96 and 97
Map-leaflet showing the breaking of the
Hindenburg line 112 and 113
News for German soldiers of the destruction
of the Turkish Army in Palestine 112 and 113
Some pointed quotations for German soldiers
culled from German sources 112 and 113
A medallion struck by the Germans in “dishonour”
of Lord Northcliffe 128 and 129
Leaflet with particulars of the fate of 150
German submarine commanders, which
created great depression in German naval
ports 128 and 129
Leaflet warning the Germans that such places
as Berlin and Hamburg had been brought
within range of aerial attack and could be
bombed if the war were prolonged 128 and 129
A German dream and the result. A leaflet
illustrating the collapse of the Mittel-Europa
ambition of German militarism 144 and 145
Front page of a “Trench Newspaper,” issued
by Crewe House for German troops 144 and 145
The late Sir Charles Nicholson, Bart., M.P. 144 and 145
Sir Roderick Jones, K.B.E. 160 and 161
Illustrated leaflet portraying contentment of
German prisoners in British hands 160 and 161
Colonel the Earl of Denbigh, C.V.O. 160 and 161
Leaflet showing how the Allies had
shattered the great Berlin-Bagdad plan 160 and 161
Mr. Robert Donald 176 and 177
Manifesto to Magyar Troops 176 and 177
“Drifting down in white showers”: Leaflets,
from Italian aeroplane squadron,
dropping on Vienna 176 and 177
Manifesto, signed by Professor (now President)
Masaryk, to Czecho-Slovak soldiers 176 and 177
Sir Sidney Low 192 and 193
Rapidly-distributed leaflets for German troops
telling of Allied successes in the Balkans
and in Syria 192 and 193
Mr. James O’Grady, M.P. 192 and 193
Inflating the balloons and attaching the
truth-telling leaflets 208 and 209
Registering the direction and velocity of the
wind, in order to judge where the leaflets
would fall 208 and 209
How leaflets were attached to the balloons 208 and 209
Dispatching the balloons 208 and 209
Testing the lifting power of balloons used for
propaganda purposes 224 and 225
LIST OF MAPS.
Ethnographic map of Austria-Hungary 32 and 38
The partition of Austria-Hungary: Showing
the boundaries as defined in the Peace
Treaties 48 and 49
Germany’s new boundaries as fixed by the
Treaty of Peace 80 and 81
Bulgaria as delimited by the Peace treaty 144 and 145
CHAPTER I
PROPAGANDA: ITS USES AND ABUSES
Definition and Axioms: Why German Propaganda Failed: Ludendorff’s
Lament and Tribute.
Propaganda in war is a comparatively modern activity. Certainly, in
the stage of development to which it attained in the closing phases of
the Great War, it is a new weapon of warfare and a powerful weapon.
Therefore it requires skilful and careful handling. Otherwise it
destroys rather than creates, and alienates whom it should conciliate.
What is propaganda? It is the presentation of a case in such a way
that others may be influenced. In so far as its use against an enemy
is concerned, the subject matter employed must not be self-evidently
propagandist. Except in special circumstances, its origin should be
completely concealed. As a general rule, too, it is desirable to hide
the channels of communication.
Creation of a favourable “atmosphere” is the first object of
propaganda. Until this psychological effect is produced (as the result
of military events, of propagandist activity or of internal political
disaffection) the mentality of enemy troops and civil population--and
both are equally important in modern warfare--will be naturally
unsympathetic and unresponsive to influence. In order to produce
this “atmosphere” of receptivity and susceptibility, continuity of
propaganda policy is indispensable. This presupposes definition of
sound policy, based upon comprehensive knowledge of the facts and of
the developments of the political, military, and economic situation,
and also of the enemy psychology.
When a line of policy has been laid down, actual propaganda operations
may be begun, but not before. First of all axioms of propaganda
is that only truthful statements be made. Secondly, there must be
no conflicting arguments, and this can only be ensured by close
co-operation of all propagandists and by strict adherence to the policy
defined. A false step may possibly be irretrievable.
Owing to inattention to these cardinal principles of propaganda
against an enemy--inattention due to lack of appreciation of their
importance--the Germans’ very energetic propaganda effort miscarried.
Wrongly assuming that the war would be of short duration, they made use
of untruths and half-truths, mis-statements and over-statements. These
produced a temporary effect, but the protraction of the war brought its
own refutation of their misrepresentation, and, instead of operating
to the good of the Central Empires, the campaign wrought harm to their
cause.
Moreover, as they afterwards realised, the Germans did not agree among
themselves in their misrepresentations. There was, as a well-known
British authority on German propaganda has pointed out, a chaotic
exuberance of different points of view. And they were incapable of
understanding other nations. Dr. Karl Lamprecht, the distinguished
German professor, deplored this in the course of a lecture at the end
of 1914, when the Germans regarded their victory as assured. “When the
war came,” he said, “everyone who could write obtained the largest
possible goose quill and wrote to all his foreign friends, telling
them that they did not realise what splendid fellows the Germans were,
and not infrequently adding that in many cases their conduct required
some excuse. The effect was stupendous.” “I can speak with the most
open heart on the subject,” he added, “for amongst the whole crowd
it was the professors who were most erratic. The consequences were
gruesome. Probably much more harm came to our cause in this way than
from all the efforts of the enemy. None the less, it was done with the
best intentions. The self-confidence was superb, but the knowledge
was lacking. People thought that they could explain the German cause
without preparation. What was wanted was organisation.”
Before coming to Allied methods and matter, it will be interesting to
examine the scope of German propaganda. In the early stages of the war,
Germany loudly proclaimed that she was winning. As the progress of
events belied such words, she changed her theme. The Allies could not
win, she averred, and the longer they took to realise this the greater
would be their suffering and losses. She continually endeavoured to
sow discord between the Allies. Great Britain was not taking her fair
share of the Allied burden; Great Britain intended to retain Belgium
and the northern part of France; Great Britain was using France and
Russia for her own selfish ends; the interests of the Balkan Powers
could not be reconciled. These were some of the foolish falsehoods in
which she indulged. They were ineffective, as were her many attempts to
stir up disaffection within Allied countries. Ireland, South Africa,
India, Egypt and Mohammedan countries were examples in the case of
Great Britain, and Algeria in that of France. She spared no effort to
encourage Pacifism among the Allied peoples.
Their lack of success became evident even to the Germans themselves.
Government agencies and Press became more reticent as the war went
on and the propaganda was found to be doing more harm than good.
The military leaders became apprehensive of the effectiveness and
superiority of British propaganda. Soldiers and writers made bitter
complaints of the lack of any German organisation to maintain an
adequate counter-campaign.
General Ludendorff (“My War Memories,” pp. 360 _et seq._) is pathetic
in his laments at the non-success of German efforts. “The German
propaganda,” he writes, “was only kept going with difficulty. In spite
of all our efforts, its achievements, in comparison to the magnitude
of the task, were inadequate. We produced no real effect on the
enemy peoples.” He admits failure, too, in propaganda efforts on the
fighting fronts. In the East, he says, the Russians were the authors
of their own collapse. In the West, “the fronts of our enemies had not
been made susceptible by the state of public opinion in their home
countries, and the propaganda we gradually introduced had no success.”
He records his efforts to induce the Imperial Chancellor to create a
great organisation, as it had become “undeniably essential to establish
an Imperial Ministry of Propaganda,” and he was convinced that no
adequate counter-campaign to Allied propaganda could be organised
except by an Imperial department possessing special powers. “At last
a feeble step in this direction was taken in August, 1918. A totally
inadequate organisation was set up; besides, it was then too late.
In these circumstances it was quite impossible to achieve uniformity
in propaganda work between Germany and Austria-Hungary, as was
conspicuously the case with our enemies. The Army found no ally in a
strong propaganda directed from home. While her Army was victorious on
the field of battle, Germany failed in the fight against the _moral_ of
the enemy peoples.”
Ludendorff’s _apologia_ shows that he understood the principles which
should govern a propaganda campaign; but he did not understand that
the German case was bad. He has the doubtful consolation of knowing he
was right in his theories; for they coincided in large degree with the
principles upon which Viscount Northcliffe based his famous intensive
campaign from Crewe House. No other German has exhibited such a grasp
of the fundamentals of propaganda as Ludendorff, and he had excellent
opportunity of judging the efficacy of the action into which these
theoretical principles were translated. His verdict is an unqualified
tribute, as the extracts from his writings quoted in another chapter
show.
How this success was attained it is the purpose of this book to reveal.
[Illustration: CREWE HOUSE.]