A terser and more taking statement of opposition has been recently

attributed to a gentleman highly honored by this University and by his

townsmen here. I gladly seize this opportunity, as a consistent

opponent during his whole political life, to add that his words carry

great weight throughout the country by reason of the unquestioned

ability, courage, and patriotic devotion he has brought to the public

service. He is reported as protesting simply against "the use of power

in the extension of American institutions." But does not this, if

applied to the present situation, seem also to miss an important

distinction? What planted us in the Philippines was the use of our

power in the most efficient naval and military defense then available

for our own institutions where they already exist, against the attack

of Spain. If the responsibility entailed by the result of these acts in

our own defense does involve some extension of our institutions, shall

we therefore run away from it? If a guaranty to chaotic tribes of the

civil rights secured by the American Constitution does prove to be an

incident springing from the discharge of the duty that has rested upon

us from the moment we drove Spain out, is that a result so

objectionable as to warrant us in abandoning our duty?

There is, it is true, one other alternative--the one which Aguinaldo

himself is said to have suggested, and which has certainly been put

forth in his behalf with the utmost simplicity and sincerity by a

conspicuous statesman at Chicago. We might at once solicit peace from

Aguinaldo. We might then encourage him to extend his rule over the

whole country,--Catholic, pagan, and Mohammedan, willing and unwilling

alike,--and promise him whatever aid might be necessary for that task.

Meantime, we should undertake to protect him against outside

interference from any European or Asiatic nation whose interests on

that oceanic highway and in those commercial capitals might be

imperiled![14] I do not desire to discuss that proposition. And I submit

to candid men that there are just those three courses, and no more, now

open to us--to run away, to protect Aguinaldo, or to back up our own

army and firmly hold on!

[14] The exact proposition made by General Carl Schurz in

addressing the Chicago Anti-Expansion Convention, October 17,

1899.

[Sidenote: Objections to Duty.]

If this fact be clearly perceived, if the choice between these three

courses be once recognized as the only choice the present situation

permits, our minds will be less disturbed by the confused cries of

perplexity and discontent that still fill the air. Thus men often say,

"If you believe in liberty for yourself, why refuse it to the Tagals?"

That is right; they should have, in the degree of their capacity, the

only kind of liberty worth having in the world, the only kind that is

not a curse to its possessors and to all in contact with them--ordered

liberty, under law, for which the wisdom of man has not yet found a

better safeguard than the guaranties of civil rights in the

Constitution of the United States. Who supposes that to be the liberty

for which Aguinaldo is fighting? What his people want, and what the

statesman at Chicago wishes us to use the Army and Navy of the United

States to help him get, is the liberty to rule others--the liberty

first to turn our own troops out of the city and harbor we had in our

own self-defense captured from their enemies; the liberty next to rule

that great commercial city, and the tribes of the interior, instead of

leaving us to exercise the rule over them that events have forced upon

us, till it is fairly shown that they can rule themselves.

Again it is said, "You are depriving them of freedom." But they never

had freedom, and could not have it now. Even if they could subdue the

other tribes in Luzon, they could not establish such order on the other

islands and in the waters of the archipelago as to deprive foreign

Powers of an immediate excuse for interference. What we are doing is in

the double line of preventing otherwise inevitable foreign seizure and

putting a stop to domestic war.

"But you cannot fit people for freedom. They must fit themselves, just

as we must do our own crawling and stumbling in order to learn to

walk." The illustration is unfortunate. Must the crawling baby, then,

be abandoned by its natural or accidental guardian, and left to itself

to grow strong by struggling, or to perish, as may happen? Must we turn

the Tagals loose on the foreigners in Manila, and on their enemies in

the other tribes, that by following their instincts they may fit

themselves for freedom?

Again, "It will injure us to exert power over an unwilling people, just

as slavery injured the slaveholders themselves." Then a community is

injured by maintaining a police. Then a court is injured by rendering a

just decree, and an officer by executing it. Then it is a greater

injury, for instance, to stop piracy than to suffer from it. Then the

manly exercise of a just responsibility enfeebles instead of developing

and strengthening a nation.

"Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the

governed." "No man is good enough to govern another against his will."

Great truths, from men whose greatness and moral elevation the world

admires. But there is a higher authority than Jefferson or Lincoln, Who

said: "If a man smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other

also." Yet he who acted literally on even that divine injunction toward

the Malays that attacked our Army in Manila would be a congenital idiot

to begin with, and his corpse, while it lasted, would remain an

object-lesson of how not to deal with the present stage of Malay

civilization and Christianity.

Why mourn over our present course as a departure from the policy of the

fathers? For a hundred years the uniform policy which they began and

their sons continued has been acquisition, expansion, annexation,

reaching out to remote wildernesses far more distant and inaccessible

then than the Philippines are now--to disconnected regions like Alaska,

to island regions like Midway, the Guano Islands, the Aleutians, the

Sandwich Islands, and even to quasi-protectorates like Liberia and

Samoa. Why mourn because of the precedent we are establishing? The

precedent was established before we were born. Why distress ourselves

with the thought that this is only the beginning, that it opens the

door to unlimited expansion? The door is wide open now, and has been

ever since Livingston in Paris jumped at Talleyrand's offer to sell him

the wilderness west of the Mississippi instead of the settlements

eastward to Florida, which we had been trying to get; and Jefferson

eagerly sustained him. For the rest, the task that is laid upon us now

is not proving so easy as to warrant this fear that we shall soon be

seeking unlimited repetitions of it.

[Sidenote: Evasion by Embrace.]

That danger, in fact, can come only if we shirk our present duty by the

second of the two alternative methods of evasion I have mentioned--the

one favored by the exuberant patriot who wants to clasp Cuban, Kanaka,

and Tagal alike to his bosom as equal partners with ourselves in our

inheritance from the fathers, and take them all into the Union as

States.

We will be wise to open our eyes at once to the gravity and the

insidious character of this danger--the very worst that could threaten

the American Union. Once begun, the rivalry of parties and the fears of

politicians would insure its continuance. With Idaho and Wyoming

admitted, they did not dare prolong the exclusion even of Utah, and so

we have the shame of seeing an avowed polygamist with a prima facie

right to sit in our Congress as a legislator not merely for Utah, but

for the whole Union. At this moment scarcely a politician dares frankly

avow unalterable opposition to the admission of Cuba, if she should

seek it. Yet, bad as that would be, it would necessarily lead to worse.

Others in the West Indies might not linger long behind. In any event,

with Cuba a State, Porto Rico could not be kept a Territory. No more

could the Sandwich Islands. And then, looming direct in our path, like

a volcano rising out of the mist on the affrighted vision of mariners

tempest-tossed in tropic seas, is the specter of such States as Luzon

and the Visayas and Haiti.

They would have precedents, too, to quote, and dangerous ones. When we

bought Louisiana we stipulated in the treaty that "the inhabitants of

the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United

States and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of

the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights,

advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States." We made

almost identically the same stipulation when we bought Florida. When

one of the most respected in the long line of our able Secretaries of

State, Mr. William L. Marcy, negotiated a treaty in 1854 for the

annexation of the Sandwich Islands, he provided that they should be

incorporated as a State, with the same degree of sovereignty as other

States, and on perfect equality with them. The schemes prior to 1861

for the purchase or annexation of Cuba practically all looked to the

same result. Not till the annexation of San Domingo was proposed did

this feature disappear from our treaties. It is only candid to add that

the habit of regarding this as the necessary destiny of any United

States Territory as soon as it has sufficient population has been

universal. It is no modern vagary, but the practice, if not the theory,

of our whole national life, that would open the doors of our Senate and

House, and give a share in the Government to these wild-eyed newcomers

from the islands of the sea.

The calamity of admitting them cannot be overrated. Even in the case of

the best of these islands, it would demoralize and degrade the national

suffrage almost incalculably below the point already reached. To the

Senate, unwieldy now, and greatly changed in character from the body

contemplated by the Constitution, it would be disastrous. For the

present States of the Union it would be an act of folly like that of a

business firm which blindly steered for bankruptcy by freely admitting

to full partnership new members, strangers, and non-residents, not only

otherwise ill qualified, but with absolutely conflicting interests. And

it would be a distinct violation of the clause in the preamble that

"we, the people,... do ordain and establish this Constitution for the

United States of _America_."

There is the only safe ground--on the letter and the spirit of the

Constitution. It contemplated a Continental Union of sovereign States.

It limited that Union to the American Continent. The man that takes it

farther sounds its death-knell.

[Sidenote: The General Welfare.]

I have designedly left to the last any estimate of the material

interests we serve by holding on in our present course. Whatever these

may be, they are only a subordinate consideration. We are in the

Philippines, as we are in the West Indies, because duty sent us; and we

shall remain because we have no right to run away from our duty, even

if it does involve far more trouble than we foresaw when we plunged

into the war that entailed it. The call to duty, when once plainly

understood, is a call Americans never fail to answer, while to calls of

interest they have often shown themselves incredulous or contemptuous.

But the Constitution we revere was also ordained "to promote the

general welfare," and he is untrue to its purpose who squanders

opportunities. Never before have they been showered upon us in such

bewildering profusion. Are the American people to rise to the occasion?

Are they to be as great as their country? Or shall the historian record

that at this unexampled crisis they were controlled by timid ideas and

short-sighted views, and so proved unequal to the duty and the

opportunity which unforeseen circumstances brought to their doors? The

two richest archipelagos in the world are practically at our disposal.

The greatest ocean on the globe has been put in our hands, the ocean

that is to bear the commerce of the Twentieth Century. In the face of

this prospect, shall we prefer, with the teeming population that

century is to bring us, to remain a "hibernating nation, living off its

own fat--a hermit nation," as Mr. Senator Davis has asked? For our

first Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Hill, was right when he said

that not to enter the Open Door in Asia means the perpetual isolation

of this continent.

[Sidenote: Have they any Value?]

Are we to be discouraged by the cry that the new possessions are

worthless? Not while we remember how often and under what circumstances

we have heard that cry before. Half the public men of the period

denounced Louisiana as worthless. Eminent statesmen made merry in

Congress over the idea that Oregon or Washington could be of any use.

Daniel Webster, in the most solemn and authoritative tones

Massachusetts has ever employed, assured his fellow-Senators that, in

his judgment, California was not worth a dollar.

Is it said that the commercial opportunities in the Orient, or at least

in the Philippines, are overrated? So it used to be said of the

Sandwich Islands. But what does our experience show? Before their

annexation even, but after we had taken this little archipelago under

our protection and into our commercial system, our ocean tonnage in

that trade became nearly double as heavy as with Great Britain. Why?

Because, while we have lost the trade of the Atlantic, superior

advantages make the Pacific ours. Is it said that elsewhere on the

Pacific we can do as well without a controlling political influence as

with it? Look again! Mexico buys our products at the rate of $1.95 for

each inhabitant; South America at the rate of 90 cents; Great Britain

at the rate of $13.42; Canada at the rate of $14; and the Hawaiian

Islands at the rate of $53.35 for each inhabitant. Look at the trade of

the chief city on the Pacific coast. All Mexico and Central America,

all the western parts of South America and of Canada, are as near to it

as is Honolulu; and comparison of the little Sandwich Islands in

population with any of them would be ridiculous. Yet none of them

bought as much salmon in San Francisco as Hawaii, and no countries

bought more save England and Australia. No countries bought as much

barley, excepting Central America; and even in the staff of life, the

California flour, which all the world buys, only five countries

outranked Hawaii in purchases in San Francisco.

No doubt a part of this result is due to the nearness of Hawaii to our

markets, and her distance from any others capable of competing with us,

and another part to a favorable system of reciprocity. Nevertheless,

nobody doubts the advantage our dealers have derived in the promotion

of trade from controlling political relations and frequent intercourse.

There are those who deny that "trade follows the flag," but even they

admit that it leaves if the flag does. And, independent of these

advantages, and reckoning by mere distance, we still have the better of

any European rivals in the Philippines. Now, assume that the Filipino

would have far fewer wants than the Kanaka or his coolie laborer, and

would do far less work for the means to gratify them. Admit, too, that,

with the Open Door, our political relations and frequent intercourse

could have barely a fifth or a sixth of the effect there they have had

in the Sandwich Islands. Roughly cast up even that result, and say

whether it is a value which the United States should throw away as not

worth considering!

And the greatest remains behind. For the trade in the Philippines will

be but a drop in the bucket compared to that of China, for which they

give us an unapproachable foothold. But let it never be forgotten that

the confidence of Orientals goes only to those whom they recognize as

strong enough and determined enough always to hold their own and

protect their rights! The worst possible introduction for the Asiatic

trade would be an irresolute abandonment of our foothold because it was

too much trouble to keep, or because some Malay and half-breed

insurgents said they wanted us away.

[Sidenote: The Future.]

Have you considered for whom we hold these advantages in trust? They

belong not merely to the seventy-five millions now within our borders,

but to all who are to extend the fortunes and preserve the virtues of

the Republic in the coming century. Their numbers cannot increase in

the startling ratio this century has shown. If they did the population

of the United States a hundred years hence would be over twelve hundred

millions. That ratio is impossible, but nobody gives reasons why we

should not increase half as fast. Suppose we do actually increase only

one fourth as fast in the Twentieth Century as in the Nineteenth. To

what height would not the three hundred millions of Americans whom even

that ratio foretells bear up the seething industrial activities of the

continent! To what corner of the world would they not need to carry

their commerce? What demands on tropical productions would they not

make? What outlets for their adventurous youth would they not require?

With such a prospect before us, who thinks that we should shrink from

an enlargement of our national sphere because of the limitations that

bound, or the dangers that threatened, before railroads, before ocean

steamers, before telegraphs and ocean cables, before the enormous

development of our manufactures, and the training of executive and

organizing faculties in our people on a constantly increasing scale for

generations?

Does the prospect alarm? Is it said that our Nation is already too

great, that all its magnificent growth only adds to the conflicting

interests that must eventually tear it asunder? What cement, then, like

that of a great common interest beyond our borders, that touches not

merely the conscience but the pocket and the pride of all alike, and

marshals us in the face of the world, standing for our own?

What, then, is the conclusion of the whole matter? Hold fast! Stand

firm in the place where Providence has put you, and do the duty a just

responsibility for your own past acts imposes. Support the army you

sent there. Stop wasting valuable strength by showing how things might

be different if something different had been done a year and a half

ago. Use the educated thought of the country for shaping best its

course now, instead of chiefly finding fault with its history. Bring

the best hope of the future, the colleges and the generation they are

training, to exert the greatest influence and accomplish the most good

by working intelligently in line with the patriotic aspirations and the

inevitable tendencies of the American people, rather than against them.

Unite the efforts of all men of good will to make the appointment of

any person to these new and strange duties beyond seas impossible save

for proved fitness, and his removal impossible save for cause. Rally

the colleges and the churches, and all they influence, the brain and

the conscience of the country, in a combined and irresistible demand

for a genuine, trained, and pure Civil Service in our new possessions,

that shall put to shame our detractors, and show to the world the

Americans of this generation, equal still to the work of civilization

and colonization, and leading the development of the coming century as

bravely as their fathers led it in the last.

IX

A CONTINENTAL UNION

This speech was delivered on the invitation of the Massachusetts Club,

at their regular dinner in Boston, March 3, 1900.

A CONTINENTAL UNION

A third of a century ago I had the honor to be a guest at this club,

which met then, as now, in Young's Hotel. It has ever since been a

pleasure to recall the men of Boston who gathered about the board,

interested, as now, in the affairs of the Republic to which they were

at once ornament and defense. Frank Bird sat at the head. Near him was

Henry Wilson. John M. Forbes was here, and John A. Andrew, and George

S. Boutwell, and George L. Stearns, and many another, eager in those

times of trial to seek and know the best thing to be done to serve this

country of our pride and love. They were practical business men, true

Yankees in the best sense; and they spent no time then in quarreling

over how we got into our trouble. Their one concern was how to get out

to the greatest advantage of the country.

Honored now by another opportunity to meet with the club, I can do no

better than profit by this example of your earlier days. You have asked

me to speak on some phase of the Philippine question. I would like to

concentrate your attention upon the present and practical phase, and to

withdraw it for the time from things that are past and cannot be

changed.

[Sidenote: Things that Cannot be Undone.]

Stare decisis. There are some things settled. Have we not a better and

more urgent use for our time now than in showing why some of us would

have liked them settled differently? In my State there is a dictum by

an eminent judge of the Court of Appeals, so familiar now as to be a

commonplace, to the effect that when that court has rendered its

decision, there are only two things left to the disappointed advocate.

One is to accept the result attained, and go to work on it as best he

can; the other, to go down to the tavern and "cuss" the court. I want

to suggest to those who dislike the past of the Philippine question

that there is more important work pressing upon you at this moment than

to cuss the court. You cannot change the past, but you may prevent some

threatened sequences which even in your eyes would be far greater

calamities.

There is no use bewailing the war with Spain. Nothing can undo it, and

its results are upon us. There is no use arguing that Dewey should have

abandoned his conquest. He didn't. There is no use regretting the Peace

of Paris. For good or for ill, it is a part of the supreme law of the

land. There is no use begrudging the twenty millions. They are paid.

There is no use depreciating the islands, East or West. They are the

property of the United States by an immutable title which, whatever

some of our own people say, the whole civilized world recognizes and

respects. There is no use talking about getting rid of them--giving

them back to Spain, or turning them over to Aguinaldo, or simply

running away from them. Whoever thinks that any one of these things

could be done, or is still open to profitable debate, takes his

observations--will you pardon me the liberty of saying it?--takes his

observations too closely within the horizon of Boston Bay to know the

American people.

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