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PROBLEMS OF EXPANSION
AS CONSIDERED IN PAPERS AND ADDRESSES
BY
WHITELAW REID
NEW YORK
THE CENTURY CO.
1900
Copyright, 1898, 1900, by
THE CENTURY CO.
THE DEVINNE PRESS.
PREFATORY NOTE
So general have been the expressions as to the value of these scattered
papers and addresses that I have thought it a useful service to gather
them together from the authorized publications at the time, or, in some
cases, from newspaper reports, and (with the consent of the Century Co.
and of Mr. John Lane for the copyrighted articles) to embody them
consecutively, in the order of their several dates, in this volume.
The article entitled "The Territory with which We are Threatened" was
prepared before the appointment of its author as a member of the
Commission to negotiate terms of peace with Spain, and published only a
few days afterward. This circumstance attracted unusual attention to
its views about retaining the territory the country had taken.
As to the attitude of every one else connected officially with the
determination of that question there has been, naturally, more or less
diplomatic reserve; but the position of Mr. Reid before he was
appointed was thus clearly revealed. When the storm of opposition was
apparently reaching its height, in June, 1899, he took occasion to avow
explicitly the course it was obvious he must have recommended. In his
address at the Seventy-fifth Anniversary of Miami University, referring
to some apparently authorized despatches on the subject from
Washington, he said: "I readily take the time which hostile critics
consider unfavorable, for accepting my own share of responsibility, and
for avowing for myself that I declared my belief in the duty and policy
of holding the whole Philippine Archipelago in the very first
conference of the Commissioners in the President's room at the White
House, in advance of any instructions of any sort. If vindication for
it be needed, I confidently await the future."
This measure of responsibility for the expansion policy upon which the
country is launched has necessarily given special interest to Mr.
Reid's subsequent discussions of the various problems it has raised.
They have been called for on important occasions both abroad and in all
parts of our own country. They have covered many phases of the subject,
but have preserved a singular uniformity of purpose and consistency of
ideas throughout. They appeared at times when public men often seemed
to be groping in the dark on an unknown road, but it is now evident
that the road which has been taken is substantially the road they
marked out. As a foreign critic said in comment on one of the
addresses: "The author is one man who knows what he thinks about the
new policy required by the new situation in which his country is
placed, and has the courage and candor to say it."
It has seemed desirable with each paper and address to prefix a brief
record of the circumstances under which it was made. A few memoranda
which Mr. Reid had prepared to elucidate the text are added, in
foot-notes and in the Appendices which include the Resolutions of
Congress as to Cuba, the Protocol of Washington, and the text of the
Peace of Paris.
C. C. BUEL.
NEW ROCHELLE, NEW YORK,
May 25, 1900.
CONTENTS
Page
I. THE TERRITORY WITH WHICH WE ARE THREATENED 1
In "The Century," September, 1898.
II. WAS IT TOO GOOD A TREATY? 25
At the Lotos Club, New York, February 11, 1899.
III. PURPORT OF THE TREATY 35
At the Marquette Club, Chicago, February 13, 1899.
IV. THE DUTIES OF PEACE 53
At the Ohio Society dinner, New York, February 25, 1899.
V. THE OPEN DOOR 65
At the dinner of the American-Asiatic Association,
New York, February 23, 1899.
VI. SOME CONSEQUENCES OF THE TREATY OF PARIS 71
From "The Anglo-Saxon Review," June, 1899.
VII. OUR NEW DUTIES 109
Address at the Seventy-fifth Anniversary of Miami
University, June 15, 1899.
VIII. LATER ASPECTS OF OUR NEW DUTIES 161
At Princeton University, on Commemoration Day,
October 21, 1899.
IX. A CONTINENTAL UNION 199
At the Massachusetts Club, Boston, March 3, 1900.
X. OUR NEW INTERESTS 221
At the University of California, on Charter Day,
March 23, 1900.
XI. "UNOFFICIAL INSTRUCTIONS" 259
At the Farewell Banquet to the Philippine Commission,
San Francisco, April 12, 1900.
APPENDICES
1. POWER TO ACQUIRE AND GOVERN TERRITORY 271
2. THE TARIFF IN UNITED STATES TERRITORY 277
3. THE RESOLUTIONS OF CONGRESS AS TO CUBA 280
4. THE PROTOCOL OF WASHINGTON 282
5. THE PEACE OF PARIS 285
I
THE TERRITORY WITH WHICH WE ARE THREATENED
This paper first appeared in "The Century Magazine" for September,
1898, for which it was written some time before the author's
appointment as a member of the Paris Commission to negotiate the terms
of peace with Spain, and, in fact, before hostilities had been
suspended or the peace protocol agreed upon in Washington.
THE TERRITORY WITH WHICH WE ARE THREATENED
Men are everywhere asking what should be our course about the territory
conquered in this war. Some inquire merely if it is good policy for the
United States to abandon its continental limitations, and extend its
rule over semi-tropical countries with mixed populations. Others ask if
it would not be the wisest policy to give them away after conquering
them, or abandon them. They say it would be ruinous to admit them as
States to equal rights with ourselves, and contrary to the Constitution
to hold them permanently as Territories. It would be bad policy, they
argue, to lower the standard of our population by taking in hordes of
West Indians and Asiatics; bad policy to run any chance of allowing
these people to become some day joint arbiters with ourselves of the
national destinies; bad policy to abandon the principles of
Washington's Farewell Address, to which we have adhered for a century,
and involve ourselves in the Eastern question, or in the entanglements
of European politics.
The men who raise these questions are sincere and patriotic. They are
now all loyally supporting the Government in the prosecution of the war
which some of them were active in bringing on, and others to the last
deprecated and resisted. Their doubts and difficulties deserve the
fairest consideration, and are of pressing importance.
[Sidenote: Duty First, not Policy.]
But is there not another question, more important, which first demands
consideration? Have we the right to decide whether we shall hold or
abandon the conquered territory, solely, or even mainly as a matter of
national policy? Are we not bound by our own acts, and by the
responsibility we have voluntarily assumed before Spain, before Europe,
and before the civilized world, to consider it first in the light of
national duty?
For that consideration it is not needful now to raise the question
whether we were in every particular justifiable for our share in the
transactions leading to the war. However men's opinions on that point
may differ, the Nation is now at war for a good cause, and has in a
vigorous prosecution of it the loyal and zealous support of all good
citizens.
The President intervened, with our Army and Navy, under the direct
command of Congress, to put down Spanish rule in Cuba, on the distinct
ground that it was a rule too bad to be longer endured. Are we not,
then, bound in honor and morals to see to it that the government which
replaces Spanish rule is better? Are we not morally culpable and
disgraced before the civilized world if we leave it as bad or worse?
Can any consideration of mere policy, of our own interests, or our own
ease and comfort, free us from that solemn responsibility which we have
voluntarily assumed, and for which we have lavishly spilled American
and Spanish blood?
Most people now realize from what a mistake Congress was kept by the
firm attitude of the President in opposing a recognition of the
so-called Cuban Republic of Cubitas. It is now generally understood
that virtually there was no Cuban Republic, or any Cuban government
save that of wandering bands of guerrilla insurgents, probably less
numerous and influential than had been represented. There seems reason
to believe that however bad Spanish government may have been, the rule
of these people, where they had the power, was as bad; and still
greater reason to apprehend that if they had full power, their sense of
past wrongs and their unrestrained tropical thirst for vengeance might
lead to something worse. Is it for that pitiful result that a civilized
and Christian people is giving up its sons and pouring out blood and
treasure in Cuba?
In commanding the war, Congress pledged us to continue our action until
the pacification of the island should be secured. When that happy time
has arrived, if it shall then be found that the Cuban insurgents and
their late enemies are able to unite in maintaining a settled and
peaceable government in Cuba, distinctly free from the faults which now
lead the United States to destroy the old one, we shall have discharged
our responsibility, and will be at liberty to end our interference. But
if not, the responsibility of the United States continues. It is
morally bound to secure to Cuba such a government, even if forced by
circumstances to furnish it itself.
[Sidenote: The Pledge of Congress.]
At this point, however, we are checked by a reminder of the further
action of Congress, "asserting its determination, when the pacification
of Cuba has been accomplished, to leave the government and control of
the island to its people."
Now, the secondary provisions of any great measure must be construed in
the light of its main purpose; and where they conflict, we are led to
presume that they would not have been adopted but for ignorance of the
actual conditions. Is it not evident that such was the case here? We
now know how far Congress was misled as to the organization and power
of the alleged Cuban government, the strength of the revolt, and the
character of the war the insurgents were waging. We have seen how
little dependence could be placed upon the lavish promises of support
from great armies of insurgents in the war we have undertaken; and we
are beginning to realize the difference between our idea of a humane
and civilized "pacification" and that apparently entertained up to this
time by the insurgents. It is certainly true that when the war began
neither Congress nor the people of the United States cherished an
intention to hold Cuba permanently, or had any further thought than to
pacify it and turn it over to its own people. But they must pacify it
before they turn it over; and, from present indications, to do that
thoroughly may be the work of years. Even then they are still
responsible to the world for the establishment of a better government
than the one they destroy. If the last state of that island should be
worse than the first, the fault and the crime must be solely that of
the United States. We were not actually forced to involve ourselves; we
might have passed by on the other side. When, instead, we insisted on
interfering, we made ourselves responsible for improving the situation;
and, no matter what Congress "disclaimed," or what intention it
"asserted," we cannot leave Cuba till that is done without national
dishonor and blood-guiltiness.
[Sidenote: Egypt and Cuba.]
The situation is curiously like that of England in Egypt. She
intervened too, under far less provocation, it must be admitted, and
for a cause rather more commercial than humanitarian. But when some
thought that her work was ended and that it was time for her to go,
Lord Granville, on behalf of Mr. Gladstone's government, addressed the
other great European Powers in a note on the outcome of which Congress
might have reflected with profit before framing its resolutions.
"Although for the present," he said, "a British force remains in Egypt
for the preservation of public tranquillity, Her Majesty's government
are desirous of withdrawing it as soon as the state of the country and
the organization of proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive's
authority will admit of it. In the meantime the position in which Her
Majesty's government are placed towards His Highness imposes upon them
the duty of giving advice, with the object of securing that the order
of things to be established shall be of a satisfactory character and
possess the elements of stability and progress." As time went on this
declaration did not seem quite explicit enough; and accordingly, just a
year later, Lord Granville instructed the present Lord Cromer, then Sir
Evelyn Baring, that it should be made clear to the Egyptian ministers
and governors of provinces that "the responsibility which for the time
rests on England obliges Her Majesty's government to insist on the
adoption of the policy which they recommend, and that it will be
necessary that those ministers and governors who do not follow this
course should cease to hold their offices."
That was in 1884--a year after the defeat of Arabi, and the
"pacification." It is now fourteen years later. The English are still
there, and the Egyptian ministers and governors now understand quite
well that they must cease to hold their offices if they do not adopt
the policy recommended by the British diplomatic agent. If it should be
found that we cannot with honor and self-respect begin to abandon our
self-imposed task of Cuban "pacification" with any greater speed, the
impetuous congressmen, as they read over their own inconsiderate
resolutions fourteen years hence, can hide their blushes behind a copy
of Lord Granville's letter. They may explain, if they like, with the
classical excuse of Benedick, "When I said I would die a bachelor, I
did not think I should live till I were married." Or if this seems too
frivolous for their serious plight, let them recall the position of Mr.
Jefferson, who originally declared that the purchase of foreign
territory would make waste paper of the Constitution, and subsequently
appealed to Congress for the money to pay for his purchase of
Louisiana. When he held such an acquisition unconstitutional, he had
not thought he would live to want Louisiana.
As to Cuba, it may be fairly concluded that only these points are
actually clear: (1) We had made ourselves in a sense responsible for
Spain's rule in that island by our consistent declaration, through
three quarters of a century, that no other European nation should
replace her--Daniel Webster, as Secretary of State, even seeking to
guard her hold as against Great Britain. (2) We are now at war because
we say Spanish rule is intolerable; and we cannot withdraw our hand
till it is replaced by a rule for which we are willing to be
responsible. (3) We are also pledged to remain till the pacification is
complete.
[Sidenote: The Conquered Territories.]
In the other territories in question the conditions are different. We
are not taking possession of them, as we are of Cuba, with the avowed
purpose of giving them a better government. We are conquering them
because we are at war with Spain, which has been holding and governing
them very much as she has Cuba; and we must strike Spain wherever and
as hard as we can. But it must at once be recognized that as to Porto
Rico at least, to hold it would be the natural course and what all the
world would expect. Both Cuba and Porto Rico, like Hawaii, are within
the acknowledged sphere of our influence, and ours must necessarily be
the first voice in deciding their destiny. Our national position with
regard to them is historic. It has been officially declared and known
to every civilized nation for three quarters of a century. To abandon
it now, that we may refuse greatness through a sudden craven fear of
being great, would be so astonishing a reversal of a policy steadfastly
maintained by the whole line of our responsible statesmen since 1823 as
to be grotesque.
John Quincy Adams, writing in April of that year, as Secretary of
State, to our Minister to Spain, pointed out that the dominion of Spain
upon the American continents, North and South, was irrevocably gone,
but warned him that Cuba and Porto Rico still remained nominally
dependent upon her, and that she might attempt to transfer them. That
could not be permitted, as they were "natural appendages to the North
American continent." Subsequent statements turned more upon what Mr.
Adams called "the transcendent importance of Cuba to the United
States"; but from that day to this I do not recall a line in our state
papers to show that the claim of the United States to control the
future of Porto Rico as well as of Cuba was ever waived. As to Cuba,
Mr. Adams predicted that within half a century its annexation would be
indispensable. "There are laws of political as well as of physical
gravitation," he said; and "Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own
unnatural connection with Spain, and incapable of self-support, can
gravitate only towards the North American Union, which, by the same law
of nature, cannot cast her off from its bosom." If Cuba is incapable of
self-support, and could not therefore be left, in the cheerful language
of Congress, to her own people, how much less could little Porto Rico
stand alone?
There remains the alternative of giving Porto Rico back to Spain at the
end of the war. But if we are warranted now in making war because the
character of Spanish rule in Cuba was intolerable, how could we justify
ourselves in handing back Porto Rico to the same rule, after having
once emancipated her from it? The subject need not be pursued. To
return Porto Rico to Spain, after she is once in our possession, is as
much beyond the power of the President and of Congress as it was to
preserve the peace with Spain after the destruction of the _Maine_ in
the harbor of Havana. From that moment the American people resolved
that the flag under which this calamity was possible should disappear
forever from the Western hemisphere, and they will sanction no peace
that permits it to remain.
The question of the Philippines is different and more difficult. They
are not within what the diplomatists of the world would recognize as
the legitimate sphere of American influence. Our relation to them is
purely the accident of recent war. We are not in honor bound to hold
them, if we can honorably dispose of them. But we know that their
grievances differ only in kind, not in degree, from those of Cuba; and
having once freed them from the Spanish yoke, we cannot honorably
require them to go back under it again. That would be to put us in an
attitude of nauseating national hypocrisy; to give the lie to all our
professions of humanity in our interference in Cuba, if not also to
prove that our real motive was conquest. What humanity forbade us to
tolerate in the West Indies, it would not justify us in reëstablishing
in the Philippines.
What, then, can we do with them? Shall we trade them for something
nearer home? Doubtless that would be permissible, if we were sure of
thus securing them a better government than that of Spain, and if it
could be done without precipitating fresh international difficulties.
But we cannot give them to our friend and their neighbor Japan without
instantly provoking the hostility of Russia, which recently interfered
to prevent a far smaller Japanese aggrandizement. We cannot give them
to Russia without a greater injustice to Japan; or to Germany or to
France or to England without raising far more trouble than we allay.
England would like us to keep them; the Continental nations would like
that better than any other control excepting Spain's or their own; and
the Philippines would prefer it to anything save the absolute
independence which they are incapable of maintaining. Having been led
into their possession by the course of a war undertaken for the sake of
humanity, shall we draw a geographical limit to our humanity, and say
we cannot continue to be governed by it in Asiatic waters because it is
too much trouble and is too disagreeable--and, besides, there may be no
profit in it?
Both war and diplomacy have many surprises; and it is quite possible
that some way out of our embarrassing possession may yet be found. The
fact is clear that many of our people do not much want it; but if a way
of relinquishing it is proposed, the one thing we are bound to insist
on is that it shall be consistent with our attitude in the war, and
with our honorable obligations to the islands we have conquered and to
civilization.
[Sidenote: Fear of them as States.]
The chief aversion to the vast accessions of territory with which we
are threatened springs from the fear that ultimately they must be
admitted into the Union as States. No public duty is more urgent at
this moment than to resist from the very outset the concession of such
a possibility. In no circumstances likely to exist within a century
should they be admitted as States of the Union. The loose, disunited,
and unrelated federation of independent States to which this would
inevitably lead, stretching from the Indian Archipelago to the
Caribbean Sea, embracing all climes, all religions, all races,--black,
yellow, white, and their mixtures,--all conditions, from pagan
ignorance and the verge of cannibalism to the best product of centuries
of civilization, education, and self-government, all with equal rights
in our Senate and representation according to population in our House,
with an equal voice in shaping our national destinies--that would, at
least in this stage of the world, be humanitarianism run mad, a
degeneration and degradation of the homogeneous, continental Republic
of our pride too preposterous for the contemplation of serious and
intelligent men. Quite as well might Great Britain now invite the
swarming millions of India to send rajas and members of the lower
House, in proportion to population, to swamp the Lords and Commons and
rule the English people. If it had been supposed that even Hawaii, with
its overwhelming preponderance of Kanakas and Asiatics, would become a
State, she could not have been annexed. If the territories we are
conquering must become States, we might better renounce them at once
and place them under the protectorate of some humane and friendly
European Power with less nonsense in its blood.
This is not to deny them the freest and most liberal institutions they
are capable of sustaining. The people of Sitka and the Aleutian Islands
enjoy the blessings of ordered liberty and free institutions, but
nobody dreams of admitting them to Statehood. New Mexico has belonged
to us for half a century, not only without oppression, but with all the
local self-government for which she was prepared; yet, though an
integral part of our continent, surrounded by States, and with an
adequate population, she is still not admitted to Statehood. Why should
not the people on the island of Porto Rico, or even of Cuba, prosper
and be happy for the next century under a rule similar in the main to
that under which their kinsmen of New Mexico have prospered for the
last half-century?
With some necessary modifications, the territorial form of government
which we have tried so successfully from the beginning of the Union is
well adapted to the best of such communities. It secures local
self-government, equality before the law, upright courts, ample power
for order and defense, and such control by Congress as gives security
against the mistakes or excesses of people new to the exercise of these
rights.
[Sidenote: Will the Constitution Permit Withholding Statehood?]
But such a system, we are told, is contrary to our Constitution and to
the spirit of our institutions. Why? We have had just that system ever
since the Constitution was framed. It is true that a large part of the
territory thus governed has now been admitted into the Union in the
form of new States. But it is not true that this was recognized at the
beginning as a right, or even generally contemplated as a probability;
nor is it true that it has been the purpose or expectation of those who
annexed foreign territory to the United States, like the Louisiana or
the Gadsden Purchase, that it would all be carved into States. That
feature of the marvelous development of the continent has come as a
surprise to this generation and the last, and would have been
absolutely incredible to the men of Thomas Jefferson's time. Obviously,
then, it could not have been the purpose for which, before that date,
our territorial system was devised. It is not clear that the founders
of the Government expected even all the territory we possessed at the
outset to be made into States. Much of it was supposed to be worthless
and uninhabitable. But it is certain that they planned for outside
accessions. Even in the Articles of Confederation they provided for the
admission of Canada and of British colonies which included Jamaica as
well as Nova Scotia. Madison, in referring to this, construes it as
meaning that they contemplated only the admission of these colonies as
colonies, not the eventual establishment of new States ("Federalist,"
No. 43). About the same time Hamilton was dwelling on the alarms of
those who thought the country already too large, and arguing that great
size was a safeguard against ambitious rulers.
Nevertheless, the objectors still argue, the Constitution gives no
positive warrant for a permanent territorial policy. But it does!
Ordinarily it may be assumed that what the framers of the Constitution
immediately proceeded to do under it was intended by them to be
warranted by it; and we have seen that they immediately devised and
maintained a territorial system for the government of territory which
they had no expectation of ever converting into States. The case,
however, is even plainer than that. The sole reference in the
Constitution to the territories of the United States is in Article IV,
Section 3: "The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other
property belonging to the United States." Jefferson revised his first
views far enough to find warrant for acquiring territory; but here is
explicit, unmistakable authority conferred for dealing with it, and
with other "property," precisely as Congress chooses. The territory was
not a present or prospective party in interest in the Union created
under this organic act. It was "property," to be disposed of or ruled
and regulated as Congress might determine. The inhabitants of the
territory were not consulted; there was no provision that they should
even be guaranteed a republican form of government like the States;
they were secured no right of representation and given no vote. So,
too, when it came to acquiring new territory, there was no thought of
consulting the inhabitants. Mr. Jefferson did not ask the citizens of
Louisiana to consent to their annexation, nor did Mr. Monroe submit
such a question to the Spaniards of Florida, nor Mr. Polk to the
Mexicans of California, nor Mr. Pierce to the New Mexicans, nor Mr.
Johnson to the Russians and Aleuts of Alaska. The power of the
Government to deal with territory, foreign or domestic, precisely as it
chooses was understood from the beginning to be absolute; and at no
stage in our whole history have we hesitated to exercise it. The
question of permanently holding the Philippines or any other conquered
territory as territory is not, and cannot be made, one of
constitutional right; it is one solely of national duty and of national
policy.
[Sidenote: Does the Monroe Doctrine Interfere?]
As a last resort, it is maintained that even if the Constitution does
not forbid, the Monroe Doctrine does. But the famous declaration of Mr.
Monroe on which reliance is placed does not warrant this conclusion.
After holding that "the American continents, by the free and
independent condition which they have assumed and maintained, are
henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by
any European Power," Mr. Monroe continued: "We should consider any
attempt on their part to extend their system to any part of this
hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing
colonies or dependencies of any European Power we have not interfered,
and shall not interfere." The context makes it clear that this
assurance applies solely to the existing colonies and dependencies they
still had in this hemisphere; and that even this was qualified by the
previous warning that while we took no part "in the wars of European
Powers, in matters relating to themselves," we resented injuries and
defended our rights. It will thus be seen that Mr. Monroe gave no
pledge that we would never interfere with any dependency or colony of
European Powers anywhere. He simply declared our general policy not to
interfere with existing colonies still remaining to them on our coast,
so long as they left the countries alone which had already gained their
independence, and so long as they did not injure us or invade our
rights. And even this statement of the scope of Mr. Monroe's
declaration must be construed in the light of the fact that the same
Administration which promulgated the Monroe Doctrine had already issued
from the State Department Mr. Adams's prediction, above referred to,
that "the annexation of Cuba will yet be found indispensable." Perhaps
Mr. Monroe's language might have been properly understood as a general
assurance that we would not meddle in Europe so long as they gave us no
further trouble in America; but certainly it did not also abandon to
their exclusive jurisdiction Asia and Africa and the islands of the
sea.
[Sidenote: The Necessary Outcome.]
The candid conclusions seem inevitable that, not as a matter of policy,
but as a necessity of the position in which we find ourselves and as a
matter of national duty, we must hold Cuba, at least for a time and
till a permanent government is well established for which we can afford
to be responsible; we must hold Porto Rico; and we may have to hold the
Philippines.
The war is a great sorrow, and to many these results of it will seem
still more mournful. They cannot be contemplated with unmixed
confidence by any; and to all who think, they must be a source of some
grave apprehensions. Plainly, this unwelcome war is leading us by ways
we have not trod to an end we cannot surely forecast. On the other
hand, there are some good things coming from it that we can already
see. It will make an end forever of Spain in this hemisphere. It will
certainly secure to Cuba and Porto Rico better government. It will
furnish an enormous outlet for the energy of our citizens, and give
another example of the rapid development to which our system leads. It
has already brought North and South together as nothing could but a
foreign war in which both offered their blood for the cause of their
reunited country--a result of incalculable advantage both at home and
abroad. It has brought England and the United States together--another
result of momentous importance in the progress of civilization and
Christianity. Europe will know us better henceforth; even Spain will
know us better; and this knowledge should tend powerfully hereafter to
keep the peace of the world. The war should abate the swaggering,
swash-buckler tendency of many of our public men, since it has shown
our incredible unreadiness at the outset for meeting even a third-rate
Power; and it must secure us henceforth an army and navy less
ridiculously inadequate to our exposure. It insures us a mercantile
marine. It insures the Nicaragua Canal, a Pacific cable, great
development on our Pacific coast, and the mercantile control of the
Pacific Ocean. It imposes new and very serious business on our public
men, which ought to dignify and elevate the public service. Finally, it
has shown such splendid courage and skill in the Army and Navy, such
sympathy at home for our men at the front, and such devoted eagerness,
especially among women, to alleviate suffering and humanize the
struggle, as to thrill every patriotic heart and make us all prouder
than ever of our country and its matchless people.
II
WAS IT TOO GOOD A TREATY?
This speech was made at a dinner given in New York by the Lotos Club in
honor of Mr. Reid, who had been its president for fourteen years prior
to his first diplomatic service abroad in 1889. It was the first public
utterance by any one of the Peace Commissioners after the ratification
of the Treaty of Paris.
Among the many letters of regret at the dinner, the following, from the
Secretary of State and from his predecessor, were given to the public:
WASHINGTON, D.C., February 9, 1899.
_To John Elderkin, Lotos Club, New York:_
I received your note in due time, and had hoped until now to be
able to come and join you in doing honor to my life-long friend,
the Hon. Whitelaw Reid; but the pressure of official engagements
here has made it impossible for me to do so. I shall be with you in
spirit, and shall applaud to the best that can be said in praise of
one who, in a life of remarkable variety of achievement, has
honored every position he has held.
Faithfully yours,
JOHN HAY.
CANTON, OHIO, February 8, 1899.
_To Chester S. Lord, Lotos Club, New York:_
I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your invitation to attend the
dinner to be given to the Hon. Whitelaw Reid on the evening of the
11th inst. Nothing would afford me more pleasure than to join the
members of the Lotos Club in doing honor to Mr. Reid. It is a
source of much regret that circumstances compel me to forego the
privilege. His high character and worth, leadership in the best
journalism of the day, eminent services, and wide experience long
since gave him an honorable place among his contemporaries. The
Commission to negotiate the treaty concluded at Paris on December
10 had no more valued member. His fellow-Commissioners were
fortunate in being able to avail themselves of Mr. Reid's wide
acquaintance with the leading statesmen and diplomats residing in
Paris. His presence as a member of the Commission rendered
unnecessary any further introduction to those who had known him as
our Minister to France. He gave to the work of the Commission in
unstinted measure the benefit of his wisdom in council, judgment,
and skill in the preparation and presentation of the American case
at Paris. Permit me to join you in congratulations and best wishes
to Mr. Reid, and to express the hope that there are in store for
him many more years of usefulness and honor.
Very truly yours,
WILLIAM R. DAY.
WAS IT TOO GOOD A TREATY?
Obviously the present occasion has no narrow or merely personal
meaning. It comes to me only because I had the good fortune, through
the friendly partiality of the President of the United States, to be
associated with a great work in which you took a patriotic interest,
and over the ratification of which you use this means of expressing
your satisfaction. It was a happy thing for us to be able to bring back
peace to our own land, and happier still to find that our treaty is
accepted by the Senate and the people as one that guards the honor and
protects the interests of the country. Only so should a nation like
ours make peace at all.
Come, Peace, not like a mourner bowed
For honor lost and dear ones wasted,
But proud, to meet a people proud,
With eyes that tell of triumph tasted.
I shall make no apology--now that the Senate has unsealed our lips--for
speaking briefly of this work just happily completed.
The only complaint one hears about it is that we did our duty too
well--that, in fact, we made peace on terms too favorable to our own
country. In all the pending discussion there seems to be no other fault
found. On no other point is the treaty said by any one to be seriously
defective.
It loyally carried out the attitude of Congress as to Cuba. It enforced
the renunciation of Spanish sovereignty there, but, in spite of the
most earnest Spanish efforts, it refused to accept American
sovereignty. It loaded neither ourselves nor the Cubans with the
so-called Cuban debts, incurred by Spain in the efforts to subdue them.
It involved us in no complications, either in the West Indies or in the
East, as to contracts or claims or religious establishments. It dealt
liberally with a fallen foe--giving him a generous lump sum that more
than covered any legitimate debts or expenditures for pacific
improvements; assuming the burden of just claims against him by our own
people; carrying back the armies surrendered on the other side of the
world at our own cost; returning their arms; even restoring them their
artillery, including heavy ordnance in field fortifications, munitions
of war, and the very cattle that dragged their caissons. It secured
alike for Cubans and Filipinos the release of political prisoners. It
scrupulously reserved for Congress the power of determining the
political status of the inhabitants of our new possessions. It declared
on behalf of the most Protectionist country in the world for the policy
of the Open Door within its Asiatic sphere of influence.
With all this the Senate and the country seemed content. But the treaty
refused to return to Spanish rule one foot of territory over which that
rule had been broken by the triumphs of our arms.
Were we to be reproached for that? Should the Senate have told us: "You
overdid this business; you looked after the interests of your own
country too thoroughly. You ought to have abandoned the great
archipelago which the fortunes of war had placed at your country's
disposal. You are not exactly unfaithful servants; you are too blindly,
unswervingly faithful. You haven't seized an opportunity to run away
from some distant results of the war into which Congress plunged the
country before dreaming how far it might spread. You haven't dodged for
us the responsibilities we incurred."
That is true. When Admiral Dewey sank the Spanish fleet, and General
Merritt captured the Spanish army that alone maintained the Spanish
hold on the Philippines, the Spanish power there was gone; and the
civilization and the common sense and the Christianity of the world
looked to the power that succeeded it to accept its responsibilities.
So we took the Philippines. How could men representing this country,
jealous of its honor, or with an adequate comprehension either of its
duty or its rights, do otherwise?
A nation at war over a disputed boundary or some other material
interest might properly stop when that interest was secured, and give
back to the enemy all else that had been taken from him. But this was
not a war for any material interest. It was a war to put down a rule
over an alien people, which we declared so barbarous that we could no
longer tolerate it. How could we consent to secure peace, after we had
broken down this barbarous rule in two archipelagos, by agreeing that
one of them should be forced back under it?
There was certainly another alternative. After destroying the only
organized government in the archipelago, the only security for life and
property, native and foreign, in great commercial centers like Manila,
Iloilo, and Cebu, against hordes of uncivilized pagans and Mohammedan
Malays, should we then scuttle out and leave them to their fate? A band
of old-time Norse pirates, used to swooping down on a capital,
capturing its rulers, seizing its treasure, burning the town,
abandoning the people to domestic disorder and foreign spoliation, and
promptly sailing off for another piratical foray--such a band of
pirates might, no doubt, have left Manila to be sacked by the
insurgents, while it fled from the Philippines. We did not think a
self-respecting, civilized, responsible Christian Power could.
[Sidenote: Indemnity.]
There was another side to it. In a conflict to which fifty years of
steadily increasing provocation had driven us we had lost 266 sailors
on the _Maine_; had lost at Santiago and elsewhere uncounted victims of
Spanish guns and tropical climates; and had spent in this war over
$240,000,000, without counting the pensions that must still accrue
under laws existing when it began. Where was the indemnity that, under
such circumstances, it is the duty of the victorious nation to exact,
not only in its own interest, but in the interest of a Christian
civilization and the tendencies of modern International Law, which
require that a nation provoking unjust war shall smart for it, not
merely while it lasts, but by paying the cost when it is ended? Spain
had no money even to pay her own soldiers. No indemnity was possible,
save in territory. Well, we once wanted to buy Cuba, before it had
been desolated by twelve years of war and decimated by Weyler; yet
our uttermost offer for it, our highest valuation even then, was
$125,000,000--less than half the cost of our war. But now we were
precluded from taking Cuba. Porto Rico, immeasurably less important to
us, and eight hundred miles farther away from our coast, is only one
twelfth the size of Cuba. Were the representatives of the United
States, charged with the duty of protecting not only its honor, but its
interests, in arranging terms of peace, to content themselves with
little Porto Rico, away off a third of the way to Spain, plus the petty
reef of Guam, in the middle of the Pacific, as indemnity for an
unprovoked war that had cost and was to cost their country
$300,000,000?
[Sidenote: The Trouble they Give--are they Worth it?]
But, some one exclaims, the Philippines are already giving us more
trouble than they are worth! It is natural to say so just now, and it
is partly true. What they are worth and likely to be worth to this
country in the race for commercial supremacy on the Pacific--that is to
say, for supremacy in the great development of trade in the Twentieth
Century--is a question too large to be so summarily decided, or to be
entered on at the close of a dinner, and under the irritation of a
Malay half-breed's folly. But nobody ever doubted that they would give
us trouble. That is the price nations must pay for going to war, even
in a just cause. I was not one of those who were eager to begin this
war with Spain; but I protest against any attempt to evade our just
responsibility in the position in which it has left us. We shall have
trouble in the Philippines. So we shall have trouble in Cuba and in
Porto Rico. If we dawdle, and hesitate, and lead them to think we fear
them and fear trouble, our trouble will be great. If, on the other
hand, we grasp this nettle danger, if we act promptly, with inexorable
vigor and with justice, it may be slight. At any rate, the more serious
the crisis the plainer our path. God give us the courage to purify our
politics and strengthen our Government to meet these new and grave
duties!
III
PURPORT OF THE TREATY
This speech was made, two days after the preceding one, on the
invitation of the Marquette Club of Chicago, at the dinner of six
hundred which it gave in the Auditorium Hotel, February 13, 1899, in
honor of Lincoln's birthday.
PURPORT OF THE TREATY
Beyond the Alleghanies the American voice rings clear and true. It does
not sound, here in Chicago, as if you favored the pursuit of partizan
aims in great questions of foreign policy, or division among our own
people in the face of insurgent guns turned upon our soldiers on the
distant fields to which we sent them. We are all here, it would seem,
to stand by the peace that has been secured, even if we have to fight
for it.
Neither has any reproach come from Chicago to the Peace Commissioners
because, when intrusted with your interests in a great negotiation in a
foreign capital, they made a settlement on terms too favorable to their
own country--because in bringing home peace with honor they also
brought home more property than some of our people wanted! When that
reproach has been urged elsewhere, it has recalled the familiar defense
against a similar complaint in an old political contest. There might,
it was said, be some serious disadvantages about a surplus in the
national Treasury; but, at any rate, it was easier to deal with a
surplus than with a deficit! If we have brought back too much, that is
only a question for Congress and our voters. If we had brought back too
little, it might have been again a question for the Army and the Navy.
No one of you has ever been heard to find fault with an agent because
in making a difficult settlement he got all you wanted, and a free
option on something further that everybody else wanted! Do you know of
any other civilized nation of the first or even of the second class
that wouldn't jump at that option on the Philippines? Ask Russia. Ask
Germany. Ask Japan. Ask England or France. Ask little Belgium![1] And
yet, what one of them, unless it be Japan, has any conceivable interest
in the Philippines to be compared with that of the mighty Republic
which now commands the one side of the Pacific, and, unless this
American generation is blinder to opportunity than any of its
predecessors, will soon command the other?
[1] At this time it was still a secret that among the many
intrigues afoot during the negotiations at Paris was one for the
transfer of the Philippines to Belgium. But for the perfectly
correct attitude of King Leopold, it might have had a chance to
succeed, or at least to make trouble.
Put yourselves for a moment in our place on the Quai d'Orsay. Would you
really have had your representatives in Paris, the guardians of your
honor in negotiating peace with your enemy, declare that while Spanish
rule in the West Indies was so barbarous that it was our duty to
destroy it, we were now so eager for peace that for its sake we were
willing in the East to reëstablish that same barbarous rule? Or would
you have had your agents in Paris, the guardians also of your material
interests, throw away all chance for indemnity for a war that began
with the loss of 266 American sailors on the _Maine_, and had cost
your Treasury during the year over $240,000,000? Would you have had
them throw away a magnificent foothold for the trade of the farther
East, which the fortune of war had placed in your hand, throw away a
whole archipelago of boundless possibilities, economic and strategic,
throw away the opportunity of centuries for your country? Would you
have had them, on their own responsibility, then and there decide this
question for all time, and absolutely refuse to reserve it for the
decision of Congress and of the American people, to whom that decision
belongs, and who have the right to an opportunity first for its
deliberate consideration?
[Sidenote: Some Features in the Treaty.]
Your toast is to the "Achievements of American Diplomacy." Not such
were its achievements under your earlier statesmen; not such has been
its work under the instructions of your State Department, from John
Quincy Adams on down the honored line; and not such the work your
representatives brought back to you from Paris.
They were dealing with a nation with whom it has never been easy to
make peace, even when war was no longer possible; but they secured a
peace treaty without a word that compromises the honor or endangers the
interests of the country.
They scrupulously reserved for your own decision, through your Congress
or at the polls, the question of political status and civil rights for
the inhabitants of your new possessions.
They resisted adroit Spanish efforts for special privileges and
guaranties for their established church, and pledged the United States
to absolute freedom in the exercise of their religion for all these
recent Spanish subjects--pagan, Mohammedan, Confucian, or Christian.