Ethics is the science of morals. Morals may be said to consist of two
very distinct factors, which we will attempt to analyse:――
1. An instinctive sense, the conscience, sense of duty, or ethical
impulse, which says to us: “This shalt thou do, and that shalt thou
leave undone.” A person in whom it is highly developed experiences
satisfaction if he obeys the “voice of conscience,” and remorse if he
fails to do so.
2. The second factor of morals includes the objects of conscience, that
is, the things which conscience commands or forbids.
The great philosopher Kant founded upon the instinct of conscience
his Categorical Imperative, and held the further investigation of its
causes to be unnecessary. If the conscience says “Thou shalt,” one
must simply act accordingly. This is, in Kant’s opinion, the absolute
moral law, which bids or forbids an action independently of any other
consideration.
The further they progress, however, the more do reason and science
rebel against the conception of the Categorical Imperative. Kant,
great as he was, was not infallible. The imperative of the conscience
is in itself no more categorical and absolute than that of the sexual
impulse, of fear, of maternal love, or of other emotions and instincts.
In the first place daily observation shows us the existence of people
born conscienceless, in whom the sense of duty is lacking, who are
aware of no “Thou shalt,” and in whose eyes other individuals are
merely welcome objects for plunder or inconvenient hindrances. For
these “ethically defective” persons there can be no categorical
imperative, because they have no conception of duty.
The ethical sense may exist in varying degrees of intensity. In some
persons the conscience is weak, in others strong; and there are cases
in which it is developed to an exaggerated and morbid extent. People of
this type suffer pangs of conscience over the merest trifle, reproach
themselves for “sins” which they have never committed, or which are no
sins at all, and make themselves and others miserable. How can all this
be reconciled with the absolute moral law as stated by Kant?
The theory of the Categorical Imperative becomes even more absurd when
we consider the actions to which men are guided by their consciences.
The same habit――the drinking of wine, for instance――may be for one
man a matter of duty (for a Christian at the Eucharist or for an
officer at the toast of the King); for another (the Mohammedan) it
may be forbidden as a deadly sin. Murder, which is certainly almost
universally prohibited by conscience, is a “duty” in time of war,
and even for certain persons in the duel. Such instances could be
multiplied indefinitely.
We will presently state the profounder reasons which prove Kant’s
error; but we must first mention another source of pretended ethical
commandments. The _religions_ exhibit a remarkable medley of various
products of human mystical phantasy and human emotions which have
crystallised and formed themselves into legends and dogmas, and these
latter have become interwoven with human morals in such a fashion that
they seem at first inextricable.
The instinct of fear and the lust for power, the hypertrophy of the
Ego and the ethical sentiments have here intermingled in a thousand
different ways. More especially we may mention the fear of the unknown,
of darker powers, and of death; the expansion of the beloved Ego, which
becomes idealised in the conception of godhead, and then immortalised;
the feelings of sympathy, antipathy and duty towards other individuals,
and so forth. The mysterious powers which move the universe are then
conceived as anthropomorphic (personal) gods, or as one such God.
The next stage is the attribution of godlike qualities to man,
which flatters his vanity considerably, and gives him a sense of
satisfaction.
As a result of this habit of thought, and assisted by the hallucinations
of highly imaginative, hysterical, or insane individuals, there have
developed the various conceptions of a direct intercourse between the
Godhead and man. Hypnotism and psychiatry, in the respective cases of
the sane and the insane, teach us how extraordinarily sensitive the
human brain is to such impressions.
In this way the legendary revelations, according to which God has
manifested himself directly and personally to certain individuals,
and dictated to them commandments for the guidance of Humanity, have
resulted.
In this, and in no other way, has come into existence the social
tyranny of religious dogmas. Certain men have made God in their
own image, and have, in the course of centuries, imposed their own
handiwork upon whole nations, mainly by means of the organising
ability of their more ambitious successors. Even to-day such prophets
frequently arise, both within and without the walls of lunatic
asylums. Each one declares that he alone possesses the true revelation.
The divine injunctions vary considerably according to the different
religions, and are often mutually contradictory. Among them are
commandments relating to the Godhead which have nothing to do with
natural moral law, and yet are amalgamated with it. Some of these are
from the human point of view frankly immoral. Many, on the other hand,
represent the precepts of a more or less suitable moral code, which
varies according to the personal views of the founder of the religion.
The Koran ordains polygamy and forbids the use of wine, while modern
Christianity allows the latter and ordains monogamy. Both Moses and
Mohammed, however, regard woman as subordinate to man, and as his
private property; a view which contradicts a higher and at the same
time a more natural moral law.
Mental science has now the hardihood to maintain, Kant and the
religious dogmas notwithstanding, that the moral law is completely
accessible to its investigations; that true human ethics can be founded
upon human nature alone; that the dogmas and commandments of pretended
revelation serve only to check a progressively higher development
of morals; and that the dogma which holds out promises of heaven or
threats of hell in the hereafter is in its effect actually immoral,
inasmuch as it seeks to regulate the moral conduct of men by purely
selfish motives――by the aid of a bill of exchange upon the future life,
so to speak.
* * * * *
In order to understand natural human ethics we must consider its
natural source, that is to say, the origin of the sense of duty or
social conscience.
The sense of duty is, as an inclination, inborn, and therefore
hereditary. It can indeed be developed or dulled by education, but it
cannot be acquired; and only diseases of the brain can destroy it where
it once clearly exists. What is actually inculcated or acquired, as
the case may be, is not the conscience, but the object towards which
it is directed, as is the case with the feeling of shame or modesty.
Just as the European woman is ashamed to exhibit her bare legs, but not
her face, while with the Turkish woman the reverse holds true, so the
objects of the conscience, according to acquired local customs, can
be absolutely opposed to one another, or at least very different in
their nature. They have, however, for the most part certain features
in common, which are suited to the requirements of human nature. The
reason for this we shall see below.
* * * * *
From what does conscience, or the sense of duty, arise? First of all
from a conflict between two groups of instinctive emotions allied with
instinctive impulses: (1) the group of so-called egoistic feelings and
impulses, directed towards self-preservation and self-gratification;
and (2) the group of sympathetic or altruistic impulses directed
towards the preservation and well-being of others.
If I feel sympathy or love for a person, an animal, or an object, I
suffer personally and feel displeasure as soon as the object of my
sympathy suffers or is endangered. Hence the words compassion and
sympathy (suffering with). I therefore seek to help the object of my
sympathy, to save him even at the risk of personal injury; and thence
the conflict arises. If my egotism triumphs I do not come to his aid,
or at most only do so if I risk nothing thereby. If, on the other hand,
my sense of sympathy is victorious, I sacrifice myself.
In the former instance I experience a feeling of dissatisfaction, the
feeling of neglected duty and of remorse; in the latter I have the
pleasurable sensation of duty fulfilled. And yet the nature of the
object matters little. Only the intensity of the sympathy, together
with the individual development of the conscience, determine the
intensity of the sense of duty in any given case. An insane person
can feel the most vehement sense of duty or remorse without any real
object, or as the result of entirely perverted conceptions.
As every living creature, particularly if it possesses a separate
nervous system, has the instinct of self-preservation, the conscience
therefore results directly from the conflict between this instinct
and the secondary emotions of altruistic sympathy. These latter are
of later origin, and have for the most part been evolved from the
attraction between the sexes (sexual love), or from the relationship of
parents to the offspring dependent upon them (parental love).
The first feelings of duty and of sympathy in the animal kingdom are
therefore confined to the family, and adapted to the preservation
of the species. They are also exclusive, and may only persist for
a short time (as in the case of cats), but frequently they are of
lifelong duration. The conjugal fidelity of certain apes and parrots is
exemplary.
But the necessity of protection against common foes brought about
in the case of many animals a ripening of the sense of sympathy,
and it became extended to whole groups, so that here and there free
communities (swallows, buffaloes, monkeys) have resulted. Finally
certain species have developed the senses of sympathy and duty to such
an extent that they have led to a complete anarchistic Socialism, as
is the case among wasps, bees, and ants. Here the social sense has so
far overcome both egotism and altruism limited to a few individuals
that it wholly dominates them. The individual devotes his whole energy
and labour to the communal existence, and even sacrifices his life for
this object. He never, however, sacrifices his life for another single
member of the community, unless the latter is of primary importance for
the maintenance of the species. One worker-bee does not immolate itself
for another, but does so without hesitation for the queen and the hive.
It will even empty the whole contents of its stomach into the queen
bee’s mouth and starve in order to save her. The altruism of the ants
and the bees knows nothing of family affection or sexual love; it is
confined absolutely to the hive or nest. Different beehives or ants’
nests are either inimical or indifferent to one another.
Nearer to man stand the higher mammals. Every one is aware of the
sentiments of sympathy and duty in the dog, for instance. In man
himself these affections are pre-eminently domestic, as may be seen in
the love of mother and child, husband and wife, father and son, and in
all the obligations thus contracted. But they also have a considerable
tendency to extend to other intimate objects or persons with whom the
individual frequently comes into contact――to friends, animals, etc.
We can also observe this inclination among bees and ants, where
strangers are received into the hive or nest after a short period
of familiarisation. But among mankind the tendency always maintains
a strongly individual character. The result is on the one hand a
grouping into communities, such as castes, tribes, and nations; and on
the other a host of individual friendships and enmities.
This fundamentally individual character of the human sense of sympathy
rests primarily upon the fact that our nearest ancestors in the animal
world, the parents of the existing anthropoid apes, were domestic
and solitary, while our primeval ancestors lived in numberless tiny
communities, inimical to one another.
In this way there appeared among mankind instinctive and exclusive
impulses of sympathy and of duty, combined with intensely selfish
predatory desires. The extraordinary complexity of the human brain
is responsible for the strange many-sidedness of character which
resulted. For example, crime and heroism developed side by side; child
murder, parricide, rapine and robbery, slavery, war, and in particular
the vilest subjugation of woman as an article of commerce or a beast
of burden――these represent the fruits of egotism and its attendant
cunning and meanness. On the other hand we see self-sacrifice, valour,
heroic martyrdom, patriotism, sense of justice, asceticism, pity for
the weak, and persistent labour for the family and the State, resulting
as the fruits of the instinct of sympathy and the social sense.
The primitive sense of duty, which arose from direct assistance
rendered to the object of sympathy, is now being enlarged by a higher
racial and individual development, and is, indeed, resolving itself
into a universal inclination to subdue egoistic instincts and passions.
If from a sense of duty I do something which is wearisome or dangerous,
it is for the most part no longer out of direct sympathy with the
particular object. The primeval impulse (which led to conflict)
is becoming independent, and is taking the form of a higher and
secondary instinct, tending towards the suppression of baser desires
and weaknesses. And yet it is necessary, in order to prevent the
degeneration of this instinct, that the objects towards which it is
directed shall be ever more adequately and better suited to the social
welfare of the community.
* * * * *
From the above brief sketch, which is based upon the theory of
evolution and the researches of science, it is clear as the day that
moral laws can only be relative. They were always relative to the
family, to the tribe, to the fatherland; they must become relative
to mankind. The racial (that is, inherited and instinctive) social
sense in man is unfortunately very variable in individual cases. In
the average it is extremely weak and chiefly directed towards a few
individuals. Moreover, as the result of centuries of bad habits and
ancient prejudices, its objects are falsely or unsuitably taught in
process of educating children. Instead of the child’s sense of duty
being directed to the necessity of labour and social sacrifice for
mankind as a whole and posterity in particular, it is directed towards
false codes of honour, local patriotism, family exclusiveness, private
property, pretended divine commandments, and so forth.
The Earth is small, and human intercourse becomes more extensive every
year; the union of all civilised peoples into a single great civilised
community is _inevitable_. Ethics must, therefore, as far as reason
permits, be directed towards this object. We require animals and plants
in order to live, so that we can further extend our altruism at most
to a moderate protection of other animals, if we are to avoid injury
to our own race. We may remark in passing that the altruism of many
lovers of animals, who prefer their favourite pets to human beings and
to the social welfare, is typical of the exclusiveness and stupidity of
misdirected impulses of sympathy.
Morality must therefore in the future consist of a common social
impulse――it must itself become social. This impulse must overthrow not
only egotism, but also the exclusiveness of individual sympathies. We
are still, alas, far from this goal! The family is often a thieves’
kitchen; patriotism is a prolific parent of wars; while communities and
societies, however noble their objects may be, readily degenerate into
petty sects and cliques.
And now comes yet another difficulty, namely, the frequent lack of
harmony between the ethical motives which inspire an action and its
real moral value.
“Ich bin
Ein Theil von jener Kraft
Die stets das Böse will
Und stets das Gute schafft,”
says Mephistopheles in Goethe’s _Faust_.[B] Let us say often instead
of always, and mention also that other Power which often wills the
good and yet does the evil, and we have the well-known picture of
the intelligent, ambitious egotist, who, without any sense of duty,
achieves great and good results; and that of the foolish, infatuated
altruist, who devotes the whole might of his zeal for duty to the
service of socially pernicious forces!
[B] “I am a part of that power which always wills the evil and always
does the good.”
* * * * *
As a result of exaggerating the above-mentioned phenomena certain
theorists have imagined that ethics can be founded upon pure egotism.
But this is a mistake. Without the altruistic impulses of sympathy
and duty among its individual members no common social existence can
thrive; on the contrary, it must degenerate.
The power of the emotions in man is much too strong to allow of any
other result. Any one who imagines that he is completely master of his
emotions makes, if possible, a still greater mistake than one who avows
that he has never lied, or that his actions are governed by free-will.
All human morality is bound up with these impulses and emotions.
Socialism, for instance, will become moral, or else it will not come
to pass. Without the support of the social conscience of mankind it
cannot become moral. Every effort must therefore be directed towards
strengthening the social conscience.
The falsity of the theory of absolute good and evil is demonstrated by
the whole disposition of a world in which living creatures are designed
to prey upon one another. When a spider devours a fly it is good for
the spider and bad for the fly. The ethical value of the act itself is
therefore purely relative.
It is just the same with human ethics. To attempt to explain all the
evil in the world by the sin of Adam is to attribute a miserable
incapacity to God. The same holds true of the attempts of certain
modern Protestants to set up the dogma of a progressive revelation,
in order to bring the older dogmas into harmony with the theory of
evolution and descent. All these halting exegeses are only new models
of the artificial drags which theology seeks to impose upon the free
research of science.
Altruism and egotism stand only in relative opposition. Among ants
and bees they are instinctively adjusted to one another with wonderful
harmony, and are rarely, if ever, found in conflict. This result
can and must be striven after by mankind, however great may be the
difficulties presented by our hereditary nature. For its achievement a
harmonious co-operation of the hereditary social conscience with reason
and knowledge is absolutely necessary.
I must briefly mention two other points. Firstly, morality and social
or race hygiene become one and the same thing directly we include in
our conception of hygiene a healthy condition of the brain or soul,
and subordinate the individual hygiene to that of society in general.
Then everything socially unhygienic is immoral, and everything immoral
socially unhygienic. If, for instance, I ruin a healthy, active member
of society, in order possibly to achieve the salvation of an incurably
diseased criminal, I am committing, although from altruistic motives,
an act which is injurious from the point of view both of ethics and
social hygiene, and therefore evil and immoral.
Secondly, the boundaries of jurisprudence and of ethics are by no means
clear. Jurisprudence is more narrowly confined. It has no right to lay
claim to or to pass a verdict upon everything which ethics may discover
or attain. Laws and the constraint they imply are a necessary evil,
a crutch for the lame and defective social conscience. They must be
reduced to an indispensable minimum. The ethical and social instincts,
on the other hand, can never be too highly developed. Humanity must
gradually develop in the future to such a point that jurisprudence may
be completely replaced by an instinctive and inculcated social impulse.
“Es erben sich Gesetz und Rechte
Wie eine ew’ge Krankheit fort.”[C]
[C] “Laws and statutes pass on in heritage, like an eternal
disease.”――Goethe, _Faust_.
In order now properly to understand our actual subject, viz. sexual
ethics, we must state the fact that an action, as well as the motives
which inspire it, may be either (1) _ethically positive_, i.e. good;
(2) _ethically negative_, i.e. evil; or (3) _ethically indifferent_,
i.e. without any relation to morals.
In their relationship to morals an action and its motive may be
completely independent of one another, as we have already seen.
We must further note that there are various degrees of duty, and that
from this cause conflicts may arise. There are duties towards one’s
self, which serve to increase the worth, and particularly the social
worth, of the individual by self-culture and education. In these days
of effeminate culture it is too often forgotten that self-discipline
and restraint, and even a certain degree of asceticism, fit the
individual for freedom and happiness, while the craving for pleasure
makes him useless and dependent.
Then there are duties towards the family and those nearer to us,
towards the State, towards existing Humanity, and towards posterity.
This last duty is the highest of all. Everything that we enjoy to-day
in culture and knowledge we owe to the toil, the suffering, and often
the martyrdom of our forefathers. Our most sacred duty is, therefore,
to secure for our descendants a loftier, happier and worthier existence
than our own.
Speaking generally, a rational system of morals must subordinate the
welfare of the individual to that of the community at large. A man who
is unprejudiced and possesses the ethical and social instinct will
therefore hold it as a principle first of all to do no man any injury;
then to develop his own individuality as highly as possible, which will
be both for his own good and that of the community; and as far as in
him lies to be of service to others and to Humanity.