CHAPTER III.

THE ESSAYS

OF

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER

TRANSLATED BY

T. BAILEY SAUNDERS, M.A.

COUNSELS AND MAXIMS.

_Le bonheur n'est pas chose aisée: il est

très difficile de le trouver en nous, et impossible

de le trouver ailleurs_.

CHAMFORT.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER

INTRODUCTION

I. GENERAL RULES

II. OUR RELATION TO OURSELVES

III. OUR RELATION TO OTHERS

IV. WORLDLY FORTUNE

V. THE AGES OF LIFE

INTRODUCTION.

If my object in these pages were to present a complete scheme of

counsels and maxims for the guidance of life, I should have to repeat

the numerous rules--some of them excellent--which have been drawn

up by thinkers of all ages, from Theognis and Solomon[1] down to La

Rochefoucauld; and, in so doing, I should inevitably entail upon the

reader a vast amount of well-worn commonplace. But the fact is that in

this work I make still less claim to exhaust my subject than in any

other of my writings.

[Footnote 1: I refer to the proverbs and maxims ascribed, in the Old

Testament, to the king of that name.]

An author who makes no claims to completeness must also, in a great

measure, abandon any attempt at systematic arrangement. For his double

loss in this respect, the reader may console himself by reflecting

that a complete and systematic treatment of such a subject as the

guidance of life could hardly fail to be a very wearisome business.

I have simply put down those of my thoughts which appear to be worth

communicating--thoughts which, as far as I know, have not been

uttered, or, at any rate, not just in the same form, by any one else;

so that my remarks may be taken as a supplement to what has been

already achieved in the immense field.

However, by way of introducing some sort of order into the great

variety of matters upon which advice will be given in the following

pages, I shall distribute what I have to say under the following

heads: (1) general rules; (2) our relation to ourselves; (3) our

relation to others; and finally, (4) rules which concern our manner of

life and our worldly circumstances. I shall conclude with some remarks

on the changes which the various periods of life produce in us.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL RULES.--SECTION 1.

The first and foremost rule for the wise conduct of life seems to me

to be contained in a view to which Aristotle parenthetically refers in

the _Nichomachean Ethics_:[1] [Greek: o phronimoz to alupon dioke e ou

to aedu] or, as it may be rendered, _not pleasure, but freedom from

pain, is what the wise man will aim at_.

[Footnote 1: vii. (12) 12.]

The truth of this remark turns upon the negative character of

happiness,--the fact that pleasure is only the negation of pain, and

that pain is the positive element in life. Though I have given a

detailed proof of this proposition in my chief work,[1] I may supply

one more illustration of it here, drawn from a circumstance of daily

occurrence. Suppose that, with the exception of some sore or painful

spot, we are physically in a sound and healthy condition: the sore of

this one spot, will completely absorb our attention, causing us to

lose the sense of general well-being, and destroying all our comfort

in life. In the same way, when all our affairs but one turn out as

we wish, the single instance in which our aims are frustrated is a

constant trouble to us, even though it be something quite trivial. We

think a great deal about it, and very little about those other and

more important matters in which we have been successful. In both these

cases what has met with resistance is _the will_; in the one case, as

it is objectified in the organism, in the other, as it presents

itself in the struggle of life; and in both, it is plain that the

satisfaction of the will consists in nothing else than that it meets

with no resistance. It is, therefore, a satisfaction which is not

directly felt; at most, we can become conscious of it only when we

reflect upon our condition. But that which checks or arrests the will

is something positive; it proclaims its own presence. All pleasure

consists in merely removing this check--in other words, in freeing us

from its action; and hence pleasure is a state which can never last

very long.

[Footnote 1: _Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_. Vol. I., p. 58.]

This is the true basis of the above excellent rule quoted from

Aristotle, which bids us direct our aim, not toward securing what is

pleasurable and agreeable in life, but toward avoiding, as far as

possible, its innumerable evils. If this were not the right course to

take, that saying of Voltaire's, _Happiness is but a dream and sorrow

is real_, would be as false as it is, in fact, true. A man who desires

to make up the book of his life and determine where the balance of

happiness lies, must put down in his accounts, not the pleasures which

he has enjoyed, but the evils which he has escaped. That is the

true method of eudaemonology; for all eudaemonology must begin by

recognizing that its very name is a euphemism, and that _to live

happily_ only means _to live less unhappily_--to live a tolerable

life. There is no doubt that life is given us, not to be enjoyed,

but to be overcome--to be got over. There are numerous expressions

illustrating this--such as _degere vitam, vita defungi_; or

in Italian, _si scampa cosi_; or in German, _man muss suchen

durchzukommen; er wird schon durch die Welt kommen_, and so on. In old

age it is indeed a consolation to think that the work of life is over

and done with. The happiest lot is not to have experienced the keenest

delights or the greatest pleasures, but to have brought life to a

close without any very great pain, bodily or mental. To measure the

happiness of a life by its delights or pleasures, is to apply a false

standard. For pleasures are and remain something negative; that

they produce happiness is a delusion, cherished by envy to its own

punishment. Pain is felt to be something positive, and hence its

absence is the true standard of happiness. And if, over and above

freedom from pain, there is also an absence of boredom, the essential

conditions of earthly happiness are attained; for all else is

chimerical.

It follows from this that a man should never try to purchase pleasure

at the cost of pain, or even at the risk of incurring it; to do so is

to pay what is positive and real, for what is negative and illusory;

while there is a net profit in sacrificing pleasure for the sake of

avoiding pain. In either case it is a matter of indifference whether

the pain follows the pleasure or precedes it. While it is a complete

inversion of the natural order to try and turn this scene of misery

into a garden of pleasure, to aim at joy and pleasure rather than

at the greatest possible freedom from pain--and yet how many do

it!--there is some wisdom in taking a gloomy view, in looking upon the

world as a kind of Hell, and in confining one's efforts to securing

a little room that shall not be exposed to the fire. The fool rushes

after the pleasures of life and finds himself their dupe; the wise man

avoids its evils; and even if, notwithstanding his precautions, he

falls into misfortunes, that is the fault of fate, not of his own

folly. As far as he is successful in his endeavors, he cannot be said

to have lived a life of illusion; for the evils which he shuns are

very real. Even if he goes too far out of his way to avoid evils, and

makes an unnecessary sacrifice of pleasure, he is, in reality, not the

worse off for that; for all pleasures are chimerical, and to mourn

for having lost any of them is a frivolous, and even ridiculous

proceeding.

The failure to recognize this truth--a failure promoted by optimistic

ideas--is the source of much unhappiness. In moments free from pain,

our restless wishes present, as it were in a mirror, the image of a

happiness that has no counterpart in reality, seducing us to follow

it; in doing so we bring pain upon ourselves, and that is something

undeniably real. Afterwards, we come to look with regret upon that

lost state of painlessness; it is a paradise which we have gambled

away; it is no longer with us, and we long in vain to undo what has

been done.

One might well fancy that these visions of wishes fulfilled were the

work of some evil spirit, conjured up in order to entice us away from

that painless state which forms our highest happiness.

A careless youth may think that the world is meant to be enjoyed, as

though it were the abode of some real or positive happiness, which

only those fail to attain who are not clever enough to overcome the

difficulties that lie in the way. This false notion takes a stronger

hold on him when he comes to read poetry and romance, and to be

deceived by outward show--the hypocrisy that characterizes the

world from beginning to end; on which I shall have something to say

presently. The result is that his life is the more or less deliberate

pursuit of positive happiness; and happiness he takes to be equivalent

to a series of definite pleasures. In seeking for these pleasures he

encounters danger--a fact which should not be forgotten. He hunts for

game that does not exist; and so he ends by suffering some very

real and positive misfortune--pain, distress, sickness, loss, care,

poverty, shame, and all the thousand ills of life. Too late he

discovers the trick that has been played upon him.

But if the rule I have mentioned is observed, and a plan of life is

adopted which proceeds by avoiding pain--in other words, by taking

measures of precaution against want, sickness, and distress in all its

forms, the aim is a real one, and something may be achieved which will

be great in proportion as the plan is not disturbed by striving after

the chimera of positive happiness. This agrees with the opinion

expressed by Goethe in the _Elective Affinities_, and there put into

the mouth of Mittler--the man who is always trying to make other

people happy: _To desire to get rid of an evil is a definite object,

but to desire a better fortune than one has is blind folly_. The same

truth is contained in that fine French proverb: _le mieux est l'ennemi

du bien_--leave well alone. And, as I have remarked in my chief

work,[1] this is the leading thought underlying the philosophical

system of the Cynics. For what was it led the Cynics to repudiate

pleasure in every form, if it was not the fact that pain is, in a

greater or less degree, always bound up with pleasure? To go out of

the way of pain seemed to them so much easier than to secure pleasure.

Deeply impressed as they were by the negative nature of pleasure and

the positive nature of pain, they consistently devoted all their

efforts to the avoidance of pain. The first step to that end was, in

their opinion, a complete and deliberate repudiation of pleasure, as

something which served only to entrap the victim in order that he

might be delivered over to pain.

[Footnote 1: _Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_, vol. ii., ch. 16.]

We are all born, as Schiller says, in Arcadia. In other words, we

come into the world full of claims to happiness and pleasure, and we

cherish the fond hope of making them good. But, as a rule, Fate soon

teaches us, in a rough and ready way that we really possess nothing at

all, but that everything in the world is at its command, in virtue of

an unassailable right, not only to all we have or acquire, to wife or

child, but even to our very limbs, our arms, legs, _eyes_ and ears,

nay, even to the nose in the middle of our face. And in any case,

after some little time, we learn by experience that happiness and

pleasure are a _fata morgana_, which, visible from afar, vanish as we

approach; that, on the other hand, suffering and pain are a reality,

which makes its presence felt without any intermediary, and for its

effect, stands in no need of illusion or the play of false hope.

If the teaching of experience bears fruit in us, we soon give up the

pursuit of pleasure and happiness, and think much more about making

ourselves secure against the attacks of pain and suffering. We see

that the best the world has to offer is an existence free from pain--a

quiet, tolerable life; and we confine our claims to this, as to

something we can more surely hope to achieve. For the safest way of

not being very miserable is not to expect to be very happy. Merck, the

friend of Goethe's youth, was conscious of this truth when he

wrote: _It is the wretched way people have of setting up a claim to

happiness_--_and, that to, in a measure corresponding with their

desires_--_that ruins everything in this world. A man will make

progress if he can get rid of this claim,[1] and desire nothing but

what he sees before him_. Accordingly it is advisable to put very

moderate limits upon our expectations of pleasure, possessions, rank,

honor and so on; because it is just this striving and struggling to

be happy, to dazzle the world, to lead a life full of pleasure, which

entail great misfortune. It is prudent and wise, I say, to reduce

one's claims, if only for the reason that it is extremely easy to be

very unhappy; while to be very happy is not indeed difficult, but

quite impossible. With justice sings the poet of life's wisdom:

_Auream quisquis mediocritatem

Diligit, tutus caret obsoleti

Sordibus tecti, caret invidenda

Sobrius aula.

Savius ventis agitatur ingens

Pinus: et celsae graviori casu

Decidunt turres; feriuntque summos

Fulgura monies.[2]_

--the golden mean is best--to live free from the squalor of a mean

abode, and yet not be a mark for envy. It is the tall pine which is

cruelly shaken by the wind, the highest summits that are struck in the

storm, and the lofty towers that fall so heavily.

[Footnote 1: Letters to and from Merck.]

[Footnote 2: Horace. Odes II. x.]

He who has taken to heart the teaching of my philosophy--who knows,

therefore, that our whole existence is something which had better

not have been, and that to disown and disclaim it is the highest

wisdom--he will have no great expectations from anything or any

condition in life: he will spend passion upon nothing in the world,

nor lament over-much if he fails in any of his undertakings. He

will feel the deep truth of what Plato[1] says: [Greek: oute ti ton

anthropinon haxion on megalaes spondaes]--nothing in human affairs is

worth any great anxiety; or, as the Persian poet has it,

_Though from thy grasp all worldly things should flee,

Grieve not for them, for they are nothing worth:

And though a world in thy possession be,

Joy not, for worthless are the things of earth.

Since to that better world 'tis given to thee

To pass, speed on, for this is nothing worth._[2]

[Footnote 1: _Republic_, x. 604.]

[Footnote 2: _Translator's Note_. From the Anvár-i Suhailí--_The

Lights of Canopus_--being the Persian version of the _Table of

Bidpai_. Translated by E.B. Eastwick, ch. iii. Story vi., p. 289.]

The chief obstacle to our arriving at these salutary views is that

hypocrisy of the world to which I have already alluded--an hypocrisy

which should be early revealed to the young. Most of the glories of

the world are mere outward show, like the scenes on a stage: there

is nothing real about them. Ships festooned and hung with pennants,

firing of cannon, illuminations, beating of drums and blowing of

trumpets, shouting and applauding--these are all the outward sign, the

pretence and suggestion,--as it were the hieroglyphic,--of _joy_: but

just there, joy is, as a rule, not to be found; it is the only guest

who has declined to be present at the festival. Where this guest may

really be found, he comes generally without invitation; he is not

formerly announced, but slips in quietly by himself _sans facon_;

often making his appearance under the most unimportant and trivial

circumstances, and in the commonest company--anywhere, in short, but

where the society is brilliant and distinguished. Joy is like the gold

in the Australian mines--found only now and then, as it were, by the

caprice of chance, and according to no rule or law; oftenest in very

little grains, and very seldom in heaps. All that outward show which I

have described, is only an attempt to make people believe that it

is really joy which has come to the festival; and to produce this

impression upon the spectators is, in fact, the whole object of it.

With _mourning_ it is just the same. That long funeral procession,

moving up so slowly; how melancholy it looks! what an endless row of

carriages! But look into them--they are all empty; the coachmen of the

whole town are the sole escort the dead man has to his grave. Eloquent

picture of the friendship and esteem of the world! This is the

falsehood, the hollowness, the hypocrisy of human affairs!

Take another example--a roomful of guests in full dress, being

received with great ceremony. You could almost believe that this is

a noble and distinguished company; but, as a matter of fact, it is

compulsion, pain and boredom who are the real guests. For where many

are invited, it is a rabble--even if they all wear stars. Really good

society is everywhere of necessity very small. In brilliant festivals

and noisy entertainments, there is always, at bottom, a sense of

emptiness prevalent. A false tone is there: such gatherings are in

strange contrast with the misery and barrenness of our existence. The

contrast brings the true condition into greater relief. Still, these

gatherings are effective from the outside; and that is just their

purpose. Chamfort[1] makes the excellent remark that _society_--_les

cercles, les salons, ce qu'on appelle le monde_--is like a miserable

play, or a bad opera, without any interest in itself, but supported

for a time by mechanical aid, costumes and scenery.

[Footnote 1: _Translator's Note_. Nicholas "Chamfort" (1741-94), a

French miscellaneous writer, whose brilliant conversation, power of

sarcasm, and epigrammic force, coupled with an extraordinary career,

render him one of the most interesting and remarkable men of his

time. Schopenhauer undoubtedly owed much to this writer, to whom he

constantly refers.]

And so, too, with academies and chairs of philosophy. You have a kind

of sign-board hung out to show the apparent abode of _wisdom_: but

wisdom is another guest who declines the invitation; she is to be

found elsewhere. The chiming of bells, ecclesiastical millinery,

attitudes of devotion, insane antics--these are the pretence, the

false show of _piety_. And so on. Everything in the world is like a

hollow nut; there is little kernel anywhere, and when it does exist,

it is still more rare to find it in the shell. You may look for it

elsewhere, and find it, as a rule, only by chance.

SECTION 2. To estimate a man's condition in regard to happiness, it is

necessary to ask, not what things please him, but what things trouble

him; and the more trivial these things are in themselves, the happier

the man will be. To be irritated by trifles, a man must be well off;

for in misfortunes trifles are unfelt.

SECTION 3. Care should be taken not to build the happiness of life

upon a _broad foundation_--not to require a great many things in order

to be happy. For happiness on such a foundation is the most easily

undermined; it offers many more opportunities for accidents; and

accidents are always happening. The architecture of happiness follows

a plan in this respect just the opposite of that adopted in every

other case, where the broadest foundation offers the greatest

security. Accordingly, to reduce your claims to the lowest possible

degree, in comparison with your means,--of whatever kind these may

be--is the surest way of avoiding extreme misfortune.

To make extensive preparations for life--no matter what form they

may take--is one of the greatest and commonest of follies. Such

preparations presuppose, in the first place, a long life, the full and

complete term of years appointed to man--and how few reach it! and

even if it be reached, it is still too short for all the plans that

have been made; for to carry them out requites more time than was

thought necessary at the beginning. And then how many mischances and

obstacles stand in the way! how seldom the goal is ever reached in

human affairs!

And lastly, even though the goal should be reached, the changes which

Time works in us have been left out of the reckoning: we forget that

the capacity whether for achievement or for enjoyment does not last a

whole lifetime. So we often toil for things which are no longer suited

to us when we attain them; and again, the years we spend in preparing

for some work, unconsciously rob us of the power for carrying it out.

How often it happens that a man is unable to enjoy the wealth which he

acquired at so much trouble and risk, and that the fruits of his

labor are reserved for others; or that he is incapable of filling the

position which he has won after so many years of toil and struggle.

Fortune has come too late for him; or, contrarily, he has come too

late for fortune,--when, for instance, he wants to achieve great

things, say, in art or literature: the popular taste has changed, it

may be; a new generation has grown up, which takes no interest in his

work; others have gone a shorter way and got the start of him. These

are the facts of life which Horace must have had in view, when he

lamented the uselessness of all advice:--

_quid eternis minorem

Consiliis animum fatigas?_[1]

[Footnote 1: Odes II. xi.]

The cause of this commonest of all follies is that optical illusion of

the mind from which everyone suffers, making life, at its beginning,

seem of long duration; and at its end, when one looks back over the

course of it, how short a time it seems! There is some advantage in

the illusion; but for it, no great work would ever be done.

Our life is like a journey on which, as we advance, the landscape

takes a different view from that which it presented at first,

and changes again, as we come nearer. This is just what

happens--especially with our wishes. We often find something else,

nay, something better than what we are looking for; and what we look

for, we often find on a very different path from that on which we

began a vain search. Instead of finding, as we expected, pleasure,

happiness, joy, we get experience, insight, knowledge--a real and

permanent blessing, instead of a fleeting and illusory one.

This is the thought that runs through _Wilkelm Meister_, like the bass

in a piece of music. In this work of Goethe's, we have a novel of the

_intellectual_ kind, and, therefore, superior to all others, even to

Sir Walter Scott's, which are, one and all, _ethical_; in other words,

they treat of human nature only from the side of the will. So, too,

in the _Zauberflöte_--that grotesque, but still significant, and even

hieroglyphic--the same thought is symbolized, but in great, coarse

lines, much in the way in which scenery is painted. Here the symbol

would be complete if Tamino were in the end to be cured of his desire

to possess Tainina, and received, in her stead, initiation into the

mysteries of the Temple of Wisdom. It is quite right for Papageno, his

necessary contrast, to succeed in getting his Papagena.

Men of any worth or value soon come to see that they are in the hands

of Fate, and gratefully submit to be moulded by its teachings. They

recognize that the fruit of life is experience, and not happiness;

they become accustomed and content to exchange hope for insight; and,

in the end, they can say, with Petrarch, that all they care for is to

learn:--

_Altro diletto che 'mparar, non provo_.

It may even be that they to some extent still follow their old wishes

and aims, trifling with them, as it were, for the sake of appearances;

all the while really and seriously looking for nothing but

instruction; a process which lends them an air of genius, a trait of

something contemplative and sublime.

In their search for gold, the alchemists discovered other

things--gunpowder, china, medicines, the laws of nature. There is a

sense in which we are all alchemists.

CHAPTER II.

OUR RELATION TO OURSELVES.--SECTION 4.

The mason employed on the building of a house may be quite ignorant of

its general design; or at any rate, he may not keep it constantly in

mind. So it is with man: in working through the days and hours of his

life, he takes little thought of its character as a whole.

If there is any merit or importance attaching to a man's career, if he

lays himself out carefully for some special work, it is all the more

necessary and advisable for him to turn his attention now and then

to its _plan_, that is to say, the miniature sketch of its general

outlines. Of course, to do that, he must have applied the maxim

[Greek: Gnothi seauton]; he must have made some little progress in the

art of understanding himself. He must know what is his real, chief,

and foremost object in life,--what it is that he most wants in order

to be happy; and then, after that, what occupies the second and third

place in his thoughts; he must find out what, on the whole, his

vocation really is--the part he has to play, his general relation to

the world. If he maps out important work for himself on great lines,

a glance at this miniature plan of his life will, more than anything

else stimulate, rouse and ennoble him, urge him on to action and keep

him from false paths.

Again, just as the traveler, on reaching a height, gets a connected

view over the road he has taken, with its many turns and windings; so

it is only when we have completed a period in our life, or approach

the end of it altogether, that we recognize the true connection

between all our actions,--what it is we have achieved, what work we

have done. It is only then that we see the precise chain of cause and

effect, and the exact value of all our efforts. For as long as we are

actually engaged in the work of life, we always act in accordance with

the nature of our character, under the influence of motive, and within

the limits of our capacity,--in a word, from beginning to end, under

a law of _necessity_; at every moment we do just what appears to us

right and proper. It is only afterwards, when we come to look back at

the whole course of our life and its general result, that we see the

why and wherefore of it all.

When we are actually doing some great deed, or creating some immortal

work, we are not conscious of it as such; we think only of satisfying

present aims, of fulfilling the intentions we happen to have at the

time, of doing the right thing at the moment. It is only when we

come to view our life as a connected whole that our character and

capacities show themselves in their true light; that we see how, in

particular instances, some happy inspiration, as it were, led us to

choose the only true path out of a thousand which might have brought

us to ruin. It was our genius that guided us, a force felt in the

affairs of the intellectual as in those of the world; and working by

its defect just in the same way in regard to evil and disaster.

SECTION 5. Another important element in the wise conduct of life is to

preserve a proper proportion between our thought for the present and

our thought for the future; in order not to spoil the one by paying

over-great attention to the other. Many live too long in the

present--frivolous people, I mean; others, too much in the future,

ever anxious and full of care. It is seldom that a man holds the right

balance between the two extremes. Those who strive and hope and live

only in the future, always looking ahead and impatiently anticipating

what is coming, as something which will make them happy when they

get it, are, in spite of their very clever airs, exactly like those

donkeys one sees in Italy, whose pace may be hurried by fixing a stick

on their heads with a wisp of hay at the end of it; this is always

just in front of them, and they keep on trying to get it. Such people

are in a constant state of illusion as to their whole existence; they

go on living _ad interim_, until at last they die.

Instead, therefore, of always thinking about our plans and anxiously

looking to the future, or of giving ourselves up to regret for the

past, we should never forget that the present is the only reality, the

only certainty; that the future almost always turns out contrary to

our expectations; that the past, too, was very different from what

we suppose it to have been. But the past and the future are, on the

whole, of less consequence than we think. Distance, which makes

objects look small to the outward eye, makes them look big to the eye

of thought. The present alone is true and actual; it is the only

time which possesses full reality, and our existence lies in it

exclusively. Therefore we should always be glad of it, and give it

the welcome it deserves, and enjoy every hour that is bearable by

its freedom from pain and annoyance with a full consciousness of its

value. We shall hardly be able to do this if we make a wry face over

the failure of our hopes in the past or over our anxiety for the

future. It is the height of folly to refuse the present hour of

happiness, or wantonly to spoil it by vexation at by-gones or

uneasiness about what is to come. There is a time, of course, for

forethought, nay, even for repentance; but when it is over let us

think of what is past as of something to which we have said farewell,

of necessity subduing our hearts--

[Greek: alla ta men protuchthai easomen achnumenoi per

tumhon eni staethessi philon damasntes hanankae],[1]

and of the future as of that which lies beyond our power, in the lap

of the gods--

[Greek: all aetoi men tauta theon en gounasi keitai.][2]

[Footnote 1: _Iliad_, xix, 65.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_, xvii, 514]

But in regard to the present let us remember Seneca's advice, and live

each day as if it were our whole life,--_singulas dies singulas vitas

puta_: let us make it as agreeable as possible, it is the only real

time we have.

Only those evils which are sure to come at a definite date have

any right to disturb us; and how few there are which fulfill this

description. For evils are of two kinds; either they are possible

only, at most probable; or they are inevitable. Even in the case of

evils which are sure to happen, the time at which they will happen is

uncertain. A man who is always preparing for either class of evil will

not have a moment of peace left him. So, if we are not to lose all

comfort in life through the fear of evils, some of which are uncertain

in themselves, and others, in the time at which they will occur, we

should look upon the one kind as never likely to happen, and the other

as not likely to happen very soon.

Now, the less our peace of mind is disturbed by fear, the more likely

it is to be agitated by desire and expectation. This is the true

meaning of that song of Goethe's which is such a favorite with

everyone: _Ich hab' mein' Sach' auf nichts gestellt_. It is only

after a man has got rid of all pretension, and taken refuge in mere

unembellished existence, that he is able to attain that peace of mind

which is the foundation of human happiness. Peace of mind! that is

something essential to any enjoyment of the present moment; and unless

its separate moments are enjoyed, there is an end of life's happiness

as a whole. We should always collect that _To-day_ comes only once,

and never returns. We fancy that it will come again to-morrow; but

_To-morrow_ is another day, which, in its turn, comes once only.

We are apt to forget that every day is an integral, and therefore

irreplaceable portion of life, and to look upon life as though it

were a collective idea or name which does not suffer if one of the

individuals it covers is destroyed.

We should be more likely to appreciate and enjoy the present, if,

in those good days when we are well and strong, we did not fail to

reflect how, in sickness and sorrow, every past hour that was free

from pain and privation seemed in our memory so infinitely to be

envied--as it were, a lost paradise, or some one who was only then

seen to have acted as a friend. But we live through our days of

happiness without noticing them; it is only when evil comes upon us

that we wish them back. A thousand gay and pleasant hours are wasted

in ill-humor; we let them slip by unenjoyed, and sigh for them in vain

when the sky is overcast. Those present moments that are bearable, be

they never so trite and common,--passed by in indifference, or, it may

be, impatiently pushed away,--those are the moments we should honor;

never failing to remember that the ebbing tide is even how hurrying

them into the past, where memory will store them transfigured and

shining with an imperishable light,--in some after-time, and above

all, when our days are evil, to raise the veil and present them as the

object of our fondest regret.

SECTION 6. _Limitations always make for happiness_. We are happy in

proportion as our range of vision, our sphere of work, our points of

contact with the world, are restricted and circumscribed. We are more

likely to feel worried and anxious if these limits are wide; for

it means that our cares, desires and terrors are increased and

intensified. That is why the blind are not so unhappy as we might be

inclined to suppose; otherwise there would not be that gentle and

almost serene expression of peace in their faces.

Another reason why limitation makes for happiness is that the second

half of life proves even more dreary that the first. As the years wear

on, the horizon of our aims and our points of contact with the world

become more extended. In childhood our horizon is limited to

the narrowest sphere about us; in youth there is already a very

considerable widening of our view; in manhood it comprises the whole

range of our activity, often stretching out over a very distant

sphere,--the care, for instance, of a State or a nation; in old age it

embraces posterity.

But even in the affairs of the intellect, limitation is necessary if

we are to be happy. For the less the will is excited, the less we

suffer. We have seen that suffering is something positive, and that

happiness is only a negative condition. To limit the sphere of outward

activity is to relieve the will of external stimulus: to limit the

sphere of our intellectual efforts is to relieve the will of internal

sources of excitement. This latter kind of limitation is attended by

the disadvantage that it opens the door to boredom, which is a direct

source of countless sufferings; for to banish boredom, a man will

have recourse to any means that may be handy--dissipation, society,

extravagance, gaming, and drinking, and the like, which in their turn

bring mischief, ruin and misery in their train. _Difficiles in otio

quies_--it is difficult to keep quiet if you have nothing to do. That

limitation in the sphere of outward activity is conducive, nay, even

necessary to human happiness, such as it is, may be seen in the fact

that the only kind of poetry which depicts men in a happy state of

life--Idyllic poetry, I mean,--always aims, as an intrinsic part of

its treatment, at representing them in very simple and restricted

circumstances. It is this feeling, too, which is at the bottom of the

pleasure we take in what are called _genre_ pictures.

_Simplicity_, therefore, as far as it can be attained, and even

_monotony_, in our manner of life, if it does not mean that we

are bored, will contribute to happiness; just because, under such

circumstances, life, and consequently the burden which is the

essential concomitant of life, will be least felt. Our existence

will glide on peacefully like a stream which no waves or whirlpools

disturb.

SECTION 7. Whether we are in a pleasant or a painful state depends,

ultimately, upon the kind of matter that pervades and engrosses our

consciousness. In this respect, purely intellectual occupation, for

the mind that is capable of it, will, as a rule, do much more in the

way of happiness than any form of practical life, with its constant

alternations of success and failure, and all the shocks and torments

it produces. But it must be confessed that for such occupation a

pre-eminent amount of intellectual capacity is necessary. And in this

connection it may be noted that, just as a life devoted to outward

activity will distract and divert a man from study, and also deprive

him of that quiet concentration of mind which is necessary for such

work; so, on the other hand, a long course of thought will make

him more or less unfit for the noisy pursuits of real life. It

is advisable, therefore, to suspend mental work for a while, if

circumstances happen which demand any degree of energy in affairs of a

practical nature.

SECTION 8. To live a life that shall be entirely prudent and discreet,

and to draw from experience all the instruction it contains, it

is requisite to be constantly thinking back,--to make a kind

of recapitulation of what we have done, of our impressions and

sensations, to compare our former with our present judgments--what

we set before us and struggle to achieve, with the actual result and

satisfaction we have obtained. To do this is to get a repetition of

the private lessons of experience,--lessons which are given to every

one.

Experience of the world may be looked upon as a kind of text, to which

reflection and knowledge form the commentary. Where there is great

deal of reflection and intellectual knowledge, and very little

experience, the result is like those books which have on each page two

lines of text to forty lines of commentary. A great deal of experience

with little reflection and scant knowledge, gives us books like those

of the _editio Bipontina_[1] where there are no notes and much that is

unintelligible.

[Footnote 1: _Translator's Note_. A series of Greek, Latin and French

classics published at Zweibräcken in the Palatinate, from and after

the year 1779. Cf. Butter, _Ueber die Bipontiner und die editiones

Bipontinae_.]

The advice here given is on a par with a rule recommended by

Pythagoras,--to review, every night before going to sleep, what we

have done during the day. To live at random, in the hurly-burly of

business or pleasure, without ever reflecting upon the past,--to go

on, as it were, pulling cotton off the reel of life,--is to have no

clear idea of what we are about; and a man who lives in this state

will have chaos in his emotions and certain confusion in his thoughts;

as is soon manifest by the abrupt and fragmentary character of his

conversation, which becomes a kind of mincemeat. A man will be all the

more exposed to this fate in proportion as he lives a restless life

in the world, amid a crowd of various impressions and with a

correspondingly small amount of activity on the part of his own mind.

And in this connection it will be in place to observe that, when

events and circumstances which have influenced us pass away in the

course of time, we are unable to bring back and renew the particular

mood or state of feeling which they aroused in us: but we can remember

what we were led to say and do in regard to them; and thus form, as it

were, the result, expression and measure of those events. We should,

therefore, be careful to preserve the memory of our thoughts at

important points in our life; and herein lies the great advantage of

keeping a journal.

SECTION 9. To be self-sufficient, to be all in all to oneself, to

want for nothing, to be able to say _omnia mea mecum porto_--that is

assuredly the chief qualification for happiness. Hence Aristotle's

remark, [Greek: hae eudaimonia ton autarchon esti][1]--to be happy

means to be self-sufficient--cannot be too often repeated. It is,

at bottom, the same thought as is present in the very well-turned

sentence from Chamfort:

_Le bonheur n'est pas chose aisée: il est très difficile de le trouver

en nous, et impossible de le trouver ailleurs_.

[Footnote 1: _Eudem. Eth_. VII. ii. 37.]

For while a man cannot reckon with certainty upon anyone but himself,

the burdens and disadvantages, the dangers and annoyances, which arise

from having to do with others, are not only countless but unavoidable.

There is no more mistaken path to happiness than worldliness, revelry,

_high life_: for the whole object of it is to transform our miserable

existence into a succession of joys, delights and pleasures,--a

process which cannot fail to result in disappointment and delusion;

on a par, in this respect, with its _obligato_ accompaniment, the

interchange of lies.[1]

[Footnote 1: As our body is concealed by the clothes we wear, so our

mind is veiled in lies. The veil is always there, and it is only

through it that we can sometimes guess at what a man really thinks;

just as from his clothes we arrive at the general shape of his body.]

All society necessarily involves, as the first condition of its

existence, mutual accommodation and restraint upon the part of its

members. This means that the larger it is, the more insipid will be

its tone. A man can be _himself_ only so long as he is alone; and if

he does not love solitude, he will not love freedom; for it is only

when he is alone that he is really free. Constraint is always present

in society, like a companion of whom there is no riddance; and in

proportion to the greatness of a man's individuality, it will be hard

for him to bear the sacrifices which all intercourse with others

demands, Solitude will be welcomed or endured or avoided, according as

a man's personal value is large or small,--the wretch feeling, when

he is alone, the whole burden of his misery; the great intellect

delighting in its greatness; and everyone, in short, being just what

he is.

Further, if a man stands high in Nature's lists, it is natural and

inevitable that he should feel solitary. It will be an advantage to

him if his surroundings do not interfere with this feeling; for if he

has to see a great deal of other people who are not of like character

with himself, they will exercise a disturbing influence upon him,

adverse to his peace of mind; they will rob him, in fact, of himself,

and give him nothing to compensate for the loss.

But while Nature sets very wide differences between man and man in

respect both of morality and of intellect, society disregards and

effaces them; or, rather, it sets up artificial differences in

their stead,--gradations of rank and position, which are very often

diametrically opposed to those which Nature establishes. The result of

this arrangement is to elevate those whom Nature has placed low,

and to depress the few who stand high. These latter, then, usually

withdraw from society, where, as soon as it is at all numerous,

vulgarity reigns supreme.

What offends a great intellect in society is the equality of rights,

leading to equality of pretensions, which everyone enjoys; while at

the same time, inequality of capacity means a corresponding disparity

of social power. So-called _good society_ recognizes every kind of

claim but that of intellect, which is a contraband article; and people

are expected to exhibit an unlimited amount of patience towards every

form of folly and stupidity, perversity and dullness; whilst personal

merit has to beg pardon, as it were, for being present, or else

conceal itself altogether. Intellectual superiority offends by its

very existence, without any desire to do so.

The worst of what is called good society is not only that it offers us

the companionship of people who are unable to win either our praise or

our affection, but that it does not allow of our being that which we

naturally are; it compels us, for the sake of harmony, to shrivel up,

or even alter our shape altogether. Intellectual conversation, whether

grave or humorous, is only fit for intellectual society; it is

downright abhorrent to ordinary people, to please whom it is

absolutely necessary to be commonplace and dull. This demands an act

of severe self-denial; we have to forfeit three-fourths of ourselves

in order to become like other people. No doubt their company may be

set down against our loss in this respect; but the more a man is

worth, the more he will find that what he gains does not cover what he

loses, and that the balance is on the debit side of the account; for

the people with whom he deals are generally bankrupt,--that is to say,

there is nothing to be got from their society which can compensate

either for its boredom, annoyance and disagreeableness, or for the

self-denial which it renders necessary. Accordingly, most society is

so constituted as to offer a good profit to anyone who will exchange

it for solitude.

Nor is this all. By way of providing a substitute for real--I mean

intellectual--superiority, which is seldom to be met with, and

intolerable when it is found, society has capriciously adopted a false

kind of superiority, conventional in its character, and resting upon

arbitrary principles,--a tradition, as it were, handed down in the

higher circles, and, like a password, subject to alteration; I refer

to _bon-ton_ fashion. Whenever this kind of superiority comes into

collision with the real kind, its weakness is manifest. Moreover, the

presence of _good tone_ means the absence of _good sense_.

No man can be in _perfect accord_ with any one but himself--not even

with a friend or the partner of his life; differences of individuality

and temperament are always bringing in some degree of discord, though

it may be a very slight one. That genuine, profound peace of mind,

that perfect tranquillity of soul, which, next to health, is the

highest blessing the earth can give, is to be attained only in

solitude, and, as a permanent mood, only in complete retirement; and

then, if there is anything great and rich in the man's own self, his

way of life is the happiest that may be found in this wretched world.

Let me speak plainly. However close the bond of friendship, love,

marriage--a man, ultimately, looks to himself, to his own welfare

alone; at most, to his child's too. The less necessity there is for

you to come into contact with mankind in general, in the relations

whether of business or of personal intimacy, the better off you are.

Loneliness and solitude have their evils, it is true; but if you

cannot feel them all at once, you can at least see where they lie; on

the other hand, society is _insidious_ in this respect; as in offering

you what appears to be the pastime of pleasing social intercourse, it

works great and often irreparable mischief. The young should early be

trained to bear being left alone; for it is a source of happiness and

peace of mind.

It follows from this that a man is best off if he be thrown upon his

own resources and can be all in all to himself; and Cicero goes so far

as to say that a man who is in this condition cannot fail to be very

happy--_nemo potest non beatissimus esse qui est totus aptus ex sese,

quique in se uno ponit omnia._[1] The more a man has in himself, the

less others can be to him. The feeling of self-sufficiency! it is that

which restrains those whose personal value is in itself great riches,

from such considerable sacrifices as are demanded by intercourse with

the world, let alone, then, from actually practicing self-denial by

going out of their way to seek it. Ordinary people are sociable and

complaisant just from the very opposite feeling;--to bear others'

company is easier for them than to bear their own. Moreover, respect

is not paid in this world to that which has real merit; it is reserved

for that which has none. So retirement is at once a proof and a result

of being distinguished by the possession of meritorious qualities. It

will therefore show real wisdom on the part of any one who is worth

anything in himself, to limit his requirements as may be necessary, in

order to preserve or extend his freedom, and,--since a man must come

into some relations with his fellow-men--to admit them to his intimacy

as little as possible.

[Footnote 1: _Paradoxa Stoidorum_: II.]

I have said that people are rendered sociable by their ability to

endure solitude, that is to say, their own society. They become

sick of themselves. It is this vacuity of soul which drives them to

intercourse with others,--to travels in foreign countries. Their mind

is wanting in elasticity; it has no movement of its own, and so they

try to give it some,--by drink, for instance. How much drunkenness

is due to this cause alone! They are always looking for some form of

excitement, of the strongest kind they can bear--the excitement of

being with people of like nature with themselves; and if they fail

in this, their mind sinks by its own weight, and they fall into a

grievous lethargy.[1] Such people, it may be said, possess only a

small fraction of humanity in themselves; and it requires a great many

of them put together to make up a fair amount of it,--to attain any

degree of consciousness as men. A man, in the full sense of the

word,--a man _par excellence_--does not represent a fraction, but a

whole number: he is complete in himself.

[Footnote 1: It is a well-known fact, that we can more easily bear up

under evils which fall upon a great many people besides ourselves.

As boredom seems to be an evil of this kind, people band together to

offer it a common resistance. The love of life is at bottom only the

fear of death; and, in the same way, the social impulse does not rest

directly upon the love of society, but upon the fear of solitude; it

is not alone the charm of being in others' company that people seek,

it is the dreary oppression of being alone--the monotony of their own

consciousness--that they would avoid. They will do anything to escape

it,--even tolerate bad companions, and put up with the feeling of

constraint which all society involves, in this case a very burdensome

one. But if aversion to such society conquers the aversion to being

alone, they become accustomed to solitude and hardened to its

immediate effects. They no longer find solitude to be such a very bad

thing, and settle down comfortably to it without any hankering after

society;--and this, partly because it is only indirectly that they

need others' company, and partly because they have become accustomed

to the benefits of being alone.]

Ordinary society is, in this respect, very like the kind of music to

be obtained from an orchestra composed of Russian horns. Each horn has

only one note; and the music is produced by each note coming in just

at the right moment. In the monotonous sound of a single horn, you

have a precise illustration of the effect of most people's minds. How

often there seems to be only one thought there! and no room for any

other. It is easy to see why people are so bored; and also why they

are sociable, why they like to go about in crowds--why mankind is so

_gregarious_. It is the monotony of his own nature that makes a man

find solitude intolerable. _Omnis stultitia laborat fastidio sui_:

folly is truly its own burden. Put a great many men together, and you

may get some result--some music from your horns!

A man of intellect is like an artist who gives a concert without any

help from anyone else, playing on a single instrument--a piano, say,

which is a little orchestra in itself. Such a man is a little world in

himself; and the effect produced by various instruments together, he

produces single-handed, in the unity of his own consciousness. Like

the piano, he has no place in a symphony: he is a soloist and performs

by himself,--in solitude, it may be; or, if in company with other

instruments, only as principal; or for setting the tone, as in

singing. However, those who are fond of society from time to time

may profit by this simile, and lay it down as a general rule that

deficiency of quality in those we meet may be to some extent

compensated by an increase in quantity. One man's company may be quite

enough, if he is clever; but where you have only ordinary people to

deal with, it is advisable to have a great many of them, so that

some advantage may accrue by letting them all work together,--on the

analogy of the horns; and may Heaven grant you patience for your task!

That mental vacuity and barrenness of soul to which I have alluded, is

responsible for another misfortune. When men of the better class form

a society for promoting some noble or ideal aim, the result almost

always is that the innumerable mob of humanity comes crowding in too,

as it always does everywhere, like vermin--their object being to try

and get rid of boredom, or some other defect of their nature; and

anything that will effect that, they seize upon at once, without the

slightest discrimination. Some of them will slip into that society,

or push themselves in, and then either soon destroy it altogether, or

alter it so much that in the end it comes to have a purpose the exact

opposite of that which it had at first.

This is not the only point of view from which the social impulse may

be regarded. On cold days people manage to get some warmth by crowding

together; and you can warm your mind in the same way--by bringing

it into contact with others. But a man who has a great deal of

intellectual warmth in himself will stand in no need of such

resources. I have written a little fable illustrating this: it may be

found elsewhere.[1] As a general rule, it may be said that a man's

sociability stands very nearly in inverse ratio to his intellectual

value: to say that "so and so" is very unsociable, is almost

tantamount to saying that he is a man of great capacity.

[Footnote 1: _Translator's Note_. The passage to which Schopenhauer

refers is _Parerga_: vol. ii. § 413 (4th edition). The fable is of

certain porcupines, who huddled together for warmth on a cold day;

but as they began to prick one another with their quills, they were

obliged to disperse. However the cold drove them together again, when

just the same thing happened. At last, after many turns of huddling

and dispersing, they discovered that they would be best off by

remaining at a little distance from one another. In the same way,

the need of society drives the human porcupines together--only to be

mutually repelled by the many prickly and disagreeable qualities of

their nature. The moderate distance which they at last discover to be

the only tolerable condition of intercourse, is the code of politeness

and fine manners; and those who transgress it are roughly told--in

the English phrase--_to keep their distance_. By this arrangement the

mutual need of warmth is only very moderately satisfied,--but then

people do not get pricked. A man who has some heat in himself prefers

to remain outside, where he will neither prick other people nor get

pricked himself.]

Solitude is doubly advantageous to such a man. Firstly, it allows

him to be with himself, and, secondly, it prevents him being with

others--an advantage of great moment; for how much constraint,

annoyance, and even danger there is in all intercourse with the world.

_Tout notre mal_, says La Bruyère, _vient de ne pouvoir être seul_. It

is really a very risky, nay, a fatal thing, to be sociable; because

it means contact with natures, the great majority of which are bad

morally, and dull or perverse, intellectually. To be unsociable is not

to care about such people; and to have enough in oneself to dispense

with the necessity of their company is a great piece of good fortune;

because almost all our sufferings spring from having to do with other

people; and that destroys the peace of mind, which, as I have said,

comes next after health in the elements of happiness. Peace of mind

is impossible without a considerable amount of solitude. The Cynics

renounced all private property in order to attain the bliss of having

nothing to trouble them; and to renounce society with the same object

is the wisest thing a man can do. Bernardin de Saint Pierre has the

very excellent and pertinent remark that to be sparing in regard

to food is a means of health; in regard to society, a means of

tranquillity--_la diète des ailmens nous rend la santé du corps, et

celle des hommes la tranquillité de l'âme._ To be soon on friendly, or

even affectionate, terms with solitude is like winning a gold mine;

but this is not something which everybody can do. The prime reason for

social intercourse is mutual need; and as soon as that is satisfied,

boredom drives people together once more. If it were not for these two

reasons, a man would probably elect to remain alone; if only because

solitude is the sole condition of life which gives full play to

that feeling of exclusive importance which every man has in his own

eyes,--as if he were the only person in the world! a feeling which,

in the throng and press of real life, soon shrivels up to nothing,

getting, at every step, a painful _démenti_. From this point of view

it may be said that solitude is the original and natural state of man,

where, like another Adam, he is as happy as his nature will allow.

But still, had Adam no father or mother? There is another sense in

which solitude is not the natural state; for, at his entrance into the

world, a man finds himself with parents, brothers, sisters, that is to

say, in society, and not alone. Accordingly it cannot be said that the

love of solitude is an original characteristic of human nature; it is

rather the result of experience and reflection, and these in their

turn depend upon the development of intellectual power, and increase

with the years.

Speaking generally, sociability stands in inverse ratio with age. A

little child raises a piteous cry of fright if it is left alone for

only a few minutes; and later on, to be shut up by itself is a great

punishment. Young people soon get on very friendly terms with one

another; it is only the few among them of any nobility of mind who are

glad now and then to be alone;--but to spend the whole day thus would

be disagreeable. A grown-up man can easily do it; it is little trouble

to him to be much alone, and it becomes less and less trouble as he

advances in years. An old man who has outlived all his friends, and is

either indifferent or dead to the pleasures of life, is in his proper

element in solitude; and in individual cases the special tendency

to retirement and seclusion will always be in direct proportion to

intellectual capacity.

For this tendency is not, as I have said, a purely natural one; it

does not come into existence as a direct need of human nature; it is

rather the effect of the experience we go through, the product

of reflection upon what our needs really are; proceeding, more

especially, from the insight we attain into the wretched stuff of

which most people are made, whether you look at their morals or their

intellects. The worst of it all is that, in the individual, moral and

intellectual shortcomings are closely connected and play into each

other's hands, so that all manner of disagreeable results are

obtained, which make intercourse with most people not only unpleasant

but intolerable. Hence, though the world contains many things which

are thoroughly bad, the worst thing in it is society. Even Voltaire,

that sociable Frenchman, was obliged to admit that there are

everywhere crowds of people not worth talking to: _la terre est

couverte de gens qui ne méritent pas qu'on leur parle_. And Petrarch

gives a similar reason for wishing to be alone--that tender spirit! so

strong and constant in his love of seclusion. The streams, the plains

and woods know well, he says, how he has tried to escape the perverse

and stupid people who have missed the way to heaven:--

_Cercato ho sempre solitaria vita

(Le rive il sanno, e le campagne e i boschi)

Per fuggir quest' ingegni storti e loschi

Che la strada del ciel' hanno smarrita_.

He pursues the same strain in that delightful book of his, _DeVita

Solitaria_, which seems to have given Zimmerman the idea of his

celebrated work on _Solitude_. It is the secondary and indirect

character of the love of seclusion to which Chamfort alludes in the

following passage, couched in his sarcastic vein: _On dit quelquefois

d'un homme qui vit seul, il n'aime pas la société. C'est souvent

comme si on disait d'un homme qu'il n'aime pas la promenade, sous le

pretexte qu'il ne se promène pas volontiers le soir dans le forêt de

Bondy_.

You will find a similar sentiment expressed by the Persian poet Sadi,

in his _Garden of Roses. Since that time_, he says, _we have taken

leave of society, preferring the path of seclusion; for there is

safety in solitude_. Angelus Silesius,[1] a very gentle and Christian

writer, confesses to the same feeling, in his own mythical language.

Herod, he says, is the common enemy; and when, as with Joseph, God

warns us of danger, we fly from the world to solitude, from Bethlehem

to Egypt; or else suffering and death await us!--

_Herodes ist ein Feind; der Joseph der Verstand,

Dem machte Gott die Gefahr im Traum (in Geist) bekannt;

Die Welt ist Bethlehem, Aegypten Einsamkeit,

Fleuch, meine Seele! fleuch, sonst stirbest du vor Leid_.

[Footnote 1: _Translator's Note_. Angelus Silesius, pseudonym for

Johannes Scheffler, a physician and mystic poet of the seventeenth

century (1624-77).]

Giordano Bruno also declares himself a friend of seclusion. _Tanti

uomini_, he says, _che in terra hanno voluto gustare vita

celeste, dissero con una voce, "ecce elongavi fugiens et mansi in

solitudine_"--those who in this world have desired a foretaste of the

divine life, have always proclaimed with one voice:

_Lo! then would I wander far off;

I would lodge in the wilderness._[1]

[Footnote 1: Psalms, lv. 7.]

And in the work from which I have already quoted, Sadi says of

himself: _In disgust with my friends at Damascus, I withdrew into

the desert about Jerusalem, to seek the society of the beasts of the

field_. In short, the same thing has been said by all whom Prometheus

has formed out of better clay. What pleasure could they find in the

company of people with whom their only common ground is just what is

lowest and least noble in their own nature--the part of them that is

commonplace, trivial and vulgar? What do they want with people who

cannot rise to a higher level, and for whom nothing remains but to

drag others down to theirs? for this is what they aim at. It is an

aristocratic feeling that is at the bottom of this propensity to

seclusion and solitude.

Rascals are always sociable--more's the pity! and the chief sign that

a man has any nobility in his character is the little pleasure he

takes in others' company. He prefers solitude more and more, and, in

course of time, comes to see that, with few exceptions, the world

offers no choice beyond solitude on one side and vulgarity on the

other. This may sound a hard thing to say; but even Angelus Silesius,

with all his Christian feelings of gentleness and love, was obliged to

admit the truth of it. However painful solitude may be, he says, be

careful not to be vulgar; for then you may find a desert everywhere:--

_Die Einsamkeit ist noth: doch sei nur nicht gemein,

So kannst du überall in einer Wüste sein_.

It is natural for great minds--the true teachers of humanity--to care

little about the constant company of others; just as little as the

schoolmaster cares for joining in the gambols of the noisy crowd of

boys which surround him. The mission of these great minds is to guide

mankind over the sea of error to the haven of truth--to draw it forth

from the dark abysses of a barbarous vulgarity up into the light of

culture and refinement. Men of great intellect live in the world

without really belonging to it; and so, from their earliest years,

they feel that there is a perceptible difference between them and

other people. But it is only gradually, with the lapse of years,

that they come to a clear understanding of their position. Their

intellectual isolation is then reinforced by actual seclusion in their

manner of life; they let no one approach who is not in some degree

emancipated from the prevailing vulgarity.

From what has been said it is obvious that the love of solitude is

not a direct, original impulse in human nature, but rather something

secondary and of gradual growth. It is the more distinguishing feature

of nobler minds, developed not without some conquest of natural

desires, and now and then in actual opposition to the promptings of

Mephistopheles--bidding you exchange a morose and soul-destroying

solitude for life amongst men, for society; even the worst, he says,

will give a sense of human fellowship:--

_Hör' auf mit deinem Gram zu spielen,

Der, wie ein Geier, dir am Leben frisst:

Die schlechteste Gesellschaft lässt dich fühlen

Dass du ein Mensch mit Menschen bist.[1]_

[Footnote 1: Goethe's _Faust_, Part I., 1281-5.]

To be alone is the fate of all great minds--a fate deplored at times,

but still always chosen as the less grievous of two evils. As

the years increase, it always becomes easier to say, Dare to be

wise--_sapere aude_. And after sixty, the inclination to be alone

grows into a kind of real, natural instinct; for at that age

everything combines in favor of it. The strongest impulse--the love of

woman's society--has little or no effect; it is the sexless condition

of old age which lays the foundation of a certain self-sufficiency,

and that gradually absorbs all desire for others' company. A thousand

illusions and follies are overcome; the active years of life are

in most cases gone; a man has no more expectations or plans or

intentions. The generation to which he belonged has passed away, and a

new race has sprung up which looks upon him as essentially outside its

sphere of activity. And then the years pass more quickly as we become

older, and we want to devote our remaining time to the intellectual

rather than to the practical side of life. For, provided that the mind

retains its faculties, the amount of knowledge and experience we have

acquired, together with the facility we have gained in the use of our

powers, makes it then more than ever easy and interesting to us to

pursue the study of any subject. A thousand things become clear which

were formerly enveloped in obscurity, and results are obtained which

give a feeling of difficulties overcome. From long experience of men,

we cease to expect much from them; we find that, on the whole, people

do not gain by a nearer acquaintance; and that--apart from a few rare

and fortunate exceptions--we have come across none but defective

specimens of human nature which it is advisable to leave in peace.

We are no more subject to the ordinary illusions of life; and as, in

individual instances, we soon see what a man is made of, we seldom

feel any inclination to come into closer relations with him. Finally,

isolation--our own society--has become a habit, as it were a second

nature to us, more especially if we have been on friendly terms with

it from our youth up. The love of solitude which was formerly indulged

only at the expense of our desire for society, has now come to be the

simple quality of our natural disposition--the element proper to our

life, as water to a fish. This is why anyone who possesses a unique

individuality--unlike others and therefore necessarily isolated--feels

that, as he becomes older, his position is no longer so burdensome as

when he was young.

For, as a matter of fact, this very genuine privilege of old age is

one which can be enjoyed only if a man is possessed of a certain

amount of intellect; it will be appreciated most of all where there is

real mental power; but in some degree by every one. It is only people

of very barren and vulgar nature who will be just as sociable in their

old age as they were in their youth. But then they become troublesome

to a society to which they are no longer suited, and, at most, manage

to be tolerated; whereas, they were formerly in great request.

There is another aspect of this inverse proportion between age and

sociability--the way in which it conduces to education. The younger

that people are, the more in every respect they have to learn; and it

is just in youth that Nature provides a system of mutual education,

so that mere intercourse with others, at that time of life, carries

instruction with it. Human society, from this point of view, resembles

a huge academy of learning, on the Bell and Lancaster system, opposed

to the system of education by means of books and schools, as something

artificial and contrary to the institutions of Nature. It is therefore

a very suitable arrangement that, in his young days, a man should be

a very diligent student at the place of learning provided by Nature

herself.

But there is nothing in life which has not some drawback--_nihil est

ab omni parte beatum_, as Horace says; or, in the words of an Indian

proverb, _no lotus without a stalk_. Seclusion, which has so many

advantages, has also its little annoyances and drawbacks, which are

small, however, in comparison with those of society; hence anyone who

is worth much in himself will get on better without other people than

with them. But amongst the disadvantages of seclusion there is one

which is not so easy to see as the rest. It is this: when people

remain indoors all day, they become physically very sensitive to

atmospheric changes, so that every little draught is enough to make

them ill; so with our temper; a long course of seclusion makes it so

sensitive that the most trivial incidents, words, or even looks, are

sufficient to disturb or to vex and offend us--little things which are

unnoticed by those who live in the turmoil of life.

When you find human society disagreeable and feel yourself justified

in flying to solitude, you can be so constituted as to be unable to

bear the depression of it for any length of time, which will probably

be the case if you are young. Let me advise you, then, to form the

habit of taking some of your solitude with you into society, to learn

to be to some extent alone even though you are in company; not to say

at once what you think, and, on the other hand, not to attach too

precise a meaning to what others say; rather, not to expect much of

them, either morally or intellectually, and to strengthen yourself in

the feeling of indifference to their opinion, which is the surest way

of always practicing a praiseworthy toleration. If you do that, you

will not live so much with other people, though you may appear to move

amongst them: your relation to them will be of a purely objective

character. This precaution will keep you from too close contact with

society, and therefore secure you against being contaminated or even

outraged by it.[1] Society is in this respect like a fire--the wise

man warming himself at a proper distance from it; not coming too

close, like the fool, who, on getting scorched, runs away and shivers

in solitude, loud in his complaint that the fire burns.

[Footnote 1: This restricted, or, as it were, entrenched kind of

sociability has been dramatically illustrated in a play--well worth

reading--of Moratin's, entitled _El Café o sea la Comedia Nuova_ (The

Cafe or the New Comedy), chiefly by one of the characters, Don Pedro

and especially in the second and third scenes of the first act.]

SECTION 10. _Envy_ is natural to man; and still, it is at once a vice

and a source of misery.[1] We should treat it as the enemy of our

happiness, and stifle it like an evil thought. This is the advice

given by Seneca; as he well puts it, we shall be pleased with what we

have, if we avoid the self-torture of comparing our own lot with

some other and happier one--_nostra nos sine comparatione delectent;

nunquam erit felix quem torquebit felicior.[2]_ And again, _quum

adspexeris quot te antecedent, cogita quot sequantur_[3]--if a great

many people appear to be better off than yourself, think how many

there are in a worse position. It is a fact that if real calamity

comes upon us, the most effective consolation--though it springs from

the same source as envy--is just the thought of greater misfortunes

than ours; and the next best is the society of those who are in the

same luck as we--the partners of our sorrows.

[Footnote 1: Envy shows how unhappy people are; and their constant

attention to what others do and leave undone, how much they are

bored.]

[Footnote 2: _De Ira_: iii., 30.]

[Footnote 3: Epist. xv.]

So much for the envy which we may feel towards others. As regards the

envy which we may excite in them, it should always be remembered that

no form of hatred is so implacable as the hatred that comes from envy;

and therefore we should always carefully refrain from doing anything

to rouse it; nay, as with many another form of vice, it is better

altogether to renounce any pleasure there may be in it, because of the

serious nature of its consequences.

Aristocracies are of three kinds: (1) of birth and rank; (2)

of wealth; and (3) of intellect. The last is really the most

distinguished of the three, and its claim to occupy the first position

comes to be recognized, if it is only allowed time to work. So eminent

a king as Frederick the Great admitted it--_les âmes privilegiées

rangent à l'égal des souverains_, as he said to his chamberlain, when

the latter expressed his surprise that Voltaire should have a seat

at the table reserved for kings and princes, whilst ministers and

generals were relegated to the chamberlain's.

Every one of these aristocracies is surrounded by a host of envious

persons. If you belong to one of them, they will be secretly

embittered against you; and unless they are restrained by fear, they

will always be anxious to let you understand that _you are no better

than they_. It is by their anxiety to let you know this, that they

betray how greatly they are conscious that the opposite is the truth.

The line of conduct to be pursued if you are exposed to envy, is to

keep the envious persons at a distance, and, as far as possible, avoid

all contact with them, so that there may be a wide gulf fixed between

you and them; if this cannot be done, to bear their attacks with the

greatest composure. In the latter case, the very thing that provokes

the attack will also neutralize it. This is what appears to be

generally done.

The members of one of these aristocracies usually get on very well

with those of another, and there is no call for envy between them,

because their several privileges effect an equipoise.

SECTION 11. Give mature and repeated consideration to any plan before

you proceed to carry it out; and even after you have thoroughly turned

it over in your mind, make some concession to the incompetency of

human judgment; for it may always happen that circumstances which

cannot be investigated or foreseen, will come in and upset the whole

of your calculation. This is a reflection that will always influence

the negative side of the balance--a kind of warning to refrain from

unnecessary action in matters of importance--_quieta non movere._ But

having once made up your mind and begun your work, you must let it

run its course and abide the result--not worry yourself by fresh

reflections on what is already accomplished, or by a renewal of your

scruples on the score of possible danger: free your mind from the

subject altogether, and refuse to go into it again, secure in the

thought that you gave it mature attention at the proper time. This is

the same advice as is given by an Italian proverb--_legala bene e poi

lascia la andare_--which Goethe has translated thus: See well to your

girths, and then ride on boldly.[1]

[Footnote 1: It may be observed, in passing, that a great many of

the maxims which Goethe puts under the head of _Proverbial_, are

translations from the Italian.]

And if, notwithstanding that, you fail, it is because human affairs

are the sport of chance and error. Socrates, the wisest of men, needed

the warning voice of his good genius, or [Greek: daimonion], to enable

him to do what was right in regard to his own personal affairs, or at

any rate, to avoid mistakes; which argues that the human intellect is

incompetent for the purpose. There is a saying--which is reported to

have originated with one of the Popes--that when misfortune happens to

us, the blame of it, at least in some degree, attaches to ourselves.

If this is not true absolutely and in every instance, it is certainly

true in the great majority of cases. It even looks as if this truth

had a great deal to do with the effort people make as far as possible

to conceal their misfortunes, and to put the best face they can upon

them, for fear lest their misfortunes may show how much they are to

blame.

SECTION 12.

In the case of a misfortune which has already happened and therefore

cannot be altered, you should not allow yourself to think that it

might have been otherwise; still less, that it might have been avoided

by such and such means; for reflections of this kind will only add

to your distress and make it intolerable, so that you will become a

tormentor to yourself--[Greek: heautontimoroumeaeos]. It is better to

follow the example of King David; who, as long as his son lay on the

bed of sickness, assailed Jehovah with unceasing supplications and

entreaties for his recovery; but when he was dead, snapped his fingers

and thought no more of it. If you are not light-hearted enough for

that, you can take refuge in fatalism, and have the great truth

revealed to you that everything which happens is the result of

necessity, and therefore inevitable.

However good this advice may be, it is one-sided and partial. In

relieving and quieting us for the moment, it is no doubt effective

enough; but when our misfortunes have resulted--as is usually the

case--from our own carelessness or folly, or, at any rate, partly by

our own fault, it is a good thing to consider how they might have

been avoided, and to consider it often in spite of its being a tender

subject--a salutary form of self-discipline, which will make us wiser

and better men for the future. If we have made obvious mistakes, we

should not try, as we generally do, to gloss them over, or to find

something to excuse or extenuate them; we should admit to ourselves

that we have committed faults, and open our eyes wide to all their

enormity, in order that we may firmly resolve to avoid them in time to

come. To be sure, that means a great deal of self-inflicted pain, in

the shape of discontent, but it should be remembered that to spare

the rod is to spoil the child--[Greek: ho mae dareis anthropos ou

paideuetai].[1]

[Footnote 1: Menander. Monost: 422.]

SECTION 13. In all matters affecting our weal or woe, we should be

careful not to let our imagination run away with us, and build no

castles in the air. In the first place, they are expensive to build,

because we have to pull them down again immediately, and that is

a source of grief. We should be still more on our guard against

distressing our hearts by depicting possible misfortunes. If these

were misfortunes of a purely imaginary kind, or very remote and

unlikely, we should at once see, on awaking from our dream, that the

whole thing was mere illusion; we should rejoice all the more in

a reality better than our dreams, or at most, be warned against

misfortunes which, though very remote, were still possible. These,

however, are not the sort of playthings in which imagination delights;

it is only in idle hours that we build castles in the air, and they

are always of a pleasing description. The matter which goes to form

gloomy dreams are mischances which to some extent really threaten us,

though it be from some distance; imagination makes us look larger and

nearer and more terrible than they are in reality. This is a kind of

dream which cannot be so readily shaken off on awaking as a pleasant

one; for a pleasant dream is soon dispelled by reality, leaving, at

most, a feeble hope lying in the lap of possibility. Once we have

abandoned ourselves to a fit of the blues, visions are conjured up

which do not so easily vanish again; for it is always just possible

that the visions may be realized. But we are not always able to

estimate the exact degree of possibility: possibility may easily

pass into probability; and thus we deliver ourselves up to torture.

Therefore we should be careful not to be over-anxious on any

matter affecting our weal or our woe, not to carry our anxiety to

unreasonable or injudicious limits; but coolly and dispassionately to

deliberate upon the matter, as though it were an abstract question

which did not touch us in particular. We should give no play to

imagination here; for imagination is not judgment--it only conjures up

visions, inducing an unprofitable and often very painful mood.

The rule on which I am here insisting should be most carefully

observed towards evening. For as darkness makes us timid and apt to

see terrifying shapes everywhere, there is something similar in the

effect of indistinct thought; and uncertainty always brings with it a

sense of danger. Hence, towards evening, when our powers of thought

and judgment are relaxed,--at the hour, as it were, of subjective

darkness,--the intellect becomes tired, easily confused, and unable

to get at the bottom of things; and if, in that state, we meditate

on matters of personal interest to ourselves, they soon assume a

dangerous and terrifying aspect. This is mostly the case at night,

when we are in bed; for then the mind is fully relaxed, and the power

of judgment quite unequal to its duties; but imagination is still

awake. Night gives a black look to everything, whatever it may be.

This is why our thoughts, just before we go to sleep, or as we lie

awake through the hours of the night, are usually such confusions and

perversions of facts as dreams themselves; and when our thoughts at

that time are concentrated upon our own concerns, they are generally

as black and monstrous as possible. In the morning all such nightmares

vanish like dreams: as the Spanish proverb has it, _noche tinta,

bianco el dia_--the night is colored, the day is white. But even

towards nightfall, as soon as the candles are lit, the mind, like the

eye, no longer sees things so clearly as by day: it is a time unsuited

to serious meditation, especially on unpleasant subjects. The morning

is the proper time for that--as indeed for all efforts without

exception, whether mental or bodily. For the morning is the youth of

the day, when everything is bright, fresh, and easy of attainment;

we feel strong then, and all our faculties are completely at our

disposal. Do not shorten the morning by getting up late, or waste it

in unworthy occupations or in talk; look upon it as the quintessence

of life, as to a certain extent sacred. Evening is like old age: we

are languid, talkative, silly. Each day is a little life: every waking

and rising a little birth, every fresh morning a little youth, every

going to rest and sleep a little death.

But condition of health, sleep, nourishment, temperature, weather,

surroundings, and much else that is purely external, have, in general,

an important influence upon our mood and therefore upon our thoughts.

Hence both our view of any matter and our capacity for any work are

very much subject to time and place. So it is best to profit by a good

mood--for how seldom it comes!--

_Nehmt die gute Stimmung wahr,

Denn sie kommt so selten_.[1]

[Footnote 1: Goethe.]

We are not always able to form new ideas about; our surroundings, or

to command original thoughts: they come if they will, and when they

will. And so, too, we cannot always succeed in completely considering

some personal matter at the precise time at which we have determined

beforehand to consider it, and just when we set ourselves to do

so. For the peculiar train of thought which is favorable to it may

suddenly become active without any special call being made upon

it, and we may then follow it up with keen interest. In this way

reflection, too, chooses its own time.

This reining-in of the imagination which I am recommending, will also

forbid us to summon up the memory of the past misfortune, to paint

a dark picture of the injustice or harm that has been done us, the

losses we have sustained, the insults, slights and annoyances to which

we have been exposed: for to do that is to rouse into fresh life all

those hateful passions long laid asleep--the anger and resentment

which disturb and pollute our nature. In an excellent parable,

Proclus, the Neoplatonist, points out how in every town the mob dwells

side by side with those who are rich and distinguished: so, too, in

every man, be he never so noble and dignified, there is, in the depth

of his nature, a mob of low and vulgar desires which constitute him an

animal. It will not do to let this mob revolt or even so much as peep

forth from its hiding-place; it is hideous of mien, and its rebel

leaders are those flights of imagination which I have been describing.

The smallest annoyance, whether it comes from our fellow-men or from

the things around us, may swell up into a monster of dreadful aspect,

putting us at our wits' end--and all because we go on brooding over

our troubles and painting them in the most glaring colors and on the

largest scale. It is much better to take a very calm and prosaic view

of what is disagreeable; for that is the easiest way of bearing it.

If you hold small objects close to your eyes, you limit your field of

vision and shut out the world. And, in the same way, the people or the

things which stand nearest, even though they are of the very smallest

consequence, are apt to claim an amount of attention much beyond

their due, occupying us disagreeably, and leaving no room for serious

thoughts and affairs of importance. We ought to work against this

tendency.

SECTION 14. The sight of things which do not belong to us is very apt

to raise the thought: _Ah, if that were only mine_! making us sensible

of our privation. Instead of that we should do better by more

frequently putting to ourselves the opposite case: _Ah, if that were

not mine_. What I mean is that we should sometimes try to look upon

our possessions in the light in which they would appear if we had lost

them; whatever they may be, property, health, friends, a wife or child

or someone else we love, our horse or our dog--it is usually only when

we have lost them that we begin to find out their value. But if we

come to look at things in the way I recommend, we shall be doubly the

gainers; we shall at once get more pleasure out of them than we did

before, and we shall do everything in our power to prevent the loss

of them; for instance, by not risking our property, or angering our

friends, or exposing our wives to temptation, or being careless about

our children's health, and so on.

We often try to banish the gloom and despondency of the present by

speculating upon our chances of success in the future; a process which

leads us to invent a great many chimerical hopes. Every one of them

contains the germ of illusion, and disappointment is inevitable when

our hopes are shattered by the hard facts of life.

It is less hurtful to take the chances of misfortune as a theme for

speculation; because, in doing so, we provide ourselves at once with

measures of precaution against it, and a pleasant surprise when it

fails to make its appearance. Is it not a fact that we always feel a

marked improvement in our spirits when we begin to get over a period

of anxiety? I may go further and say that there is some use in

occasionally looking upon terrible misfortunes--such as might happen

to us--as though they had actually happened, for then the trivial

reverses which subsequently come in reality, are much easier to

bear. It is a source of consolation to look back upon those great

misfortunes which never happened. But in following out this rule,

care must be taken not to neglect what I have said in the preceding

section.

SECTION 15. The things which engage our attention--whether they are

matters of business or ordinary events--are of such diverse kinds,

that, if taken quite separately and in no fixed order or relation,

they present a medley of the most glaring contrasts, with nothing in

common, except that they one and all affect us in particular. There

must be a corresponding abruptness in the thoughts and anxieties which

these various matters arouse in us, if our thoughts are to be in

keeping with their various subjects. Therefore, in setting about

anything, the first step is to withdraw our attention from everything

else: this will enable us to attend to each matter at its own time,

and to enjoy or put up with it, quite apart from any thought of our

remaining interests. Our thoughts must be arranged, as it were, in

little drawers, so that we may open one without disturbing any of the

others.

In this way we can keep the heavy burden of anxiety from weighing upon

us so much as to spoil the little pleasures of the present, or from

robbing us of our rest; otherwise the consideration of one matter will

interfere with every other, and attention to some important business

may lead us to neglect many affairs which happen to be of less moment.

It is most important for everyone who is capable of higher and nobler

thoughts to keep their mind from being so completely engrossed with

private affairs and vulgar troubles as to let them take up all his

attention and crowd out worthier matter; for that is, in a very real

sense, to lose sight of the true end of life--_propter vitam vivendi

perdere causas_.

Of course for this--as for so much else--self-control is necessary;

without it, we cannot manage ourselves in the way I have described.

And self-control may not appear so very difficult, if we consider that

every man has to submit to a great deal of very severe control on the

part of his surroundings, and that without it no form of existence

is possible. Further, a little self-control at the right moment may

prevent much subsequent compulsion at the hands of others; just as a

very small section of a circle close to the centre may correspond to

a part near the circumference a hundred times as large. Nothing

will protect us from external compulsion so much as the control of

ourselves; and, as Seneca says, to submit yourself to reason is

the way to make everything else submit to you--_si tibi vis omnia

subjicere, te subjice rationi_. Self-control, too, is something which

we have in our own power; and if the worst comes to the worst, and it

touches us in a very sensitive part, we can always relax its severity.

But other people will pay no regard to our feelings, if they have

to use compulsion, and we shall be treated without pity or mercy.

Therefore it will be prudent to anticipate compulsion by self-control.

SECTION 16. We must set limits to our wishes, curb our desires,

moderate our anger, always remembering that an individual can attain

only an infinitesimal share in anything that is worth having; and

that, on the other hand, everyone must incur many of the ills of life;

in a word, we must bear and forbear--_abstinere et sustinere_; and

if we fail to observe this rule, no position of wealth or power will

prevent us from feeling wretched. This is what Horace means when he

recommends us to study carefully and inquire diligently what will

best promote a tranquil life--not to be always agitated by fruitless

desires and fears and hopes for things, which, after all, are not

worth very much:--

_Inter cuncta leges et percontabere doctos

Qua ratione queas traducere leniter aevum;

Ne te semper inops agitet vexetque cupido,

Ne pavor, et rerum mediocriter utilium spes.[1]_

[Footnote 1: Epist. I. xviii. 97.]

SECTION 17. Life consists in movement, says Aristotle; and he is

obviously right. We exist, physically, because our organism is the

seat of constant motion; and if we are to exist intellectually, it can

only be by means of continual occupation--no matter with what so long

as it is some form of practical or mental activity. You may see that

this is so by the way in which people who have no work or nothing to

think about, immediately begin to beat the devil's tattoo with their

knuckles or a stick or anything that comes handy. The truth is, that

our nature is essentially _restless_ in its character: we very soon

get tired of having nothing to do; it is intolerable boredom. This

impulse to activity should be regulated, and some sort of method

introduced into it, which of itself will enhance the satisfaction we

obtain. Activity!--doing something, if possible creating something, at

any rate learning something--how fortunate it is that men cannot exist

without that! A man wants to use his strength, to see, if he can, what

effect it will produce; and he will get the most complete satisfaction

of this desire if he can make or construct something--be it a book or

a basket. There is a direct pleasure in seeing work grow under one's

hands day by day, until at last it is finished. This is the pleasure

attaching to a work of art or a manuscript, or even mere manual labor;

and, of course, the higher the work, the greater pleasure it will

give.

From this point of view, those are happiest of all who are conscious

of the power to produce great works animated by some significant

purpose: it gives a higher kind of interest--a sort of rare flavor--to

the whole of their life, which, by its absence from the life of the

ordinary man, makes it, in comparison, something very insipid. For

richly endowed natures, life and the world have a special interest

beyond the mere everyday personal interest which so many others share;

and something higher than that--a formal interest. It is from life and

the world that they get the material for their works; and as soon

as they are freed from the pressure of personal needs, it is to

the diligent collection of material that they devote their whole

existence. So with their intellect: it is to some extent of a two-fold

character, and devoted partly to the ordinary affairs of every

day--those matters of will which are common to them and the rest of

mankind, and partly to their peculiar work--the pure and objective

contemplation of existence. And while, on the stage of the world, most

men play their little part and then pass away, the genius lives a

double life, at once an actor and a spectator.

Let everyone, then, do something, according to the measure of his

capacities. To have no regular work, no set sphere of activity--what a

miserable thing it is! How often long travels undertaken for pleasure

make a man downright unhappy; because the absence of anything that can

be called occupation forces him, as it were, out of his right element.

Effort, struggles with difficulties! that is as natural to a man as

grubbing in the ground is to a mole. To have all his wants satisfied

is something intolerable--the feeling of stagnation which comes

from pleasures that last too long. To overcome difficulties is

to experience the full delight of existence, no matter where the

obstacles are encountered; whether in the affairs of life, in commerce

or business; or in mental effort--the spirit of inquiry that tries

to master its subject. There is always something pleasurable in the

struggle and the victory. And if a man has no opportunity to excite

himself, he will do what he can to create one, and according to his

individual bent, he will hunt or play Cup and Ball: or led on by this

unsuspected element in his nature, he will pick a quarrel with some

one, or hatch a plot or intrigue, or take to swindling and rascally

courses generally--all to put an end to a state of repose which is

intolerable. As I have remarked, _difficilis in otio quies_--it is

difficult to keep quiet if you have nothing to do.

SECTION 18. A man should avoid being led on by the phantoms of his

imagination. This is not the same thing as to submit to the guidance

of ideas clearly thought out: and yet these are rules of life which

most people pervert. If you examine closely into the circumstances

which, in any deliberation, ultimately turn the scale in favor of

some particular course, you will generally find that the decision is

influenced, not by any clear arrangement of ideas leading to a formal

judgment, but by some fanciful picture which seems to stand for one of

the alternatives in question.

In one of Voltaire's or Diderot's romances,--I forget the precise

reference,--the hero, standing like a young Hercules at the parting

of ways, can see no other representation of Virtue than his old tutor

holding a snuff-box in his left hand, from which he takes a pinch

and moralizes; whilst Vice appears in the shape of his mother's

chambermaid. It is in youth, more especially, that the goal of our

efforts comes to be a fanciful picture of happiness, which continues

to hover before our eyes sometimes for half and even for the whole of

our life--a sort of mocking spirit; for when we think our dream is to

be realized, the picture fades away, leaving us the knowledge that

nothing of what it promised is actually accomplished. How often this

is so with the visions of domesticity--the detailed picture of what

our home will be like; or, of life among our fellow-citizens or in

society; or, again, of living in the country--the kind of house we

shall have, its surroundings, the marks of honor and respect that will

be paid to us, and so on,--whatever our hobby may be; _chaque fou a

sa marotte_. It is often the same, too, with our dreams about one we

love. And this is all quite natural; for the visions we conjure up

affect us directly, as though they were real objects; and so they

exercise a more immediate influence upon our will than an abstract

idea, which gives merely a vague, general outline, devoid of details;

and the details are just the real part of it. We can be only

indirectly affected by an abstract idea, and yet it is the abstract

idea alone which will do as much as it promises; and it is the

function of education to teach us to put our trust in it. Of course

the abstract idea must be occasionally explained--paraphrased, as it

were--by the aid of pictures; but discreetly, _cum grano salis_.

SECTION 19. The preceding rule may be taken as a special case of the

more general maxim, that a man should never let himself be mastered

by the impressions of the moment, or indeed by outward appearances at

all, which are incomparably more powerful in their effects than the

mere play of thought or a train of ideas; not because these momentary

impressions are rich in virtue of the data they supply,--it is often

just the contrary,--but because they are something palpable to the

senses and direct in their working; they forcibly invade our mind,

disturbing our repose and shattering our resolutions.

It is easy to understand that the thing which lies before our very

eyes will produce the whole of its effect at once, but that time and

leisure are necessary for the working of thought and the appreciation

of argument, as it is impossible to think of everything at one and the

same moment. This is why we are so allured by pleasure, in spite of

all our determination to resist it; or so much annoyed by a criticism,

even though we know that its author it totally incompetent to

judge; or so irritated by an insult, though it comes from some very

contemptible quarter. In the same way, to mention no other instances,

ten reasons for thinking that there is no danger may be outweighed by

one mistaken notion that it is actually at hand. All this shows the

radical unreason of human nature. Women frequently succumb altogether

to this predominating influence of present impressions, and there are

few men so overweighted with reason as to escape suffering from a

similar cause.

If it is impossible to resist the effects of some external influence

by the mere play of thought, the best thing to do is to neutralize it

by some contrary influence; for example, the effect of an insult may

be overcome by seeking the society of those who have a good opinion of

us; and the unpleasant sensation of imminent danger may be avoided by

fixing our attention on the means of warding it off.

Leibnitz[1] tells of an Italian who managed to bear up under the

tortures of the rack by never for a moment ceasing to think of the

gallows which would have awaited him, had he revealed his secret; he

kept on crying out: _I see it! I see it_!--afterwards explaining that

this was part of his plan.

[Footnote 1: _Nouveaux Essais_. Liv. I. ch. 2. Sec. 11.]

It is from some such reason as this, that we find it so difficult to

stand alone in a matter of opinion,--not to be made irresolute by the

fact that everyone else disagrees with us and acts accordingly, even

though we are quite sure that they are in the wrong. Take the case of

a fugitive king who is trying to avoid capture; how much consolation

he must find in the ceremonious and submissive attitude of a faithful

follower, exhibited secretly so as not to betray his master's strict

_incognito_; it must be almost necessary to prevent him doubting his

own existence.

SECTION 20. In the first part of this work I have insisted upon the

great value of _health_ as the chief and most important element in

happiness. Let me emphasize and confirm what I have there said by

giving a few general rules as to its preservation.

The way to harden the body is to impose a great deal of labor and

effort upon it in the days of good health,--to exercise it, both as a

whole and in its several parts, and to habituate it to withstand all

kinds of noxious influences. But on the appearance of an illness or

disorder, either in the body as a whole or in many of its parts, a

contrary course should be taken, and every means used to nurse the

body, or the part of it which is affected, and to spare it any effort;

for what is ailing and debilitated cannot be hardened.

The muscles may be strengthened by a vigorous use of them; but not so

the nerves; they are weakened by it. Therefore, while exercising the

muscles in every way that is suitable, care should be taken to spare

the nerves as much as possible. The eyes, for instance, should be

protected from too strong a light,--especially when it is reflected

light,--from any straining of them in the dark, or from the

long-continued examination of minute objects; and the ears from too

loud sounds. Above all, the brain should never be forced, or used too

much, or at the wrong time; let it have a rest during digestion; for

then the same vital energy which forms thoughts in the brain has a

great deal of work to do elsewhere,--I mean in the digestive organs,

where it prepares chyme and chyle. For similar reasons, the brain

should never be used during, or immediately after, violent muscular

exercise. For the motor nerves are in this respect on a par with the

sensory nerves; the pain felt when a limb is wounded has its seat in

the brain; and, in the same way, it is not really our legs and arms

which work and move,--it is the brain, or, more strictly, that part of

it which, through the medium of the spine, excites the nerves in the

limbs and sets them in motion. Accordingly, when our arms and legs

feel tired, the true seat of this feeling is in the brain. This is why

it is only in connection with those muscles which are set in motion

consciously and voluntarily,--in other words, depend for their action

upon the brain,--that any feeling of fatigue can arise; this is not

the case with those muscles which work involuntarily, like the heart.

It is obvious, then, that injury is done to the brain if violent

muscular exercise and intellectual exertion are forced upon it at the

same moment, or at very short intervals.

What I say stands in no contradiction with the fact that at the

beginning of a walk, or at any period of a short stroll, there often

comes a feeling of enhanced intellectual vigor. The parts of the brain

that come into play have had no time to become tired; and besides,

slight muscular exercise conduces to activity of the respiratory

organs, and causes a purer and more oxydated supply of arterial blood

to mount to the brain.

It is most important to allow the brain the full measure of sleep

which is required to restore it; for sleep is to a man's whole nature

what winding up is to a clock.[1] This measure will vary directly with

the development and activity of the brain; to overstep the measure is

mere waste of time, because if that is done, sleep gains only so much

in length as it loses in depth.[2]

[Footnote 1: _Of. Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_, 4th Edition. Bk.

II. pp. 236-40.]

[Footnote: 2: _Cf. loc: cit_: p. 275. Sleep is a morsel of death

borrowed to keep up and renew the part of life which is exhausted by

the day--_le sommeil est un emprunt fait à la mort_. Or it might be

said that sleep is the interest we have to pay on the capital which is

called in at death; and the higher the rate of interest and the

more regularly it is paid, the further the date of redemption is

postponed.]

It should be clearly understood that thought is nothing but the

organic function of the brain; and it has to obey the same laws in

regard to exertion and repose as any other organic function. The brain

can be ruined by overstrain, just like the eyes. As the function of

the stomach is to digest, so it is that of the brain to think. The

notion of a _soul_,--as something elementary and immaterial, merely

lodging in the brain and needing nothing at all for the performance

of its essential function, which consists in always and unweariedly

_thinking_--has undoubtedly driven many people to foolish practices,

leading to a deadening of the intellectual powers; Frederick the

Great, even, once tried to form the habit of doing without sleep

altogether. It would be well if professors of philosophy refrained

from giving currency to a notion which is attended by practical

results of a pernicious character; but then this is just what

professorial philosophy does, in its old-womanish endeavor to keep on

good terms with the catechism. A man should accustom himself to

view his intellectual capacities in no other light than that of

physiological functions, and to manage them accordingly--nursing or

exercising them as the case may be; remembering that every kind of

physical suffering, malady or disorder, in whatever part of the body

it occurs, has its effect upon the mind. The best advice that I know

on this subject is given by Cabanis in his _Rapports du physique et du

moral de l'homme_.[1]

[Footnote 1: _Translator's Note_. The work to which Schopenhauer

here refers is a series of essays by Cabanis, a French philosopher

(1757-1808), treating of mental and moral phenomena on a physiological

basis. In his later days, Cabanis completely abandoned his

materialistic standpoint.]

Through neglect of this rule, many men of genius and great scholars

have become weak-minded and childish, or even gone quite mad, as they

grew old. To take no other instances, there can be no doubt that the

celebrated English poets of the early part of this century, Scott,

Wordsworth, Southey, became intellectually dull and incapable towards

the end of their days, nay, soon after passing their sixtieth year;

and that their imbecility can be traced to the fact that, at that

period of life, they were all led on? by the promise of high pay, to

treat literature as a trade and to write for money. This seduced them

into an unnatural abuse of their intellectual powers; and a man who

puts his Pegasus into harness, and urges on his Muse with the whip,

will have to pay a penalty similar to that which is exacted by the

abuse of other kinds of power.

And even in the case of Kant, I suspect that the second childhood of

his last four years was due to overwork in later life, and after he

had succeeded in becoming a famous man.

Every month of the year has its own peculiar and direct influence upon

health and bodily condition generally; nay, even upon the state of the

mind. It is an influence dependent upon the weather.

CHAPTER III.

OUR RELATION TO OTHERS.--SECTION 21.

In making his way through life, a man will find it useful to be ready

and able to do two things: to look ahead and to overlook: the one

will protect him from loss and injury, the other from disputes and

squabbles.

No one who has to live amongst men should absolutely discard any

person who has his due place in the order of nature, even though he is

very wicked or contemptible or ridiculous. He must accept him as an

unalterable fact--unalterable, because the necessary outcome of an

eternal, fundamental principle; and in bad cases he should

remember the words of Mephistopheles: _es muss auch solche Käuze

geben[1]_--there must be fools and rogues in the world. If he acts

otherwise, he will be committing an injustice, and giving a challenge

of life and death to the man he discards. No one can alter his

own peculiar individuality, his moral character, his intellectual

capacity, his temperament or physique; and if we go so far as to

condemn a man from every point of view, there will be nothing left him

but to engage us in deadly conflict; for we are practically allowing

him the right to exist only on condition that he becomes another

man--which is impossible; his nature forbids it.

[Footnote 1: Goethe's _Faust_, Part I.]

So if you have to live amongst men, you must allow everyone the right

to exist in accordance with the character he has, whatever it turns

out to be: and all you should strive to do is to make use of this

character in such a way as its kind and nature permit, rather than to

hope for any alteration in it, or to condemn it off-hand for what it

is. This is the true sense of the maxim--Live and let live. That,

however, is a task which is difficult in proportion as it is right;

and he is a happy man who can once for all avoid having to do with a

great many of his fellow creatures.

The art of putting up with people may be learned by practicing

patience on inanimate objects, which, in virtue of some mechanical

or general physical necessity, oppose a stubborn resistance to our

freedom of action--a form of patience which is required every day.

The patience thus gained may be applied to our dealings with men,

by accustoming ourselves to regard their opposition, wherever we

encounter it, as the inevitable outcome of their nature, which sets

itself up against us in virtue of the same rigid law of necessity as

governs the resistance of inanimate objects. To become indignant at

their conduct is as foolish as to be angry with a stone because it

rolls into your path. And with many people the wisest thing you can

do, is to resolve to make use of those whom you cannot alter.

The Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer; Counsels and Maxims · 第 1 / 26 章