MAN AND THE APE.
The primary object of the present essay is to ascertain whether the
conclusion arrived at by Mr. Darwin and other writers as to the origin
of man—that he has sprung from the ape by simple descent—can be
depended on, and if not, what is the nature of man’s relationship to
the animal kingdom.
Without further preface, I shall proceed to consider as briefly as
possible the main arguments adduced by Mr. Darwin in support of this
conclusion.[364] Those which are derived from the consideration of
physical data appear to me to be of comparatively small importance,
since they may be admitted without seriously affecting the question
at issue. They are almost all connected with the fact that man is
“constructed on the same general type or model with other mammals.”
Thus it is with the brain, every chief fissure and fold of which is
declared to be developed in the brain of the orang equally with that of
man. Their constitutional habit, however, appears also to be the same.
Thus man and monkeys are liable to many of the same non-contagious
diseases; medicines produce the same effect on both, and most mammals
exhibit the mysterious law of periodicity in various diseases. These
are interesting facts, but the most important for the argument of the
ape-descent of man are those which show the existence in the human
body of certain rudimentary organs and structures which are fully
developed with some of the lower animals. It is possible, however, to
explain this phenomenon without having recourse to the hypothesis of
a simple ape-descent; even if it be admitted with M. Broca, that in
the parallel between man and the anthropoids, the comparison of organs
shows only some slight differences.[365] This may be granted even as
to the brain, and that “the immense superiority of man’s intelligence
depends, not on the anatomical structure of his brain, but on its
volume and power.”[366] But then, if such is the case, it is all the
more difficult to account for the vast difference which, says Broca, a
comparison of function reveals, and which led M. Gratiolet to exclaim
that, although man is indeed by his structure a monkey, yet by his
intelligence he is a God.[367]
While admitting that physiological considerations reveal a much
wider interval between man and the anthropoid apes than anatomical
data require, M. Broca would hardly allow that the former exhibits
anything peculiar in his mental action. So, also, Mr. Darwin says that
man and the higher mammals “have some few instincts in common. All
have the same senses, intuitions, and sensations—similar passions,
affections, and emotions, even the more complex ones; they feel
wonder and curiosity; they possess the same faculties of imitation,
attention, memory, imagination, and reason, though in very different
degrees.”[368] The faculty of articulate speech, moreover, is said
not in itself to offer “any insuperable objection to the belief that
man has been developed from some lower form;” while the taste for
the “beautiful” is shown not to be peculiar to the human mind.[369]
The moral sense is supposed by Mr. Darwin to be the most distinctive
characteristic of man; but even this is asserted to have been developed
out of the social instincts which man and many of the lower animals
have in common.[370] Finally, self-consciousness, abstraction, &c.,
even if peculiar to man, are declared to be “the incidental results of
other highly-advanced intellectual faculties;”[371] and these again
are mainly due to the continued use of a highly-developed language,
which originated in “the imitation and modification, aided by signs and
gestures, of various natural sounds, the voices of other animals and
man’s own instinctive cries.”[372]
If, however, all this be true, how are we to account for the wonderful
intellectual superiority of man? Haeckel gives an explanation which,
although ingenious, is far from satisfactory. He says that it is
owing to the fact that “man combines in himself several prominent
peculiarities, which only occur separately among other animals.” The
most important of these are the superior structure of the larynx, the
degree of brain or soul development, and that of the extremities, the
upright walk, and, lastly, speech. But, says Haeckel, “all these
prerogatives belong singly to other animals—birds with highly-organised
larynx and tongue, such as the parrot, &c., can learn to utter
articulate sounds as perfectly as man himself. The soul’s activity
exists among many of the higher animals, particularly with the dog,
the elephant, and the horse, in a higher degree of cultivation than
with man when most degraded. The hand, as a mechanical instrument,
is as highly developed among the anthropoid apes as with the lowest
men. Finally, man shares his upright walk with the penguin and
other animals, while capacity for locomotion is more fully and more
perfectly developed among many animals than with man.” Haeckel
concludes, therefore, that it is “solely the fortunate combination of
a higher organisation of several very important organs and functions
which raises most men, but not all, above the animals.”[373] This
explanation, however, appears rather to increase the difficulty than to
remove it. Some of Haeckel’s statements might probably be challenged
with success; but even admitting their truth, what cause can be given
of the marvellous combination in man, of qualities possessed separately
by animals, the highest in the class to which they belong?
Mr. Darwin justly remarks, that “the belief that there exists in man
some close relation between the size of the brain and the development
of the intellectual faculties, is supported by the comparison of the
skulls of savage and civilised races of ancient and modern peoples,
and by the analogy of the whole vertebrate series.”[374] There must,
indeed, be a certain agreement between the brain and its intellectual
products, and hence the large size of the human brain requires that
the mental phenomena of man should be of a vastly superior nature
to those presented by the lower animals. Whether, according to the
developmental view of the correspondence between human and brute mental
faculties, the lower races of man, as compared with animals, really
exhibit an intellectual superiority commensurate with the largeness
of their brains, may be questioned. Mr. Wallace, indeed, declares
that they do not, and he goes so far as to say that “a brain slightly
larger than that of the gorilla would, according to the evidence
before us, fully have sufficed for the limited mental development of
the savage.”[375] This opinion is correct, on the assumption that
animal and human mental action is perfectly analogous, and Mr. Wallace
would undoubtedly be right in asserting that the savage possesses a
brain “quite disproportionate to his actual requirements,” if by this
phrase is meant his mere animal wants. But the savage is a man, and
the size of brain required by him must be judged of, not by the degree
of intellectual action he exhibits, but by its accompaniments—not by
quantity, but by quality.
The source of man’s superiority must be sought in an examination of
his mental faculties, and yet the inquiry is vitiated at the very
commencement, by the assumption that the mind of man differs from that
of the animal only in the degree of its activity. I am prepared to
admit that the higher mammalia, at least, have the power of reasoning,
with all the faculties which are essential to its exercise. But this
very fact makes it utterly incomprehensible how the result of human
mental activity can be so superior, unless some further principle or
faculty than those which the animal mind possesses operates in that of
man. What this principle or faculty is, may be shown by reference to
certain facts connected with language. Mr. Darwin ascribes the origin
of human speech to imitation and modification of natural sounds and
man’s own instinctive utterances.[376] That the primitive elements
of man’s language were thus obtained is doubtless true. Something
else, however, is required to explain the phenomena presented by the
languages of uncultured peoples. Such, for instance, cannot have been
the origin of certain ideas which are apparently common to the minds
of all peoples however savage. It has been said that these peoples,
although having names for every particular object, have no words to
express a class of objects. This statement must be received with
caution. But if absolutely true in the sense intended, it cannot be
denied that nearly all primitive languages have words denoting colours,
and these by their very nature, as expressive of attributes, are
applicable to a series of objects.
Now there is not the slightest reason to believe that animals have
any idea of qualities, as such. Even the taste for the beautiful,
which Mr. Darwin tells us is not unknown to various animals—especially
birds, has relation to the object which attracts by its colour, &c.,
and not to the colour itself. But it is just this perception of the
qualities of objects which is at the foundation, and forms the starting
point, of all human progress. The essential instrument of intellectual
development, articulate language, was first prompted by such a
perception, and it was in the recognition of the qualities of actions,
by reflection on their consequences, that the moral sense was gradually
evolved. It can hardly be that a power which has had so wonderful an
effect, and one which is so different from anything met with among the
lower animals, can be referred to any of the ordinary faculties which
these possess. If not, we must ascribe it to a new faculty altogether,
a kind of spiritual insight, which can be explained only as resulting
from the addition of a principle of activity superior to that which is
the seat of the animal life. If we were to trace the beginning of every
single branch of human culture, it would be found to have originated in
the exercise of such a faculty of reflection as that here described.
The elements of knowledge man possesses in common with the animals
around him; but these have not built up any superstructure, because
they have no spiritual insight such as will enable them to analyse
those elements, and thus to fit them for re-combination into that
wonderful series of forms which they have taken in the human mind.
It is hardly necessary to discuss here the nature of the principle
which thus shows its energy in the mind of man. Whether it is the
cause or the effect of the refined organisation exhibited by the human
body need not now be considered. If the latter, however, it may be
objected that—assuming the human bodily organism to have been derived
by descent from a lower animal form, according to the principles of
natural selection—the intellectual faculty peculiar to man must have
had analogous origin. To this it might be answered that man’s special
faculty could not have been derived from an animal organism which
does not itself possess it; but it is advisable rather to test that
conclusion by a consideration of the physical data, and to see how far
the argument for natural descent can be supported. According to this
view, the tendency to the bipedal character was the first to become
operative in the gradual development of man out of the ape. The erect
form is supposed, however, to have been assumed that the arms and hands
might have full play,[377] and it is evident that the free use of these
would not have been of any special advantage without an increased
brain-activity to guide them. Probably the changes required in the
physical structure would be concomitant, but if they had a starting
point it would surely be in the brain rather than in the extremities.
The great development of the encephalon in man as compared with
the monkey tribe would, in fact, require all the other supposed
changes. Thus the greatly increased size and weight of the brain and
its bony case, combined with the position of the foramen magnum
at the base of the skull, would necessitate the erect position of
the body, and this would supply the arms and upper part of the
trunk with the required freedom of movement. These changes would be
accompanied by the modification of the pelvis and lower limbs, while
the increased sensitiveness of the skin, resulting from man’s more
refined nervous structure, will sufficiently account for its general
nakedness,[378] without supposing, with Mr. Darwin, the influence of
sexual selection.[379] It is therefore in reality only the large size
of the human brain that has to be accounted for, and this is by no
means easy on the principle of natural selection. No doubt, with the
increased activity of the mental powers, the brain would become more
voluminous. But what was to determine that increased activity? It can
only have been an improvement in the conditions of existence, to which
man’s supposed ape progenitors were subjected, for which no sufficient
reason can be given. Moreover, those progenitors would be subjected
to the inevitable struggle for existence—a struggle which, even with
man, in an uncivilised state, has a tendency to brutalise rather than
to humanise. Under these conditions it would seem to be impossible for
man to have raised himself to so great a superiority over his nearest
allies as even the lowest savage exhibits. “His absolute erectness of
posture, the completeness of his nudity, the harmonious perfection of
his hands, the almost infinite capacities of his brain, constitute,”
says Mr. Wallace, “a series of correlated advances too great to be
accounted for by the struggle for existence of an isolated group of
apes in a limited area,”[380] as Mr. Darwin’s hypothesis supposes.
While firmly convinced, on the grounds already stated, that man cannot
have been derived from the ape by descent with natural selection, I
am by no means prepared to admit that he may not have been so derived
under other conditions. Although man undoubtedly has a mental faculty
of the utmost importance which the animals do not possess, agreeing
with his superiority of physical structure, there can be no question
that, both physically and mentally, he is most intimately allied to
the members of the animal kingdom. Before endeavouring to furnish a
solution of the difficult question of the origin of man under these
conditions, I would point out, what is so ably insisted on by M.
Broca,[381] that _transformism_, to use the continental term, is wholly
distinct from “natural selection,” or any other mode by which the
transformation may be originated or effected. This is a most important
consideration, and one which Mr. Darwin has incidentally referred
to.[382] That man is the final term in a process of evolution, the
beginning of which we cannot yet trace, appears to me to be a firmly
established truth. The descent of man from the ape under the influence
of external conditions is, however, a totally different proposition,
and one of which no actual proof has yet been furnished, the argument
really amounting to this, that the correspondences between man and the
higher mammals render it more likely that he has descended from the
ape than that he has been specially created. This may be true, and yet
those correspondences be owing to a very different cause from the one
thus supposed for them.
Mr. Herbert Spencer affirms that “successive changes of conditions
would produce divergent varieties or species” of the organisms subject
to them, apart from the influence of “natural selection,” which, in
the absence of such successive changes of conditions, would effect
“comparatively little.”[383] It is to the latter especially Mr. Spencer
traces the gradual evolution of nature, on the process of which he has
thrown so much light. Thus, when treating elsewhere of that evolution,
he says, “While we are not called on to suppose that there exists in
organisms any primordial impulse which makes them continually unfold
into more heterogeneous forms; we see that a liability to be unfolded
arises from the actions and reactions between organisms and their
fluctuating environments. And we see that the existence of such a
cause of development pre-supposes the non-occurrence of development
where this fluctuation of actions and reactions does not come into
play.”[384] It is evident that this theory, like that of Mr. Darwin,
supposes the occurrence of slight structural changes which, in the
absence of knowledge as to their exciting causes, may be described as
“spontaneous,” and the perpetuation of which is the establishment of
new forms or species. But among domestic animals, and by analogy we may
assume, therefore, among wild animals, variation in the way supposed
is not the only mode by which the physical structure may be modified.
Various instances of sudden change have been collected which are very
difficult to deal with, and they have led Mr. Huxley to remark that Mr.
Darwin’s position “might have been even stronger than it is if he had
not embarrassed himself with the aphorism ‘_natura non facit saltum_,’
which turns up so often in his pages.” Mr. Huxley adds “that nature
does make jumps now and then, and a recognition of the fact is of no
small importance in disposing of many minor objections to the doctrine
of transmutation.”[385] Minor objections may certainly be thus removed,
but only by introducing one of much greater moment. If, as Mr. Spencer
says, “natural selection is capable of _producing_ fitness between
organisms and their circumstances,”[386] it must be by the perpetuation
of slight changes, and there does not, indeed, appear to be any room in
the hypothesis of natural selection for the saltatory movements which it
is so necessary to explain.
The changes which organisms undergo, whether sudden or gradual, and
whatever their approximate exciting cause, take place in pursuance of
the evolution of organic nature, and there can be no doubt that this
proceeds under the guidance of law. Professor Owen expresses this fact
in saying that “generations do not vary accidentally in any and every
direction, but in preordained, definite, and correlated courses.”[387]
This may be accepted as expressing a general truth, subject to some
qualification of the word “preordained.” It is not exactly true,
however, for variations are not always regular and orderly. Within
certain limits, indeed, they would seem to take place in any direction,
but there is always a tendency for them to accumulate in that course
along which they meet with the least resistance. This is in accordance
with the principle laid down by Mr. Herbert Spencer, that everything
tends towards equilibration, the state being one not of absolute but of
moving equilibrium, while “throughout evolution of all kinds there is a
continual approximation, and more or less complete maintenance of this
moving equilibrium.”[388] The ultimate result is that, “when through
a change of habit or circumstance an organism is permanently subject
to some new influence, or different amount of an old influence, there
arises, after more or less disturbance of the old rhythms, a balancing
of them around the new average conditions produced by this additional
influence.”[389] It is evident that the variations which have been
originated before the attainment of the state of temporary stability
thus established would have little chance of being perpetuated; and we
have probably here the explanation of the fact that the progress of
evolution reveals itself so often by sudden movements. In these cases,
where the disturbing influence has rendered the equilibrium of the
organism affected more or less unstable, a new centre of equilibrium
will be formed, and the appearance of a fresh specific form be the
result.
However fitted this explanation may be to account for the gaps
which so often present themselves in developmental series of animal
structures, it is far from sufficient to account for the origin of
man, at least on the assumption of evolution governed merely by
mechanical principles. Neither man nor animals, in fact, could have
come into being at all unless there had been an organic necessity,
quite independent even of the general average effects of the relations
of living bodies to their environments, insisted on by Mr. Spencer.
That these agencies have been very influential in the evolution of
organic nature is undoubtedly true. But their influence in this
respect depends altogether on the organism on which they act being
in a condition of unstable equilibrium. Mr. Spencer declares, when
speaking of the condition of homogeneity being a condition of unstable
equilibrium, that this instability is “consequent on the fact that the
several parts of any homogeneous aggregation are necessarily exposed
to different forces—forces that differ either in kind or amount.”[390]
This may be true in relation to animal and vegetable forms, whose germs
are supposed not to show the slightest trace of the future organism,
although even as to these Mr. Spencer can say that “doubtless we are
still in the dark respecting those mysterious properties which make
the germ, when subject to fit influences, undergo the special changes
beginning this series of transformations.”[391] But the unstable
condition of the primeval homogeneous substance of nature could not
be due to the cause assigned. For it requires the impossible case
of certain forces, the action of which is supposed to result in the
condition of instability, existing _outside_ of that substance which,
as being identified with the Absolute, we must assume to be present
throughout all space. The notion of an universally diffused homogeneous
substance, acted on by external forces, appears to be contrary to
reason; and the proper explanation of the original condition of
instability would seem to be that it is natural to the primeval
substance as the result of an innate energy, the internal force which
constitutes its vitality. But this substance cannot have been merely
“material.” There is just as little room for transition from the
inorganic to the organic as from the animal to man; there is but one
satisfactory starting-point—nature itself viewed as organic.
If such is the case when the changes observable in nature are viewed
as strictly evolutional, much more so is it when they are traced to
the lower activity of natural selection. Mr. J. J. Murphy well remarks
that “the facts of variability being the greatest in the lowest
organisms, while progress has been most rapid among the higher ones,
shows that there is something in organic progress which mere natural
selection among spontaneous variations will not account for.”[392]
Elsewhere the same writer declares that “no solution of the questions
of the origin of organisation and the origin of organic species can be
adequate which does not recognise an organising intelligence over and
above the common laws of matter”—_i.e._, the laws of self-adaptation to
circumstances and natural selection.[393] This organising intelligence
is supposed to have been bestowed once for all on vitalised matter by
the Creator, so as to prevent the necessity of separately organising
each particular structure,[394] although it is suggested that man’s
spiritual nature may be a direct result of creative power.[395] Mr.
Wallace objects to the law of “unconscious intelligence,” that “it has
the double disadvantage of being both unintelligible and incapable of
any kind of proof.”[396] This is true enough, but it has the equally
serious defect of reintroducing the notion of special “creation,”
with all the difficulties attendant on the origin of matter, and the
separate existence of independent spiritual and material substances.
Mr. Wallace himself is so much struck with the imposing position
occupied by man that he thinks that “a superior intelligence has
guided the development of man in a definite direction and for a
special purpose, just as man guides the development of many animal
and vegetable forms.”[397] He supposes, moreover, that “the whole
universe is not merely dependent on, but actually _is_, the WILL of
higher intelligences, or of one supreme intelligence.”[398] It seems to
me, although Mr. Wallace thinks otherwise, that this notion completely
undermines the hypothesis of natural selection. If not only the whole
universe, but also a particular portion of it—man—has been divinely
“willed,” analogy will lead us to believe that every other portion of
the whole has thus originated.
The difficulties attendant on theories such as those of Mr. Murphy and
Mr. Wallace, and the unsatisfactory explanation afforded by the theory
of evolution, as usually understood, of the origin of man, have led
me to the opinion that nature as a whole is organic, and that man is
the necessary result of its evolution. Not only so, however; man must
be viewed as the real object of the evolution of nature viewed as a
living organism. Without him nature itself would be imperfect, and all
lower animal forms must, therefore, be considered as subsidiary to the
human organism, and as so many stages only towards its attainment.
But if living nature is an organic whole, its several parts must be
intimately connected. Hence the numerous correspondences between man
and the higher mammals cannot be accidental or even merely designed
similarities. They betoken an actual and intimate connection between
the organisms presenting them, and such an one as is consistent only
with a derivation of one from the other. This view differs from that
of Mr. Darwin, not in the fact of man’s derivation from the ape, but
in the mode and conditions under which it has taken place. Derivation,
by virtue of an inherent evolutional impulse, is totally different
from simple descent, aided by natural selection. In the latter case
the appearance of man may be described as in some sense accidental;
in the former, not only is it necessary, but it is that for which all
evolution has taken place, the only condition, in fact, under which
evolution was possible.
How far such a development of organic forms as I have supposed is
consistent with design is a difficult question. It is apparent that
when nature is conceived of as forming an organic whole, the universe
becomes identified with the Absolute, of whose being relative nature is
merely an expression. But is not the possession by relative existences
of intellectual faculties, and of the marvellous power of insight or
reflection, evidence that the same powers belong also to the absolute
Being? The possession by man of intelligence is, in fact, proof that
organic nature is intelligent. Still, however, the need of design is
not apparent. Granting that relative nature has been evolved out of the
absolute existence, such evolution can have taken only one course—that
which led to man, who could appear only when the conditions of nature
were fitted for him, and who _must_ appear when those conditions were
so fitted. Moreover, as man was from the beginning the object of
organic evolution, this must have taken place along the line which led
to him, without any actually preconceived design or intention other
than that which is implied in the preknowledge of man’s appearance. It
does not follow, however, that other branches of organic nature besides
that which ended in man may not have reached a stage of structural
perfection. No doubt they have so done, and thus we can understand
how it is that certain animals seem to have been, as Professor Owen
asserts, “predestined and prepared for man.” The fitness pointed out by
our great anatomist “of the organisation of the horse and ass for the
needs of mankind, and the coincidence of the origin of the Ungulates
having equine modifications of the perissodactyle structure with
the period immediately preceding, or coincident with, the earliest
evidence of the human race,” is certainly remarkable.[399] I cannot see
in these facts, however, anything more than a necessary coincidence
arising from the progress of evolution along different planes. It
is possible, however, that Professor Owen may mean little more than
this, and that he would be satisfied to admit the identity between the
“predetermining” agent and organic nature, acting by virtue of the laws
of its own evolutional impulse. So at least may be supposed from the
fact that he rejects “the principle of direct or miraculous creation,”
and recognises “a ‘natural law or secondary cause’ as operative in the
production of species in orderly succession and progression.”[400] It
is difficult to understand how otherwise there could be an “innate
tendency to deviate from the parental type.”
Before concluding, reference should be made to certain facts
connected with the development of the brain and the human organism
generally, which at first sight seem to be quite irreconcilable with
the notion of man’s derivation from the ape, even under the conditions
I have proposed. Thus, M. Pruner Bey has shown that in man and the
anthropomorphous apes there exists “an _inverse order_ of the final
term of development in the sensitive and vegetative apparatus, and in
the systems of locomotion and reproduction.” The same inverse order
is exhibited in the development of individual organs. Thus it is,
says Pruner Bey, with a portion of the permanent teeth; Welcher makes
a similar remark as to the modifications of the base of the skull in
relation to the sphenoidal angle of Virchow; and Gratiolet points out
an analogous fact in the development of the brain. The language of
the great French anatomist is very precise. He says: “With man and
the adult anthropormorphous apes there exists a certain resemblance
in the mode of arrangement in the cerebral folds which has imposed
on some persons and on which they have strongly insisted. But this
result is attained _by an inverse process_ (_marche inverse_). In
the monkey the temporosphenoidal convolutions which form the middle
lobe appear and perfect themselves before the anterior convolutions
which form the frontal lobe. With man, on the contrary, the frontal
convolutions appear the first, and those of the middle lobe show
themselves the last.” In referring to these facts, M. de Quatrefages
declares that “when two organised beings follow an inverse course
in their development, the more highly developed of the two cannot
have descended from the other by means of evolution.”[401] If by
evolution is meant simple descent under the influence of natural
selection and modification of external conditions, this conclusion is
certainly correct. It is true that, contrary to the opinion expressed
by Gratiolet, that “the human brain differs the more from that of the
monkey the less it is developed, and an arrest of development can only
exaggerate this natural difference.”[402] M. Carl Vogt declares that
the human brain may, under certain conditions, not only externally
resemble that of the higher apes, but also that the superior portion
of it (_parties voûtées_) in microcephalic idiots is really developed
after the simian type,[403] the skull itself having both simian and
human elements.[404] But does not the fact that the lower part of the
microcephalic skull, and the portion of the brain which is the earliest
developed, are formed on the human type, amply justify the assertion of
Gratiolet that “the microcephale, however degraded, is not a brute, but
only a modified man?” Is it not evident, moreover, that however highly
an ape brain may be developed, it could not become like that of a man,
at least by descent with natural selection? It is different, however,
if we view man as the necessary product of the evolution of organic
nature. We may well believe that when the sudden advance from the ape
structure to that of man was made, under the conditions above proposed,
the great increase in the size of the brain and the change in the
position of the foramen magnum were accompanied by an alteration in the
order of development, not only of the different parts of the brain,
but also of the internal apparatus as pointed out by M. Pruner Bey.
But the advance having once taken place, the human type can no more be
lost; and although the approach to the simian type which appears in the
abnormal microcephalic brain evidences the intimate connection between
man and the ape, yet it furnishes no disproof of derivation, one from
the other, by the agency of internal evolutional impulse.
In conclusion, I would again refer to the fact, so strongly insisted
on by M. Broca, that the truth of the theory of evolution is not
dependent on that of the hypothesis of natural selection. The great
defect of “natural selection” as an agent in organic evolution, is that
it cannot do more than perpetuate certain structural peculiarities,
the appearance of which it is powerless to explain. The hypothesis is
properly defined as “natural selection among spontaneous variations;”
and it is the appearance of these variations which constitutes the
most important part of the problem. They can be explained only on the
assumption of “an internal tendency to deviate from the parental type;”
and granting that this tendency results from a necessary evolution
of nature viewed as an organic whole, there is no difficulty in
accounting for all the facts dwelt on by Mr. Darwin without supposing
the derivation of man from the ape by simple descent, although not
without identifying the universe with Deity, and viewing its various
manifestations as His organs.
FOOTNOTES:
[364] “The Descent of Man,” vol. i., p. 10, _et seq._
[365] “L’Ordre des Primates,” p. 173 (1870).
[366] _Ibid._, p. 168.
[367] _Ibid._, p. 173.
[368] _Op. cit._, vol. i., p. 48.
[369] _Ibid._, p. 63.
[370] _Ibid._, p. 70, _et seq._
[371] _Ibid._, p. 105.
[372] _Ibid._, p. 56.
[373] “Generelle Morphologie der Organismen,” vol. ii., p. 430 (1866).
[374] _Op. cit._, vol. i., p. 145.
[375] “Natural Selection,” p. 343 (1870).
[376] _Op. cit._, vol. i., p. 56.
[377] Darwin, _op. cit._, vol. i., p. 141.
[378] See Owen’s “Anatomy of the Vertebrates,” vol. iii., p. 186.
[379] _Op. cit._, vol. ii., p. 376.
[380] The “Academy,” No. 20, p. 183 (1871).
[381] “Revue des Cours Scientifiques,” 30th July, 1870, p. 558.
[382] “Descent of Man,” vol. i., p. 152.
[383] “First Principles,” 2nd edition, p. 447, n.
[384] “Principles of Biology,” vol. i., p. 430.
[385] “Lay Sermons,” p. 326.
[386] “Principles of Biology,” vol. i., p. 446.
[387] _Op. cit._, vol. iii., p. 808.
[388] “First Principles,” 2nd edition, p. 489.
[389] _Ibid._, p. 500.
[390] “First Principles,” 2nd edition, p. 404.
[391] _Ibid._, p. 444.
[392] “Habit and Intelligence,” vol. i., p. 348 (1869).
[393] _Ibid._, vol. i., p. 295.
[394] _Ibid._, vol. ii., p. 8.
[395] _Ibid._, vol. i., p. 331.
[396] _Op. cit._, p. 360.
[397] _Op. cit._, p. 359.
[398] _Ibid._, p. 368.
[399] _Op. cit._, vol. iii., p. 795.
[400] _Ibid._, p. 789.
[401] “Rapport sur les Progrès de l’Anthropologie,” p. 247 (1867).
[402] _Ibid._
[403] “Mémoire sur les Microcéphales,” p. 197.
[404] _Ibid._, p. 81.
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