[_First published in _The Contemporary Review_, for June,_ 1872.]
The article by Mr. Martineau, in the April number of the _Contemporary
Review_, on "The Place of Mind in Nature, and Intuition of Man,"
recalled to me a partially-formed intention to deal with the chief
criticisms which have from time to time been made on the general
doctrine set forth in _First Principles_; since, though not avowedly
directed against propositions asserted or implied in that work, Mr.
Martineau's reasoning tells against them by implication. The fulfilment
of this intention I should, however, have continued to postpone, had I
not learned that the arguments of Mr. Martineau are supposed by many to
be conclusive, and that, in the absence of replies, it will be assumed
that no replies can be made. It seems desirable, therefore, to notice
these arguments at once--especially as the essential ones may, I think,
be effectually dealt with in a comparatively small space.
* * * * *
The first definite objection which Mr. Martineau raises is, that the
hypothesis of General Evolution is powerless to account even for the
simpler orders of facts in the absence of numerous different substances.
He argues that were matter all of one kind, no such phenomena as
chemical changes would be possible; and that, "in order to start the
world on its chemical career, you must enlarge its capital and present
it with an outfit of _heterogeneous_ constituents. Try, therefore, the
effect of such a gift; fling into the pre-existing cauldron the whole
list of recognized elementary substances, and give leave to their
affinities to work." The intended implication obviously is, that there
must exist the separately-created elements before evolution can begin.
Here, however, Mr. Martineau makes an assumption which few, if any,
chemists will commit themselves to, and which many will distinctly deny.
There are no "recognized elementary substances," if the expression means
substances known to be elementary. What chemists, for convenience, call
elementary substances, are merely substances which they have thus far
failed to decompose; but, bearing in mind past experiences, they do not
dare to say that they are absolutely undecomposable. Water was taken to
be an element for more than two thousand years, and then was proved to
be a compound; and, until Davy brought a galvanic current to bear upon
them, the alkalies and the earths were supposed to be elements. So
little true is it that "recognized elementary substances" are supposed
to be absolutely elementary, that there has been much speculation among
chemists respecting the process of compounding and recompounding by
which they have been formed out of some ultimate substance--some
chemists having supposed the atom of hydrogen to be the unit of
composition, but others having contended that the atomic weights of the
so-called elements are not thus interpretable. If I remember rightly,
Sir John Herschel was one, among others, who, some five-and-twenty years
ago, threw out suggestions respecting a system of compounding that might
explain these relations of the atomic weights.
What was at that time a suspicion has now become practically a
certainty. Spectrum-analysis yields results wholly irreconcilable with
the assumption that the conventionally-named simple substances are
really simple. Each yields a spectrum having lines varying in number
from two to eighty or more, every one of which implies the intercepting
of ethereal undulations of a certain order by something oscillating in
unison or in harmony with them. Were iron absolutely elementary, it is
not conceivable that its atom could intercept ethereal undulations of
eighty different orders. Though it does not follow that its molecule
contains as many separate atoms as there are lines in its spectrum, it
must clearly be a complex molecule. The evidence thus gained points to
the conclusion that, out of some primordial units, the so-called
elements arise by compounding and recompounding; just as by the
compounding and recompounding of so-called elements there arise oxides,
and acids, and salts.
And this hypothesis is entirely in harmony with the phenomena of
allotropy. Various substances, conventionally distinguished as simple,
have several forms under which they present quite different properties.
The semi-transparent, colourless, extremely active substance called
phosphorus may be so changed as to become opaque, dark red, and inert.
Like changes are known to occur in some gaseous, non-metallic elements,
as oxygen; and also in metallic elements, as antimony. These total
changes of properties, brought about without any changes to be called
chemical, are interpretable only as due to molecular rearrangements;
and, by showing that difference of property is producible by difference
of arrangement, they support the inference otherwise to be drawn, that
the properties of different elements result from differences of
arrangement arising by the compounding and recompounding of ultimate
homogeneous units.
Thus Mr. Martineau's objection, which at best would imply a turning of
our ignorance of the nature of elements into positive knowledge that
they are simple, is, in fact, to be met by two sets of evidences, which
imply that they are compound.
* * * * *
Mr. Martineau next alleges that a fatal difficulty is put in the way of
the General Doctrine of Evolution by the existence of a chasm between
the living and the not-living. He says:--"But with all your enlargement
of data, turn them as you will, at the end of every passage which they
explore, the _door of life_ is closed against them still." Here again
our ignorance is employed to play the part of knowledge. The fact that
we do not know distinctly how an alleged transition has taken place, is
transformed into the assumption that no transition has taken place. We
have, in a more general shape, the argument which until lately was
thought conclusive--the argument that because the genesis of each
species of creature had not been explained, therefore each species must
have been separately created.
Merely noting this, however, I go on to remark that scientific discovery
is day by day narrowing the chasm, or, to vary Mr. Martineau's metaphor,
"opening the door." Not many years since, it was held as certain that
the chemical compounds distinguished as organic could not be formed
artificially. Now, more than a thousand organic compounds have been
formed artificially. Chemists have discovered the art of building them
up from the simpler to the more complex, and do not doubt that they will
eventually produce the most complex. Moreover, the phenomena attending
isomeric change give a clue to those movements which are the only
indications we have of life in its lowest forms. In various colloidal
substances, including the albuminoid, isomeric change is accompanied by
contraction or expansion, and consequent motion; and, in such primordial
types as the _Protogenes_ of Haeckel, which do not differ in appearance
from minute portions of albumen, the observed motions are comprehensible
as accompanying isomeric changes caused by variations in surrounding
physical actions. The probability of this interpretation will be seen on
remembering the evidence we have that, in the higher organisms, many
functions are essentially effected by isomeric changes from one to
another of the multitudinous forms which protein assumes.
Thus the reply to this objection is, first, that there is going on from
both sides a narrowing of the chasm supposed to be impassable; and,
secondly, that, even were the chasm not in course of being filled up, we
should no more be justified in therefore assuming a supernatural
commencement of life, than Kepler was justified in assuming that there
were guiding-spirits to keep the planets in their orbits, because he
could not see how else they were to be kept in their orbits.
* * * * *
The third definite objection made by Mr. Martineau is of kindred nature.
The Hypothesis of Evolution is, he thinks, met by the insurmountable
difficulty that plant life and animal life are absolutely distinct. "You
cannot," he says, "take a single step toward the deduction of sensation
and thought: neither at the upper limit do the highest plants (the
exogens) transcend themselves and overbalance into animal existence; nor
at the lower, grope as you may among the sea-weeds and sponges, can you
persuade the sporules of the one to develop into the other."
This is an extremely unfortunate objection to raise. For, though there
are no transitions from vegetal to animal life at the places Mr.
Martineau names, where, indeed, no biologist would look for them; yet
the connexion between the two great kingdoms of living things is so
complete that separation is now regarded as impossible. For a long time
naturalists endeavored to frame definitions such as would, the one
include all plants and exclude all animals, and the other include all
animals and exclude all plants. But they have been so repeatedly foiled
in the attempt that they have given it up. There is no chemical
distinction which holds; there is no structural distinction which
holds; there is no functional distinction which holds; there is no
distinction as to mode of existence which holds. Large groups of the
simpler animals contain chlorophyll, and decompose carbonic acid under
the influence of light, as plants do. Large groups of the simpler
plants, as you may observe in the diatoms from any stagnant pool, are no
less actively locomotive than the minute creatures classed as animals
seen along with them. Nay, among these lowest types of living things, it
is common for the life to be now predominantly animal and presently to
become predominantly vegetal. The very name _zoospores_, given to germs
of _algae_, which for a while swim about actively by means of cilia, and
presently settling down grow into plant-forms, is given because of this
conspicuous community of nature. So complete is this community of nature
that for some time past many naturalists have wished to establish for
these lowest types a sub-kingdom, intermediate between the animal and
the vegetal: the reason against this course being, however, that the
difficulty crops up afresh at any assumed places where this intermediate
sub-kingdom may be supposed to join the other two.
Thus the assumption on which Mr. Martineau proceeds is diametrically
opposed to the conviction of naturalists in general.
* * * * *
Though I do not perceive that it is specifically stated, there appears
to be tacitly implied a fourth difficulty of allied kind--the difficulty
that there is no possibility of transition from life of the simplest
kind to mind. Mr. Martineau says, indeed, that there can be "with only
vital resources, as in the vegetable world, no beginning of mind:"
apparently leaving it to be inferred that in the animal world the
resources are such as to make the "beginning of mind" comprehensible.
If, however, instead of leaving it a latent inference, he had
distinctly asserted a chasm between mind and bodily life, for which
there is certainly quite as much reason as for asserting a chasm between
animal life and vegetal life, the difficulties in his way would have
been no less insuperable.
For those lowest forms of irritability in the animal kingdom which, I
suppose, Mr. Martineau refers to as the "beginning of mind," are not
distinguishable from the irritability which plants display: they in no
greater degree imply consciousness. If the sudden folding of a
sensitive-plant's leaf when touched, or the spreading out of the stamens
in a wild-cistus when gently brushed, is to be considered a vital action
of a purely physical kind; then so too must be considered the equally
slow contraction of a polype's tentacles. And yet, from this simple
motion of an animal of low type, we may pass by insensible stages
through ever-complicating forms of actions, with their accompanying
signs of feeling and intelligence, until we reach the highest.
Even apart from the evidence derived from the ascending grades of
animals up from _zoophytes_, as they are significantly named, it needs
only to observe the evolution of a single animal to see that there does
not exist any break or chasm between the life which shows no mind and
the life which shows mind. The yelk of an egg which the cook has just
broken, not only yields no sign of mind, but yields no sign of life. It
does not respond to a stimulus as much even as many plants do. Had the
egg, instead of being broken by the cook, been left under the hen for a
certain time, the yelk would have passed by infinitesimal gradations
through a series of forms ending in the chick; and by similarly
infinitesimal gradations would have arisen those functions which end in
the chick breaking its shell; and which, when it gets out, show
themselves in running about, distinguishing and picking up food, and
squeaking if hurt. When did the feeling begin? and how did there come
into existence that power of perception which the chick's actions show?
Should it be objected that the chick's actions are mainly automatic, I
will not dwell on the fact that, though they are largely so, the chick
manifestly has feeling and therefore consciousness; but I will accept
the objection, and propose that instead we take the human being. The
course of development before birth is just of the same general kind; and
similarly, at a certain stage, begins to be accompanied by reflex
movements. At birth there is displayed an amount of mind certainly not
greater than that of the chick: there is no power of running from
danger--no power of distinguishing and picking up food. If we say the
chick is unintelligent, we must certainly say the infant is
unintelligent. And yet from the unintelligence of the infant to the
intelligence of the adult, there is an advance by steps so small that on
no day is the amount of mind shown, appreciably different from that
shown on preceding and succeeding days.
Thus the tacit assumption that there exists a break, is not simply
gratuitous, but is negatived by the most obvious facts.
* * * * *
Certain of the words and phrases used in explaining that particular part
of the Doctrine of Evolution which deals with the origin of species, are
commented upon by Mr. Martineau as having implications justifying his
view. Let us consider his comments.
He says that _competition_ is not an "original power, which can of
itself do anything;" further, that "it cannot act except in the presence
of some _possibility of a better or worse_;" and that this "possibility
of a better or worse" implies a "world pre-arranged for progress," "a
directing Will intent upon the good." Had Mr. Martineau looked more
closely into the matter, he would have found that, though the words and
phrases he quotes are used for convenience, the conceptions they
imply are not at all essential to the doctrine. Under its
rigorously-scientific form, the doctrine is expressible in
purely-physical terms, which neither imply competition nor imply better
and worse.[37]
Beyond this indirect mistake there is a direct mistake. Mr. Martineau
speaks of the "survivorship of the better," as though that were the
statement of the law; and then adds that the alleged result cannot be
inferred "except on the assumption that whatever is _better_ is
_stronger_ too." But the words he here uses are his own words, not the
words of those he opposes. The law is the survival of the _fittest_.
Probably, in substituting "better" for "fittest," Mr. Martineau did not
suppose that he was changing the meaning; though I dare say he perceived
that the meaning of the word "fittest" did not suit his argument so
well. Had he examined the facts, he would have found that the law is not
the survival of the "better" or the "stronger," if we give to those
words any thing like their ordinary meanings. It is the survival of
those which are constitutionally fittest to thrive under the conditions
in which they are placed; and very often that which, humanly speaking,
is inferiority, causes the survival. Superiority, whether in size,
strength, activity, or sagacity, is, other things equal, at the cost of
diminished fertility; and where the life led by a species does not
demand these higher attributes, the species profits by decrease of them,
and accompanying increase of fertility. This is the reason why there
occur so many cases of retrograde metamorphosis--this is the reason why
parasites, internal and external, are so commonly degraded forms of
higher types. Survival of the "better" does not cover these cases,
though survival of the "fittest" does; and as I am responsible for the
phrase, I suppose I am competent to say that the word "fittest" was
chosen for this reason. When it is remembered that these cases outnumber
all others--that there are more species of parasites than there are
species of all other animals put together--it will be seen that the
expression "survivorship of the better" is wholly inappropriate, and the
argument Mr. Martineau bases upon it quite untenable. Indeed, if, in
place of those adjustments of the human sense-organs, which he so
eloquently describes as implying pre-arrangement, Mr. Martineau had
described the countless elaborate appliances which enable parasites to
torture animals immeasurably superior to them, and which, from his point
of view, no less imply pre-arrangement, I think the notes of admiration
which end his descriptions would not have seemed to him so appropriate.
One more word there is from the intrinsic meaning of which Mr. Martineau
deduces what appears a powerful argument--the word _Evolution_ itself.
He says:--
"It means, to unfold from within; and it is taken from the history
of the seed or embryo of living natures. And what is the seed but a
casket of pre-arranged futurities, with its whole contents
_prospective_, settled to be what they are by reference to ends
still in the distance?"
Now, this criticism would have been very much to the point did the word
Evolution truly express the process it names. If this process, as
scientifically defined, really involved that conception which the word
evolution was originally designed to convey, the implications would be
those Mr. Martineau alleges. But, unfortunately for him, the word,
having been in possession of the field before the process was
understood, has been adopted merely because displacing it by another
word seemed impracticable. And this adoption of it has been joined with
a caution against misunderstandings arising from its unfitness. Here is
a part of the caution:--"Evolution has other meanings, some of which are
incongruous with, and some even directly opposed to, the meaning here
given to it.... The antithetical word, Involution, would much more truly
express the nature of the process; and would, indeed, describe better
the secondary characters of the process which we shall have to deal
with presently."[38] So that the meanings which the word involves, and
which Mr. Martineau regards as fatal to the hypothesis, are already
repudiated as not belonging to the hypothesis.
* * * * *
And now, having dealt with the essential objections raised by Mr.
Martineau to the Hypothesis of Evolution as it is presented under that
purely scientific form which generalizes the process of things, firstly
as observed and secondly as inferred from certain ultimate principles,
let me go on to examine that form of the Hypothesis which he
propounds--Evolution as determined by Mind and Will--Evolution as
pre-arranged by a Divine Actor. For Mr. Martineau apparently abandons
the primitive theory of creation by "fiat of Almighty Will", and also
the theory of creation by manufacture--by "a contriving and adapting
power," and seems to believe in evolution: requiring only that "an
originating Mind" shall be taken as its antecedent. Let us ask, first,
in what relation Mr. Martineau conceives the "originating Mind" to stand
to the evolving Universe. From some passages it is inferable that he
considers the "presence of mind" to be everywhere needful. He says:--
"It is impossible to work the theory of Evolution upwards from the
bottom. If all force is to be conceived as One, its type must be
looked for in the highest and all-comprehending term; and Mind must
be conceived as there, and as divesting itself of some speciality
at each step of its descent to a lower stratum of law, till
represented at the base under the guise of simple Dynamics."
This seems to be an unmistakable assertion that, wherever Evolution is
going on, Mind is then and there behind it. At the close of the
argument, however, a quite different conception is implied. Mr.
Martineau says:--
"If the Divine Idea will not retire at the bidding of our
speculative science, but retains its place, it is natural to ask,
What is its relation to the series of so-called Forces in the
world? But the question is too large and deep to be answered here.
Let it suffice to say, that there need not be any _overruling_ of
these forces by the Will of God, so that the supernatural should
disturb the natural; or any _supplementing_ of them, so that He
should fill up their deficiencies. Rather is His thought related to
them as, in man, the mental force is related to all below it."
It would take too much space to deal fully with the various questions
which this last passage raises. There is the question--Whence come these
"Forces," spoken of as separate from the "Will of God"--did they
pre-exist? Then what becomes of the Divine Power? Do they exist by the
Divine Will? Then what kind of nature is that by which they act apart
from the Divine Will? Again, there is the question--How do these
deputy-forces co-operate in each particular phenomenon, if the presiding
Will is not there present to control them? Either an organ which
develops into fitness for its function, develops by the co-operation of
these forces under the direction of Mind then present, or it so develops
in the absence of Mind. If it develops in the absence of Mind, the
hypothesis is given up; and if the "originating Mind" is required to be
then and there present, we must suppose a particular providence to be
present in each particular organ of each particular creature throughout
the universe. Once more there is the question--If "His thought is
related to them [these Forces] as, in Man, the mental force is related
to all below it," how can "His thought" be regarded as the cause of
Evolution? In man the mental force is related to the forces below it
neither as a creator of them nor as a regulator of them, save in a very
limited way: the greater part of the forces present in man, both
structural and functional, defy the mental force absolutely. Nay, more,
it needs but to injure a nerve to see that the power of the mental force
over the physical forces is dependent on conditions which are themselves
physical; and one who takes morphia in mistake for magnesia, discovers
that the power of the physical forces over the mental is
_un_conditioned by any thing mental.
Not dwelling on these questions, however, I will merely draw attention
to the entire incongruity of this conception with the previous
conception which I have quoted. Assuming that, when the choice is
pressed on him, Mr. Martineau will choose the first, which alone has any
thing like defensibility, let us go on to ask how far Evolution is made
more comprehensible by postulating Mind, universally immanent, as its
cause.
In metaphysical controversy, many of the propositions propounded and
accepted as quite believable, are absolutely inconceivable. There is a
perpetual confusing of actual ideas with what are nothing but
pseud-ideas. No distinction is made between propositions that contain
real thoughts, and propositions that are only the forms of thoughts. A
thinkable proposition is one of which _the two terms can be brought
together in consciousness under the relation said to exist between
them_. But very often, when the subject of a proposition has been
thought of as something known, and when the predicate has been thought
of as something known, and when the relation alleged between them has
been thought of as a known relation, it is supposed that the proposition
itself has been thought. The thinking separately of the elements of a
proposition is mistaken for the thinking of them in the combination
which the proposition affirms. And hence it continually happens that
propositions which cannot be rendered into thought at all, are supposed
to be not only thought but believed. The proposition that Evolution is
caused by Mind is one of this nature. The two terms are separately
intelligible; but they can be regarded in the relation of effect and
cause only so long as no attempt is made to put them together in this
relation.
The only thing which any one knows as Mind is the series of his own
states of consciousness; and if he thinks of any mind other than his
own, he can think of it only in terms derived from his own. If I am
asked to frame a notion of Mind divested of all those structural traits
under which alone I am conscious of mind in myself, I cannot do it. I
know nothing of thought save as carried on in ideas originally traceable
to the effects wrought by objects and forces on me. A mental act is an
unintelligible phrase if I am not to regard it as an act in which states
of consciousness are severally known as like other states in the series
that has gone by, and in which the relations between them are severally
known as like past relations in the series. If, then, I have to conceive
Evolution as caused by an "originating Mind," I must conceive this Mind
as having attributes akin to those of the only mind I know, and without
which I cannot conceive Mind at all.
I will not dwell on the many incongruities hence resulting, by asking
how the "originating Mind" is to be thought of as having states produced
by things objective to it; as discriminating among these states, and
classing them as like and unlike; and as preferring one objective result
to another. I will simply ask--What happens if we ascribe to the
"originating Mind" the character absolutely essential to the conception
of Mind, that it consists of a series of states of consciousness? Put a
series of states of consciousness as cause, and the evolving Universe as
effect, and then endeavor to see the last as flowing from the first. I
find it possible to imagine in some dim way a series of states of
consciousness serving as antecedent to any one of the movements I see
going on; for my own states of consciousness are often indirectly the
antecedents to such movements. But how if I attempt to think of such a
series as antecedent to _all_ actions throughout the Universe--to the
motions of the multitudinous stars through space, to the revolutions of
all their planets round them, to the gyrations of all these planets on
their axes, to the infinitely-multiplied physical processes going on in
each of these suns and planets? I cannot think of a single series of
states of consciousness as causing even the relatively small group of
actions going on over the Earth's surface. I cannot think of it even as
antecedent to all the various winds and the dissolving clouds they bear,
to the currents of all the rivers, and the grinding actions of all the
glaciers; still less can I think of it as antecedent to the infinity of
processes simultaneously going on in all the plants that cover the
globe, from scattered polar lichens to crowded tropical palms, and in
all the millions of quadrupeds that roam among them, and the millions of
millions of insects that buzz about them. Even to a single small set of
these multitudinous terrestrial changes, I cannot conceive as antecedent
a single series of states of consciousness--cannot, for instance, think
of it as causing the hundred thousand breakers that are at this instant
curling over on the shores of England. How, then, is it possible for me
to conceive an "originating Mind," which I must represent to myself as a
_single_ series of states of consciousness, working the
infinitely-multiplied sets of changes _simultaneously_ going on in
worlds too numerous to count, dispersed throughout a space that baffles
imagination?
If, to account for this infinitude of physical changes everywhere going
on, "Mind must be conceived as there" "under the guise of simple
Dynamics," then the reply is that, to be so conceived, Mind must be
divested of all attributes by which it is distinguished; and that, when
thus divested of its distinguishing attributes, the conception
disappears--the word Mind stands for a blank. If Mr. Martineau takes
refuge in the entirely different and, as it seems to me, incongruous
hypothesis of something like a plurality of minds--if he accepts, as he
seems to do, the doctrine that you cannot explain Evolution "unless
among your primordial elements you scatter already the _germs_ of Mind
as well as the inferior elements"--if the insuperable difficulties I
have just pointed out are to be met by assuming a local series of states
of consciousness for each phenomenon, then we are obviously carried
back to something like the alleged fetichistic notion, with the
difference only, that the assumed spiritual agencies are indefinitely
multiplied.
Clearly, therefore, the proposition that an "originating Mind" is the
cause of Evolution, is a proposition that can be entertained so long
only as no attempt is made to unite in thought its two terms in the
alleged relation. That it should be accepted as a matter of _faith_, may
be a defensible position, provided good cause is shown why it should be
so accepted; but that it should be accepted as a matter of
_understanding_--as a statement making the order of the universe
comprehensible--is a quite indefensible position.
* * * * *
Here let me guard myself against a misinterpretation very likely to be
put upon the foregoing arguments; especially by those who have read the
Essay to which they reply. The statements of that Essay carry the
implication that all who adhere to the hypothesis it combats, imagine
they have solved the mystery of things when they have shown the
processes of Evolution to be naturally caused. Mr. Martineau tacitly
represents them as believing that, when every thing has been interpreted
in terms of Matter and Motion, nothing remains to be explained. This,
however, is by no means the fact. The Doctrine of Evolution, under its
purely scientific form, does not involve Materialism, though its
opponents persistently represent it as doing so. Indeed, among adherents
of it who are friends of mine, there are those who speak of the
Materialism of Buechner and his school, with a contempt certainly not
less than that felt by Mr. Martineau. To show how anti-materialistic my
own view is, I may, perhaps, without impropriety, quote some out of many
passages which I have written on the question elsewhere:
"Hence though of the two it seems easier to translate so-called
Matter into so-called Spirit, than to translate so-called Spirit
into so-called Matter (which latter is, indeed, wholly
impossible); yet no translation can carry us beyond our
symbols."[39]
And again:
"See then our predicament. We can think of Matter only in terms of
Mind. We can think of Mind only in terms of Matter. When we have
pushed our explorations of the first to the uttermost limit, we are
referred to the second for a final answer; and, when we have got
the final answer of the second, we are referred back to the first
for an interpretation of it. We find the value of _x_ in terms of
_y_; then we find the value of _y_ in terms of _x_; and so on we
may continue forever without coming nearer to a solution. The
antithesis of subject and object, never to be transcended while
consciousness lasts, renders impossible all knowledge of that
Ultimate Reality in which subject and object are united."[40]
It is thus, I think, manifest that the difference between Mr.
Martineau's view and the view he opposes is by no means so wide as he
makes it appear; and further, it seems to me that such difference as
exists is rather the reverse of that indicated by his exposition.
Briefly expressed, the difference is that, where he thinks there is no
mystery, the doctrine he combats recognizes a mystery. Speaking for
myself only, I may say that, agreeing entirely with Mr. Martineau in
repudiating the materialistic interpretation as utterly futile, I differ
from him simply in this, that while he says he has found another
interpretation, I confess that I cannot find any interpretation; while
he holds that he can understand the Power which is manifested in things,
I feel obliged to admit, after many failures, that I cannot understand
it. So that, in presence of the transcendent problem which the universe
presents, Mr. Martineau regards the human intellect as capable, and I as
incapable. This contrast does not appear to me of the kind which his
Essay tacitly asserts. If there is such a thing as the "pride of
Science," it is obviously exceeded by the pride of Theology. I fail to
perceive humility in the belief that the human mind is able to
comprehend that which is behind appearances; and I do not see how piety
is especially exemplified in the assertion that the Universe contains
no mode of existence higher in Nature than that which is present to us
in consciousness. On the contrary, I think it quite a defensible
proposition that humility is better shown by a confession of
incompetence to grasp in thought the Cause of all things; and that the
religious sentiment may find its highest sphere in the belief that the
Ultimate Power is no more representable in terms of human consciousness
than human consciousness is representable in terms of a plant's
functions.