THE MACEDONIAN CAMPAIGN
THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
GIROLAMO SAVONAROLA
By Professor PASQUALE VILLARI
Translated by LINDA VILLARI
Illustrated. Cloth, 8s. 6d. net
THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI
By Professor PASQUALE VILLARI
Translated by LINDA VILLARI
Illustrated. Cloth, 8s. 6d. net
T. FISHER UNWIN LTD LONDON
[Illustration: GENERAL SIR G. F. MILNE.
Frontispiece.
]
THE MACEDONIAN CAMPAIGN
_By_ LUIGI VILLARI
_With Illustrations and Maps_
T. FISHER UNWIN LTD
LONDON: ADELPHI TERRACE
_First published in English 1922_
(_All rights reserved_)
PREFATORY NOTE
The operations of the Allied forces, and in particular those of the
Italian contingent in Macedonia, are less well known than those of
almost any other of the many campaigns into which the World War is
subdivided. There have already been several published accounts of it
in English and French, but these works have dealt almost exclusively
with the action of the British or French contingent, and are mostly of
a polemical or journalistic character; very little has been written
about the other Allied forces, or about the campaign as a whole.
Owing to the position which I held for two years as Italian liaison
officer with the various Allied Commands in the East, I have been able
to collect a good deal of unpublished material on the subject, and I
felt that it might be useful to give a consecutive account of these
events, correcting many inaccuracies which have been spread about. The
book was written originally in Italian, and dealt in particular detail
with the operations of the Italian expeditionary force. In the present
English edition I have omitted certain details concerning the Italian
force, which were of less interest for a non-Italian public, while I
have added some further material of a general character, which I only
obtained since the Italian edition was written.
The published authoritative and reliable sources for the history of the
Macedonian campaign are very few. A bibliography is appended. Besides
my own notes and recollections of the events, set down day by day, and
the records of various conversations which I had with the chief actors
in the Balkan war drama, I must acknowledge the valuable assistance
afforded to me by various Italian and foreign officers and officials.
My especial thanks are due to the following:
General Petitti di Roreto, for information on the events of the early
period of the campaign;
General Ernesto Mombelli, who supplied me with a great deal of useful
information and advice on the latter period;
Colonel Vitale, under whom I worked for some time, and who first
instructed me in the duties of a liaison officer;
Colonel Fenoglietto, who kindly provided a part of the photographs
reproduced in the book;
Commendatore Fracassetti, director of the Museo del Risorgimento in
Rome, who kindly placed a large number of photographs at my disposal,
authorizing me to make use of them;
Captain Harold Goad, British liaison officer with the Italian force
from soon after its landing at Salonica until it was broken up in
the summer of 1919, who supplied me with many details concerning the
topography of the Italian area of the Macedonian front, which he knew
stone by stone, and his notes and recollections of many political and
military episodes. Few men have done such admirable and disinterested
work in favour of good relations between Britain and Italy, both during
and after the war, as this officer, who was most deservedly decorated
with the Italian silver medal for valour in the field.
L. V.
CONTENTS
PAGE
PREFATORY NOTE 5
CHAPTER
I. INTRODUCTION--REASONS FOR THE MACEDONIAN CAMPAIGN AND FOR
THE PARTICIPATION OF ITALY. POLITICAL INTRIGUES AND
FIRST MILITARY OPERATIONS 11
II. OPERATIONS IN THE SUMMER AND AUTUMN OF 1916 36
III. THE COMMAND OF THE ALLIED ARMIES IN THE ORIENT. THE FRENCH
TROOPS 56
IV. THE BRITISH SALONICA FORCE 68
V. THE SERBIANS 85
VI. THE ITALIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 96
VII. OPERATIONS IN THE WINTER AND SPRING OF 1917 118
VIII. GREEK AFFAIRS 137
IX. SALONICA AND THE WAY THITHER 157
X. IRRITATION AGAINST GENERAL SARRAIL 171
XI. FROM THE SALONICA FIRE TO THE RECALL OF SARRAIL 179
XII. GENERAL GUILLAUMAT 191
XIII. MARKING TIME. ARRIVAL OF GENERAL FRANCHET D’ESPÉREY 199
XIV. ON THE EVE OF THE OFFENSIVE 211
XV. THE BATTLE OF THE BALKANS 225
XVI. FINAL OPERATIONS 255
APPENDIX A. LETTER FROM VOIVOD MICHICH TO GENERAL PETITTI DI
RORETO CONCERNING THE FIGHTING ON HILL 1050 IN
FEBRUARY 1917 271
APPENDIX B. LOSSES OF THE BELLIGERENTS DURING THE MACEDONIAN
CAMPAIGN 272
APPENDIX C. GENERAL FRANCHET D’ESPÉREY’S TELEGRAM TO THE FRENCH
GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS WITH
BULGARIA 273
APPENDIX D. ARMISTICE BETWEEN THE ALLIES AND BULGARIA, SIGNED AT
SALONICA ON SEPTEMBER 29, 1918 274
BIBLIOGRAPHY 277
INDEX 279
ILLUSTRATIONS
GENERAL SIR. G. F. MILNE _Frontispiece_
TO FACE PAGE
GENERAL ERNESTO MOMBELLI, COMMANDER OF THE ITALIAN
EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN MACEDONIA 10
ARCH OF GALERUS, SALONICA 20
GENERAL LEBLOIS BIDDING FAREWELL TO GENERAL PETITTI AT TEPAVCI 38
LANDING OF ITALIAN TROOPS AT SALONICA 38
CHURCH OF ST. GEORGE, SALONICA 58
TRANSPORT IN WINTER 62
THE ALLIED LIAISON OFFICERS AT G.H.Q., SALONICA 62
THE AUTHOR 76
GENERAL MOMBELLI INAUGURATING A SCHOOL FOR SERB CHILDREN BUILT
BY ITALIAN SOLDIERS AT BROD 88
ITALIAN BRIDGE OVER THE CERNA AT BROD 88
THE BAND OF THE 35TH DIVISION PLAYING IN THE PLACE DE LA
LIBERTÉ AT SALONICA 102
GENERAL GUILLAUMAT VISITS GENERAL MOMBELLI AT TEPAVCI 102
CAMP NEAR THE PARALOVO MONASTERY 122
H.Q. OF AN INFANTRY REGIMENT ON HILL 1050 122
HELIOGRAPH IN A CAVERN ON HILL 1050 126
ROCK-PERFORATING MACHINE ON HILL 1050 126
CAMP UNDER THE PITON BRÛLÉ 134
ITALIAN NATIONAL FESTIVAL (THE STATUTO) AT SAKULEVO. HIGH MASS 134
HILL 1075: ARTILLERY CAMP 140
ARTILLERY O.P. 140
THE GREEK NATIONAL FESTIVAL ON APRIL 7, 1917: M. VENIZELOS
LEAVING THE CHURCH OF S. SOPHIA, SALONICA 158
KING ALEXANDER OF GREECE VISITS A FRENCH CAMP 158
A FLOODED ROAD 172
LEAVE PARTY FROM MACEDONIA ON THE SANTI QUARANTA ROAD 172
(_Photograph by Lieut. Landini._)
BULGARIAN PRISONERS 180
IN THE “CASTELLETTO” TRENCHES 180
THE SALONICA FIRE, NIGHT FROM AUGUST 18 TO 19, 1917 192
CAMP OF THE 111TH FLIGHT: ITALIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 192
CRASHED ITALIAN AEROPLANE 246
COMMUNICATION TRENCHES IN THE MEGLENTZI VALLEY 246
CRASHED GERMAN AEROPLANE 250
GENERAL FRANCHET D’ESPÉREY DECORATING GENERALS MILNE AND
MOMBELLI 250
AFTER THE VICTORY: ENEMY PRISONERS 256
GERMAN PRISONERS CAPTURED BY THE ITALIANS ON HILL 1050 262
HILL 1050: HOURS OF REST 262
MONUMENT TO THE FALLEN OF THE 161ST ITALIAN REGIMENT ON VRATA
HILL 264
MAPS
AREA OF THE ITALIAN FORCE 104
AREA OF THE BRITISH XII CORPS 129
AREA OF THE FRANCO-SERB GROUP 213
ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE, SEPTEMBER 15, 1918 227
THE PRILEP-KRUSHEVO AREA 236
GRÆCO-BULGARIAN FRONTIER 242
[Illustration: GENERAL ERNESTO MOMBELLI, COMMANDER OF THE ITALIAN
EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN MACEDONIA.
To face p. 10.
]
The Macedonian Campaign
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
REASONS FOR THE MACEDONIAN CAMPAIGN AND FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF
ITALY. POLITICAL INTRIGUES AND FIRST MILITARY OPERATIONS.
The great victory of our army on the Italian front with which the war
came to an end made the Italian public almost forget the deeds achieved
by Italian troops on other fronts, and particularly in Macedonia.
This has happened not only in Italy; even France and Britain, who had
far larger contingents in Macedonia than ours, do not seem to have
appreciated at their full value the operations in that area. There was
a whole school of strategists, professional and amateur, competent
and incompetent, known as the “Westerners,” who desired that every
effort should be concentrated exclusively on the French and Italian
fronts, and that the operations on the various Eastern fronts should
be neglected or even abandoned altogether. Until the Balkan offensive
of September 1918, that front, in the opinion of the great majority of
the public and even in that of many political and military circles, was
of small importance; according to the pure “Westerners,” the Salonica
expedition was an error in its very origin, and a useless dispersion
of troops who might have been more usefully employed elsewhere. There
were even those who maintained the necessity of withdrawing the
troops already sent to the East, and others who, although they did
not go quite so far, were opposed to any increase of the forces in
Macedonia, and even objected to their being provided with the necessary
reinforcements and materials.
In support of this view it must be admitted that the Salonica
expedition absorbed a vast quantity of tonnage, at a moment when
tonnage in all the Entente countries was dangerously scarce, and when
the voyage between England, France, Italy and Macedonia was extremely
risky on account of submarines. It is also true that for about three
years that expedition produced no tangible results; so much so that
the Germans called it with ironical satisfaction their largest
concentration camp, “an enemy army, prisoner of itself.”
Yet it was with the victorious offensive of September, 1918, that the
Entente struck the first knock-down blow at the Central Powers and
produced the first real breach in the enemy barrier which helped the
armies in France and Italy to achieve final victory. Even Marshal
von Ludendorff, in his memoirs, recognized the enormous importance
of the Allied victory in the Balkans. Until September 15th, 1918, in
fact, the enemy’s line of chief resistance from the North Sea to the
Swiss frontier, from the Stelvio to the mouth of the Piave, from the
Voyussa to the Struma, was intact. When the Balkan front collapsed, the
whole of the rest of the enemy front in the West as in the East was
threatened by a vast encircling movement, the moral effect of which was
not less serious than its material consequences.
But it was not only at the moment of the victorious offensive that
the Eastern expedition justified itself. Even in the preceding period
of long and enervating suspense, the presence of the Allied armies in
Macedonia had an importance which was far from indifferent with regard
to the general economy of the war. Owing to causes which we shall
subsequently examine, the Army of the Orient[1] had not been able to
carry out the task originally assigned to it of bringing aid to invaded
Serbia and saving her from her extreme ruin, and it was therefore
believed that that army had no longer any _raison d’être_. The truth,
however, is very different, because for months and years it mounted
guard in the Balkans, preventing the Central Empires from reaching
Salonica and invading Old Greece,[2] where they might have established
innumerable new submarine bases and thus dominated the whole of the
Eastern Mediterranean. This would have rendered any traffic with Egypt
and consequently with India and Australia practically impossible, that
is to say, with some of the most important sources of supply for the
whole of the Entente and particularly for Italy. If the Army of the
Orient was enmeshed amidst the marshes and arid rocks of Macedonia,
on the other hand that Army nailed down the whole of the Bulgarian
Army, consisting of close on three-quarters of a million men,[3] amply
provided with artillery both Bulgarian and German, throughout the
whole of the war, and for a time certain German and Turkish divisions
as well, forces which might themselves have been employed elsewhere.
Incidentally, the operations in Albania against the Austrians could not
have been maintained without the support of the Army of the Orient on
its right.
In Italy, perhaps more than elsewhere, the advantages of the Macedonian
expedition were doubted, and in many political and military circles,
as well as among the mass of the public, the current of opinion was
opposed to any Italian participation in the operations of that sector.
Even when Italian participation had been decided upon, and the Italian
expeditionary force was actually in Macedonia, it was not always
possible for it to obtain all that it needed, and the command had to
struggle hard to obtain the indispensable minimum of reinforcements
and materials. Even among the officers of that force, many considered
Italian intervention in the East useless and even harmful. Various
reasons contributed to this opinion. In the first place, the fact that
Italy’s war aims were at the gates of Italy and not in the Balkans
influenced public feeling in general. Secondly, the fact that our
expeditionary force was in a subordinate position seemed to many to
be derogatory to Italian dignity; a feeling which may be compared with
the one that the war with Austria was in a certain sense apart from the
general World War. This attitude, which lasted to the end, has been
very injurious to our interests in the Balkans and elsewhere, and those
among us who really felt the inter-Allied character of the war have had
to struggle without ceasing both to convince our dissident compatriots
of their error, and to prove to the Allies that those who maintained
the purely Italian character of the war only represented a part of
Italian public opinion, and that part not the best informed.
Yet Italy’s participation in the Eastern expedition was inevitable.
Independently of boundary questions of a general character, it was
not possible that Italy should remain absent from that area, which
subsequent events have proved to be extremely important. Even before
the war we had great political and economic interests in the Balkans,
interests in part destroyed and in part menaced by the Austrians and
Germans in the course of the campaign; it was absolutely necessary that
we ourselves should participate in reconstructing them, instead of
leaving this work entirely to others. Further, in the new settlement
which the war would create in the Near East, fresh interests and new
currents of trade were bound to be created. For this reason too it was
necessary that Italy by her presence should participate directly in
shaping this new settlement. We complain now that our interests in the
East are not sufficiently recognized and respected, but how could we
have claimed recognition and respect for them if we had had no share
at all in the Macedonian campaign? Above all, what would have been our
prestige among the Balkan peoples if the latter had seen the victorious
troops of France, Britain, Serbia and even Greece marching past, and
not those of Italy? Our victory in Italy would not have sufficed to
affirm our position among the Balkan peoples if they had not seen us
take part in the victory won in their own homelands. It would indeed
have been better if our participation had been far greater and our
expeditionary force on a far larger scale.
The vicissitudes of the Army of the Orient are much less known than
those of all the other armies in the World War, and in particular those
of the Italian expeditionary force are largely ignored by the public,
even in Italy. Many believe that it was merely a modest contingent,
because it was called the “35th Infantry Division,” whereas in reality
its strength was superior to that of an army corps; and considering
the conditions of the area where it was fighting, its importance was
equal to that of an army. It is with the object of making known to the
public a little more of the actions of that fine unit and the debt of
gratitude which the country owes to its officers and men for their long
and arduous struggle, conducted in one of the most pestilent climates
in Europe amid great hardship, and the increase of Italy’s prestige
obtained by their merit, that I have undertaken to write these pages.
* * * * *
When the World War broke out, Austria immediately commenced an
offensive against Serbia, and the Entente Powers could not at first
send assistance to the latter on account of her geographical situation,
as she was surrounded on all sides by enemy or neutral States, except
to the south-west, but communications through Montenegro were extremely
difficult, and by that route only a few volunteers penetrated into
Serbia. Supplies and armies could arrive by way of Salonica, but always
in the face of serious difficulties, both on account of the obstruction
offered by Greece, whose neutrality was not benevolent, and of the
attempts made by Bulgarian bands, with or without the approval of the
Sofia Government, which was also neutral but still less benevolent, to
cut the Vardar railway. The Serbians, however, had proved themselves
in the first months of the war capable of defending their country, and
they inflicted serious defeats on the Austrians, first at Tzer, in the
loop formed by the Save and the Danube, in September, 1914, and later
on in the winter at Valievo, where the hostile army, after having
occupied Belgrade and penetrated into the heart of Serbia, was beaten
and put to flight, leaving thousands of prisoners and vast booty in the
hands of the Serbians.
Nevertheless the Serbians were in urgent need of assistance. Their food
situation was still very grave, their supply of arms and munitions
quite inadequate, and a terrible epidemic of spotted typhus was raging
throughout the country. But in addition to material obstacles, the
very psychology of the people rendered it difficult to assist them. In
the spring of 1915, when the intervention of Italy was certain, the
Serbs had a chance of inflicting a new and perhaps decisive defeat
on the Austrians by co-operating with us. France, Great Britain, and
Russia then brought strong pressure to bear on the Serbian Government
to induce it to launch an offensive in the direction of Agram at
the moment when the Italians were about to attack on the Isonzo.
The Government agreed, and submitted a plan of operations to the
Allies, which was approved, but just when it should have been put
into execution, the Serbian Army did not move; as a result of fresh
pressure on the part of the Allies the Government again promised to
attack, but again did nothing. Finally, when this pressure was renewed
for the third time, reinforced, it is said, by a personal letter from
the Tsar, Belgrade replied at the last moment that it had decided not
to attack in the direction of Croatia, because it wished to carry out
another plan against Bulgaria, who was still neutral! The reasons for
this sudden change in the decisions of the Serbian Government must be
sought in the influence of the secret societies which permeate the
whole political life of the country, and especially the army. The most
important of these societies was the notorious “Black Hand,” to which
many of the regicide officers belonged. Although the Government itself
was apparently favourable to the action proposed by the Entente, which
offered great possibilities of success, inasmuch as the Austrians had
only a small body of troops in Croatia, it was not strong enough to
resist the influence of the secret societies, who placed their veto
on any action in co-operation with Italy.[4] The full details of this
affair are not quite clear, but one thing is certain, and that is that
owing to Serbia’s inaction Austria was able to withdraw five out of the
six divisions which were left on the Save and send them to the Italian
front. At that period of the war the Serbian front was considered in
the Austrian Army almost as a rest camp.
In the autumn of 1915 the Serbian _débâcle_ took place, caused chiefly
by the Bulgarian attack. The intervention of Turkey on the side of the
Central Empires had rendered Bulgaria’s position extremely difficult,
but that was not the chief reason of the latter’s intervention.
Bulgaria had remained profoundly dissatisfied with the results of the
Peace of Bucarest (1913), which brought the Turko-Balkan War to an end
and deprived her of a great part of the fruits of her victory against
the Turks. The fault was to a large extent her own, because she had
attacked her ex-Allies, Serbia and Greece, and had been completely
defeated by them; she then lost not only the whole of Macedonia, to
conquer which she had entered the war, but also Eastern Thrace, with
Adrianople and Kirk-Kilisse, which were reoccupied by the Turks when
the Bulgarian Army had been beaten by the Serbs and Greeks, and a
part of Dobrugia which had belonged to her since the creation of the
Bulgarian State in 1878, and had been annexed by Roumania, who had
intervened in the war at the last moment. This left a bitter feeling of
spite in the soul of the Bulgarians, and sowed the seeds of a future
war of revenge.
This violent irritation against the Serbs, Greeks and Roumanians
was not the only cause which threw the Bulgarians into the arms of
the Central Empires, and of their former mortal enemies, the Turks.
Their main aspiration--almost their only one since the creation of
the Bulgarian State--has been Macedonia. The Dobrugia and Thrace are
of comparatively small interest to them, whereas Macedonia, on the
contrary, is the bourne of all their desires. In Thrace and in the
Dobrugia the population is very mixed, and the Bulgarians, in spite
of the statistics drawn up by the Sofia Government, are a minority,
and the non-Bulgarian elements of the population--Turks, Greeks,
Roumanians--are racially entirely different. In Macedonia, on the other
hand, at least in Central and Northern Macedonia, the great majority
is Slav, and the Bulgarians consider it Bulgarian. In reality the
population is racially and linguistically something between Serbian
and Bulgarian, and the predominance of Serbian or Bulgarian sentiments
varies according to the proximity of the frontier of one or other of
these States, the activity of their respective propagandists, and the
greater or less prestige and strength of the two Governments. I will
not quote statistics which, being drawn up by Balkan writers, have a
doubtful value and no scientific basis, but it is certain that the
Bulgarian peoples are convinced that if Macedonia were annexed to
Bulgaria, in a few years the population would become wholly Bulgarian,
so that the State would find itself with a considerable increase of
inhabitants--not aliens who cannot be assimilated, such as Greeks,
Roumanians or Turks, whose territories can only be Bulgarized by
massacre or deportation _en masse_, but of a race which is already
very closely akin to the Bulgarian race. Further, in Macedonia there
are several cities closely connected with the most ancient and sacred
historical traditions of the Bulgarian peoples, such as Monastir and
Ochrida. The latter was indeed for a time the capital of the Bulgarian
Empire and for many centuries the see of the Bulgarian patriarchate.
Bulgarian propaganda had always been much more active and more able
than that of the Serbians under the Turkish régime, a propaganda based
on excellent schools and assassinations, and, as until the wars of
1912–13, the Bulgarians appeared to be the most solid, and from a
military point of view the strongest of the Balkan States, Bulgaria
exercised a powerful force of attraction over the Macedonians. In
consequence of this propaganda and of Turkish persecutions, a large
number of active and intelligent Macedonians migrated into Bulgaria,
where they occupied many important positions in the country. A large
part of the political men, diplomats, consuls, high officials,
professors, school-masters, officers and merchants in Bulgaria are
Macedonians, and they have long dominated the internal and foreign
policy of the country, directing it naturally towards Macedonia. On the
whole, Bulgarian feeling predominates over Serbian or Greek feeling
throughout almost the whole of Macedonia.
During the Turko-Balkan War, the Bulgarians had conquered a large
part of Macedonia and Thrace, and their legitimate aspirations might
thus have been satisfied, but, owing to the mad ambition of their
Government, or rather of a small number of ambitious officers, they
attempted to obtain a great deal more, and threw themselves without
reflecting into the foolhardy enterprise which was the second Balkan
War. The unfortunate result of that campaign made them lose the
whole of their conquests, with the exception of Western Thrace and
the districts of Strumitza and Djumaya forming part of Macedonia.
They retained, it is true, the port of Dede-Agatch and the railway
connecting it with the rest of Bulgaria, passing through a strip
of Turkish territory (Sufli--Demotika--Adrianople--Mustafa Pasha).
But if they were justly prevented from obtaining satisfaction for
these exaggerated ambitions, they were on the other hand deprived of
territories to which on national grounds they had some legitimate
claims. The Serbian authorities in Macedonia, while maintaining that
that country was purely Serbian, showed by their policy that they
considered the population preponderantly Bulgarian, inasmuch as they
instituted a system of such extreme and rigorous terrorism as is
only explicable on the ground that they were ruling over a conquered
territory, whose inhabitants were hostile to them, and must be kept
down by force.
The Bulgarian aspiration to regain Macedonia was by no means eliminated
by the unfortunate outcome of the second Balkan War. On the contrary,
it was strengthened and embittered, and when the World War broke out
Bulgaria regarded it merely from the point of view of a possible
readjustment of the Macedonian frontier in her own favour. I have
been told that the Bulgarian Prime Minister, when a British diplomat
went to see him a short time before Bulgaria entered the war, pointed
to a map of the Balkans on the wall and said: “We care little about
the British, Germans, French, Russians, Italians or Austrians; our
only thought is Macedonia; whichever of the two groups of Powers
will enable us to conquer it will have our alliance.” I do not know
if this anecdote is true, but in any case it represents crudely
but accurately Bulgarian mentality. The Governments of the Entente
understood this state of feeling, but their situation was embarrassing
and delicate. They tried to convince Serbia of the necessity of handing
over Macedonia, or at least part of it, to Bulgaria, promising her
compensation elsewhere. But they did not care to insist too much,
because Serbia was an ally, and the compensation offered to her was
in territories still retained by the enemy, whereas Bulgaria was a
neutral, but a short while ago Serbia’s enemy, who was attempting a
sort of blackmail, and who hitherto made use of comitadji bands, or
at least gave them a free hand, to blow up the bridges on the Vardar,
Serbia’s only line of supply. Serbia would not hear of this proposal,
and in fact intended, as we have seen, to attack Bulgaria before the
latter came to a decision; but the Entente, and particularly the Tsar
of Russia, naturally dissuaded them from such action, which would have
been little different from that committed by the Germans in invading
Belgium. Certainly Serbia would have been wiser had she shown herself
more conciliatory towards Bulgaria; if she had done so, she would
have avoided the catastrophe of 1915 and the three terrible years of
German-Bulgarian slavery. But the Serbians, we must not forget, are
a Balkan people. They have no high political sense nor broad views,
and probably even on this occasion the secret societies, with their
insatiable and megalomaniac ambitions, brought pressure to bear on the
Government to induce it to reject any idea of compromise. However this
may be, Serbia did not give way, and the diplomacy of the Entente could
do nothing.
[Illustration: ARCH OF GALERUS, SALONICA.
To face p. 20.
]
The Entente counted much on the sympathy for Russia, which it believed
to be very widespread among the Bulgarians, but that sympathy carried
no weight in the decisions of the Sofia Government. The Bulgarians,
like other Balkan peoples, are vindictive for all offences suffered,
and understand gratitude largely in the sense of anticipation of
benefits to come. In the case of Russia, moreover, their gratitude
towards her for having freed them from the Ottoman yoke had been
much weakened by the foolish, overbearing and intriguing conduct of
the Russian officials in Bulgaria after 1878. The Bulgarians quickly
forgot the thousands of Russians who had fallen at Plevna for Bulgarian
liberty, but they retained a lively recollection of the persecutions
and brutality of Generals Kaulbars and Ernroth, and of their satellites
who misgoverned the country for many years; of Russia’s illicit
interference in their internal affairs at the time of Prince Alexander
of Battenberg; and of the fact that Russia abandoned Bulgaria when
she was attacked without warning or provocation by Serbia in 1885. By
the summer of 1915 the Bulgarians had come to the conclusion that the
Central Empires were stronger than the Entente, and that the former
therefore offered them a better chance of reconquering Macedonia than
the latter. On September 10th, 1915, a general mobilization was ordered
in Bulgaria, and on the 29th Bulgarian troops attacked Serbia at
Kadibogaz, without a formal declaration of war.
Bulgarian intervention had, however, already been decided upon for
some time. Bulgaria had obtained a loan from Germany which tied her
hand and foot, and, further, after protracted negotiations promoted by
Germany, she had concluded on September 6th an agreement with Turkey,
whereby the latter granted her a rectification of the frontiers, so
that the railway between Dede-Agatch and the rest of Bulgaria should
pass wholly through Bulgarian territory. There were two immediate
consequences of Bulgarian intervention. The first was that Turkey could
now receive supplies from Germany with greater facility because there
was only a small strip of Serbian territory to be invaded so as to
establish communications by way of the Danube, and it was very soon
occupied. The second consequence, which was a result of the first, was
that the situation of the Allies on the Dardanelles became far more
critical. The British Command knew that the arrival of powerful German
artillery at Gallipoli was imminent, and that as soon as it was in
position the situation of the Allied expeditionary force would become
very precarious. The fact that Bulgaria was now an ally of the Central
Powers greatly facilitated the sending of this artillery, and it was
on the eve of its arrival that the evacuation of the blood-stained
peninsula was decided upon.
Germany, after the various Austrian defeats in Serbia, determined
to take the command of a new punitive expedition herself, and in
view of the co-operation of Bulgaria she had concentrated a powerful
Austro-German army, amply supplied with artillery, including guns of
the heaviest calibre, in South Hungary under the command of the German
Field-Marshal von Mackensen. The invasion of Serbia was carried out by
the Austrians and Germans from the north and also from the west (from
Bosnia), and by the Bulgarian Army from the east and south-east. The
Serbians fought heroically, opposing a desperate resistance on three
fronts, and at one moment it seemed as if they might miraculously
succeed; perhaps indeed they might have saved themselves, or at least
avoided the extreme disaster, if they had only followed the advice
of the Allies. But although it soon became known that a new and more
formidable attempt was about to be made by the enemy to crush Serbia
definitely, the Serbs refused to create a modern defensive system of
trenches and wire entanglements, which in a mountainous territory
such as that of Serbia would at least have held up the invaders for
a considerable time. To the suggestions made by the Allies that
these methods be adopted, the Serbs replied with typical Balkan
vaingloriousness: “Wire entanglements and trenches are all very well
for the Germans and Austrians, for the French, Italians, British
or Russians, but we have no use for them; we fight in the open and
drive out the enemy.” Their victories over the Austrians had made
them lose their heads and forget that these victories were not due
solely to their own courage but also, to a considerable extent, to the
serious strategical and tactical errors of the Austrian commanders,
from General Potiorek downwards, errors which were not repeated by
Marshal von Mackensen. The new invasion carried out by the formidable
Austro-German Army to which we have referred, and there came also the
stab in the back on the part of the Bulgarians.
The enemy had 12 German and Austrian divisions advancing up the Morava
valley, and 7 Bulgarian divisions (divisions of 6 regiments each, many
of whose regiments were of 4 battalions), which pushed forward in the
direction of the Nish-Uskub railway. Altogether these forces comprised
341 battalions, of which 111 were German, 53 Austro-Hungarian, and
177 Bulgarian; against these forces the Serbs could only oppose 194
battalions--116 against the Austrians and Germans, and 78 against the
Bulgarians. They were, moreover, exhausted by the long struggle, and
reduced to about half their organic strength. Serbia had been deprived
of her lines of supply via the Morava and Toplitza valleys by the enemy
invasion. The only hope for her army was to establish a connexion
with the relieving forces which the Allies were preparing to send up
from Salonica. On October 17th the railway was cut at Vrania, thus
interrupting communications with Salonica; on the 27th Veles and Uskub
were occupied.
As soon as the preparations for a new enemy invasion of Serbia were
known, the Entente decided to send an expeditionary force to Salonica
and at the same time decided, as we have seen, to withdraw the
Dardanelles force.[5] This decision was taken at the end of September,
and on the 29th a mission, comprised of one British and two French
officers departed from Mudros for Salonica with very vague orders.
On reaching their destination, they set to work to prepare for the
disembarkation of the troops, but they found themselves faced with
the most insidious obstruction on the part of the Greek authorities.
The Athens Government, of which M. Venizelos was president, had given
its unwilling consent to the landing of the Allies, but the civil
officials and the military commanders on the spot did everything to
interfere with their operations. The first Allied contingents were
British and French troops from the Dardanelles. They were elements
of the 10th British Division commanded by General Sir Bryan Mahon,
who for some time commanded all the British troops in Macedonia,
and of the 156th French Division commanded by General Bailloud. The
landing began on October 5th, and in a short time the 2 divisions were
complete, although reduced in strength by sickness and losses to very
weak effectives. Later, the 57th French Division arrived. On October
12th General Sarrail arrived at Salonica as Commander of all the French
troops in the Orient. For a considerable time nothing was decided as
to the relations between the different commands in Macedonia, and
although the rank of Commander-in-Chief had been conferred on General
Sarrail, the British Commander, and later also the Serbian Commander,
insisted on maintaining their own autonomy. It was not until June 23,
1916, that an agreement was concluded on this matter between the French
and British General Staffs, but even this was somewhat vague. “The
question of the Command,” this document states, “is regulated by the
following formula: Instructions concerning the initial offensive as
well as the line of conduct necessary for the further development of
operations will be established by mutual agreement between the French
and British Commands. It is thus understood that the Commander of the
British forces will give the Commander of the French forces assistance
and co-operation in proportion to the effectives and equipment of
the troops under his orders. He will be responsible, however, to the
British Government for the employment of his forces. The Commander
of the French forces will consult with the Commander of the British
forces as to the manner in which the latter shall be employed; with
this reserve, he will have as Commander-in-Chief authority to establish
the duties and objectives to be attained, the area of action, and the
date for the commencement of operations.”[6] It is easy to see that
the authority of General Sarrail over the British Commander was quite
illusory. His orders might be discussed, and they were. Field-Marshal
French had said clearly to the British Commander in Macedonia:
“You will never be in a subordinate position,” and in fact every
time that Sarrail sought to make use of the British or even French
troops, temporarily placed under British Command, he had to conduct
negotiations as if it were a political act. We shall see subsequently
why it was that he never succeeded in imposing his authority, but the
fact certainly did not contribute to the success of the operations in
the Near East.
Day by day fresh troops and fresh material arrived at Salonica, but
the ill-will of the Greek authorities rendered everything difficult.
The buildings which the Allies needed were always found to have been
already requisitioned by the Greeks, so that the French and British
had to encamp on Zeitenlik, a spot at 5 km. to the north of Salonica,
at that time, before the drainage works afterwards carried out by
the Allies, infected with malaria. In the purchase of foodstuffs and
material every sort of difficulty was encountered. Worse still, every
movement of the Allies was spied upon by and communicated to the enemy,
either indirectly via Athens by the Greek authorities, or directly by
the German, Austrian, Bulgarian and Turkish Consuls, who continued
to reside in Salonica. The situation was absolutely preposterous--an
Entente army operating in a neutral country which was friendly to the
enemy.
On November 17th, 1915, the Anglo-French troops were about 120,000, of
whom two-thirds were French, and on the 20th a fresh British division
arrived, but they were still far from the 300,000 men deemed necessary
for operations on a large scale. There was another greater danger which
was anything but indifferent. The Greek Army, comprised about 240,000
men, of whom half were in Macedonia, and if its military value was not
very formidable, it might have, in alliance with the enemy, represented
a serious menace to the Entente.
The initial objective of the Allies was to bring assistance to the
Serbs who were retreating before the Austro-German and Bulgarian
invasion. This assistance was to have taken the form of an advance up
the Vardar Valley towards Uskub or towards Monastir. As soon as the
troops were landed at Salonica they were immediately pushed forward
towards the front, the British to the east of the Vardar and the
French to the west. On October 20th the French reached Krivolak on the
Vardar and occupied the whole peninsula formed by that river and the
Cerna, while the British were to the north of lake of Doiran, on the
Kosturino Pass on the Beles Mountains, whence it is possible to descend
into Bulgaria. The Serbs were being driven ever further south, but a
detachment of their army was holding Monastir. If they had followed
the advice of the Allies and had retreated towards them, perhaps a
part of the army might have been saved; but, attracted by the mirage
of an outlet on the Adriatic, or for some other motive, they insisted
on deviating towards the west, thus undertaking that retreat across
Albania which was to prove one of the most terrible tragedies of the
whole war. Before the invasion the Serbian Army comprised 400,000 men,
when it reached Albania it was reduced to 150,000, with some tens
of thousands of Austrian prisoners; the rest had died of hunger and
suffering. This miserable remnant was saved by the assistance of the
Allies, and particularly of the Italians, as we shall see further on.
The retreat through Albania rendered the situation of the Anglo-French
on the middle Vardar untenable. When the French learnt that the
Bulgarians had occupied the Babuna Pass between Veles and Monastir
at the beginning of November, they tried to break the enemy front on
the left bank of the Cerna in the hope of reaching the Serbs to the
north-west of that pass. For fifteen days (November 5–19th) a fierce
struggle went on between the French and the Bulgarians, in which our
Allies showed all their admirable military qualities. The Bulgarians
counter-attacked on the Cerna and were repulsed with heavy losses,
but as the bulk of the Serbian Army had retreated towards Albania
and the French had been unable to capture the dominating position of
Mount Arkhangel (west of Gradsko on the Vardar), the offensive passed
definitely to the Bulgarians. On the 2nd, General Sarrail ordered a
general retreat from Krivolak on Salonica. Even this operation was
anything but easy. It was necessary to withdraw 3 divisions (the 122nd
had been recently added to the 156th and 57th) and an enormous quantity
of material along the Vardar Valley over a single-track railway and
without decent carriage roads, in a season when the rains converted
the whole country into a vast muddy swamp. It must be admitted that
General Sarrail conducted this retreat in good order. The Bulgarians
were attacking from the north towards Krivolak and from the west on
the Cerna, while from the east they were attacking the British at
Kosturino, while irregular bands were trying to capture convoys along
the Vardar, and enemy artillery from the Beles range dominated the
railway. Added to this there was rain, snow and cold.
There were two plans of retreat, which may be described as the maximum
and the minimum. The first consisted in withdrawing to the entrenched
camp at Salonica, the other in resisting on an intermediate position
between the Krivolak-Cerna line and Salonica along the Greek frontier.
The first had the advantage of considerably shortening the line to
be defended, and of bringing it nearer to the base: but on the other
hand, besides adversely affecting the prestige of the Allies, it would
have left the road from Macedonia and Albania into Old Greece open
to the enemy, thus renewing and reinforcing German pressure on King
Constantine in favour of Greek intervention on the side of the Central
Empires. In that case Salonica, and with it the whole of the Allied
Armies, would have been irreparably lost. Consequently the second plan
was adopted.
The French retreat was carried out by echelons. First the detachments
on the left of the Cerna were withdrawn to the right bank and the
bridge at Vozartzi destroyed. Then a concentration took place at
Krivolak, which was the rail-head, and the troops retreated in four
stages. The Bulgarian attacks near the Cerna having been repulsed, the
French reached Demir-Kapu without difficulty. They passed through the
narrow gorge by night, while the rearguard covered the retreat. The
Bulgarians tried to out-flank the French, advancing by mountain paths
on the Marianska Planina so as to fall on them when emerging from
the gorge, but their attempt failed. On December 7th the bridge and
tunnel at Strumitza were blown up. On the 8th, although exhausted by
the interminable march, the French repulsed still other enemy attacks.
The great depots at Ghevgheli were evacuated, and on the 10th, as the
Bulgarians were attacking along the river, the convoys had to continue
their retreat over the mountains. The two African march regiments
counter-attacked with great vigour, and on the 11th, the depots having
been burnt and the railway and the bridge destroyed, all the troops
withdrew beyond the Greek frontier.
The British (10th Division), who occupied the area between the Vardar,
the Lake of Doiran and the Kosturino Pass, were not attacked until
the end of November, but on December 6th the Germans and Bulgarians
attacked and the British commenced their withdrawal. On the 12th they
too had crossed the Greek frontier between Ghevgheli and Doiran, and
the enemy did not advance farther for the time being.
The enemy had by now occupied the whole of Serbia, including Monastir,
which had been evacuated on December 5th, the Serbian garrison having
withdrawn to Salonica, but for political reasons they did not wish
to cross the Greek frontier, as they considered the Greece of King
Constantine (Venizelos having fallen) a benevolent neutral. This
gave the Allies breathing space and time to reinforce themselves. On
December 3rd, the French Government ordered General Sarrail to create
an entrenched camp at Salonica. The area from Topshin to Dogandzi
and Daudli was entrusted to the French, that from Daudli to the sea,
passing along the Lakes of Langaza and Besik and through the Rendina
gorge, to the British. The former had their usual 3 divisions, the
British five (22nd, 28th, 26th, 10th, and in addition the 27th without
artillery in reserve at Salonica). Within two months the first
positions were created with three lines of resistance and a barbed wire
entanglement 10 metres broad defended by 30 heavy batteries. These
defences had been made according to all the latest scientific rules
of war, and had the advantage of not having been constructed under
the pressure of the enemy, as was the case with the great entrenched
camps in France. Of the three lines of defence, the first and second
were in excellent condition, whereas the third was merely sketched.
The works were in groups of three, so that the two more advanced ones
were dominated by the one in the rear. They were united to each other
by communication trenches, which could also be used as firing trenches.
Beyond the entrenched camp the Allies occupied advanced positions,
the French as far as Sorovich, and later (March 21st, 1916) Florina,
and farther east along the railway between Kilkish and Kilindir; the
British towards the Lake Doiran.
Allies and enemies now stopped along the line which they were to occupy
without important change for several months. The enemy lines passed
to the south of Kenali (on the railway between Florina and Monastir)
along the ridge of Mount Kaimakchalan and thence along the mountains to
Lake Doiran. Beyond the lake they ascended on to the crest of the Beles
mountains, following the Græco-Bulgarian frontier of 1913. The enemy
attack was expected from week to week, but it did not come, and in the
meanwhile the Allies continued to receive reinforcements (French and
British) and material, and they were able to strengthen their defences
and improve their situation.
In all there were at the beginning of 1916 a little less than 100,000
French troops, about as many British and a few thousand Serbs,
altogether about 200,000 men to defend the entrenched camp, forming
an arc of a circle of 120 kilometres, in addition to the advanced
positions. There were 358 French and 350 British guns, but the heaviest
French guns were only long 155 mm. and the heaviest British were of 6
in. General Sarrail had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied
Armies in the Orient. The British Army, in May, 1916, was commanded by
Lieutenant-General George (now Sir George) Milne, under the superior
command, although in a limited measure, of General Sarrail. The enemy
forces amounted to about 280,000 men.
The results of these operations, although disaster had been avoided,
cannot be regarded as brilliant, nor were they of such character as
to raise the prestige of General Sarrail with the Allies, nor of the
Allies in general with the enemy States and those who were still
neutral. A well-executed retreat without heavy losses in men or
material may be a fine operation from a technical point of view, but it
does not arouse enthusiasm. On the other hand, the relative conditions
of the two armies amounted to a situation of stalemate from which it
would not be easy to emerge. General Lord Kitchener, who had come to
inspect the Macedonian Army in December 1915, had actually proposed
the withdrawal of the expedition, which appeared to him as to many
other experts a useless dispersion of forces, and the Governments
were in doubt as to whether or not it were advisable to carry out
this suggestion. But in the course of 1916 the Allies received a new
reinforcement, in the shape of the revived Serbian Army, which was
destined to exercise a considerable political and military influence on
the future vicissitudes of the Oriental campaign.
The disastrous retreat through Albania in which the Serbian Army had
lost nearly all its artillery and more than half its effectives, took
refuge in Corfu, save a few detachments which were sent to Bizerta.
In Corfu the exhausted and worn-out soldiers rested, were re-equipped
with everything and thoroughly reorganized. As soon as they began to
recover from their terrible experiences they wished to go to Macedonia
to take part in the Allied operations. They began to reach Salonica in
the spring of 1916, and at the end of April there were about 15,000 of
them, besides the detachment formed of the men who had escaped from
Monastir. At the end of June they amounted to 120,000 and in July to
152,000. They were divided into three armies, each comprising two
divisions: I Army (Morava and Vardar Division); II (Shumadia and Timok)
and III (Drina and Danube), in addition to the cavalry division and
the volunteer corps, with 72 machine-gun sections. The artillery was
supplied to a great extent by the French, except for a few guns saved
in the retreat, to which some others captured from the enemy were
afterwards added. They had 6 groups of 75 mm., 6 of 80 mm. mountain
batteries (afterwards replaced by 65 mm. quick-firing guns), 6 groups
of Krupp 70 mm. or Schneider 75 mm. mountain guns, 6 groups of 120
mm. howitzers, 6 batteries of 58 mm. trench guns. Scattered about
the mountains along the border between Macedonia and Albania and in
Macedonia there were irregular Serbian comitadji bands estimated, in
July 1916, at about 5,000 men, who broke up and reformed according to
circumstances, now attempting a raid, now hiding among the mountains.
Other bands continued to exist in Old Serbia, and in fact they rose in
revolt in the winter of 1916–17, causing serious anxiety to the enemy;
the movement, however, was ruthlessly repressed.
But the situation of the Allies continued to be made extremely
difficult by the conduct of the Greek authorities who, although
officially neutral, were in reality most unfriendly. They had created
a regular system of espionage in favour of the Central Empires, headed
by Colonel Messalas, who sent reports of every variation in the
strength and distribution of the Allied troops to the Ministry of War
at Athens and to the King and Queen, whence they reached the German
G.H.Q. The Consuls of the enemy States were naturally extremely active
in this work of espionage and the Allied G.H.Q., owing to its peculiar
situation, and not wishing to come to a regular breach with Greece,
either because it was feared that she might definitely go over to the
enemy or in the hope of inducing her to join the Entente, had its hands
tied. When, however, in consequence of information supplied by enemy
agents, German aeroplanes bombed the city, causing considerable damage,
and killing a number of people, General Sarrail declared that he would
henceforth consider the area occupied by the Allies as a war zone, and
on the night of December 30th Franco-British patrols arrested the four
enemy consuls and seized their archives, whence they obtained valuable
information concerning enemy spies. A British detachment had on its own
account arrested the German Consul at Drama in the train near Serres,
in spite of violent rhodomontades and protests of the Greek officers in
the same compartment.
Graver anxiety was caused by the Greek Army. At the end of 1915, its
distribution was as follows: The I and II Corps were in Old Greece,
except the artillery, which was between Salonica and Vassilika; the
III Corps was echeloned between Salonica, Yenidje-Vardar, Verria,
Ekshisu, Banitza and Florina; the IV between Serres and Drama, and the
V between Langaza and Guvesne. In theory the Greek troops were to guard
the frontier, preventing the Germans and Bulgarians from violating
it, but none of the Allies had the slightest confidence that they
would have offered any resistance to an attempt at invasion, even if
they did not actively co-operate in it. Further, Greek officers and
officials conducted an active and lucrative contraband in favour of
the “hereditary enemy.” The British writer, G. Ward Price, notes that
it is remarkable how instinctively the soldiers of the various Allied
Armies--the most heterogeneous collection of characters, types and
standards of conduct--were agreed in hating the Greeks at that time.[7]
The Allies now began to bring pressure to bear on the Greek Government
in order that the Greek Army should be withdrawn from Macedonia
and demobilized. On January 28th an Anglo-French detachment, with
the co-operation of warships, among which was the Italian cruiser
_Piemonte_, occupied the forts of Karaburun, south-east of Salonica,
the port of which is dominated by them, and expelled the Greek
garrison. On the night of January 31st-February 1st, a German Zeppelin
bombarded Salonica; it was afterwards brought down and destroyed near
the mouth of the Vardar, and at the same time luminous signals were
seen coming from the city. General Sarrail, who since January 15th had
assumed the control of the police, the railways and the telegraph,
seized the occasion to proclaim the state of siege. The chief of the
French _Sûreté_ and the British A.P.M. proceeded little by little to
cleanse the town of suspicious elements, and there was good need of
it. In the meanwhile the Greek troops slowly and unwillingly began to
evacuate Macedonia. On May 23rd, 1916, the Germano-Bulgar Army, on the
pretext that the Allies were carrying out threatening movements in the
Serres area, crossed the Greek frontier and demanded the evacuation
of Fort Rupel dominating the narrow defile through which the Struma
opens its way to the east Macedonian plain and flows down to the sea.
The Commander of the garrison made a feeble protest, fired a few shots
to salve his conscience, and asked for instructions from Athens. These
were to the effect that he should hand over the fort with all its
material, which he did with enthusiasm. In conformity with analogous
instructions, the whole of the IV Corps, distributed through the
Serres area and commanded by Colonel Hadzopoulos, surrendered to the
Bulgarians and Germans, except 2,500 men of the Serres Division who,
with their Commander, Colonel Christodoulos, refused to submit to this
dishonour and managed to escape to the island of Thasos, whence in
September they were transported to Salonica and formed the nucleus of
the future Venizelist army.
The conduct of the Greek Government is explained by some retrospective
history. M. Venizelos, although convinced of the erroneous policy
pursued by King Constantine, hesitated to promote an open rebellion
against him, also because he saw much weakness and indecision among the
Allies. The King had dissolved the Chamber in June 1915, and whereas in
that Parliament, which had been elected by 750,000 voters, the majority
was in favour of Venizelos, in the new Chamber, elected by only 200,000
voters in December in an illegal manner under Government pressure and
threats, the majority was hostile to him. But independently of these
illegalities, Greek public opinion was to a great extent opposed to
the policy of Venizelos, who desired the intervention of Greece in
favour of the Entente, not only in order to meet Greece’s obligations
of honour towards Serbia, but also in the higher interests of Greece
herself. Facts have proved that he was right, but in 1915 the policy
of Constantine might well have been deemed the more prudent. Serbia
was, like Belgium, invaded and devastated; Bulgaria and Turkey allied
to Germany and Austria; one half of Albania occupied by the Austrians
and the other half by the Italians--the latter undesired neighbours
of Greece--and German terrorist propaganda, which in Italy had failed
so miserably, in Greece achieved the success of fear. “Should we
throw ourselves into this conflict and run the risk of seeing our
country invaded and devastated?” the Greeks asked themselves, and
most of them came to the conclusion that it was better to remain
neutral and to make money through war trade; from the point of view
of their immediate interests, they were not altogether wrong. It is
not true, however, that the whole population was pro-German. The King
and the Queen (sister of the Emperor William) were pro-Germans, and
so also were nearly the whole of the General Staff, and the majority
of the generals and field officers educated in Germany or at least
trained according to German methods. The masses were indifferent to
the respective moral merits of the two groups of belligerents, and
did not want war, and as Constantine would have found it extremely
difficult to make war in open alliance with the Central Empires, he
tried to help them by remaining neutral. In the popular mind Venizelos
consequently came to be synonymous with intervention and Constantine
with peace; the people preferred peace. Further, as the army was
still mobilized there was a good deal of discontent, and the people
regarded Venizelos as responsible for this state of things. Another
reason in favour of neutrality was that if Greece had intervened
she would have found herself in alliance with Italy, against whom
she was much irritated owing to the question of the Dodecannese and
Southern Albania. Finally, she had reason to believe that the Allies
had offered a considerable part of Macedonia to Bulgaria in September
1915, in the vain hope of obtaining the latter’s intervention against
the Central Powers. In the meanwhile, Venizelos was awaiting the
moment for action. For all these reasons, the surrender of Rupel and
of the IV Army Corps did not arouse that reaction which was expected,
and which in other circumstances would certainly have occurred. King
Constantine had received as a reward for his policy a loan from the
Central Empires of 75 million drachmæ, while at the same time he was
trying to negotiate another for 125 millions from the Allies. In
spite of the declaration of the Prime Minister, M. Skouloudis, in the
Chamber, there was a general belief throughout the Allied countries,
as even M. Coronillas, Greek Minister in Rome, and his colleague in
Paris, M. Caclamanos admitted, that the Government of King Constantine
had concluded an agreement with Thrace, Germany and Bulgaria.[8] The
treachery of Rupel and the 4th Corps produced very unfavourable results
for the Allies. The whole of Eastern Macedonia fell into the hands of
the enemy without a blow having been struck. Demir-Hissar, Serres,
Drama, Kavalla were occupied by the Bulgarians, and the fighting line
was brought to the course of the Struma from Rupel to the sea, and
although these towns might have been retaken without great difficulty,
they were dominated by very strong positions on the mountains behind
them, which were immediately fortified. For this reason, Great
Britain, France and Russia renewed their demands on the Government at
Athens in order that all the remaining Greek troops be withdrawn into
Greece, the army demobilized, and the anti-Constitutional Government
abolished.[9] It will be noted that in all the affairs of Greece it
was always these three Governments who acted, and not the Entente as a
whole. This was due to the fact that, owing to the London Convention
of May 7, 1832, these three Powers were declared the protectors of the
Greek Kingdom and of its Constitution. The evacuation of Macedonia
was carried out slowly, as was also the demobilization. What remained
of the Greek Army was nearly all concentrated in the Peloponnese,
where it could be easily watched and prevented from returning towards
Macedonia. But the Royal Government did everything in its power to
avoid fulfilling its engagements, and while the demobilization was
being carried out, leagues of Epistrates (Reservists) were being
formed. These associations, organized by officers devoted to King
Constantine, constituted a new element hostile to the Entente. Then
also, the Government tried to maintain armed forces in Northern Greece
by strengthening the gendarmerie and creating hidden deposits of arms.
Although the importance of these attempts were much exaggerated, they
nevertheless caused some anxiety to the Allied Armies in Macedonia.