OF THE FRUITLESS EXCURSIONS OF THE CORDOBANS
AGAINST THE ABIPONES.
What! you exclaim, did the minds of the Cordobans at last grow callous
to so much slaughter?—Were they so tame as never to think of
revenge?—Did Cordoba want men, or arms, or strength? In neither of these
requisites was that flourishing city deficient. The Cordobans have
always in readiness twelve thousand men fit to bear arms. Cordoba
abounds in swift and strong horses. The bodies of the inhabitants are
strong and vigorous, and their minds filled with the desire of military
glory; they might not only put the Abipones to flight, but reduce the
whole province of Chaco: in short, they might do every thing against the
savages, did not the vain fear with which they are possessed make them
despair of doing any thing. Whilst depressed by the recollection of the
slaughters they had suffered, they thought victory must always attend
the Abipones; they dared attempt nothing against them, and were thus
forsaken by fortune, which usually favours the brave. I will here
describe some expeditions of the Cordobans, the issue of which was
always either unfortunate or ridiculous.
The Abipones laid waste the territories of Rio Segundo, and some
Cordoban forces were sent out to repress them. The enemy was overtaken
in the open plain. On one side stood the Spaniards, on the other the
Abipones, in battle-array. They threatened one another for a long time,
but no one had courage to begin the attack, till at last an Abipon leapt
from his horse, approached the ranks of the Spaniards, and challenged
one of them to single combat. Many of the soldiers would have been
willing enough to engage with this bold one, but the leader of the
expedition forbade them to stir hand or foot, under pain of death;
perceiving which, the Abipones slowly departed, each his own way,
leaving the Spaniards to themselves. The Cordoban captains acted in the
same way on other occasions, and by thus betraying their own fear,
rendered the savages still bolder in their projects. To pacify the minds
of the people, endless expeditions were undertaken against Chaco, but
all unsuccessful. There were many causes for this. These delicate
warriors always drove before them a vast number of horses and oxen,
consequently the journey was retarded by the multitude of beasts. The
number of captains was too great in proportion to that of soldiers;
there were too many to give commands and too few to execute them.
Besides laden mules, they carried a good many waggons for conveying
provisions, which are always sure to impede a journey. Moreover, the
Commander-in-chief made use of a chariot for show. I myself saw a place
in Chaco where that chariot and all the waggons were burnt by the
Cordobans, when, surrounded by pools and marshes, they could neither go
back nor forwards. Doubtless the ways which led to the retreats of the
savages in Chaco, were dangerous to the Indians themselves. The nature
of the soil is such, that after a long cessation of rain, it grows as
dry as a flint, and denies even the little birds wherewith to drink; but
if the showers be frequent, you will not find an inch of dry ground to
walk or lie down upon. As the plain is varied neither by fountains,
hills, nor stones, but runs out into a vast extent of even ground,
covered with turf, when deluged with rain it presents the appearance of
a lake. At other times the road is intercepted by marshes and
overflowing rivers, which occasion delay, even if the soldiers can
overcome them by swimming; but if this be not the case, they are
entirely prevented from proceeding, being unprovided with bridges or
skiffs. The place of these is supplied, as I have said, by the pelota;
but, as those vessels are capable of holding but one man at once, much
time will be consumed whilst four hundred soldiers are transported, in
this manner, to the opposite shore; and likewise so much noise must
necessarily be made during the process, that the enemy, apprized of
their arrival, will either take to speedy flight, or rush on the
Spaniards whilst unprepared and separated from one another by the river.
If, therefore, you would know the chief reason why the Spaniards so
often returned ingloriously home from Chaco, without even obtaining a
sight of the savages, it was that they could not swim.
Of this I had a most creditable witness in Landriel, who sometimes acted
as guide to the Cordobans in their expeditions into Chaco; and under
whose conduct they arrived, after many days' journey, at the eastern
shore of the river Malabrigo, on the opposite side of which the Abipones
Riikahes were accustomed to pitch their tents. It was a difficult matter
to discover their lurking-holes, to attack which was the object of the
expedition; the whole plain being deluged with water to such a degree
that no traces of either man or beast could be found there. The only
things that appeared above the surface of the water were some large
ant-hills, from one of which Landriel perceived that a honeycomb had
been lately taken. This circumstance led him to conjecture that the
Abipones must be somewhere near, and after much search he discovered a
large horde of them, which might have been attacked, conquered,
plundered, and destroyed on the same day, had Landriel brought soldiers
of St. Iago, Corrientes, or Sta. Fè, all excellent swimmers, instead of
Cordobans who are ignorant of that art; for as they drew nigh to the
hostile horde, it was necessary to cross the river Malabrigo, which,
being at that time greatly overflowed, would neither suffer a bridge,
nor allow of being forded. The soldiers might all have been transported
to the opposite shore on a hide, but they foresaw that a passage of this
kind could not be effected in less than a day, whatever haste were
employed. Meantime the Abipones, roused by the noise of the Spaniards,
or by the neighing of their horses alone, would have placed their
families in safety, and undoubtedly attacked and routed the Cordobans,
who were never formidable to them, and would be still less so at that
time, when their forces were divided by the river. After discussing
these matters, they concluded that it was most advisable to hasten their
return, which they did, falling, rather than marching; for the way had
been rendered slippery from the inundation, and dangerous on account of
the deep holes underneath the water. Numberless multitudes of wild oxen
had formerly filled the plain, and the bulls by tearing the ground with
their horns, as is usual with them when enraged, had occasioned those
numerous holes: which are the more dangerous to horsemen because when
covered with water they cannot be seen: many of them are one cubit deep,
and equally wide. If any of the Cordobans slipped into one of these
holes, his comrades all followed him, and fell in too, and when Landriel
advised them to turn their horses a little to the right or the left, for
the sake of avoiding the ditch where their companion had fallen, they
seldom attended to his admonitions, saying, "It is true we saw our
fellow-soldier fall in there, but we also saw him get safely out again.
If we go another way we shall perhaps fall into a deeper ditch, whence
we may not rise without injury." These holes are properly called by the
Spaniards _pozzos_, or wells, because they receive the rain water, and
preserve it a long time for the use of travellers, when the plains and
woods are parched by a dry season. From what I have related you may
collect, that the expeditions of the Cordobans into Chaco, so far from
subduing and overawing the savages, served only to confirm them in their
disposition to plunder; indeed they became more unrestrained in their
attacks upon the colonists of Cordoba, in proportion as they became more
fully convinced of the imbecility of the Cordoban soldiers, whom they
believed incapable of returning injury for injury, slaughter for
slaughter, and deterred from venturing into Chaco by the difficulties of
the journey thither. To ensure the safety of the merchants, soldiers
were at last hired to keep guard continually over those places. The tax
laid on the herb of Paraguay, which is conveyed in waggons into Peru,
was the chief source of the money for paying the soldiers. But this
provision, though it thoroughly drained the purses of the merchants, did
not much lessen the boldness or frequency of these robberies, the
savages sometimes craftily deceiving this little band of soldiers,
sometimes intimidating it with superior numbers. It is true that when
most part of the Mocobios and Abipones were settled by us in the
colonies, the province, delivered from so many enemies, began to breathe
once more. The remainder of both nations, who still wandered without
these colonies, though they disturbed and laid waste the country of Sta.
Fè and Asumpcion, hardly ever attempted any hostilities against the
territories of Cordoba; which tranquillity they owed to Alvarez, captain
at Rio Segundo, and to Benavides commander at Rio Seco. As soon as those
brave men took upon themselves the direction of military affairs the
Cordobans became bolder, and the Abipones more timid in their attacks,
especially after one of them had been taken in the plain by a Cordoban
soldier, and the formidable Pachiekè, son of the Cacique Alaykin, slain.
When we returned to Europe, almost all the Abipones deserted the
colonies we had founded and taken care of. Weary of the peace and
friendship which had been established between them and the Spaniards,
they resumed their arms, with what success is best known to those who
had to contend with the savages, enraged and distracted at our
departure. I have shown how formidable and destructive the savage tribe
of Abipones was to the whole province, and how little the arms of the
Spaniards availed to check and restrain them. What fruit we had of our
endeavours in subduing and reclaiming them is yet to be related.