In September, 1845, the President of the United States directed their
consul at Mexico to ascertain from the Mexican Government, whether it
would receive an _Envoy_ from the United States, intrusted with full
power to adjust all the questions in dispute between the two
Governments.
The answer of Mr. De la Pena y Pena, Minister of the Foreign Relations
of Mexico, was, "That although the Mexican nation was deeply injured by
the United States, through the acts committed by them in the department
of Texas, which belongs to his nation, his Government was disposed to
receive the _Commissioner_ of the United States who might come to the
capital, with full powers from his Government to settle the present
dispute in a peaceful, reasonable and honorable manner;" thus giving a
new proof that, even in the midst of its injuries and of its firm
decision to exact adequate reparation for them, the Government of Mexico
does not reply with contumely to the measures of reason and peace to
which it was invited by its adversary.
The Mexican Minister at the same time intimated, that the previous
recall of the whole Naval force of the United States, then lying in
sight of the port of Vera Cruz, was indispensable; and this was
accordingly done by our Government.
But it is essential to observe that, whilst Mr. Black had, according to
his instructions, inquired, whether the Mexican Government would receive
an _Envoy_ from the United States, with full power to adjust all the
questions in dispute between the two Governments, the Mexican Minister
had answered, that his Government was disposed to receive the
_Commissioner_ of the United States, who might come with full powers to
settle the present dispute in a peaceful, reasonable and honorable
manner.
Mr. Slidell was, in November following, appointed Envoy Extraordinary
and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America near the
Government of the Mexican Republic; and he arrived in Mexico on the
sixth of December.
Mr. Herrera, the President of Mexico, was undoubtedly disposed to settle
the disputes between the two countries. But taking advantage of the
irritation of the mass of the people, his political opponents were
attempting to overset him for having made, as they said, unworthy
concessions. The arrival of Mr. Slidell disturbed him extremely; and Mr.
Pena y Pena declared to Mr. Black, that his appearance in the capital at
this time might prove destructive to the Government, and thus defeat the
whole affair. Under these circumstances General Herrera complained,
without any foundation, that Mr. Slidell had come sooner than had been
understood; he resorted to several frivolous objections against the
tenor of his powers; and he intimated that the difficulties respecting
Texas must be adjusted before any other subject of discussion should be
taken into consideration.
But the main question was, whether Mexico should receive Mr. Slidell in
the character of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, to
reside in the republic. It was insisted by the Mexican Government, that
it had only agreed to receive a commissioner, to treat on the questions
which had arisen from the events in Texas; and that until this was done,
the suspended diplomatic intercourse could not be restored, and a
residing minister plenipotentiary be admitted.
Why our Government should have insisted, that the intended negotiation
should be carried on by a residing Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary, is altogether unintelligible. The questions at issue
might have been discussed and settled as easily, fully and
satisfactorily, by commissioners appointed for that special purpose, as
by residing ministers or envoys. It is well known that whenever
diplomatic relations have been superseded by war, treaties of peace are
always negotiated by commissioners appointed for that special purpose,
who are personally amply protected by the law of nations, but who are
never received as resident ministers, till after the peace has restored
the ordinary diplomatic intercourse. Thus the treaty of peace of 1783,
between France and England, was negotiated and concluded at Paris by
British commissioners, whom it would have been deemed absurd to admit as
resident envoys or ministers, before peace had been made.
The only distinction which can possibly be made between the two cases
is, that there was not as yet actual war between Mexico and the United
States. But the annexation of Texas was no ordinary occurrence. It was a
most clear act of unprovoked aggression; a deep and most offensive
injury; in fact, a declaration of war, if Mexico had accepted it as
such. In lieu of this, that country had only resorted to a suspension of
the ordinary diplomatic relations. It would seem as if our Government
had considered this as an act of unparalleled audacity, which Mexico
must be compelled to retract, before any negotiations for the
arrangement of existing difficulties could take place; as an insult to
the Government and to the nation, which must compel it to assert its
just rights and _to avenge its injured honor_.
General Herrera was not mistaken in his anticipations. His government
was overset in the latter end of the month of December, 1845, and fell
into the hands of those who had denounced him for having listened to
overtures of an arrangement of the difficulties between the two nations.
When Mexico felt its inability to contend with the United States; and,
instead of considering the annexation of Texas to be, as it really was,
tantamount to a declaration of war, only suspended the ordinary
diplomatic relations between the two countries, its Government, if
directed by wise counsels, and not impeded by popular irritation, should
at once, since it had already agreed to recognize the independence of
Texas, have entered into a negotiation with the United States. At that
time there would have been no intrinsic difficulty in making a final
arrangement founded on an unconditional recognition of the independence
of Texas, within its legitimate boundaries. Popular feeling and the
ambition of contending military leaders, prevented that peaceable
termination of those unfortunate dissensions.
Yet, when Mexico refused to receive Mr. Slidell as an Envoy
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, the United States should
have remembered, that we had been the aggressors, that we had committed
an act acknowledged, as well by the practical law of nations, as by
common sense and common justice, to be tantamount to a declaration of
war; and they should have waited with patience, till the feelings
excited by our own conduct had subsided.
General Taylor had been instructed by the War Department, as early as
May 28, 1845, to cause the forces under his command to be put into a
position where they might most promptly and efficiently act in defence
of Texas, in the event that it should become necessary or proper to
employ them for that purpose. By subsequent instructions, and after the
people of Texas had accepted the proposition of annexation, he was
directed to select and occupy a position adapted to repel invasion, as
near the boundary line, the Rio Grande, as prudence would dictate; and
that, with this view, a part of his forces at least should be west of
the river Nueces. It was certainly the duty of the President to protect
Texas against invasion, from the moment it had been annexed to the
United States; and as that republic was in actual possession of Corpus
Christi, which was the position selected by General Taylor, there was
nothing, in the position he had taken, indicative of any danger of
actual hostilities.
But our Government seems to have considered the refusal, on the part of
Mexico, to receive Mr. Slidell as a resident Envoy of the United States,
as necessarily leading to war. The Secretary of State, in his letter to
Mr. Slidell of January 28, 1846, says:--"Should the Mexican Government
finally refuse to receive you, the cup of forbearance will then have
been exhausted. Nothing can remain but to take the redress of the
injuries to our citizens, and the insults to our Government, into our
own hands." And again, "Should the Mexican Government finally refuse to
receive you, then demand passports from the proper authority, and return
to the United States. It will then become the duty of the President to
submit the whole case to Congress, and call upon the nation to assert
its just rights, and avenge its injured honor."
With the same object in view, the Secretary of War did, by his letter
dated January 13, 1846, instruct General Taylor "to advance and occupy,
with the troops under his command, positions on or near the east bank of
the Rio del Norte.... It is presumed Point Isabel will be considered by
you an eligible position. This point, or some one near it, and points
opposite Matamoras and Mier, and in the vicinity of Laredo, are
suggested for your consideration.... Should you attempt to exercise the
right, which the United States have in common with Mexico, to the free
navigation of this river, it is probable that Mexico would interpose
resistance. You will not attempt to enforce this right without further
instructions.... It is not designed, in our present relations with
Mexico, that you should treat her as an enemy; but, should she assume
that character by a declaration of war, or any open act of hostility
towards us, you will not act merely on the defensive if your relative
means enable you to do otherwise."
The administration was therefore of opinion, that this military
occupation of the territory in question was not an act of hostility,
towards Mexico, or treating her as an enemy. Now, I do aver, without
fear of contradiction, that whenever a territory claimed by two powers
is, and has been for a length of time in the possession of one of them,
if the other should invade and take possession of it by a military
force, such an act is an open act of hostility according to the
acknowledged and practical law of nations. In this case the law of
nations only recognizes a clear and positive fact.
The sequel is well known. General Taylor, with his troops, left Corpus
Christi, March 8th to 11th, 1846, and entered the desert which
separates that place from the vicinity of the del Norte. On the 21st he
was encamped three miles south of the Arroyo, or Little Colorado, having
by the route he took marched 135 miles, and being nearly north of
Matamoras about thirty miles distant. He had on the 19th met a party of
irregular Mexican cavalry, who informed him that they had peremptory
orders, if he passed the river, to fire upon his troops, and that it
would be considered a declaration of war. The river was however crossed
without a single shot having been fired. In a proclamation issued on the
12th, General Mejia, who commanded the forces of the Department of
Tamaulipas, asserts, that the limits of Texas are certain and
recognized, and never had extended beyond the river Nueces, that the
cabinet of the United States coveted the regions on the left bank of the
Rio Bravo, and that the American army was now advancing to take
possession of a large part of Tamaulipas. On the 24th March General
Taylor reached a point on the route from Matamoras to Point Isabel,
eighteen miles from the former, and ten from the latter place, where a
deputation sent him a formal Protest of the Prefect of the Northern
District of the Department of Tamaulipas, declaring, in behalf of the
citizens of the district, that they never will consent to separate
themselves from the Mexican Republic, and to unite themselves with the
United States. On the 12th of April, the Mexican General, Ampudia,
required General Taylor to break up his camp within twenty-four hours,
and to retire to the other bank of the Nueces river, and notified him
that, if he insisted in remaining upon the soil of the Department of
Tamaulipas, it would clearly result that arms alone must decide the
question; in which case, he declared that the Mexicans would accept the
war to which they had been provoked. On the 24th of April, General
Arista arrived in Matamoras, and on the same day, informed General
Taylor, that he considered hostilities commenced, and would prosecute
them. On the same day, a party of sixty-three American dragoons, who had
been sent some distance up the left bank of the river, became engaged
with a very large force of the enemy, and after a short affair, in which
about sixteen were killed or wounded, were surrounded and compelled to
surrender. These facts were laid before Congress by the President in his
message of the 11th of May.