Two motions on two given screws,

With amplitudes at pleasure,

Into a third screw-motion fuse,

Whose amplitude we measure

By parallelogram construction

(A very obvious deduction).

Its axis cuts the nodal line

Which to both screws is normal,

And generates a form divine,

Whose name, in language formal,

Is “surface-ruled of third degree.”

Cylindroid is the name for me.

Rotation round a given line

Is like a force along,

If to say couple you decline,

You’re clearly in the wrong;--

’Tis obvious, upon reflection,

A line is not a mere direction.

So couples with translations too

In all respects agree;

And thus there centres in the screw

A wondrous harmony

Of Kinematics and of Statics,--

The sweetest thing in mathematics.

The forces on one given screw,

With motion on a second,

In general some work will do,

Whose magnitude is reckoned

By angle, force, and what we call

The coefficient virtual.

Rotation now to force convert,

And force into rotation;

Unchanged the work, we can assert,

In spite of transformation.

And if two screws no work can claim,

Reciprocal will be their name.

Five numbers will a screw define,

A screwing motion, six;

For four will give the axial line,

One more the pitch will fix;

And hence we always can contrive

One screw reciprocal to five.

Screws--two, three, four or five, combined

(No question here of six),

Yield other screws which are confined

Within one screw complex.

Thus we obtain the clearest notion

Of freedom and constraint of motion.

In complex III, three several screws

At every point you find,

Or if you one direction choose,

One screw is to your mind;

And complexes of order III.

Their own reciprocals may be.

In IV, wherever you arrive,

You find of screws a cone,

On every line of complex V.

There is precisely one;

At each point of this complex rich,

A plane of screws have given pitch.

But time would fail me to discourse

Of Order and Degree;

Of Impulse, Energy and Force,

And Reciprocity.

All these and more, for motions small,

Have been discussed by Dr. Ball.

--ANONYMOUS.

CHAPTER XIX

THE CALCULUS AND ALLIED TOPICS

=1901.= It may be said that the conceptions of differential

quotient and integral, which in their origin certainly go back to

Archimedes, were introduced into science by the investigations of

Kepler, Descartes, Cavalieri, Fermat and Wallis.... The capital

discovery that differentiation and integration are _inverse_

operations belongs to Newton and Leibnitz.--LIE, SOPHUS.

_Leipziger Berichte, 47 (1895),

Math.-phys. Classe, p. 53._

=1902.= It appears that Fermat, the true inventor of the

differential calculus, considered that calculus as derived from

the calculus of finite differences by neglecting infinitesimals

of higher orders as compared with those of a lower order....

Newton, through his method of fluxions, has since rendered the

calculus more analytical, he also simplified and generalized the

method by the invention of his binomial theorem. Leibnitz has

enriched the differential calculus by a very happy notation.

--LAPLACE.

_Lés Intégrales Définies, etc.; Oeuvres,

t. 12 (Paris, 1898), p. 359._

=1903.= Professor Peacock’s Algebra, and Mr. Whewell’s Doctrine

of Limits should be studied by every one who desires to

comprehend the evidence of mathematical truths, and the meaning

of the obscure processes of the calculus; while, even after

mastering these treatises, the student will have much to learn on

the subject from M. Comte, of whose admirable work one of the

most admirable portions is that in which he may truly be said to

have created the philosophy of the higher mathematics.

--MILL, J. S.

_System of Logic, Bk. 3, chap. 24, sect.

6._

=1904.= If we must confine ourselves to one system of notation

then there can be no doubt that that which was invented by

Leibnitz is better fitted for most of the purposes to which the

infinitesimal calculus is applied than that of fluxions, and for

some (such as the calculus of variations) it is indeed almost

essential.--BALL, W. W. R.

_History of Mathematics (London, 1901),

p. 371._

=1905.= The difference between the method of infinitesimals and

that of limits (when exclusively adopted) is, that in the latter

it is usual to retain evanescent quantities of higher orders

until the end of the calculation and then neglect them. On the

other hand, such quantities are neglected from the commencement

in the infinitesimal method, from the conviction that they cannot

affect the final result, as they must disappear when we proceed

to the limit.--WILLIAMSON, B.

_Encyclopedia Britannica, 9th Edition;

Article “Infinitesimal Calculus,” sect.

14._

=1906.= When we have grasped the spirit of the infinitesimal

method, and have verified the exactness of its results either by

the geometrical method of prime and ultimate ratios, or by the

analytical method of derived functions, we may employ infinitely

small quantities as a sure and valuable means of shortening and

simplifying our proofs.--LAGRANGE.

_Méchanique Analytique, Preface;

Oeuvres, t. 2 (Paris, 1888), p. 14._

=1907.= The essential merit, the sublimity, of the infinitesimal

method lies in the fact that it is as easily performed as the

simplest method of approximation, and that it is as accurate as

the results of an ordinary calculation. This advantage would be

lost, or at least greatly impaired, if, under the pretense of

securing greater accuracy throughout the whole process, we were

to substitute for the simpler method given by Leibnitz, one less

convenient and less in harmony with the probable course of

natural events....

The objections which have been raised against the infinitesimal

method are based on the false supposition that the errors due to

neglecting infinitely small quantities during the actual

calculation will continue to exist in the result of the

calculation.--CARNOT, L.

_Réflections sur la Métaphysique du

Calcul Infinitésimal (Paris, 1813), p.

215._

=1908.= A limiting ratio is neither more nor less difficult to

define than an infinitely small quantity.--CARNOT, L.

_Réflections sur la Métaphysique du

Calcul Infinitésimal (Paris, 1813), p.

210._

=1909.= A limit is a peculiar and fundamental conception, the use

of which in proving the propositions of Higher Geometry cannot

be superseded by any combination of other hypotheses and

definitions. The axiom just noted that what is true up to the

limit is true at the limit, is involved in the very conception of

a limit: and this principle, with its consequences, leads to all

the results which form the subject of the higher mathematics,

whether proved by the consideration of evanescent triangles, by

the processes of the Differential Calculus, or in any other way.

--WHEWELL, W.

_The Philosophy of the Inductive

Sciences, Part 1, bk. 2, chap. 12, sect.

1, (London, 1858)._

=1910.= The differential calculus has all the exactitude of other

algebraic operations.--LAPLACE.

_Théorie Analytique des Probabilités,

Introduction; Oeuvres, t. 7 (Paris,

1886), p. 37._

=1911.= The method of fluxions is probably one of the greatest,

most subtle, and sublime discoveries of any age: it opens a new

world to our view, and extends our knowledge, as it were, to

infinity; carrying us beyond the bounds that seemed to have been

prescribed to the human mind, at least infinitely beyond those to

which the ancient geometry was confined.--HUTTON, CHARLES.

_A Philosophical and Mathematical

Dictionary (London, 1815), Vol. 1, p.

525._

=1912.= The states and conditions of matter, as they occur in

nature, are in a state of perpetual flux, and these qualities

may be effectively studied by the Newtonian method (Methodus

fluxionem) whenever they can be referred to number or subjected

to measurement (real or imaginary). By the aid of Newton’s

calculus the mode of action of natural changes from moment to

moment can be portrayed as faithfully as these words represent

the thoughts at present in my mind. From this, the law which

controls the whole process can be determined with unmistakable

certainty by pure calculation.--MELLOR, J. W.

_Higher Mathematics for Students of

Chemistry and Physics (London, 1902),

Prologue._

=1913.= The calculus is the greatest aid we have to the

appreciation of physical truth in the broadest sense of the word.

--OSGOOD, W. F.

_Bulletin American Mathematical Society,

Vol. 13 (1907), p. 467._

=1914.= [Infinitesimal] analysis is the most powerful weapon of

thought yet devised by the wit of man.--SMITH, W. B.

_Infinitesimal Analysis (New York,

1898), Preface, p. vii._

=1915.= The method of Fluxions is the general key by help whereof

the modern mathematicians unlock the secrets of Geometry, and

consequently of Nature. And, as it is that which hath enabled

them so remarkably to outgo the ancients in discovering theorems

and solving problems, the exercise and application thereof is

become the main if not sole employment of all those who in this

age pass for profound geometers.--BERKELEY, GEORGE.

_The Analyst, sect. 3._

=1916.= I have at last become fully satisfied that the language

and idea of infinitesimals should be used in the most elementary

instruction--under all safeguards of course.--DE MORGAN, A.

_Graves’ Life of W. R. Hamilton (New

York, 1882-1889), Vol. 3, p. 479._

=1917.= Pupils should be taught how to differentiate and how to

integrate simple algebraic expressions before we attempt to

teach them geometry and these other complicated things. The

dreadful fear of the symbols is entirely broken down in those

cases where at the beginning the teaching of the calculus is

adopted. Then after the pupil has mastered those symbols you may

begin geometry or anything you please. I would also abolish out

of the school that thing called geometrical conics. There is a

great deal of superstition about conic sections. The student

should be taught the symbols of the calculus and the simplest use

of these symbols at the earliest age, instead of these being left

over until he has gone to the College or University.

--THOMPSON, S. P.

_Perry’s Teaching of Mathematics

(London, 1902), p. 49._

=1918.= Every one versed in the matter will agree that even the

elements of a scientific study of nature can be understood only by

those who have a knowledge of at least the elements of the

differential and integral calculus, as well as of analytical

geometry--i.e. the so-called lower part of the higher mathematics....

We should raise the question, whether sufficient time could not be

reserved in the curricula of at least the science high schools

[Realanstalten] to make room for these subjects....

The first consideration would be to entirely relieve from the

mathematical requirements of the university [Hochschule]

certain classes of students who can get along without extended

mathematical knowledge, or to make the necessary mathematical

knowledge accessible to them in a manner which, for various

reasons, has not yet been adopted by the university. Among such

students I would count architects, also the chemists and in

general the students of the so-called descriptive natural

sciences. I am moreover of the opinion--and this has been for

long a favorite idea of mine--, that it would be very useful to

medical students to acquire such mathematical knowledge as

is indicated by the above described modest limits; for it

seems impossible to understand far-reaching physiological

investigations, if one is terrified as soon as a differential or

integration symbol appears.--KLEIN, F.

_Jahresbericht der Deutschen

Mathematiker Vereinigung, Bd. 2 (1902),

p. 131._

=1919.= Common integration is only the _memory of

differentiation_ ... the different artifices by which integration

is effected, are changes, not from the known to the unknown, but

from forms in which memory will not serve us to those in which it

will.--DE MORGAN, A.

_Transactions Cambridge Philosophical

Society, Vol. 8 (1844), p. 188._

=1920.= Given for one instant an intelligence which could

comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated and the

respective positions of the beings which compose it, if moreover

this intelligence were vast enough to submit these data to

analysis, it would embrace in the same formula both the movements

of the largest bodies in the universe and those of the lightest

atom: to it nothing would be uncertain, and the future as the

past would be present to its eyes. The human mind offers a feeble

outline of that intelligence, in the perfection which it has

given to astronomy. Its discoveries in mechanics and in geometry,

joined to that of universal gravity, have enabled it to

comprehend in the same analytical expressions the past and future

states of the world system.--LAPLACE.

_Théorie Analytique des Probabilités,

Introduction; Oeuvres, t. 7 (Paris,

1886), p. 6._

=1921.= There is perhaps the same relation between the action of

natural selection during one generation and the accumulated

result of a hundred thousand generations, that there exists

between differential and integral. How seldom are we able to

follow completely this latter relation although we subject it to

calculation. Do we on that account doubt the correctness of our

integrations?--BOIS-REYMOND, EMIL DU.

_Reden, Bd. 1 (Leipzig, 1885), p. 228._

=1922.= It seems to be expected of every pilgrim up the slopes of

the mathematical Parnassus, that he will at some point or other

of his journey sit down and invent a definite integral or two

towards the increase of the common stock.--SYLVESTER, J. J.

_Notes to the Meditation on Poncelet’s

Theorem; Mathematical Papers, Vol. 2, p.

214._

=1923.= The experimental verification of a theory concerning

any natural phenomenon generally rests on the result of an

integration.--MELLOR, J. W.

_Higher Mathematics for Students of

Chemistry and Physics (New York, 1902),

p. 150._

=1924.= Among all the mathematical disciplines the theory of

differential equations is the most important.... It furnishes the

explanation of all those elementary manifestations of nature

which involve time....--LIE, SOPHUS.

_Leipziger Berichte, 47 (1895);

Math.-phys. Classe, p. 262._

=1925.= If the mathematical expression of our ideas leads to

equations which cannot be integrated, the working hypothesis will

either have to be verified some other way, or else relegated to

the great repository of unverified speculations.--MELLOR, J. W.

_Higher Mathematics for Students of

Chemistry and Physics (New York, 1902),

p. 157._

=1926.= It is well known that the central problem of the whole of

modern mathematics is the study of the transcendental functions

defined by differential equations.--KLEIN, F.

_Lectures on Mathematics (New York,

1911), p. 8._

=1927.= Every one knows what a curve is, until he has studied

enough mathematics to become confused through the countless

number of possible exceptions.... A curve is the totality of

points, whose co-ordinates are functions of a parameter which may

be differentiated as often as may be required.--KLEIN, F.

_Elementar Mathematik vom höheren

Standpunkte aus. (Leipzig. 1909) Vol. 2,

p. 354._

=1928.= Fourier’s theorem is not only one of the most beautiful

results of modern analysis, but it may be said to furnish an

indispensable instrument in the treatment of nearly every

recondite question in modern physics. To mention only sonorous

vibrations, the propagation of electric signals along telegraph

wires, and the conduction of heat by the earth’s crust, as

subjects in their generality intractable without it, is to give

but a feeble idea of its importance.--THOMSON AND TAIT.

_Elements of Natural Philosophy, chap.

1._

=1929.= The principal advantage arising from the use of

hyperbolic functions is that they bring to light some curious

analogies between the integrals of certain irrational functions.

--BYERLY, W. E.

_Integral Calculus (Boston, 1890), p.

30._

=1930.= Hyperbolic functions are extremely useful in every branch

of pure physics and in the applications of physics whether to

observational and experimental sciences or to technology. Thus

whenever an entity (such as light, velocity, electricity, or

radio-activity) is subject to gradual absorption or extinction,

the decay is represented by some form of hyperbolic functions.

Mercator’s projection is likewise computed by hyperbolic

functions. Whenever mechanical strains are regarded great enough

to be measured they are most simply expressed in terms of

hyperbolic functions. Hence geological deformations invariably

lead to such expressions....--WALCOTT, C. D.

_Smithsonian Mathematical Tables,

Hyperbolic Functions (Washington, 1909),

Advertisement._

=1931.= Geometry may sometimes appear to take the lead over

analysis, but in fact precedes it only as a servant goes before

his master to clear the path and light him on the way. The

interval between the two is as wide as between empiricism and

science, as between the understanding and the reason, or as

between the finite and the infinite.--SYLVESTER, J. J.

_Philosophic Magazine, Vol. 31 (1866),

p. 521._

=1932.= Nature herself exhibits to us measurable and observable

quantities in definite mathematical dependence; the conception of

a function is suggested by all the processes of nature where we

observe natural phenomena varying according to distance or to

time. Nearly all the “known” functions have presented themselves

in the attempt to solve geometrical, mechanical, or physical

problems.--MERZ, J. T.

_A History of European Thought in the

Nineteenth Century (Edinburgh and

London, 1903), p. 696._

=1933.= That flower of modern mathematical thought--the notion of

a function.--MCCORMACK, THOMAS J.

_On the Nature of Scientific Law and

Scientific Explanation, Monist, Vol. 10

(1899-1900), p. 555._

=1934.=

Fuchs. Ich bin von alledem so consterniert,

Als würde mir ein Kreis im Kopfe quadriert.

Meph. Nachher vor alien andern Sachen

Müsst ihe euch an die Funktionen-Theorie machen.

Da seht, dass ihr tiefsinnig fasst,

Was sich zu integrieren nicht passt.

An Theoremen wird’s euch nicht fehlen,

Müsst nur die Verschwindungspunkte zählen,

Umkehren, abbilden, auf der Eb’ne ’rumfahren

Und mit den Theta-Produkten nicht sparen.

--LASSWITZ, KURD.

_Der Faust-Tragödie (-n)ter Tiel;

Zeitschrift für den math.-natur.

Unterricht, Bd. 14 (1883), p. 316._

Fuchs. Your words fill me with an awful dread,

Seems like a circle were squared in my head.

Meph. Next in order you certainly ought

On function-theory bestow your thought,

And penetrate with contemplation

What resists your attempts at integration.

You’ll find no dearth of theorems there--

To vanishing-points give proper care--

Enumerate, reciprocate,

Nor forget to delineate,

Traverse the plane from end to end,

And theta-functions freely spend.

=1935.= The student should avoid _founding results_ upon

divergent series, as the question of their legitimacy is disputed

upon grounds to which no answer commanding anything like general

assent has yet been given. But they may be used as means of

discovery, provided that their results be verified by other means

before they are considered as established.--DE MORGAN, A.

_Trigonometry and Double Algebra

(London, 1849), p. 55._

=1936.= There is nothing now which ever gives me any thought or

care in algebra except divergent series, which I cannot follow

the French in rejecting.--DE MORGAN, A.

_Graves’ Life of W. R. Hamilton (New

York, 1882-1889), Vol. 3, p. 249._

=1937.= It is a strange vicissitude of our science that these

[divergent] series which early in the century were supposed to be

banished once and for all from rigorous mathematics should at its

close be knocking at the door for readmission.--PIERPONT, J.

_Congress of Arts and Sciences (Boston

and New York, 1905), Vol. 1, p. 476._

=1938.= Zeno was concerned with three problems.... These are the

problem of the infinitesimal, the infinite, and continuity....

From him to our own day, the finest intellects of each generation

in turn attacked these problems, but achieved broadly speaking

nothing.... Weierstrass, Dedekind, and Cantor, ... have

completely solved them. Their solutions ... are so clear as to

leave no longer the slightest doubt of difficulty. This

achievement is probably the greatest of which the age can

boast.... The problem of the infinitesimal was solved by

Weierstrass, the solution of the other two was begun by Dedekind

and definitely accomplished by Cantor.--RUSSELL, BERTRAND.

_International Monthly, Vol. 4 (1901),

p. 89._

=1939.= It was not till Leibnitz and Newton, by the discovery of

the differential calculus, had dispelled the ancient darkness

which enveloped the conception of the infinite, and had clearly

established the conception of the continuous and continuous

change, that a full and productive application of the newly-found

mechanical conceptions made any progress.--HELMHOLTZ, H.

_Aim and Progress of Physical Science;

Popular Lectures [Flight] (New York,

1900), p. 372._

=1940.= The idea of an infinitesimal involves no

contradiction.... As a mathematician, I prefer the method of

infinitesimals to that of limits, as far easier and less infested

with snares.--PIERCE, C. F.

_The Law of Mind; Monist, Vol. 2

(1891-1892), pp. 543, 545._

=1941.= The chief objection against all _abstract_ reasonings is

derived from the ideas of space and time; ideas, which, in common

life and to a careless view, are very clear and intelligible, but

when they pass through the scrutiny of the profound sciences (and

they are the chief object of these sciences) afford principles,

which seem full of obscurity and contradiction. No priestly

_dogmas_, invented on purpose to tame and subdue the rebellious

reason of mankind, ever shocked common sense more than the

doctrine of the infinite divisibility of extension, with

its consequences; as they are pompously displayed by all

geometricians and metaphysicians, with a kind of triumph and

exultation. A real quantity, infinitely less than any finite

quantity, containing quantities infinitely less than itself, and

so on _in infinitum_; this is an edifice so bold and prodigious,

that it is too weighty for any pretended demonstration to

support, because it shocks the clearest and most natural

principles of human reason. But what renders the matter more

extraordinary, is, that these seemingly absurd opinions are

supported by a chain of reasoning, the clearest and most natural;

nor is it possible for us to allow the premises without admitting

the consequences. Nothing can be more convincing and satisfactory

than all the conclusions concerning the properties of circles and

triangles; and yet, when these are once received, how can we

deny, that the angle of contact between a circle and its tangent

is infinitely less than any rectilineal angle, that as you may

increase the diameter of the circle _in infinitum_, this angle of

contact becomes still less, even _in infinitum_, and that the

angle of contact between other curves and their tangents may be

infinitely less than those between any circle and its tangent,

and so on, _in infinitum_? The demonstration of these principles

seems as unexceptionable as that which proves the three angles

of a triangle to be equal to two right ones, though the

latter opinion be natural and easy, and the former big with

contradiction and absurdity. Reason here seems to be thrown into

a kind of amazement and suspense, which, without the suggestion

of any sceptic, gives her a diffidence of herself, and of the

ground on which she treads. She sees a full light, which

illuminates certain places; but that light borders upon the most

profound darkness. And between these she is so dazzled and

confounded, that she scarcely can pronounce with certainty and

assurance concerning any one object.--HUME, DAVID.

_An Inquiry concerning Human

Understanding, Sect. 12, part 2._

=1942.= He who can digest a second or third fluxion, a second or

third difference, need not, methinks, be squeamish about any

point in Divinity.--BERKELEY, G.

_The Analyst, sect. 7._

=1943.= And what are these fluxions? The velocities of evanescent

increments. And what are these same evanescent increments? They

are neither finite quantities, nor quantities infinitely small,

nor yet nothing. May we not call them ghosts of departed

quantities?--BERKELEY, G.

_The Analyst, sect. 35._

=1944.= It is said that the minutest errors are not to be

neglected in mathematics; that the fluxions are celerities, not

proportional to the finite increments, though ever so small; but

only to the moments or nascent increments, whereof the proportion

alone, and not the magnitude, is considered. And of the aforesaid

fluxions there be other fluxions, which fluxions of fluxions are

called second fluxions. And the fluxions of these second fluxions

are called third fluxions: and so on, fourth, fifth, sixth, etc.,

_ad infinitum_. Now, as our Sense is strained and puzzled with

the perception of objects extremely minute, even so the

Imagination, which faculty derives from sense, is very much

strained and puzzled to frame clear ideas of the least particle

of time, or the least increment generated therein: and much more

to comprehend the moments, or those increments of the flowing

quantities in _status nascenti_, in their first origin or

beginning to exist, before they become finite particles. And it

seems still more difficult to conceive the abstracted velocities

of such nascent imperfect entities. But the velocities of the

velocities, the second, third, fourth, and fifth velocities,

etc., exceed, if I mistake not, all human understanding. The

further the mind analyseth and pursueth these fugitive ideas the

more it is lost and bewildered; the objects, at first fleeting

and minute, soon vanishing out of sight. Certainly, in any sense,

a second or third fluxion seems an obscure Mystery. The incipient

celerity of an incipient celerity, the nascent augment of a

nascent augment, i.e. of a thing which hath no magnitude; take it

in what light you please, the clear conception of it will, if I

mistake not, be found impossible; whether it be so or no I appeal

to the trial of every thinking reader. And if a second fluxion be

inconceivable, what are we to think of third, fourth, fifth

fluxions, and so on without end.--BERKELEY, G.

_The Analyst, sect, 4._

=1945.= The _infinite_ divisibility of _finite_ extension, though

it is not expressly laid down either as an axiom or theorem in

the elements of that science, yet it is throughout the same

everywhere supposed and thought to have so inseparable and

essential a connection with the principles and demonstrations in

Geometry, that mathematicians never admit it into doubt, or make

the least question of it. And, as this notion is the source

whence do spring all those amusing geometrical paradoxes which

have such a direct repugnancy to the plain common sense of

mankind, and are admitted with so much reluctance into a mind not

yet debauched by learning; so it is the principal occasion of all

that nice and extreme subtility which renders the study of

Mathematics so difficult and tedious.--BERKELEY, G.

_On the Principles of Human Knowledge,

Sect. 123._

=1946.= To avoid misconception, it should be borne in mind that

infinitesimals are not regarded as being actual quantities in the

ordinary acceptation of the words, or as capable of exact

representation. They are introduced for the purpose of abridgment

and simplification of our reasonings, and are an ultimate phase

of magnitude when it is conceived by the mind as capable of

diminution below any assigned quantity, however small....

Moreover such quantities are neglected, not, as Leibnitz stated,

because they are infinitely small in comparison with those that

are retained, which would produce an infinitely small error, but

because they must be neglected to obtain a rigorous result; since

such result must be definite and determinate, and consequently

independent of these _variable indefinitely small quantities_. It

may be added that the precise principles of the infinitesimal

calculus, like those of any other science, cannot be thoroughly

apprehended except by those who have already studied the science,

and made some progress in the application of its principles.

--WILLIAMSON, B.

_Encyclopedia Britannica, 9th Edition;

Article “Infinitesimal Calculus,” Sect.

12, 14._

=1947.= We admit, in geometry, not only infinite magnitudes, that

is to say, magnitudes greater than any assignable magnitude, but

infinite magnitudes infinitely greater, the one than the other.

This astonishes our dimension of brains, which is only about six

inches long, five broad, and six in depth, in the largest heads.

--VOLTAIRE.

_A Philosophical Dictionary; Article

“Infinity.” (Boston, 1881)._

=1948.= Infinity is the land of mathematical hocus pocus. There

Zero the magician is king. When Zero divides any number he

changes it without regard to its magnitude into the infinitely

small [great?], and inversely, when divided by any number he

begets the infinitely great [small?]. In this domain the

circumference of the circle becomes a straight line, and then the

circle can be squared. Here all ranks are abolished, for Zero

reduces everything to the same level one way or another. Happy is

the kingdom where Zero rules!--CARUS, PAUL.

_Logical and Mathematical Thought;

Monist, Vol. 20 (1909-1910), p. 69._

=1949.=

Great fleas have little fleas upon their backs

to bite ’em,

And little fleas have lesser fleas, and so _ad

infinitum._

And the great fleas themselves, in turn, have

greater fleas to go on;

While these again have greater still, and

greater still, and so on.

--DE MORGAN, A.

_Budget of Paradoxes (London, 1872), p.

377._

=1950.= We have adroitly defined the infinite in arithmetic by a

loveknot, in this manner ∞; but we possess not therefore the

clearer notion of it.--VOLTAIRE.

_A Philosophical Dictionary; Article

“Infinity.” (Boston, 1881)._

=1951.= I protest against the use of infinite magnitude as

something completed, which in mathematics is never permissible.

Infinity is merely a _facon de parler_, the real meaning being a

limit which certain ratios approach indefinitely near, while

others are permitted to increase without restriction.--GAUSS.

_Brief an Schumacher (1831); Werke, Bd.

8 p. 216._

=1952.= In spite of the essential difference between the

conceptions of the _potential_ and the _actual_ infinite, the

former signifying a _variable_ finite magnitude increasing beyond

all finite limits, while the latter is a _fixed_, _constant_

quantity lying beyond all finite magnitudes, it happens only too

often that the one is mistaken for the other.... Owing to a

justifiable aversion to such _illegitimate_ actual infinities and

the influence of the modern epicuric-materialistic tendency, a

certain _horror infiniti_ has grown up in extended scientific

circles, which finds its classic expression and support in the

letter of Gauss [see 1951], yet it seems to me that the

consequent uncritical rejection of the legitimate actual infinite

is no lesser violation of the nature of things, which must be

taken as they are.--CANTOR, G.

_Zum Problem des actualen Unendlichen;

Natur und Offenbarung, Bd. 32 (1886), p.

226._

=1953.= The Infinite is often confounded with the Indefinite, but

the two conceptions are diametrically opposed. Instead of being a

quantity with unassigned yet assignable limits, the Infinite is

not a quantity at all, since it neither admits of augmentation

nor diminution, having no assignable limits; it is the operation

of continuously _withdrawing_ any limits that may have been

assigned: the endless addition of new quantities to the old: the

flux of continuity. The Infinite is no more a quantity than Zero

is a quantity. If Zero is the sign of a vanished quantity, the

Infinite is a sign of that continuity of Existence which has been

ideally divided into discrete parts in the affixing of limits.

--LEWES, G. H.

_Problems of Life and Mind (Boston,

1875), Vol. 2, p. 384._

=1954.= A great deal of misunderstanding is avoided if it be

remembered that the terms _infinity_, _infinite_, _zero_,

_infinitesimal_ must be interpreted in connexion with their

context, and admit a variety of meanings according to the way in

which they are defined.--MATHEWS, G. B.

_Theory of Numbers (Cambridge, 1892),

Part 1, sect. 104._

=1955.= This further is observable in number, that it is that

which the mind makes use of in measuring all things that by us

are measurable, which principally are _expansion_ and _duration_;

and our idea of infinity, even when applied to those, seems to be

nothing but the infinity of number. For what else are our ideas

of Eternity and Immensity, but the repeated additions of certain

ideas of imagined parts of duration and expansion, with the

infinity of number; in which we can come to no end of addition?

--LOCKE, JOHN.

_An Essay concerning Human

Understanding, Bk. 2, chap. 16, sect.

8._

=1956.= But of all other ideas, it is number, which I think

furnishes us with the clearest and most distinct idea of infinity

we are capable of.--LOCKE, JOHN.

_An Essay concerning Human

Understanding, Bk. 2, chap. 17, sect.

9._

=1957.=

Willst du ins Unendliche schreiten?

Geh nur im Endlichen nach allen Seiten!

Willst du dich am Ganzen erquicken,

So musst du das Ganze im Kleinsten erblicken.

--GOETHE.

_Gott, Gemüt und Welt (1815)._

[Would’st thou the infinite essay?

The finite but traverse in every way.

Would’st in the whole delight thy heart?

Learn to discern the whole in its minutest part.]

=1958.=

Ich häufe ungeheure Zahlen,

Gebürge Millionen auf,

Ich setze Zeit auf Zeit und Welt auf Welt zu Hauf,

Und wenn ich von der grausen Höh’

Mit Schwindeln wieder nach dir seh,’

Ist alle Macht der Zahl, vermehrt zu tausendmalen,

Noch nicht ein Theil von dir.

_Ich zieh’ sie ab, und du liegst ganz vor mir._

--HALLER, ALBR. VON.

_Quoted in Hegel: Wissenschaft der

Logik, Buch 1, Abschnitt 2, Kap. 2, C,

b._

[Numbers upon numbers pile,

Mountains millions high,

Time on time and world on world amass,

Then, if from the dreadful hight, alas!

Dizzy-brained, I turn thee to behold,

All the power of number, increased thousandfold,

Not yet may match thy part.

_Subtract what I will, wholly whole thou art._]

=1959.= A collection of terms is infinite when it contains as

parts other collections which have just as many terms in it as it

has. If you can take away some of the terms of a collection,

without diminishing the number of terms, then there is an

infinite number of terms in the collection.--RUSSELL, BERTRAND.

_International Monthly, Vol. 4 (1901),

p. 93._

=1960.= An assemblage (ensemble, collection, group, manifold) of

elements (things, no matter what) is infinite or finite according

as it has or has not a part to which the whole is just _equivalent_

in the sense that between the elements composing that part and

those composing the whole there subsists a unique and reciprocal

(one-to-one) correspondence.--KEYSER, C. J.

_The Axioms of Infinity; Hibbert

Journal, Vol. 2 (1903-1904), p. 539._

=1961.= Whereas in former times the Infinite betrayed its

presence not indeed to the faculties of Logic but only to the

spiritual Imagination and Sensibility, mathematics has shown ...

that the structure of Transfinite Being is open to exploration

by the organon of Thought.--KEYSER, C. J.

_Lectures on Science, Philosophy and Art

(New York, 1908), p. 42._

=1962.= The mathematical theory of probability is a science which

aims at reducing to calculation, where possible, the amount of

credence due to propositions or statements, or to the occurrence

of events, future or past, more especially as contingent or

dependent upon other propositions or events the probability of

which is known.--CROFTON, M. W.

_Encyclopedia Britannica, 9th Edition;

Article, “Probability.”_

=1963.= The theory of probabilities is at bottom nothing but

common sense reduced to calculus; it enables us to appreciate

with exactness that which accurate minds feel with a sort of

instinct for which ofttimes they are unable to account. If we

consider the analytical methods to which this theory has given

birth, the truth of the principles on which it is based, the fine

and delicate logic which their employment in the solution of

problems requires, the public utilities whose establishment rests

upon it, the extension which it has received and which it may

still receive through its application to the most important

problems of natural philosophy and the moral sciences; if again

we observe that, even in matters which cannot be submitted to the

calculus, it gives us the surest suggestions for the guidance of

our judgments, and that it teaches us to avoid the illusions

which often mislead us, then we shall see that there is no

science more worthy of our contemplations nor a more useful one

for admission to our system of public education.--LAPLACE.

_Théorie Analytique des Probabilitiés,

Introduction; Oeuvres, t. 7 (Paris,

1886), p. 153._

=1964.= It is a truth very certain that, when it is not in our

power to determine what is true, we ought to follow what is most

probable.--DESCARTES.

_Discourse on Method, Part 3._

=1965.= As _demonstration_ is the showing the agreement or

disagreement of two ideas, by the intervention of one or more

proofs, which have a constant, immutable, and visible connexion

one with another; so _probability_ is nothing but the appearance

of such an agreement or disagreement, by the intervention of

proofs, whose connexion is not constant and immutable, or at

least is not perceived to be so, and it is enough to induce the

mind to judge the proposition to be true or false, rather than

contrary.--LOCKE, JOHN.

_An Essay concerning Human

Understanding, Bk. 4, chap. 15, sect.

1._

=1966.= The difference between necessary and contingent truths is

indeed the same as that between commensurable and incommensurable

numbers. For the reduction of commensurable numbers to a common

measure is analogous to the demonstration of necessary truths, or

their reduction to such as are identical. But as, in the case of

surd ratios, the reduction involves an infinite process, and yet

approaches a common measure, so that a definite but unending

series is obtained, so also contingent truths require an infinite

analysis, which God alone can accomplish.--LEIBNITZ.

_Philosophische Schriften [Gerhardt] Bd.

7 (Berlin, 1890), p. 200._

=1967.= The theory in question [theory of probability] affords an

excellent illustration of the application of the theory of

permutation and combinations which is the fundamental part of the

algebra of discrete quantity; it forms in the elementary parts an

excellent logical exercise in the accurate use of terms and in

the nice discrimination of shades of meaning; and, above all, it

enters into the regulation of some of the most important

practical concerns of modern life.--CHRYSTAL, GEORGE.

_Algebra, Vol. 2 (Edinburgh, 1889),

chap. 36, sect. 1._

=1968.= There is possibly no branch of mathematics at once so

interesting, so bewildering, and of so great practical importance

as the theory of probabilities. Its history reveals both the

wonders that can be accomplished and the bounds that cannot be

transcended by mathematical science. It is the link between rigid

deduction and the vast field of inductive science. A complete

theory of probabilities would be the complete theory of the

formation of belief. It is certainly a pity then, that, to quote

M. Bertrand, “one cannot well understand the calculus of

probabilities without having read Laplace’s work,” and that “one

cannot read Laplace’s work without having prepared oneself for it

by the most profound mathematical studies.”--DAVIS, E. W.

_Bulletin American Mathematical Society,

Vol. 1 (1894-1895), p. 16._

=1969.= The most important questions of life are, for the most

part, really only problems of probability. Strictly speaking one

may even say that nearly all our knowledge is problematical; and

in the small number of things which we are able to know with

certainty, even in the mathematical sciences themselves,

induction and analogy, the principal means for discovering truth,

are based on probabilities, so that the entire system of human

knowledge is connected with this theory.--LAPLACE.

_Théorie Analytique des Probabilitiés,

Introduction; Oeuvres, t. 7 (Paris,

1886), p. 5._

=1970.= There is no more remarkable feature in the mathematical

theory of probability than the manner in which it has been found

to harmonize with, and justify, the conclusions to which mankind

have been led, not by reasoning, but by instinct and experience,

both of the individual and of the race. At the same time it has

corrected, extended, and invested them with a definiteness and

precision of which these crude, though sound, appreciations of

common sense were till then devoid.--CROFTON, M. W.

_Encyclopedia Britannica, 9th Edition;

Article “Probability.”_

=1971.= It is remarkable that a science [probabilities] which

began with the consideration of games of chance, should have

become the most important object of human knowledge.--LAPLACE.

_Théorie Analytique des Probabilitiés,

Introduction; Oeuvres, t. 7 (Paris,

1886), p. 152._

=1972.= Not much has been added to the subject [of probability]

since the close of Laplace’s career. The history of science

records more than one parallel to this abatement of activity.

When such a genius has departed, the field of his labours seems

exhausted for the time, and little left to be gleaned by his

successors. It is to be regretted that so little remains to us of

the inner workings of such gifted minds, and of the clue by which

each of their discoveries was reached. The didactic and synthetic

form in which these are presented to the world retains but faint

traces of the skilful inductions, the keen and delicate

perception of fitness and analogy, and the power of imagination

... which have doubtless guided such a master as Laplace or

Newton in shaping out such great designs--only the minor details

of which have remained over, to be supplied by the less cunning

hand of commentator and disciple.--CROFTON, M. W.

_Encyclopedia Britannica, 9th Edition;

Article “Probability.”_

=1973.= The theory of errors may be defined as that branch of

mathematics which is concerned, first, with the expression of the

resultant effect of one or more sources of error to which

computed and observed quantities are subject; and, secondly, with

the determination of the relation between the magnitude of an

error and the probability of its occurrence.--WOODWARD, R. S.

_Probability and Theory of Errors (New

York, 1906), p. 30._

=1974.= Of all the applications of the doctrine of probability

none is of greater utility than the theory of errors. In

astronomy, geodesy, physics, and chemistry, as in every science

which attains precision in measuring, weighing, and computing, a

knowledge of the theory of errors is indispensable. By the aid of

this theory the exact sciences have made great progress during

the nineteenth century, not only in the actual determinations of

the constants of nature, but also in the fixation of clear ideas

as to the possibilities of future conquests in the same

direction. Nothing, for example, is more satisfactory and

instructive in the history of science than the success with which

the unique method of least squares has been applied to the

problems presented by the earth and the other members of the

solar system. So great, in fact, are the practical value and

theoretical importance of least squares, that it is frequently

mistaken for the whole theory of errors, and is sometimes

regarded as embodying the major part of the doctrine of

probability itself.--WOODWARD, R. S.

_Probability and Theory of Errors (New

York, 1906), pp. 9-10._

=1975.= Direct and inverse ratios have been applied by an

ingenious author to measure human affections, and the moral worth

of actions. An eminent Mathematician attempted to ascertain by

calculation, the ratio in which the evidence of facts must

decrease in the course of time, and fixed the period when the

evidence of the facts on which Christianity is founded shall

become evanescent, and when in consequence no faith shall be

found on the earth.--REID, THOMAS.

_Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind

(Edinburgh, 1812), Vol. 2, p. 408._

CHAPTER XX

THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS, TIME AND SPACE

=2001.= Kant’s Doctrine of Time.

I. Time is not an empirical concept deduced from any experience,

for neither co-existence nor succession would enter into our

perception, if the representation of time were not given _a

priori_. Only when this representation _a priori_ is given,

can we imagine that certain things happen at the same time

(simultaneously) or at different times (successively).

II. Time is a necessary representation on which all intuitions

depend. We cannot take away time from phenomena in general,

though we can well take away phenomena out of time. In time alone

is reality of phenomena possible. All phenomena may vanish, but

time itself (as the general condition of their possibility)

cannot be done away with.

III. On this _a priori_ necessity depends also the possibility of

apodictic principles of the relations of time, or of axioms of

time in general. Time has one dimension only; different times are

not simultaneous, but successive, while different spaces are

never successive, but simultaneous. Such principles cannot be

derived from experience, because experience could not impart to

them absolute universality nor apodictic certainty....

IV. Time is not a discursive, or what is called a general

concept, but a pure form of sensuous intuition. Different times

are parts only of one and the same time....

V. To say that time is infinite means no more than that every

definite quantity of time is possible only by limitations of one

time which forms the foundation of all times. The original

representation of time must therefore be given as unlimited. But

when the parts themselves and every quantity of an object can be

represented as determined by limitation only, the whole

representation cannot be given by concepts (for in that case the

partial representation comes first), but must be founded on

immediate intuition.--KANT, I.

_Critique of Pure Reason [Max Müller]

(New York, 1900), pp. 24-25._

=2002.= Kant’s Doctrine of Space.

I. Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from

external experience. For in order that certain sensations should

be referred to something outside myself, i.e. to something in a

different part of space from that where I am; again, in order

that I may be able to represent them as side by side, that

is, not only as different, but as in different places, the

representation of space must already be there....

II. Space is a necessary representation _a priori_, forming the

very foundation of all external intuitions. It is impossible to

imagine that there should be no space, though one might very well

imagine that there should be space without objects to fill it.

Space is therefore regarded as a condition of the possibility of

phenomena, not as a determination produced by them; it is a

representation _a priori_ which necessarily precedes all external

phenomena.

III. On this necessity of an _a priori_ representation of space

rests the apodictic certainty of all geometrical principles, and

the possibility of their construction _a priori_. For if the

intuition of space were a concept gained _a posteriori_, borrowed

from general external experience, the first principles of

mathematical definition would be nothing but perceptions. They

would be exposed to all the accidents of perception, and there

being but one straight line between two points would not be a

necessity, but only something taught in each case by experience.

Whatever is derived from experience possesses a relative

generality only, based on induction. We should therefore not be

able to say more than that, so far as hitherto observed, no space

has yet been found having more than three dimensions.

IV. Space is not a discursive or so-called general concept of

the relations of things in general, but a pure intuition. For,

first of all, we can imagine one space only, and if we speak of

many spaces, we mean parts only of one and the same space. Nor

can these parts be considered as antecedent to the one and

all-embracing space and, as it were, its component parts out

of which an aggregate is formed, but they can be thought of

as existing within it only. Space is essentially one; its

multiplicity, and therefore the general concept of spaces in

general, arises entirely from limitations. Hence it follows that,

with respect to space, an intuition _a priori_, which is not

empirical, must form the foundation of all conceptions of

space....

V. Space is represented as an infinite given quantity. Now it is

quite true that every concept is to be thought as a representation,

which is contained in an infinite number of different possible

representations (as their common characteristic), and therefore

comprehends them: but no concept, as such, can be thought as if

it contained in itself an infinite number of representations.

Nevertheless, space is so thought (for all parts of infinite space

exist simultaneously). Consequently, the original representation

of space is an _intuition a priori_, and not a concept.--KANT, I.

_Critique of Pure Reason [Max Müller]

(New York, 1900), pp. 18-20 and

Supplement 8._

=2003.=

_Schopenhauer’s Predicabilia a priori._[11]

OF TIME OF SPACE

1. There is but _one time_, all 1. There is but _one space_,

different times are parts of all different spaces are

it. parts of it.

2. Different times are not 2. Different spaces are not

simultaneous but successive. successive but

simultaneous.

3. Everything in time may be 3. Everything in space may be

thought of as non-existent, thought of as non-existent,

but not time. but not space.

4. Time has three divisions: 4. Space has three dimensions:

past, present and future, height, breadth, and

which form two directions length.

with a point of indifference.

5. Time is infinitely 5. Space is infinitely

divisible. divisible.

6. Time is homogeneous and a 6. Space is homogeneous and a

continuum: i.e. no part is continuum: i.e. no part

different from another, nor is different from another,

separated by something nor separated by something

which is not time. which is not space.

7. Time has no beginning nor 7. Space has no limits

end, but all beginning and [Gränzen], but all limits

end is in time. are in space.

8. Time makes counting 8. Space makes measurement

possible. possible.

9. Rhythm exists only in time. 9. Symmetry exists only in

space.

10. The laws of time are _a 10. The laws of space are _a

priori_ conceptions. priori_ conceptions.

11. Time is perceptible _a 11. Space is immediately

priori_, but only by a perceptible _a priori_.

means of a line-image.

12. Time has no permanence but 12. Space never passes but is

passes the moment it is permanent throughout

present. all time.

13. Time never rests. 13. Space never moves.

14. Everything in time has 14. Everything in space has

duration. position.

15. Time has no duration, but 15. Space has no motion, but

all duration is in time; all motion is in space;

time is the persistence of space is the change in

what is permanent in position of that which

contrast with its restless moves in contrast to its

course. imperturbable rest.

16. Motion is only possible in 16. Motion is only possible in

time. space.

17. Velocity, the space being 17. Velocity, the time being

the same, is in the inverse the same, is in the direct

ratio of the time. ratio of the space.

18. Time is not directly 18. Space is measurable directly

measurable by means of through itself and

itself but only by means of indirectly through motion

motion which takes place in which takes place in both

both space and time.... time and space....

19. Time is omnipresent: each 19. Space is eternal: each

part of it is everywhere. part of it exists always.

20. In time alone all things 20. In space alone all things

are successive. are simultaneous.

21. Time makes possible the 21. Space makes possible the

change of accidents. endurance of substance.

22. Each part of time contains 22. No part of space contains

all substance. the same substance as

another.

23. Time is the _principium 23. Space is the _principium

individuationis_. individuationis_.

24. The now is without 24. The point is without

duration. extension.

25. Time of itself is empty and 25. Space is of itself empty

indeterminate. and indeterminate.

26. Each moment is conditioned 26. The relation of each

by the one which precedes boundary in space to every

it, and only so far as this other is determined by its

one has ceased to exist. relation to any one.

(Principle of sufficient (Principle of sufficient

reason of being in time.) reason of being in space.)

27. Time makes Arithmetic 27. Space makes Geometry

possible. possible.

28. The simple element of 28. The element of Geometry

Arithmetic is unity. is the point.

--SCHOPENHAUER, A.

_Die Welt als Vorstellung und Wille;

Werke (Frauenstädt) (Leipzig, 1877), Bd.

2, p. 55._

[11] Schopenhauer’s table contains a third column

headed “of matter” which has here been omitted.

=2004.= The clear possession of the Idea of Space is the first

requisite for all geometrical reasoning; and this clearness of

idea may be tested by examining whether the axioms offer

themselves to the mind as evident.--WHEWELL, WILLIAM.

_The Philosophy of the Inductive

Sciences, Part 1, Bk. 2, chap. 4, sect.

4 (London, 1858)._

=2005.= Geometrical axioms are neither synthetic _a priori_

conclusions nor experimental facts. They are conventions:

our choice, amongst all possible conventions, is guided by

experimental facts; but it remains free, and is only limited by

the necessity of avoiding all contradiction.... In other words,

axioms of geometry are only definitions in disguise.

That being so what ought one to think of this question: Is the

Euclidean Geometry true?

The question is nonsense. One might as well ask whether the

metric system is true and the old measures false; whether

Cartesian co-ordinates are true and polar co-ordinates false.

--POINCARÉ, H.

_Non-Euclidean Geometry; Nature, Vol 45

(1891-1892), p. 407._

=2006.= I do in no wise share this view [that the axioms are

arbitrary propositions which we assume wholly at will, and that

in like manner the fundamental conceptions are in the end only

arbitrary symbols with which we operate] but consider it the

death of all science: in my judgment the axioms of geometry are

not arbitrary, but reasonable propositions which generally have

the origin in space intuition and whose separate content and

sequence is controlled by reasons of expediency.--KLEIN, F.

_Elementarmathematik vom höheren

Standpunkte aus (Leipzig, 1909), Bd. 2,

p. 384._

=2007.= Euclid’s Postulate 5 [The Parallel Axiom].

That, if a straight line falling on two straight lines make the

interior angles on the same side less than two right angles, the

two straight lines, if produced indefinitely, meet on that side

on which are the angles less than the two right angles.--EUCLID.

_The Thirteen Books of Euclid’s Elements

[T. L. Heath] Vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1908),

p. 202._

=2008.= It must be admitted that Euclid’s [Parallel] Axiom is

unsatisfactory as the basis of a theory of parallel straight

lines. It cannot be regarded as either simple or self-evident,

and it therefore falls short of the essential characteristics of

an axiom....--HALL, H. S. and STEVENS, F. H.

_Euclid’s Elements (London, 1892), p.

55._

=2009.= We may still well declare the parallel axiom the simplest

assumption which permits us to represent spatial relations, and

so it will be true generally, that concepts and axioms are not

immediate facts of intuition, but rather the idealizations of

these facts chosen for reasons of expediency.--KLEIN, F.

_Elementarmathematik vom, höheren

Standpunkte aus (Leipzig, 1909), Bd. 2,

p. 382._

=2010.= The characteristic features of our space are not

necessities of thought, and the truth of Euclid’s axioms, in so

far as they specially differentiate our space from other

conceivable spaces, must be established by experience and by

experience only.--BALL, R. S.

_Encyclopedia Britannica, 9th Edition;

Article “Measurement.”_

=2011.= Mathematical and physiological researches have shown that

the space of experience is simply an _actual_ case of many

conceivable cases, about whose peculiar properties experience

alone can instruct us.--MACH, ERNST.

_Popular Scientific Lectures (Chicago,

1910), p. 205._

=2012.= The familiar definition: An axiom is a self-evident

truth, means if it means anything, that the proposition which we

call an axiom has been approved by us in the light of our

experience and intuition. In this sense mathematics has no

axioms, for mathematics is a formal subject over which formal and

not material implication reigns.--WILSON, E. B.

_Bulletin American Mathematical Society,

Vol. 2 (1904-1905), p. 81._

=2013.= The proof of self-evident propositions may seem, to the

uninitiated, a somewhat frivolous occupation. To this we might

reply that it is often by no means self-evident that one obvious

proposition follows from another obvious proposition; so that we

are really discovering new truths when we prove what is evident

by a method which is not evident. But a more interesting retort

is, that since people have tried to prove obvious propositions,

they have found that many of them are false. Self-evidence is

often a mere will-o’-the-wisp, which is sure to lead us astray if

we take it as our guide.--RUSSELL, BERTRAND.

_Recent Work on the Principles of

Mathematics; International Monthly, Vol.

4 (1901), p. 86._

=2014.= The problem [of Euclid’s Parallel Axiom] is now at a par

with the squaring of the circle and the trisection of an angle by

means of ruler and compass. So far as the mathematical public is

concerned, the famous problem of the parallel is settled for all

time.--YOUNG, JOHN WESLEY.

_Fundamental Concepts of Algebra and

Geometry (New York, 1911), p. 32._

=2015.= If the Euclidean assumptions are true, the constitution

of those parts of space which are at an infinite distance from

us, “geometry upon the plane at infinity,” is just as well known

as the geometry of any portion of this room. In this infinite and

thoroughly well-known space the Universe is situated during at

least some portion of an infinite and thoroughly well-known time.

So that here we have real knowledge of something at least that

concerns the Cosmos; something that is true throughout the

Immensities and the Eternities. That something Lobatchewsky and

his successors have taken away. The geometer of to-day knows

nothing about the nature of the actually existing space at an

infinite distance; he knows nothing about the properties of this

present space in a past or future eternity. He knows, indeed,

that the laws assumed by Euclid are true with an accuracy that no

direct experiment can approach, not only in this place where we

are, but in places at a distance from us that no astronomer has

conceived; but he knows this as of Here and Now; beyond this

range is a There and Then of which he knows nothing at present,

but may ultimately come to know more.--CLIFFORD, W. K.

_Lectures and Essays (New York, 1901),

Vol. 1, pp. 358-359._

=2016.= The truth is that other systems of geometry are possible,

yet after all, these other systems are not spaces but other

methods of space measurements. There is one space only, though we

may conceive of many different manifolds, which are contrivances

or ideal constructions invented for the purpose of determining

space.--CARUS, PAUL.

_Science, Vol. 18 (1903), p. 106._

=2017.= As I have formerly stated that from the philosophic side

Non-Euclidean Geometry has as yet not frequently met with full

understanding, so I must now emphasize that it is universally

recognized in the science of mathematics; indeed, for many

purposes, as for instance in the modern theory of functions, it

is used as an extremely convenient means for the visual

representation of highly complicated arithmetical relations.

--KLEIN, F.

_Elementarmathematik vom höheren

Standpunkte aus (Leipzig, 1909), Bd. 2,

p. 377._

=2018.= Everything in physical science, from the law of

gravitation to the building of bridges, from the spectroscope to

the art of navigation, would be profoundly modified by any

considerable inaccuracy in the hypothesis that our actual space

is Euclidean. The observed truth of physical science, therefore,

constitutes overwhelming empirical evidence that this hypothesis

is very approximately correct, even if not rigidly true.

--RUSSELL, BERTRAND.

_Foundations of Geometry (Cambridge,

1897), p. 6._

=2019.= The most suggestive and notable achievement of the last

century is the discovery of Non-Euclidean geometry.--HILBERT, D.

_Quoted by G. D. Fitch in Manning’s “The

Fourth Dimension Simply Explained,” (New

York, 1910), p. 58._

=2020.= Non-Euclidean geometry--primate among the emancipators of

the human intellect....--KEYSER, C. J.

_The Foundations of Mathematics; Science

History of the Universe, Vol. 8 (New

York, 1909), p. 192._

=2021.= Every high school teacher [Gymnasial-lehrer] must of

necessity know something about non-euclidean geometry, because it

is one of the few branches of mathematics which, by means of

certain catch-phrases, has become known in wider circles, and

concerning which any teacher is consequently liable to be asked

at any time. In physics there are many such matters--almost every

new discovery is of this kind--which, through certain catch-words

have become topics of common conversation, and about which

therefore every teacher must of course be informed. Think of a

teacher of physics who knows nothing of Roentgen rays or of

radium; no better impression would be made by a mathematician who

is unable to give information concerning non-euclidean geometry.

--KLEIN, F.

_Elementarmathematik vom höheren

Standpunkte_ aus _(Leipzig, 1909), Bd.

2, p. 378._

=2022.= What Vesalius was to Galen, what Copernicus was to

Ptolemy, that was Lobatchewsky to Euclid. There is, indeed, a

somewhat instructive parallel between the last two cases.

Copernicus and Lobatchewsky were both of Slavic origin. Each of

them has brought about a revolution in scientific ideas so great

that it can only be compared with that wrought by the other. And

the reason of the transcendent importance of these two changes is

that they are changes in the conception of the Cosmos.... And in

virtue of these two revolutions the idea of the Universe, the

Macrocosm, the All, as subject of human knowledge, and therefore

of human interest, has fallen to pieces.--CLIFFORD, W. K.

_Lectures and Essays (New York, 1901),

Vol. 1, pp. 356, 358._

=2023.= I am exceedingly sorry that I have failed to avail myself

of our former greater proximity to learn more of your work on

the foundations of geometry; it surely would have saved me

much useless effort and given me more peace, than one of my

disposition can enjoy so long as so much is left to consider in a

matter of this kind. I have myself made much progress in this

matter (though my other heterogeneous occupations have left me

but little time for this purpose); though the course which I have

pursued does not lead as much to the desired end, which you

assure me you have reached, as to the questioning of the truth of

geometry. It is true that I have found much which many would

accept as proof, but which in my estimation proves _nothing_, for

instance, if it could be shown that a rectilinear triangle is

possible, whose area is greater than that of any given surface,

then I could rigorously establish the whole of geometry. Now most

people, no doubt, would grant this as an axiom, but not I; it is

conceivable that, however distant apart the vertices of the

triangle might be chosen, its area might yet always be below a

certain limit. I have found several other such theorems, but none

of them satisfies me.--GAUSS.

_Letter to Bolyai (1799); Werke, Bd. 8

(Göttingen, 1900), p. 159._

=2024.= On the supposition that Euclidean geometry is not valid,

it is easy to show that similar figures do not exist; in that

case the angles of an equilateral triangle vary with the side in

which I see no absurdity at all. The angle is a function of the

side and the sides are functions of the angle, a function which,

of course, at the same time involves a constant length. It seems

somewhat of a paradox to say that a constant length could be

given a priori as it were, but in this again I see nothing

inconsistent. Indeed, it would be desirable that Euclidean

geometry were not valid, for then we should possess a general a

priori standard of measure.--GAUSS.

_Letter to Gerling (1816); Werke, Bd. 8

(Göttingen, 1900), p. 169._

=2025.= I am convinced more and more that the necessary truth of

our geometry cannot be demonstrated, at least not _by_ the

_human_ intellect _to_ the human understanding. Perhaps in

another world we may gain other insights into the nature of space

which at present are unattainable to us. Until then we must

consider geometry as of equal rank not with arithmetic, which is

purely a priori, but with mechanics.--GAUSS.

_Letter to Olbers (1817); Werke, Bd. 8

(Göttingen, 1900), p. 177._

=2026.= There is no doubt that it can be rigorously established

that the sum of the angles of a rectilinear triangle cannot

exceed 180°. But it is otherwise with the statement that the sum

of the angles cannot be less than 180°; this is the real Gordian

knot, the rocks which cause the wreck of all.... I have been

occupied with the problem over thirty years and I doubt if anyone

has given it more serious attention, though I have never

published anything concerning it. The assumption that the angle

sum is less than 180° leads to a peculiar geometry, entirely

different from the Euclidean, but throughout consistent with

itself. I have developed this geometry to my own satisfaction so

that I can solve every problem that arises in it with the

exception of the determination of a certain constant which cannot

be determined a priori. The larger one assumes this constant the

more nearly one approaches the Euclidean geometry, an infinitely

large value makes the two coincide. The theorems of this geometry

seem in part paradoxical, and to the unpracticed absurd; but on a

closer and calm reflection it is found that in themselves they

contain nothing impossible.... All my efforts to discover some

contradiction, some inconsistency in this Non-Euclidean geometry

have been fruitless, the one thing in it that seems contrary to

reason is that space would have to contain a _definitely

determinate_ (though to us unknown) linear magnitude. However, it

seems to me that notwithstanding the meaningless word-wisdom of

the metaphysicians we know really too little, or nothing,

concerning the true nature of space to confound what appears

unnatural with the _absolutely impossible._ Should Non-Euclidean

geometry be true, and this constant bear some relation to

magnitudes which come within the domain of terrestrial or

celestial measurement, it could be determined a posteriori.

--GAUSS.

_Letter to Taurinus (1824); Werke, Bd. 8

(Göttingen, 1900), p. 187._

=2027.= There is also another subject, which with me is nearly

forty years old, to which I have again given some thought during

leisure hours, I mean the foundations of geometry.... Here, too,

I have consolidated many things, and my conviction has, if

possible become more firm that geometry cannot be completely

established on a priori grounds. In the mean time I shall

probably not for a long time yet put my _very extended_

investigations concerning this matter in shape for publication,

possibly not while I live, for I fear the cry of the Bœotians

which would arise should I express my whole view on this

matter.--It is curious too, that besides the known gap in

Euclid’s geometry, to fill which all efforts till now have been

in vain, and which will never be filled, there exists another

defect, which to my knowledge no one thus far has criticised and

which (though possible) it is by no means easy to remove. This is

the definition of a plane as a surface which wholly contains the

line joining any two points. This definition contains more than

is necessary to the determination of the surface, and tacitly

involves a theorem which demands proof.--GAUSS.

_Letter to Bessel (1829); Werke, Bd. 8

(Göttingen, 1900), p. 200._

=2028.= I will add that I have recently received from Hungary a

little paper on Non-Euclidean geometry, in which I rediscover all

_my own ideas_ and _results_ worked out with great elegance, ....

The writer is a very young Austrian officer, the son of one of my

early friends, with whom I often discussed the subject in 1798,

although my ideas were at that time far removed from the

development and maturity which they have received through the

original reflections of this young man. I consider the young

geometer v. Bolyai a genius of the first rank.--GAUSS.

_Letter to Gerling (1832); Werke, Bd. 8

(Göttingen, 1900), p. 221._

=2029.= Think of the image of the world in a convex mirror.... A

well-made convex mirror of moderate aperture represents the

objects in front of it as apparently solid and in fixed positions

behind its surface. But the images of the distant horizon and of

the sun in the sky lie behind the mirror at a limited distance,

equal to its focal length. Between these and the surface of the

mirror are found the images of all the other objects before it,

but the images are diminished and flattened in proportion to the

distance of their objects from the mirror.... Yet every straight

line or plane in the outer world is represented by a straight [?]

line or plane in the image. The image of a man measuring with a

rule a straight line from the mirror, would contract more and

more the farther he went, but with his shrunken rule the man in

the image would count out exactly the same number of centimeters

as the real man. And, in general, all geometrical measurements of

lines and angles made with regularly varying images of real

instruments would yield exactly the same results as in the outer

world, all lines of sight in the mirror would be represented by

straight lines of sight in the mirror. In short, I do not see how

men in the mirror are to discover that their bodies are not rigid

solids and their experiences good examples of the correctness of

Euclidean axioms. But if they could look out upon our world as

we look into theirs without overstepping the boundary, they must

declare it to be a picture in a spherical mirror, and would speak

of us just as we speak of them; and if two inhabitants of the

different worlds could communicate with one another, neither, as

far as I can see, would be able to convince the other that he had

the true, the other the distorted, relation. Indeed I cannot see

that such a question would have any meaning at all, so long as

mechanical considerations are not mixed up with it.--HELMHOLTZ, H.

_On the Origin and Significance of

Geometrical Axioms; Popular Scientific

Lectures, second series (New York,

1881), pp. 57-59._

=2030.= That space conceived of as a locus of points has but

three dimensions needs no argument from the mathematical point of

view; but just as little can we from this point of view prevent

the assertion that space has really four or an infinite number of

dimensions though we perceive only three. The theory of

multiply-extended manifolds, which enters more and more into the

foreground of mathematical research, is from its very nature

perfectly independent of such an assertion. But the form of

expression, which this theory employs, has indeed grown out of

this conception. Instead of referring to the individuals of a

manifold, we speak of the points of a higher space, etc. In

itself this form of expression has many advantages, in that it

facilitates comprehension by calling up geometrical intuition.

But it has this disadvantage, that in extended circles,

investigations concerning manifolds of any number of dimensions

are considered singular alongside the above-mentioned conception

of space. This view is without the least foundation. The

investigations in question would indeed find immediate geometric

applications if the conception were valid but its value and

purpose, being independent of this conception, rests upon its

essential mathematical content.--KLEIN, F.

_Mathematische Annalen, Bd. 43 (1893),

p. 95._

=2031.= We are led naturally to extend the language of geometry

to the case of any number of variables, still using the word

_point_ to designate any system of values of n variables (the

coördinates of the point), the word _space_ (of n dimensions) to

designate the totality of all these points or systems of values,

_curves_ or _surface_ to designate the spread composed of

points whose coördinates are given functions (with the proper

restrictions) of one or two parameters (the _straight line_ or

_plane_, when they are linear fractional functions with the same

denominator), etc. Such an extension has come to be a necessity

in a large number of investigations, in order as well to give

them the greatest generality as to preserve in them the intuitive

character of geometry. But it has been noted that in such use of

geometric language we are no longer constructing truly a

geometry, for the forms that we have been considering are

essentially analytic, and that, for example, the general

projective geometry constructed in this way is in substance

nothing more than the algebra of linear transformations.

--SEGRE, CORRADI.

_Rivista di Matematica, Vol. I (1891),

p. 59. [J. W. Young.]_

=2032.= Those who can, in common algebra, find a square root of

−1, will be at no loss to find a fourth dimension in space in

which ABC may become ABCD: or, if they cannot find it, they have

but to imagine it, and call it an _impossible_ dimension, subject

to all the laws of the three we find possible. And just as √−1 in

common algebra, gives all its _significant_ combinations _true_,

so would it be with any number of dimensions of space which the

speculator might choose to call into _impossible_ existence.

--DE MORGAN, A.

_Trigonometry and Double Algebra

(London, 1849), Part 2, chap. 3._

=2033.= The doctrine of non-Euclidean spaces and of hyperspaces

in general possesses the highest intellectual interest, and it

requires a far-sighted man to foretell that it can never have any

practical importance.--SMITH, W. B.

_Introductory Modern Geometry (New York,

1893), p. 274._

=2034.= According to his frequently expressed view, Gauss considered

the three dimensions of space as specific peculiarities of the

human soul; people, which are unable to comprehend this, he

designated in his humorous mood by the name Bœotians. We could

imagine ourselves, he said, as beings which are conscious of but

two dimensions; higher beings might look at us in a like manner,

and continuing jokingly, he said that he had laid aside certain

problems which, when in a higher state of being, he hoped to

investigate geometrically.--SARTORIUS, W. V. WALTERSHAUSEN.

_Gauss zum Gedächtniss (Leipzig, 1856),

p. 81._

=2035.= _There is many a rational logos_, and the mathematician

has high delight in the contemplation of _in_consistent _systems_

of _consistent relationships_. There are, for example, a

Euclidean geometry and more than one species of non-Euclidean. As

theories of a given space, these are not compatible. If our

universe be, as Plato thought, and nature-science takes for

granted, a space-conditioned, geometrised affair, one of these

geometries may be, none of them may be, not all of them can be,

valid in it. But in the vaster world of thought, all of them are

valid, there they co-exist, and interlace among themselves and

others, as differing component strains of a higher, strictly

supernatural, hypercosmic, harmony.--KEYSER, C. J.

_The Universe and Beyond; Hibbert

Journal, Vol. 3 (1904-1905), p. 313._

=2036.= The introduction into geometrical work of conceptions

such as the infinite, the imaginary, and the relations of

hyperspace, none of which can be directly imagined, has a

psychological significance well worthy of examination. It gives a

deep insight into the resources and working of the human mind. We

arrive at the borderland of mathematics and psychology.

--MERZ, J. T.

_History of European Thought in the

Nineteenth Century (Edinburgh and

London, 1903), p. 716._

=2037.= Among the splendid generalizations effected by modern

mathematics, there is none more brilliant or more inspiring or

more fruitful, and none more commensurate with the limitless

immensity of being itself, than that which produced the great

concept designated ... hyperspace or multidimensional space.

--KEYSER, C. J.

_Mathematical Emancipations; Monist,

Vol. 16 (1906), p. 65._

=2038.= The great generalization [of hyperspace] has made it

possible to enrich, quicken and beautify analysis with the terse,

sensuous, artistic, stimulating language of geometry. On the

other hand, the hyperspaces are in themselves immeasurably

interesting and inexhaustibly rich fields of research. Not only

does the geometrician find light in them for the illumination of

otherwise dark and undiscovered properties of ordinary spaces of

intuition, but he also discovers there wondrous structures quite

unknown to ordinary space.... It is by creation of hyperspaces

that the rational spirit secures release from limitation. In them

it lives ever joyously, sustained by an unfailing sense of

infinite freedom.--KEYSER, C. J.

_Mathematical Emancipations; Monist,

Vol. 16 (1906), p. 83._

=2039.= Mathematicians who busy themselves a great deal with the

formal theory of four-dimensional space, seem to acquire a capacity

for imagining this form as easily as the three-dimensional form

with which we are all familiar.--OSTWALD, W.

_Natural Philosophy [Seltzer], (New

York, 1910), p. 77._

=2040.=

Fuchs. Was soll ich nun aber denn studieren?

Meph. Ihr könnt es mit _analytischer Geometrie_ probieren.

Da wird der Raum euch wohl dressiert,

In Coordinaten eingeschnürt,

Dass ihr nicht etwa auf gut Glück

Von der Figur gewinnt ein Stück.

Dann lehret man euch manchen Tag,

Dass, was ihr sonst auf einen Schlag

Construiertet im Raume frei,

Eine Gleichung dazu nötig sei.

Zwar war dem Menschen zu seiner Erbauung

Die dreidimensionale Raumanschauung,

Dass er sieht, was um ihn passiert,

Und die Figuren sich construiert--

Der Analytiker tritt herein

Und beweist, das könnte auch anders sein.

Gleichungen, die auf dem Papiere stehn,

Die müsst’ man auch können im Raume sehn;

Und könnte man’s nicht construieren,

Da müsste man’s anders definieren.

Denn was man formt nach Zahlengesetzen

Müsst’ uns auch geometrisch erletzen.

Drum in den unendlich fernen beiden

Imaginären Punkten müssen sich schneiden

Alle Kreise fein säuberlich,

Auch Parallelen, die treffen sich,

Und im Raume kann man daneben

Allerlei Krümmungsmasse erleben.

Die Formeln sind alle wahr und schön,

Warum sollen sie nicht zu deuten gehn?

Da preisen’s die Schüler aller Orten,

Dass das Gerade ist krumm geworden.

_Nicht-Euklidisch_ nennt’s die Geometrie,

Spotted ihrer selbst, und weiss nicht wie.

Fuchs. Kann euch nicht eben ganz verstehn.

Meph. Das soll den Philosophen auch so gehn.

Doch wenn ihr lernt alles reducieren

Und gehörig transformieren,

Bis die Formeln den Sinn verlieren,

Dann versteht ihr mathematish zu spekulieren.

--LASSWITZ, KURD.

_Der Faust-Tragödie (-n)ter Teil;

Zeitschrift für den math-naturw.

Unterricht, Bd. 14 (1888), p. 316._

[Fuchs. To what study then should I myself apply?

Meph. Begin with _analytical geometry_.

There all space is properly trained,

By coördinates well restrained,

That no one by some lucky assay

Carry some part of the figure away.

Next thou’ll be taught to realize,

Constructions won’t help thee to geometrize,

And the result of a free construction

Requires an equation for proper deduction.

Three-dimensional space relation

Exists for human edification,

That he may see what about him transpires,

And construct such figures as he requires.

Enters the analyst. Forthwith you see

That all this might otherwise be.

Equations, written with pencil or pen,

Must be visible in space, and when

Difficulties in construction arise,

We need only define it otherwise.

For, what is formed after laws arithmetic

Must also yield some delight geometric.

Therefore we must not object

That all circles intersect

In the circular points at infinity.

And all parallels, they declare,

If produced must meet somewhere.

So in space, it can’t be denied,

Any old curvature may abide.

The formulas are all fine and true,

Then why should they not have a meaning too?

Pupils everywhere praise their fate

That that now is crooked which once was straight.

Non-Euclidean, in fine derision,

Is what it’s called by the geometrician.

Fuchs. I do not fully follow thee.

Meph. No better does philosophy.

To master mathematical speculation,

Carefully learn to reduce your equation

By an adequate transformation

Till the formulas are devoid of interpretation.]

CHAPTER XXI

PARADOXES AND CURIOSITIES

=2101.= The pseudomath is a person who handles mathematics as a

monkey handles the razor. The creature tried to shave himself as

he had seen his master do; but, not having any notion of the

angle at which the razor was to be held, he cut his own throat.

He never tried it a second time, poor animal! but the pseudomath

keeps on in his work, proclaims himself clean shaved, and all the

rest of the world hairy.

The graphomath is a person who, having no mathematics, attempts

to describe a mathematician. Novelists perform in this way: even

Walter Scott now and then burns his fingers. His dreaming

calculator, Davy Ramsay, swears “by the bones of the immortal

Napier.” Scott thought that the philomaths worshipped relics: so

they do in one sense.--DE MORGAN, A.

_Budget of Paradoxes (London, 1872), p.

473._

=2102.= Proof requires a person who can give and a person who can

receive....

A blind man said, As to the Sun,

I’ll take my Bible oath there’s none;

For if there had been one to show

They would have shown it long ago.

How came he such a goose to be?

Did he not know he couldn’t see?

Not he.

--DE MORGAN, A.

_Budget of Paradoxes (London, 1872), p.

262._

=2103.= Mathematical research, with all its wealth of hidden

treasure, is all too apt to yield nothing to our research: for it

is haunted by certain _ignes fatui_--delusive phantoms, that

float before us, and seem so fair, and are _all but_ in our

grasp, so nearly that it never seems to need more than _one_ step

further, and the prize shall be ours! Alas for him who has been

turned aside from real research by one of these spectres--who

has found a music in its mocking laughter--and who wastes his

life and energy in the desperate chase!--DODGSON, C. L.

_A new Theory of Parallels (London,

1895), Introduction._

=2104.= As lightning clears the air of impalpable vapours, so an

incisive paradox frees the human intelligence from the lethargic

influence of latent and unsuspected assumptions. Paradox is the

slayer of Prejudice.--SYLVESTER, J. J.

_On a Lady’s Fan etc. Collected

Mathematical Papers, Vol. 3, p. 36._

=2105.= When a paradoxer parades capital letters and diagrams

which are as good as Newton’s to all who know nothing about it,

some persons wonder why science does not rise and triturate the

whole thing. This is why: all who are fit to read the refutation

are satisfied already, and can, if they please, detect the

paradoxer for themselves. Those who are not fit to do this would

not know the difference between the true answer and the new

capitals and diagrams on which the delighted paradoxer would

declare that he had crumbled the philosophers, and not they him.

--DE MORGAN, A.

_A Budget of Paradoxes (London, 1872),

p. 484._

=2106.= Demonstrative reason never raises the cry of _Church in

Danger!_ and it cannot have any Dictionary of heresies except a

Budget of Paradoxes. Mistaken claimants are left to Time and his

extinguisher, with the approbation of all non-claimants: there is

no need of a succession of exposures. Time gets through the job

in his own workmanlike manner.--DE MORGAN, A.

_A Budget of Paradoxes (London, 1872),

p. 485._

=2107.= D’Israeli speaks of the “six follies of science,”--the

quadrature, the duplication, the perpetual motion, the philosopher’s

stone, magic, and astrology. He might as well have added the

trisection, to make the mystic number seven; but had he done so,

he would still have been very lenient; only seven follies in all

science, from mathematics to chemistry! Science might have said

to such a judge--as convicts used to say who got seven years,

expecting it for life, “Thank you, my Lord, and may you sit there

until they are over,”--may the Curiosities of Literature outlive

the Follies of Science!--DE MORGAN, A.

_A Budget of Paradoxes (London, 1872),

p. 71._

=2108.= Montucla says, speaking of France, that he finds three

notions prevalent among cyclometers: 1. That there is a large

reward offered for success; 2. That the longitude problem depends

on that success; 3. That the solution is the great end and object

of geometry. The same three notions are equally prevalent among

the same class in England. No reward has ever been offered by the

government of either country. The longitude problem in no way

depends upon perfect solution; existing approximations are

sufficient to a point of accuracy far beyond what can be wanted.

And geometry, content with what exists, has long passed on to

other matters. Sometimes a cyclometer persuades a skipper who has

made land in the wrong place that the astronomers are at fault,

for using a wrong measure of the circle; and the skipper thinks

it a very comfortable solution! And this is the utmost that the

problem has to do with longitude.--DE MORGAN, A.

_A Budget of Paradoxes (London, 1872),

p. 96._

=2109.= Gregory St. Vincent is the greatest of circle-squarers,

and his investigations led him into many truths: he found the

property of the arc of the hyperbola which led to Napier’s

logarithms being called hyperbolic. Montucla says of him, with

sly truth, that no one ever squared the circle with so much

genius, or, excepting his principal object, with so much success.

--DE MORGAN, A.

_A Budget of Paradoxes (London, 1872),

p. 70._

=2110.= When I reached geometry, and became acquainted with the

proposition the proof of which has been sought for centuries, I

felt irresistibly impelled to try my powers at its discovery. You

will consider me foolish if I confess that I am still earnestly

of the opinion to have succeeded in my attempt.--BOLZANO, BERNARD.

_Selbstbiographie (Wien, 1875), p. 19._

=2111.= The Theory of Parallels.

It is known that to complete the theory it is only necessary to

demonstrate the following proposition, which Euclid assumed as an

axiom:

Prop. If the sum of the interior angles ECF and DBC which two

straight lines EC and DB make with a third line CP is less than

two right angles, the lines, if sufficiently produced, will

intersect.

[Illustration: A geometrical drawing of parallel lines and

intersecting lines to accompany proof.]

Proof. Construct PCA equal to the supplement PBD of CBD, and ECF,

FCG, etc. each equal to ACE, so that ACF = 2.ACE, ACG = 3.ACE,

etc. Then however small the angle ACE may be, there exists some

number n such that n.ACE = ACH will be equal to or greater than

ACP.

Again, take BI, IL, etc. each equal to CB, and draw IK, LM, etc.

parallel to BD, then the figures ACBD, DBIK, KILM, etc. are

congruent, and ACIK = 2.ABCD, ACLM = 3.ACBD, etc.

Take ACNO = n.ACBD, n having the same value as in the expression

ACH = n.ACE, then ACNO is certainly less than ACP, since ACNO

must be increased by ONP to be equal to ACP. It follows that ACNO

is also less than ACH, and by taking the nth part of each of

these, that ACBD is less than ACE.

But if ACE is greater than ACBD, CE and BD must intersect, for

otherwise ACE would be a part of ACBD.

_Journal für Mathematik, Bd. 2 (1834),

p. 198._

=2112.= Are you sure that it is impossible to trisect the angle

by _Euclid_? I have not to lament a single hour thrown away on

the attempt, but fancy that it is rather a tact, a feeling, than

a proof, which makes us think that the thing cannot be done. But

would _Gauss’s_ inscription of the regular polygon of seventeen

sides have seemed, a century ago, much less an impossible thing,

by line and circle?--HAMILTON, W. R.

_Letter to De Morgan (1852)._

=2113.= One of the most curious of these cases [geometrical

paradoxers] was that of a student, I am not sure but a graduate,

of the University of Virginia, who claimed that geometers were in

error in assuming that a line had no thickness. He published

a school geometry based on his views, which received the

endorsement of a well-known New York school official and, on the

basis of this, was actually endorsed, or came very near being

endorsed, as a text-book in the public schools of New York.

--NEWCOMB, SIMON.

_The Reminiscences of an Astronomer

(Boston and New York, 1903), p. 388._

=2114.= What distinguishes the straight line and circle more

than anything else, and properly separates them for the purpose

of elementary geometry? Their self-similarity. Every inch of

a straight line coincides with every other inch, and off a

circle with every other off the same circle. Where, then, did

Euclid fail? In not introducing the third curve, which has the

same property--the _screw_. The right line, the circle, the

screw--the representations of translation, rotation, and the two

combined--ought to have been the instruments of geometry. With

a screw we should never have heard of the impossibility of

trisecting an angle, squaring the circle, etc.--DE MORGAN, A.

_Quoted in Graves’ Life of Sir W. R.

Hamilton, Vol. 3 (New York, 1889), p.

342._

=2115.=

Mad Mathesis alone was unconfined,

Too mad for mere material chains to bind,

Now to pure space lifts her ecstatic stare,

Now, running round the circle, finds it square.

--POPE, ALEXANDER.

_The Dunciad, Bk. 4, lines 31-34._

=2116.=

Or is’t a tart idea, to procure

An edge, and keep the practic soul in ure,

Like that dear Chymic dust, or puzzling quadrature?

--QUARLES, PHILIP.

_Quoted by De Morgan: Budget of

Paradoxes (London, 1872), p. 436._

=2117.=

Quale è’l geometra che tutto s’ affige

Per misurar lo cerchio, e non ritruova,

Pensando qual principio ond’ egli indige.

--DANTE.

_Paradise, canto 33, lines 122-125._

[As doth the expert geometer appear

Who seeks to square the circle, and whose skill

Finds not the law with which his course to steer.[12]]

_Quoted in Frankland’s Story of Euclid

(London, 1902), p. 101._

[12] For another rendition of these same lines see

1858.

=2118.=

In _Mathematicks_ he was greater

Than _Tycho Brahe_, or _Erra Pater_:

For he, by _Geometrick_ scale,

Could take the size of _Pots of Ale_;

Resolve by Signs and Tangents streight,

If _Bread_ or _Butter_ wanted weight;

And wisely tell what hour o’ th’ day

The Clock doth strike, by _Algebra_.

--BUTLER, SAMUEL.

_Hudibras, Part 1, canto 1, lines_

119-126.

=2119.= I have often been surprised that Mathematics, the

quintessence of truth, should have found admirers so few and so

languid. Frequent considerations and minute scrutiny have at

length unravelled the cause; viz. that though Reason is feasted,

Imagination is starved; whilst Reason is luxuriating in its

proper Paradise, Imagination is wearily travelling on a dreary

desert.--COLERIDGE, SAMUEL.

_A Mathematical Problem._

=2120.= At last we entered the palace, and proceeded into the

chamber of presence where I saw the king seated on his throne,

attended on each side by persons of prime quality. Before the

throne, was a large table filled with globes and spheres, and

mathematical instruments of all kinds. His majesty took not the

least notice of us, although our entrance was not without

sufficient noise, by the concourse of all persons belonging to

the court. But he was then deep in a problem, and we attended an

hour, before he could solve it. There stood by him, on each side,

a young page with flaps in their hands, and when they saw he was

at leisure, one of them gently struck his mouth, and the other

his right ear; at which he started like one awaked on the sudden,

and looking toward me and the company I was in, recollected the

occasion of our coming, whereof he had been informed before. He

spake some words, whereupon immediately a young man with a flap

came to my side, and flapt me gently on the right ear, but I made

signs, as well as I could, that I had no occasion for such an

instrument; which, as I afterwards found, gave his majesty, and

the whole court, a very mean opinion of my understanding. The

king, as far as I could conjecture, asked me several questions,

and I addressed myself to him in all the languages I had. When it

was found, that I could neither understand nor be understood, I

was conducted by his order to an apartment in his palace, (this

prince being distinguished above all his predecessors, for his

hospitality to strangers) where two servants were appointed to

attend me. My dinner was brought, and four persons of quality,

did me the honour to dine with me. We had two courses of three

dishes each. In the first course, there was a shoulder of mutton

cut into an equilateral triangle, a piece of beef into a

rhomboides, and a pudding into a cycloid. The second course, was,

two ducks trussed up in the form of fiddles; sausages and

puddings, resembling flutes and haut-boys, and a breast of veal

in the shape of a harp. The servants cut our bread into cones,

cylinders, parallelograms, and several other mathematical

figures.--SWIFT, JONATHAN.

_Gulliver’s Travels; A Voyage to Laputa;

Chap. 2._

=2121.= Those to whom the king had entrusted me, observing how

ill I was clad, ordered a taylor to come next morning, and take

measure for a suit of cloaths. This operator did his office

after a different manner, from those of his trade in Europe. He

first took my altitude by a quadrant, and then, with rule and

compasses, described the dimensions and outlines of my whole

body, all which he entered upon paper; and in six days, brought

my cloaths very ill made, and quite out of shape, by happening to

mistake a figure in the calculation. But my comfort was, that I

observed such accidents very frequent, and little regarded.

--SWIFT, JONATHAN.

_Gulliver’s Travels; A Voyage to Laputa,

Chap. 2._

=2122.= The knowledge I had in mathematics, gave me great

assistance in acquiring their phraseology, which depended much

upon that science, and music; and in the latter I was not

unskilled. Their ideas are perpetually conversant in lines and

figures. If they would, for example, praise the beauty of a

woman, or any other animal, they describe it by rhombs, circles,

parallelograms, ellipses, and other geometrical terms, or by

words of art drawn from music, needless here to repeat. I

observed in the king’s kitchen all sorts of mathematical and

musical instruments, after the figures of which, they cut up the

joints that were served to his majesty’s table.--SWIFT, JONATHAN.

_Gulliver’s Travels; A Voyage to Laputa,

Chap. 2._

=2123.= I was at the mathematical school, where the master taught

his pupils, after a method, scarce imaginable to us in Europe.

The propositions, and demonstrations, were fairly written on a

thin wafer, with ink composed of a cephalic tincture. This, the

student was to swallow upon a fasting stomach, and for three days

following, eat nothing but bread and water. As the wafer

digested, the tincture mounted to his brain, bearing the

proposition along with it. But the success has not hitherto been

answerable, partly by some error in the _quantum_ or composition,

and partly by the perverseness of lads; to whom this bolus is so

nauseous, that they generally steal aside, and discharge it

upwards, before it can operate; neither have they been yet

persuaded to use so long an abstinence as the prescription

requires.--SWIFT, JONATHAN.

_Gulliver’s Travels; A Voyage to Laputa,

Chap. 5._

=2124.= It is worth observing that some of those who disparage

some branch of study in which they are deficient, will often

affect more contempt for it than they really feel. And not

unfrequently they will take pains to have it thought that they

are themselves well versed in it, or that they easily might be,

if they thought it worth while;--in short, that it is not from

hanging too high that the grapes are called sour.

Thus, Swift, in the person of Gulliver, represents himself, while

deriding the extravagant passion for Mathematics among the

Laputians, as being a good mathematician. Yet he betrays his

utter ignorance, by speaking “of a pudding in the _form of a

cycloid_:” evidently taking the cycloid for a _figure_, instead

of a _line_. This may help to explain the difficulty he is said

to have had in obtaining his Degree.--WHATELY, R.

_Annotations to Bacon’s Essays, Essay

L._

=2125.= It is natural to think that an abstract science cannot be

of much importance in the affairs of human life, because it has

omitted from its consideration everything of real interest. It

will be remembered that Swift, in his description of Gulliver’s

voyage to Laputa, is of two minds on this point. He describes the

mathematicians of that country as silly and useless dreamers,

whose attention has to be awakened by flappers. Also, the

mathematical tailor measures his height by a quadrant, and

deduces his other dimensions by a rule and compasses, producing a

suit of very ill-fitting clothes. On the other hand, the

mathematicians of Laputa, by their marvellous invention of the

magnetic island floating in the air, ruled the country and

maintained their ascendency over their subjects. Swift, indeed,

lived at a time peculiarly unsuited for gibes at contemporary

mathematicians. Newton’s _Principia_ had just been written, one

of the great forces which have transformed the modern world.

Swift might just as well have laughed at an earthquake.

--WHITEHEAD, A. N.

_An Introduction to Mathematics (New

York, 1911), p. 10._

=2126.= [Illustration: A geometrical drawing including square and

four triangles to demonstrate a graphical proof of the theorem of

Pythagoras as described in the poem.]

Here I am as you may see

a² + b² - ab

When two Triangles on me stand

Square of hypothen^e is plann’d

But if I stand on them instead,

The squares of both the sides are read.

--AIRY, G. B.

_Quoted in Graves’ Life of Sir W. R.

Hamilton, Vol. 3 (New York, 1889), p.

502._

=2127.= π = 3.141 592 653 589 793 238 462 643 383 279 ...

3 1 4 1 5 9

Now I, even I, would celebrate

2 6 5 3 5

In rhymes inapt, the great

8 9 7 9

Immortal Syracusan, rivaled nevermore,

3 2 3 8 4

Who in his wondrous lore,

6 2 6

Passed on before,

4 3 3 8 3 2 7 9

Left men his guidance how to circles mensurate.

--ORR, A. C.

_Literary Digest, Vol. 32 (1906), p.

84._

=2128.= I take from a biographical dictionary the first five

names of poets, with their ages at death. They are

Aagard, died at 48.

Abeille, “ “ 76.

Abulola, “ “ 84.

Abunowas, “ “ 48.

Accords, “ “ 45.

These five ages have the following characters in common:--

1. The difference of the two digits composing the number divided

by _three_, leaves a remainder of _one_.

2. The first digit raised to the power indicated by the second,

and then divided by _three_, leaves a remainder of _one_.

3. The sum of the prime factors of each age, including _one_ as a

prime factor, is divisible by _three_.--PEIRCE, C. S.

_A Theory of Probable Inference; Studies

in Logic (Boston, 1883), p. 163._

=2129.= In view of the fact that the offered prize [for the

solution of the problem of Fermat’s Greater Theorem] is about

$25,000 and that lack of marginal space in his copy of Diophantus

was the reason given by Fermat for not communicating his proof,

one might be tempted to wish that one could send credit for a

dime back through the ages to Fermat and thus secure this coveted

prize, if it actually existed. This might, however, result more

seriously than one would at first suppose; for if Fermat had

bought on credit a dime’s worth of paper even during the year of

his death, 1665, and if this bill had been drawing compound

interest at the rate of six per cent, since that time, the bill

would now amount to more than seven times as much as the prize.

--MILLER, G. A.

_Some Thoughts on Modern Mathematical

Research; Science, Vol. 35 (1912), p.

881._

=2130.= _If the Indians hadn’t spent the $24._ In 1626 Peter

Minuit, first governor of New Netherland, purchased Manhattan

Island from the Indians for about $24. The rate of interest on

money is higher in new countries, and gradually decreases as

wealth accumulates. Within the present generation the legal rate

in the state has fallen from 7% to 6%. Assume for simplicity a

uniform rate of 7% from 1626 to the present, and suppose that the

Indians had put their $24 at interest at that rate (banking

facilities in New York being always taken for granted!) and had

added the interest to the principal yearly. What would be the

amount now, after 280 years? 24 × (1.07)^{280} = more than

4,042,000,000.

The latest tax assessment available at the time of writing gives

the realty for the borough of Manhattan as $3,820,754.181. This

is estimated to be 78% of the actual value, making the actual

value a little more than $4,898,400,000.

The amount of the Indians’ money would therefore be more than the

present assessed valuation but less than the actual valuation.

--WHITE, W. F.

_A Scrap-book of Elementary Mathematics

(Chicago, 1908), pp. 47-48._

=2131.= See Mystery to Mathematics fly!--POPE, ALEXANDER.

_The Dunciad, Bk. 4, line 647._

=2132.= The Pythagoreans and Platonists were carried further by

this love of simplicity. Pythagoras, by his skill in mathematics,

discovered that there can be no more than five regular solid

figures, terminated by plane surfaces which are all similar and

equal; to wit, the tetrahedron, the cube, the octahedron, the

dodecahedron, and the eicosihedron. As nature works in the most

simple and regular way, he thought that all elementary bodies

must have one or other of those regular figures; and that the

discovery of the properties and relations of the regular solids

must be a key to open the mysteries of nature.

This notion of the Pythagoreans and Platonists has undoubtedly

great beauty and simplicity. Accordingly it prevailed, at least

to the time of Euclid. He was a Platonic philosopher, and is said

to have wrote all the books of his Elements, in order to discover

the properties and relations of the five regular solids. The

ancient tradition of the intention of Euclid in writing his

elements, is countenanced by the work itself. For the last book

of the elements treats of the regular solids, and all the

preceding are subservient to the last.--REID, THOMAS.

_Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind

(Edinburgh, 1812), Vol. 2, p. 400._

=2133.= In the Timæus [of Plato] it is asserted that the

particles of the various elements have the forms of these [the

regular] solids. Fire has the Pyramid; Earth has the Cube; Water

the Octahedron; Air the Icosahedron; and the Dodecahedron is the

plan of the Universe itself. It was natural that when Plato had

learnt that other mathematical properties had a bearing upon

the constitution of the Universe, he should suppose that

the singular property of space, which the existence of this

limited and varied class of solids implied, should have some

corresponding property in the Universe, which exists in space.

--WHEWELL, W.

_History of the Inductive Sciences, 3rd

Edition, Additions to Bk. 2._

=2134.= The orbit of the earth is a circle: round the sphere to

which this circle belongs, describe a dodecahedron; the sphere

including this will give the orbit of Mars. Round Mars describe a

tetrahedron; the circle including this will be the orbit of

Jupiter. Describe a cube round Jupiter’s orbit; the circle

including this will be the orbit of Saturn. Now inscribe in the

earth’s orbit an icosahedron; the circle inscribed in it will be

the orbit of Venus. Inscribe an octahedron in the orbit of Venus;

the circle inscribed in it will be Mercury’s orbit. This is the

reason of the number of the planets.--KEPLER.

_Mysterium Cosmographicum [Whewell]._

=2135.= It will not be thought surprising that Plato expected

that Astronomy, when further advanced, would be able to render an

account of many things for which she has not accounted even to

this day. Thus, in the passage in the seventh Book of the

_Republic_, he says that the philosopher requires a reason for

the proportion of the day to the month, and the month to the

year, deeper and more substantial than mere observation can give.

Yet Astronomy has not yet shown us any reason why the proportion

of the times of the earth’s rotation on its axis, the moon’s

revolution round the earth, and the earth’s revolution round the

sun, might not have been made by the Creator quite different from

what they are. But in asking Mathematical Astronomy for reasons

which she cannot give, Plato was only doing what a great

astronomical discoverer, Kepler, did at a later period. One of

the questions which Kepler especially wished to have answered

was, why there are five planets, and why at such particular

distances from the sun? And it is still more curious that he

thought he had found the reason of these things, in the relation

of those five regular solids which Plato was desirous of

introducing into the philosophy of the universe.... Kepler

regards the law which thus determines the number and magnitude of

the planetary orbits by means of the five regular solids as a

discovery no less remarkable and certain than the Three Laws

which give his name its imperishable place in the history of

astronomy.--WHEWELL, W.

_History of the Inductive Sciences, 3rd

Edition, Additions to Bk. 3._

=2136.= Pythagorean philosophers ... maintained that of two

combatants, he would conquer, the sum of the numbers expressed by

the characters of whose names exceeded the sum of those expressed

by the other. It was upon this principle that they explained the

relative prowess and fate of the heroes in Homer, Πατροκλος, Ἑκτορ

and Αχιλλευς, the sum of the numbers in whose names are 861, 1225,

and 1276 respectively.--PEACOCK, GEORGE.

_Encyclopedia of Pure Mathematics

(London, 1847); Article “Arithmetic,”

sect. 38._

=2137.= Round numbers are always false.--JOHNSON, SAMUEL.

_Johnsoniana; Apothegms, Sentiment,

etc._

=2138.= Numero deus impare gaudet [God in number odd rejoices.]

--VIRGIL.

_Eclogue, 8, 77._

=2139.= Why is it that we entertain the belief that for every

purpose odd numbers are the most effectual?--PLINY.

_Natural History, Bk. 28, chap. 5._

=2140.=

“Then here goes another,” says he, “to make sure,

Fore there’s luck in odd numbers,” says Rory O’Moore.

--LOVER, S.

_Rory O’Moore._

=2141.= This is the third time; I hope, good luck lies in odd

numbers.... They say, there is divinity in odd numbers, either in

nativity, chance, or death.--SHAKESPEARE.

_The Merry Wives of Windsor, Act 5,

scene 1._

=2142.= To add to golden numbers, golden numbers.--DECKER, THOMAS.

_Patient Grissell, Act 1, scene 1._

=2143.=

I’ve read that things inanimate have moved,

And, as with living souls, have been inform’d,

By magic numbers and persuasive sound.

--CONGREVE, RICHARD.

_The Morning Bride, Act 1, scene 1._

=2144.= ... the Yancos on the Amazon, whose name for three is

Poettarrarorincoaroac,

of a length sufficiently formidable to justify the remark of La

Condamine: Heureusement pour ceux qui ont à faire avec eux, leur

Arithmetique ne va pas plus loin.--PEACOCK, GEORGE.

_Encyclopedia of Pure Mathematics

(London, 1847); Article “Arithmetic,”

sect. 32._

=2145.= There are three principal sins, avarice, luxury, and

pride; three sorts of satisfaction for sin, fasting, almsgiving,

and prayer; three persons offended by sin, God, the sinner

himself, and his neighbour; three witnesses in heaven, _Pater_,

_verbum_, and _spiritus sanctus_; three degrees of penitence,

contrition, confession, and satisfaction, which Dante has

represented as the three steps of the ladder that lead to

purgatory, the first marble, the second black and rugged stone,

and the third red porphyry. There are three sacred orders

in the church militant, _sub-diaconati_, _diaconiti_, and

_presbyterati_; there are three parts, not without mystery, of

the most sacred body made by the priest in the mass; and three

times he says _Agnus Dei_, and three times, _Sanctus_; and if we

well consider all the devout acts of Christian worship, they are

found in a ternary combination; if we wish rightly to partake of

the holy communion, we must three times express our contrition,

_Domine non sum dignus_; but who can say more of the ternary

number in a shorter compass, than what the prophet says, _tu

signaculum sanctae trinitatis_. There are three Furies in the

infernal regions; three Fates, Atropos, Lachesis, and Clotho.

There are three theological virtues: _Fides_, _spes_, and

_charitas_. _Tria sunt pericula mundi: Equum currere; navigare,

et sub tyranno vivere._ There are three enemies of the soul: the

Devil, the world, and the flesh. There are three things which are

of no esteem: the strength of a porter, the advice of a poor man,

and the beauty of a beautiful woman. There are three vows of the

Minorite Friars: poverty, obedience, and chastity. There are

three terms in a continued proportion. There are three ways in

which we may commit sin: _corde_, _ore_, _ope_. Three principal

things in Paradise: glory, riches, and justice. There are three

things which are especially displeasing to God: an avaricious

rich man, a proud poor man, and a luxurious old man. And all

things, in short, are founded in three; that is, in number, in

weight, and in measure.

--PACIOLI, _Author of the first printed treatise on arithmetic._

_Quoted in Encyclopedia of Pure

Mathematics (London, 1847); Article

“Arithmetic,” sect. 90._

=2146.= Ah! why, ye Gods, should two and two make four?

--POPE, ALEXANDER.

_The Dunciad, Bk. 2, line 285._

=2147.=

By him who stampt _The Four_ upon the mind,--

_The Four_, the fount of nature’s endless stream.

--_Ascribed to_ PYTHAGORAS.

_Quoted in Whewell’s History of the

Inductive Sciences, Bk. 4, chap. 3._

=2148.=

Along the skiey arch the goddess trode,

And sought Harmonia’s august abode;

The universal plan, the mystic Four,

Defines the figure of the palace floor.

Solid and square the ancient fabric stands,

Raised by the labors of unnumbered hands.

--NONNUS.

_Dionysiac, 41, 275-280. [Whewell]._

=2149.= The number seventy-seven figures the abolition of all

sins by baptism.... The number ten signifies justice and

beatitude, resulting from the creature, which makes seven with

the Trinity, which is three: therefore it is that God’s

commandments are ten in number. The number eleven denotes sin,

because it _transgresses_ ten.... This number seventy-seven is

the product of eleven, figuring sin, multiplied by seven, and not

by ten, for seven is the number of the creature. Three represents

the soul, which is in some sort an image of Divinity; and four

represents the body, on account of its four qualities....

--ST. AUGUSTINE.

_Sermon 41, art. 23._

=2150.= Heliodorus says that the Nile is nothing else than the

year, founding his opinion on the fact that the numbers expressed

by the letters Νειλος, Nile, are in Greek arithmetic, Ν = 50; Ε =

5; Ι = 10; Λ = 30; Ο = 70; Σ = 200; and these figures make up

together 365, the number of days in the year.

_Littell’s Living Age, Vol. 117, p.

380._

=2151.= In treating 666, Bungus [Petri Bungi Bergomatis Numerorum

mysteria, Bergamo, 1591] a good Catholic, could not compliment

the Pope with it, but he fixes it on Martin Luther with a little

forcing. If from A to I represent 1-9, from K to S 10-90, and

from T to Z 100-500, we see--

M A R T I N L U T E R A

30 1 80 100 9 40 20 200 100 5 80 1

which gives 666. Again in Hebrew, _Lulter_ [Hebraized form of

Luther] does the same:--

ר ת ל י ל

200 400 30 6 30

--DE MORGAN, A.

_Budget of Paradoxes (London, 1872), p. 37._

=2152.= Stifel, the most acute and original of the early

mathematicians of Germany, ... relates ... that whilst a monk at

Esslingen in 1520, and when infected by the writings of Luther,

he was reading in the library of his convent the 13th Chapter of

_Revelations_, it struck his mind that the _Beast_ must signify

the Pope, Leo X.; He then proceeded in pious hope to make the

calculation of the sum of the numeral letters in _Leo decimus_,

which he found to be M, D, C, L, V, I; the sum which these formed

was too great by M, and too little by X; but he bethought him

again, that he has seen the name written Leo X., and that there

were ten letters in _Leo decimus_, from either of which he could

obtain the deficient number, and by interpreting the M to mean

_mysterium_, he found the number required, a discovery which gave

him such unspeakable comfort, that he believed that his

interpretation must have been an immediate inspiration of God.

--PEACOCK, GEORGE.

_Encyclopedia of Pure Mathematics

(London, 1847); Article “Arithmetic,”

sect. 89._

Memorabilia Mathematica; or, the Philomath's Quotation-Book · 第 16 / 17 章