CHAPTER XII

MATHEMATICS AS A LANGUAGE

=1201.= The new mathematics is a sort of supplement to language,

affording a means of thought about form and quantity and a means

of expression, more exact, compact, and ready than ordinary

language. The great body of physical science, a great deal of the

essential facts of financial science, and endless social and

political problems are only accessible and only thinkable to

those who have had a sound training in mathematical analysis, and

the time may not be very remote when it will be understood that

for complete initiation as an efficient citizen of one of the new

great complex world wide states that are now developing, it is as

necessary to be able to compute, to think in averages and maxima

and minima, as it is now to be able to read and to write.

--WELLS, H. G.

_Mankind in the Making (London, 1904),

pp. 191-192._

=1202.= Mathematical language is not only the simplest and most

easily understood of any, but the shortest also.--BROUGHAM, H. L.

_Works (Edinburgh, 1872), Vol. 7, p.

317._

=1203.= Mathematics is the science of definiteness, the necessary

vocabulary of those who know.--WHITE, W. F.

_A Scrap-book of Elementary Mathematics

(Chicago, 1908), p. 7._

=1204.= Mathematics, too, is a language, and as concerns its

structure and content it is the most perfect language which

exists, superior to any vernacular; indeed, since it is

understood by every people, mathematics may be called the

language of languages. Through it, as it were, nature herself

speaks; through it the Creator of the world has spoken, and

through it the Preserver of the world continues to speak.

--DILLMANN, C.

_Die Mathematik die Fackelträgerin einer

neuen Zeit (Stuttgart, 1889), p. 5._

=1205.= Would it sound too presumptuous to speak of perception as

a quintessence of sensation, language (that is, communicable

thought) of perception, mathematics of language? We should then

have four terms differentiating from inorganic matter and from

each other the Vegetable, Animal, Rational, and Super-sensual

modes of existence.--SYLVESTER, J. J.

_Presidential Address, British

Association; Collected Mathematical

Papers, Vol. 2, p. 652._

=1206.= Little could Plato have imagined, when, indulging his

instinctive love of the true and beautiful for their own sakes,

he entered upon these refined speculations and revelled in a

world of his own creation, that he was writing the grammar of the

language in which it would be demonstrated in after ages that the

pages of the universe are written.--SYLVESTER, J. J.

_A Probationary Lecture on Geometry;

Collected Mathematical Papers, Vol. 2,

p. 7._

=1207.= It is the symbolic language of mathematics only which has

yet proved sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to demand

familiarity with this conception of an inverse process.

--VENN, JOHN.

_Symbolic Logic (London and New York,

1894), p. 74._

=1208.= Without this language [mathematics] most of the intimate

analogies of things would have remained forever unknown to us;

and we should forever have been ignorant of the internal harmony

of the world, which is the only true objective reality....

This harmony ... is the sole objective reality, the only truth we

can attain; and when I add that the universal harmony of the

world is the source of all beauty, it will be understood what

price we should attach to the slow and difficult progress which

little by little enables us to know it better.--POINCARÉ, H.

_The Value of Science [Halsted] Popular

Science Monthly, 1906, pp. 195-196._

=1209.= The most striking characteristic of the written language

of algebra and of the higher forms of the calculus is the

sharpness of definition, by which we are enabled to reason upon

the symbols by the mere laws of verbal logic, discharging our

minds entirely of the meaning of the symbols, until we have

reached a stage of the process where we desire to interpret our

results. The ability to attend to the symbols, and to perform the

verbal, visible changes in the position of them permitted by the

logical rules of the science, without allowing the mind to be

perplexed with the meaning of the symbols until the result is

reached which you wish to interpret, is a fundamental part of

what is called analytical power. Many students find themselves

perplexed by a perpetual attempt to interpret not only the

result, but each step of the process. They thus lose much of the

benefit of the labor-saving machinery of the calculus and are,

indeed, frequently incapacitated for using it.--HILL, THOMAS.

_Uses of Mathesis; Bibliotheca Sacra,

Vol. 32, p. 505._

=1210.= The prominent reason why a mathematician can be judged by

none but mathematicians, is that he uses a peculiar language. The

language of mathesis is special and untranslatable. In its

simplest forms it can be translated, as, for instance, we say a

right angle to mean a square corner. But you go a little higher

in the science of mathematics, and it is impossible to dispense

with a peculiar language. It would defy all the power of Mercury

himself to explain to a person ignorant of the science what is

meant by the single phrase “functional exponent.” How much more

impossible, if we may say so, would it be to explain a whole

treatise like Hamilton’s Quaternions, in such a wise as to make

it possible to judge of its value! But to one who has learned

this language, it is the most precise and clear of all modes of

expression. It discloses the thought exactly as conceived by the

writer, with more or less beauty of form, but never with

obscurity. It may be prolix, as it often is among French writers;

may delight in mere verbal metamorphoses, as in the Cambridge

University of England; or adopt the briefest and clearest forms,

as under the pens of the geometers of our Cambridge; but it

always reveals to us precisely the writer’s thought.

--HILL, THOMAS.

_North American Review, Vol. 85, pp.

224-225._

=1211.= The domain, over which the language of analysis extends

its sway, is, indeed, relatively limited, but within this domain

it so infinitely excels ordinary language that its attempt to

follow the former must be given up after a few steps. The

mathematician, who knows how to think in this marvelously

condensed language, is as different from the mechanical computer

as heaven from earth.--PRINGSHEIM, A.

_Jahresberichte der Deutschen

Mathematiker Vereinigung, Bd. 13, p.

367._

=1212.= The results of systematic symbolical reasoning must

_always_ express general truths, by their nature; and do not, for

their justification, require each of the steps of the process to

represent some definite operation upon quantity. The _absolute

universality of the interpretation of symbols_ is the fundamental

principle of their use.--WHEWELL, WILLIAM.

_The Philosophy of the Inductive

Sciences, Part I, Bk. 2, chap. 12, sect.

2 (London, 1858)._

=1213.= Anyone who understands algebraic notation, reads at a

glance in an equation results reached arithmetically only with

great labour and pains.--COURNOT, A.

_Theory of Wealth [N. T. Bacon], (New

York, 1897), p. 4._

=1214.= As arithmetic and algebra are sciences of great

clearness, certainty, and extent, which are immediately

conversant about signs, upon the skilful use whereof they

entirely depend, so a little attention to them may possibly help

us to judge of the progress of the mind in other sciences, which,

though differing in nature, design, and object, may yet agree in

the general methods of proof and inquiry.--BERKELEY, GEORGE.

_Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher,

Dialogue 7, sect. 12._

=1215.= In general the position as regards all such new calculi

is this--That one cannot accomplish by them anything that could

not be accomplished without them. However, the advantage is,

that, provided such a calculus corresponds to the inmost

nature of frequent needs, anyone who masters it thoroughly is

able--without the unconscious inspiration of genius which no one

can command--to solve the respective problems, yea, to solve them

mechanically in complicated cases in which, without such aid,

even genius becomes powerless. Such is the case with the

invention of general algebra, with the differential calculus, and

in a more limited region with Lagrange’s calculus of variations,

with my calculus of congruences, and with Möbius’s calculus. Such

conceptions unite, as it were, into an organic whole countless

problems which otherwise would remain isolated and require for

their separate solution more or less application of inventive

genius.--GAUSS, C. J.

_Werke, Bd. 8, p. 298._

=1216.= The invention of what we may call primary or fundamental

notation has been but little indebted to analogy, evidently owing

to the small extent of ideas in which comparison can be made

useful. But at the same time analogy should be attended to, even

if for no other reason than that, by making the invention of

notation an art, the exertion of individual caprice ceases to be

allowable. Nothing is more easy than the invention of notation,

and nothing of worse example and consequence than the confusion

of mathematical expressions by unknown symbols. If new notation

be advisable, permanently or temporarily, it should carry with it

some mark of distinction from that which is already in use,

unless it be a demonstrable extension of the latter.

--DE MORGAN, A.

_Calculus of Functions; Encyclopedia

Metropolitana, Addition to Article 26._

=1217.= Before the introduction of the Arabic notation,

multiplication was difficult, and the division even of integers

called into play the highest mathematical faculties. Probably

nothing in the modern world could have more astonished a Greek

mathematician than to learn that, under the influence of

compulsory education, the whole population of Western Europe,

from the highest to the lowest, could perform the operation of

division for the largest numbers. This fact would have seemed to

him a sheer impossibility.... Our modern power of easy reckoning

with decimal fractions is the most miraculous result of a perfect

notation.--WHITEHEAD, A. N.

_Introduction to Mathematics (New York,

1911), p. 59._

=1218.= Mathematics is often considered a difficult and

mysterious science, because of the numerous symbols which it

employs. Of course, nothing is more incomprehensible than a

symbolism which we do not understand. Also a symbolism, which we

only partially understand and are unaccustomed to use, is

difficult to follow. In exactly the same way the technical terms

of any profession or trade are incomprehensible to those who have

never been trained to use them. But this is not because they are

difficult in themselves. On the contrary they have invariably

been introduced to make things easy. So in mathematics, granted

that we are giving any serious attention to mathematical ideas,

the symbolism is invariably an immense simplification.

--WHITEHEAD, A. N.

_Introduction to Mathematics (New York,

1911), pp. 59-60._

=1219.= Symbolism is useful because it makes things difficult.

Now in the beginning everything is self-evident, and it is hard

to see whether one self-evident proposition follows from another

or not. Obviousness is always the enemy to correctness. Hence we

must invent a new and difficult symbolism in which nothing is

obvious.... Thus the whole of Arithmetic and Algebra has

been shown to require three indefinable notions and five

indemonstrable propositions.--RUSSELL, BERTRAND.

_International Monthly, 1901, p. 85._

=1220.= The employment of mathematical symbols is perfectly

natural when the relations between magnitudes are under

discussion; and even if they are not rigorously necessary, it

would hardly be reasonable to reject them, because they are not

equally familiar to all readers and because they have sometimes

been wrongly used, if they are able to facilitate the exposition

of problems, to render it more concise, to open the way to more

extended developments, and to avoid the digressions of vague

argumentation.--COURNOT, A.

_Theory of Wealth [N. T. Bacon], (New

York, 1897), pp. 3-4._

=1221.= An all-inclusive geometrical symbolism, such as Hamilton

and Grassmann conceived of, is impossible.--BURKHARDT, H.

_Jahresbericht der Deutschen

Mathematiker Vereinigung, Bd. 5, p. 52._

=1222.= The language of analysis, most perfect of all, being in

itself a powerful instrument of discoveries, its notations,

especially when they are necessary and happily conceived, are so

many germs of new calculi.--LAPLACE.

_Oeuvres, t. 7 (Paris, 1896), p. xl._

Memorabilia Mathematica; or, the Philomath's Quotation-Book · 第 11 / 17 章