message was sent to both houses containing some of the promised
communications relative to the connection of the United States with
foreign powers.
After suggesting, as a motive for this communication, that it not only
disclosed "matter of interesting inquiry to the Legislature," but "might
indeed give rise to deliberations to which they alone were competent,"
the President added:
"The representative and executive bodies of France have manifested
generally a friendly attachment to this country; have given advantages
to our commerce and navigation; and have made overtures for placing
these advantages on permanent ground. A decree, however, of the National
Assembly, subjecting vessels laden with provisions to be carried into
their ports, and making enemy goods lawful prize in the vessel of a
friend, contrary to our treaty, though revoked at one time as to the
United States, has been since extended to their vessels also, as has
been recently stated to us. Representations on the subject will be
immediately given in charge to our minister there, and the result shall
be communicated to the Legislature.
"It is with extreme concern I have to inform you that the person whom
they have unfortunately appointed their minister plenipotentiary here,
has breathed nothing of the friendly spirit of the nation which sent
him. Their tendency, on the contrary, has been to involve us in a war
abroad and discord and anarchy at home. So far as his acts, or those
of his agents, have threatened an immediate commitment in the war, or
flagrant insult to the authority of the laws, their effect has been
counteracted by the ordinary cognizance of the laws and by an exertion
of the powers confided to me. Where their danger was not imminent, they
have been borne with, from sentiments of regard of his nation, from a
sense of their friendship toward us, from a conviction that they would
not suffer us to remain long exposed to the actions of a person who has
so little respected our mutual dispositions, and, I will add, from a
reliance on the firmness of my fellow-citizens in their principles
of peace and order. In the meantime I have respected and pursued the
stipulations of our treaties, according to what I judged their true
sense, and have withheld no act of friendship which their affairs have
called for from us, and which justice to others left us free to perform.
I have gone further. Rather than employ force for the restitution of
certain vessels which I deemed the United States bound to restore, I
thought it more advisable to satisfy the parties by avowing it to be my
opinion that, if restitution were not made, it would be incumbent on the
United States to make compensation."
The message next proceeded to state that inquiries had been instituted
respecting the vexations and spoliations committed on the commerce
of the United States, the result of which, when received, would be
communicated.
The order issued by the British government on the 8th of June (1793),
and the measures taken by the executive of the United States in
consequence thereof, were briefly noticed, and the discussions which had
taken place in relation to the nonexecution of the treaty of peace, were
also mentioned. The message was then concluded with a reference to the
negotiations with Spain. "The public good," it was said, "requiring that
the present state of these should be made known to the Legislature in
confidence only, they would be the subject of a separate and subsequent
communication."
This message was accompanied with copies of the correspondence between
the Secretary of State and the French minister, on the points of
difference which subsisted between the two governments, together with
several documents necessary for the establishment of particular facts,
and with the letter written by Mr. Jefferson to Mr. Morris, which
justified the conduct of the United States by arguments too clear to be
misunderstood, and too strong ever to be controverted.
The extensive discussions which had taken place relative to the
nonexecution of the treaty of peace, and the correspondence produced
by the objectionable measures which had been adopted by the British
government during the existing war, were also laid before the
Legislature.
In a popular government the representatives of the people may generally
be considered as a mirror, reflecting truly the passions and feelings
which govern their constituents. In the late elections, the strength of
parties had been tried, and the opposition had derived so much aid from
associating the cause of France with its own principles, as to furnish
much reason to suspect that, in one branch of the Legislature at
least, it had become the majority. The first act of the House of
Representatives served to strengthen this suspicion. By each party a
candidate for the chair was brought forward, and Mr. Muhlenberg, who
was supported by the opposition, was elected by a majority of ten votes,
against Mr. Sedgewick, whom the Federalists supported.
The answer, however, to Washington's speech, bore no tinge of that
malignant and furious spirit which had infused itself into the
publications of the day. Breathing the same affectionate attachment to
his person and character which had been professed in other times,
and being approved by every part of the House, it indicated that the
leaders, at least, still venerated their chief magistrate, and that no
general intention as yet existed to involve him in the obloquy directed
against his measures.
Noticing that unanimous suffrage by which he had been again called to
his present station, "it was," they said, "with equal sincerity and
promptitude they embraced the occasion for expressing to him their
congratulations on so distinguished a testimony of public approbation,
and their entire confidence in the purity and patriotism of the motives
which had produced this obedience to the voice of his country. It
is," proceeded the address, "to virtues which have commanded long and
universal reverence, and services from which have flowed great and
lasting benefits, that the tribute of praise may be paid without the
reproach of flattery; and it is from the same sources that the fairest
anticipations may be derived in favor of the public happiness."
The proclamation of neutrality was approved in guarded terms, and
the topics of the speech were noticed in a manner which indicated
dispositions cordially to cooperate with the executive.
On the part of the Senate, also, the answer to the speech was
unfeignedly affectionate. In warm terms they expressed the pleasure
which the re-election of Washington gave them. "In the unanimity," they
added, "which a second time marks this important national act, we trace
with particular satisfaction, besides the distinguished tribute paid
to the virtues and abilities which it recognizes, another proof of that
discernment, and constancy of sentiments and views, which have hitherto
characterized the citizens of the United States." Speaking of the
proclamation, they declared it to be "a measure well timed and wise,
manifesting a watchful solicitude for the welfare of the nation, and
calculated to promote it."
In a few days a confidential message from Washington was delivered,
communicating the critical situation of affairs with Spain. The
negotiations attempted with that power in regard to the interesting
objects of boundary, navigation, and commerce, had been exposed to much
delay and embarrassment, in consequence of the changes which the French
revolution had effected in the political state of Europe. Meanwhile, the
neighborhood of the Spanish colonies to the United States had given rise
to various other subjects of discussion, one of which had assumed a very
serious aspect.
Having the best reason to suppose that the hostility of the southern
Indians was excited by the agents of Spain, Washington had directed the
American commissioners at Madrid to make the proper representations on
the subject and to propose that each nation should, with good faith,
promote the peace of the other with their savage neighbors.
About the same time the Spanish government entertained, or affected to
entertain, corresponding suspicions of like hostile excitements by
the agents of the United States, to disturb their peace with the
same nations. The representations which were induced by these real or
affected suspicions were accompanied with pretensions and made in a
style to which the American executive could not be inattentive. The
King of Spain asserted these claims as a patron and protector of those
Indians. He assumed a right to mediate between them and the United
States, and to interfere in the establishment of their boundaries. At
length, in the very moment when those savages were committing daily
inroads on the American frontier, at the instigation of Spain, as
was believed, the representatives of that power, complaining of the
aggressions of American citizens on the Indians, declared "that the
continuation of the peace, good harmony, and perfect friendship of the
two nations was very problematical for the future, unless the United
States should take more convenient measures, and of greater energy than
those adopted for a long time past."
Notwithstanding the zeal and enthusiasm with which the pretensions of
the French republic, as asserted by their minister Genet, continued to
be supported out of doors, they found no open advocate in either branch
of the Legislature. This circumstance is, in a great measure, to
be ascribed to the temperate conduct of the executive, and to the
convincing arguments with which its decisions were supported.
But when it is recollected that the odium which these decisions excited
sustained no diminution; that the accusation of hostility to France
and to liberty, which originated in them, was not retracted; that, when
afterwards many of the controverted claims were renewed by France, her
former advocates still adhered to her; it is not unreasonable to suppose
that other considerations mingled themselves with the conviction
which the correspondence laid before the Legislature was calculated to
produce.
An attack on the administration could be placed on no ground more
disadvantageous than on its controversy with Mr. Genet. The conduct
and language of that minister were offensive to reflecting men of all
parties. The President had himself taken so decisive a part in favor of
the measures which had been adopted that they must be ascribed to
him, not to his Cabinet, and, of consequence, the whole weight of his
personal character must be directly encountered in an attempt to censure
those measures. From this censure it would have been difficult to
extricate the person who was contemplated by the party in opposition
as its chief; for the Secretary of State had urged the arguments of the
administration with a degree of ability and earnestness, which ought to
have silenced the suspicion that he might not feel their force. [1]
The expression of a legislative opinion, in favor of the points insisted
on by the French minister, would probably have involved the nation in a
calamitous war, the whole responsibility for which would rest on
them. To these considerations was added another, which could not
be disregarded. The party in France, to which Mr. Genet owed his
appointment, had lost its power, and his fall was the inevitable
consequence of the fall of his patrons. That he would probably be
recalled was known in America, and that his conduct had been disapproved
by his government, was generally believed. The future system of
the French republic, with regard to the United States, could not be
foreseen, and it would be committing something to hazard not to wait its
development.
These objections did not exist to an indulgence of the partialities
and prejudices of the nation towards the belligerent powers in measures
suggested by its resentment against Great Britain. But, independent of
these considerations, it is scarcely possible to doubt that Congress
really approved the conduct of the executive with regard to France, and
was also convinced that a course of hostility had been pursued by Great
Britain which the national interest and national honor required them to
repel. In the irritable state of the public mind, it was not difficult
to produce this opinion.
Early in the session a report was made by Mr. Jefferson, Secretary of
State, in pursuance of a resolution of the House of Representatives,
passed on the 23d of February, 1791, requiring him "to report to
Congress the nature and extent of the privileges and restrictions of the
commercial intercourse of the United States with foreign nations,
and the measures which he should think proper to be adopted for the
improvement of the commerce and navigation of the same."
This report stated the exports of the United States in articles of
their own produce and manufacture, at $19,587,055, and the imports at
$19,823,060.
Of the exports, nearly one-half was carried to the kingdom of Great
Britain and its dominions; of the imports, about four-fifths were
brought from the same countries. The American shipping amounted to
277,519 tons, of which not quite one-sixth was employed in the trade
with Great Britain and its dominions.
In all the nations of Europe, most of the articles produced in the
United States were subject to heavy duties, and some of them were
prohibited. In England, the trade of the United States was in general on
as good a footing as the trade of other countries, and several articles
were more favored than the same articles, the growth of other countries.
The statements and arguments of this report tended to enforce the policy
of making discriminations which might favor the commerce of the United
States with France and discourage that with England, and which might
promote the increase of American navigation as a branch of industry and
a resource of defense.
This was the last official act of the Secretary of State. Early in the
preceding summer he had signified to the President his intention
to retire in September from the public service, and had, with some
reluctance, consented to postpone the execution of this intention to the
close of the year. Retaining his purpose, he resigned his office on the
last day of December. He was succeeded by Edmund Randolph, whose place
as Attorney-General was supplied by William Bradford, of Pennsylvania.
On the 4th of January (1794), the House resolved itself into a committee
of the whole, on the report of the Secretary of State, relative to the
restrictions of the commerce of the United States, when Mr. Madison,
after some prefatory observations, laid on the table a series of
resolutions for the consideration of the members.
These memorable resolutions embraced almost completely the idea of the
report. They imposed an additional duty on the manufactures, and on
the tonnage of vessels of nations having no commercial treaty with the
United States; while they reduced the duties already imposed by law
on the tonnage of vessels belonging to nations having such commercial
treaty, and they reciprocated the restrictions which were imposed on
American navigation.
The resolutions were taken up on the 13th of January (1794), and the
consideration of them led to protracted and very animated debates. The
friends of the administration regarded Mr. Madison's scheme as directly
hostile to England and subservient to the views of France, in a degree
utterly inconsistent with the policy of neutrality. On the other hand,
the opposition insisted that the proposed measures were absolutely
necessary to protect the commerce of the country from aggression and
plunder.
Mr. Madison, in advocating the views which he held, looked especially
to measures correspondent to the British navigation act, which had given
England the command of the sea. He contended that America would thrive
more from exclusion and contest, than from conciliating and stooping to
a power that slighted her; and that now was the moment, if ever, when
England was engaged in mortal strife with France, to bring her to
reason. [2] Mr. Madison's plan was debated at different periods of the
session, and underwent considerable modification in its progress
through the House, where a resolution was finally adopted retaining the
principle of commercial restrictions. It was rejected in the Senate by
the casting vote of Mr. Adams, the Vice-President.
Early in January, a resolution was agreed to in the House, declaring
"that a naval force, adequate to the protection of the commerce of the
United States against the Algerine corsairs, ought to be provided." The
force proposed was to consist of six frigates.
This measure was founded on the communications of the President
respecting the improbability of being able to negotiate a peace with
the Dey of Algiers; and on undoubted information that these pirates
had, during their first short cruise in the Atlantic, captured eleven
American merchantmen, and made upwards of 100 prisoners, and were
preparing to renew their attack on the unprotected vessels of the United
States. This bill was strongly opposed, but finally passed both houses,
and was approved by the President.
While these debates were going on, the news of the British order in
council of the 6th of November (which had not become known to the
American minister in England until the close of December, 1793),
relative to the French West India trade, arrived in the United
States, and roused afresh the hostility against England. Such was the
threatening aspect of affairs, that early in the session a committee
of the House was instructed to prepare and report an estimate of the
expense requisite to place the principal seaports of the country in a
state of defense.
That some steps should be taken to resist aggressions on the part of
England, was very evident; but the members of Congress differed as to
what measures ought to be adopted. The opponents of the administration
urged the adoption of commercial restrictions, while its supporters,
with the President himself, were in favor of a different course. Various
plans were submitted to the House by members, in accordance with their
different views of the subject.
On the 12th of March (1794) Mr. Sedgwick moved several resolutions, the
objects of which were to raise a military force, and to authorize the
President to lay an embargo. The armament was to consist of 15,000
men, who should be brought into actual service in case of war with any
European power, but not until war should break out. In the meantime they
were to receive pay while assembled for the purpose of discipline, which
was not to exceed twenty-four days in each year.
After stating the motives which led to the introduction of these
resolutions they were laid on the table for the consideration of the
members.
On the 21st of March Mr. Sedgwick's motion, authorizing the President to
lay an embargo, was negatived by a majority of two votes, but in a few
days the consideration of that subject was resumed, and a resolution
passed prohibiting all trade from the United States to any foreign port
or place for thirty days, and empowering the President to carry the
resolution into effect.
On the 27th of March Mr. Dayton moved a resolution for sequestering
all debts due to British subjects, and for taking means to secure their
payment into the treasury, as a fund out of which to indemnify the
citizens of the United States for depredations committed on their
commerce by British cruisers, in violation of the laws of nations.
The debate on this resolution was such as was to be expected from the
irritable state of the public mind. The invectives against the British
nation were uttered with peculiar vehemence, and were mingled with
allusions to the exertions of the government for the preservation of
neutrality, censuring strongly the system which had been pursued.
Before any question was taken on the proposition for sequestering
British debts, and without a decision on those proposed by Mr. Madison,
Mr. Clarke moved a resolution which in some degree suspended the
commercial regulations that had been so earnestly debated. This was to
prohibit all intercourse with Great Britain until her government should
make full compensation for all injuries done to the citizens of the
United States by armed vessels, or by any person or persons acting under
the authority of the British King, and until the western posts should be
delivered up.
On the 4th of April (1794) before any decision was made on the several
propositions which have been stated, the President laid before Congress
a letter just received from Thomas Pinckney, the minister of the
United States at London, communicating additional instructions to the
commanders of British armed ships, which were dated the 8th of January.
These instructions revoked those of the 6th of November (1793), and,
instead of bringing in for adjudication all neutral vessels trading with
the French islands, British cruisers were directed to bring in those
only which were laden with cargoes the produce of the French islands,
and were on a direct voyage from those islands to Europe.
The letter detailed a conversation with Lord Grenville on this subject,
in which his lordship explained the motives which had originally
occasioned the order of the 6th of November, and gave to it a
less extensive signification than it had received in the courts of
vice-admiralty.
It was intended, he said, to be temporary and was calculated to answer
two purposes. One was to prevent the abuses which might take place in
consequence of the whole of the St. Domingo fleet having gone to the
United States; the other was on account of the attack designed upon the
French West India islands by the armament under Sir John Jervis and
Sir Charles Grey; but it was now no longer necessary to continue the
regulations for those purposes. His lordship added that the order of the
6th of November did not direct the confiscation of all vessels trading
with the French islands, but only that they should be brought in for
legal adjudication, and he conceived that no vessel would be condemned
under it which would not have been previously liable to the same
sentence.
The influence of this communication on the party in the Legislature
which was denominated Federal was very considerable. Believing that
the existing differences between the two nations still admitted of
explanation and adjustment, they strenuously opposed all measures which
were irritating in their tendency or which might be construed into a
dereliction of the neutral character they were desirous of maintaining,
but they gave all their weight to those which, by putting the nation in
a posture of defense, prepared it for war should negotiation fail.
On the opposite party no change of sentiment or of views appears to have
been produced. Their system seems to have been matured, and not to have
originated in the feelings of the moment. They adhered to it, therefore,
with inflexible perseverance, but seemed not anxious to press an
immediate determination of the propositions which had been made. These
propositions were discussed with great animation, but, notwithstanding
an ascertained majority in their favor, were permitted to remain
undecided, as if their fate depended on some extrinsic circumstance.
Meanwhile, great exertions were made to increase the public agitation
and to stimulate the resentments which were felt against Great Britain.
The artillery of the press was played with unceasing fury on the
minority of the House of Representatives and the democratic societies
brought their whole force into operation. Language will scarcely afford
terms of greater outrage than were employed against those who sought
to stem the torrent of public opinion and to moderate the rage of the
moment. They were denounced as a British faction, seeking to impose
chains on their countrymen. Even the majority was declared to be but
half roused and to show little of that energy and decision which the
crisis required.
The proceedings of Congress continued to manifest a fixed purpose to
pursue the system which had been commenced, and the public sentiment
seemed to accord with that system. That the nation was advancing rapidly
to a state of war was firmly believed by many intelligent men, who
doubted the necessity and denied the policy of abandoning the neutral
position which had been thus long maintained. In addition to the
extensive calamities which must, in any state of things, result to the
United States from a rupture with a nation which was the mistress of the
ocean, and which furnished the best market for the sale of their produce
and the purchase of manufactures of indispensable necessity, there
were considerations belonging exclusively to the moment, which, though
operating only in a narrow circle, were certainly entitled to great
respect. [3]
That war with Britain, during the continuance of the passionate and
almost idolatrous devotion of a great majority of the people to the
French republic, would throw America so completely into the arms of
France as to leave her no longer mistress of her own conduct, was not
the only fear which the temper of the day suggested. That the spirit
which triumphed in that nation and deluged it with the blood of its
revolutionary champions might cross the Atlantic, and desolate the
hitherto safe and peaceful dwellings of the American people, was
an apprehension not so entirely unsupported by appearances as to be
pronounced chimerical. With a blind infatuation, which treated reason as
a criminal, immense numbers applauded a furious despotism, trampling on
every right, and sporting with life as the essence of liberty; and
the few who conceived freedom to be a plant which did not flourish
the better for being nourished with human blood, and who ventured to
disapprove the ravages of the guillotine, were execrated as the tools
of the coalesced despots, and as persons who, to weaken the affection
of America for France, became the calumniators of that republic. Already
had an imitative spirit, captivated with the splendor, but copying the
errors, of a great nation, reared up in every part of the continent
self-created corresponding societies, who, claiming to be the people,
assumed a control over the government and were loosening its bands.
Already were the Mountain, [4] and a revolutionary tribunal, favorite
toasts, and already were principles familiarly proclaimed, which, in
France, had been the precursors of that tremendous and savage despotism,
which, in the name of the people and by the instrumentality of
affiliated societies, had spread its terrific sway over that fine
country and had threatened to extirpate all that was wise and virtuous.
That a great majority of those statesmen who conducted the opposition
would deprecate such a result furnished no security against it. When
the physical force of a nation usurps the place of its wisdom, those who
have produced such a state of things no longer control it.
These apprehensions, whether well or ill founded, produced in those who
felt them an increased solicitude for the preservation of peace. Their
aid was not requisite to confirm the judgment of Washington on this
interesting subject. Fixed in his purpose of maintaining the neutrality
of the United States until the aggressions of a foreign power should
clearly render neutrality incompatible with honor, and conceiving from
the last advices received from England that the differences between the
two nations had not yet attained that point, he determined to make one
decisive effort, which should either remove the ostensible causes of
quarrel or demonstrate the indisposition of Great Britain to remove
them. This determination was executed by the nomination of an envoy
extraordinary to his Britannic majesty, which was announced to the
Senate on the 16th of April (1794), in the following terms:
"The communications which I have made to you during your present
session, from the dispatches of our minister in London, contain a
serious aspect of our affairs with Great Britain. But as peace ought to
be pursued with unremitted zeal, before the last resource--which has so
often been the scourge of nations and cannot fail to check the advanced
prosperity of the United States--is contemplated, I have thought proper
to nominate and do hereby nominate John Jay as envoy extraordinary of
the United States to his Britannic majesty. [5]
"My confidence in our minister plenipotentiary in London continues
undiminished. But a mission like this, while it corresponds with the
solemnity of the occasion, will announce to the world a solicitude for
the friendly adjustment of our complaints and a reluctance to hostility.
Going immediately from the United States, such an envoy will carry
with him a full knowledge of the existing temper and sensibility of our
country, and will thus be taught to vindicate our rights with firmness
and to cultivate peace with sincerity."
To those who believed the interests of the nation to require a rupture
with England and a still closer connection with France nothing could be
more unlooked for or more unwelcome than this decisive measure. That it
would influence the proceedings of Congress could not be doubted, and
that it would materially affect the public mind was probable. Evincing
the opinion of the executive that negotiation, not legislative
hostility, was still the proper medium for accommodating differences
with Great Britain, it threw on the Legislature a great responsibility,
if they should persist in a system calculated to defeat that
negotiation. By showing to the people that their President did not yet
believe war to be necessary, it turned the attention of many to peace,
and, by suggesting the probability, rekindled the almost extinguished
desire of preserving that blessing.
Scarcely has any public act of the President drawn upon his
administration a greater degree of censure than this. That such would be
its effect could not be doubted by a person who had observed the ardor
with which opinions that it thwarted were embraced, or the extremity to
which the passions and contests of the moment had carried all orders of
men. But it is the province of real patriotism to consult the utility
more than the popularity of a measure, and to pursue the path of duty,
although it may be rugged.
In the Senate the nomination was approved by a majority of ten votes,
and, in the House of Representatives, it was urged as an argument
against persevering in the system which had been commenced. On the 18th
of April a motion for taking up the report of the committee of the whole
house on the resolution for cutting off all commercial intercourse with
Great Britain was opposed chiefly on the ground that, as an envoy had
been nominated to the court of that country, no obstacle ought to be
thrown in his way. The adoption of the resolution would be a bar to
negotiation, because it used the language of menace and manifested
a partiality to one of the belligerents which was incompatible
with neutrality. It was also an objection to the resolution that it
prescribed the terms on which alone a treaty should be made, and
was, consequently, an infringement of the right of the executive to
negotiate, and an indelicacy to that department.
The resolution having undergone some modifications, a bill in conformity
with it was brought in and carried by a considerable majority. In the
Senate it was lost by the casting vote of Mr. Adams, the Vice-President.
The system which had been taken up in the House of Representatives was
pressed no further.
A bill for punishing infringements of the neutrality laws and
prohibiting the condemnation and sale of prizes in the ports of the
United States, brought in by the belligerent powers, was suggested by
Washington and reported in the Senate, where it met a violent opposition
and was finally passed by the casting vote of the Vice-President. In the
House of Representatives it was passed after striking out the provision
relative to the sale of prizes. In maintaining his system of strict
neutrality Washington had to fight every inch of the ground. The
opposition omitted no means of bringing the administration into
discredit. Attacks in Congress on the executive officers of the
government was resorted to.
In both houses inquiries were set on foot respecting the treasury
department, which obviously originated in the hope of finding some
foundation for censuring Mr. Hamilton, the secretary, but which failed
entirely. In a similar hope, as respected Gouverneur Morris, the
minister of the United States at Paris, the Senate passed a vote
requesting the President to lay before that body his correspondence with
the French republic, and also with the Department of State.
As a war with Great Britain seemed inevitable should the mission of Mr.
Jay prove unsuccessful, Congress did not adjourn without passing the
absolutely necessary laws for putting the country in a state of defense.
Provision was made for fortifying the principal harbors, and 80,000
militia were ordered to be in readiness for active service. Arms and
munitions of war were allowed to be imported free of duty, and the
President was authorized to purchase galleys and lay an embargo if he
should deem that the public interest required it. To meet the expenses
thus incurred duties were levied on a number of additional articles of
importation.
On the 9th of June (1794) this active and stormy session was closed by
an adjournment to the first Monday in the succeeding November.
"The public," says Marshall, "was not less agitated than the Legislature
had been by those interesting questions which had occasioned some of the
most animated and eloquent discussions that had ever taken place on
the floor of the House of Representatives. Mr. Madison's resolutions
especially continued to be the theme of general conversation, and, for
a long time, divided parties throughout the United States. The struggle
for public opinion was ardent, and each party supported its pretensions,
not only with those arguments which each deemed conclusive, but also by
those reciprocal criminations which, perhaps, each in part believed.
"The opposition declared that the friends of the administration were
an aristocratic and corrupt faction, who, from a desire to introduce
monarchy, were hostile to France, and under the influence of Britain;
that they sought every occasion to increase expense, to augment debt,
to multiply the public burdens, to create armies and navies, and, by the
instrumentality of all this machinery, to govern and enslave the people;
that they were a paper nobility, whose extreme sensibility at every
measure which threatened the funds, induced a tame submission to
injuries and insults, which the interest and the honor of the nation
required them to resist.
"The friends of the administration retorted that the opposition was
prepared to sacrifice the best interests of their country on the altar
of the French revolution; that they were willing to go to war for
French, not for American objects; that while they urged war they
withheld the means of supporting it in order the more effectually to
humble and disgrace the government; that they were so blinded by their
passion for France as to confound crimes with meritorious deeds, and
to abolish the natural distinction between virtue and vice; that
the principles which they propagated and with which they sought to
intoxicate the people were, in practice, incompatible with the existence
of government; that they were the apostles of anarchy, not of freedom,
and were, consequently, not the friends of real and rational liberty."
Immediately after the adjournment of Congress, Washington paid a short
visit to Mount Vernon. On the 19th of June he writes from Baltimore to
Randolph, Secretary of State, respecting the commission and letters of
credence of John Quincy Adams, whom he had recently appointed minister
resident to the United Netherlands. From the same place, on the same
day, he writes to Gouverneur Morris, who had recently been recalled from
France at the request of the revolutionary authorities, he having pretty
openly expressed his disapprobation of the excesses of the party in
power. Washington had appointed as his successor James Monroe, who, as
senator, had uniformly opposed the measures of the administration. Such
an act of magnanimity in these times would excite considerable surprise.
On the 25th of June (1794), after his arrival at Mount Vernon,
Washington again writes to Gouverneur Morris, who still retained his
warm friendship and confidence. Speaking of his political course, he
says: "My primary objects, to which I have steadily adhered, have been
to preserve the country in peace if I can, and to be prepared for war
if I cannot; to effect the first upon terms consistent with the respect
which is due to ourselves and with honor, justice, and good faith to all
the world."
On the same day he writes to Edmund Randolph, Secretary of State:
"I shall endeavor to be back by the time I allotted before I left
Philadelphia, if I am able, but an exertion to save myself and horse
from falling among the rocks at the lower falls of the Potomac, whither
I went on Sunday morning to see the canal and locks, has wrenched my
back in such a manner as to prevent my riding, and hitherto has defeated
the purposes for which I came home. My stay here will only be until I
can ride with ease and safety, whether I accomplish my own business or
not."
In July (1794) Washington returned to Philadelphia, where very weighty
matters were demanding his attention.
1. Footnote: Marshall.
2. Footnote: Madison, on this and other occasions, appears to have been
earnestly desirous to build up an extensive mercantile marine, with a
view to the formation of an efficient navy. It is pleasant to recollect
that, under his administration as President, the proudest triumphs of
our navy were achieved.
3. Footnote: Marshall.
4. Footnote: A well-known term designating the most violent party in
France.
5. Footnote: Mr. Jay's secretary on this mission was Col. John Trumbull.
Colonel Trumbull may be considered one of the most interesting among
the many remarkable characters called into action and developed by our
Revolutionary War. All that we know of him tends to raise him in our
estimation as a soldier, a gentleman, and an artist. When accidentally,
as he thought, but providentially, as the event proved, he was excluded
from the army, he deemed it a great misfortune, but it forced upon him
the cultivation of his art, and made him the painter of the Revolution.
His noble historical paintings are the most precious relics of that
heroic age which the nation possesses. They are justly prized above all
price; and the latest posterity will rejoice that Trumbull laid down the
sword to take up the pallet and pencil.
CHAPTER VIII.
WASHINGTON QUELLS THE WESTERN INSURRECTION. 1794.
While Congress was in session several important matters had claimed
the consideration of Washington, to which we will now call the reader's
attention. It will be recollected that a request of the executive for
the recall of Mr. Genet had been transmitted to the French government.
During the time which elapsed before an answer could be returned Genet's
proceedings had been such as to call for all the prudence, foresight,
and moderation of Washington.
In that spirit of conciliation which adopts the least irritating means
for effecting its objects, Washington had resolved to bear with the
insults, the resistance, and the open defiance of Genet until his appeal
to the friendship and the policy of the French republic should be fairly
tried. Early in January (1794) this resolution was shaken by fresh
proofs of the perseverance of that minister in a line of conduct not to
be tolerated by a nation which has not surrendered all pretensions
to self-government. Genet had meditated and deliberately planned two
expeditions, to be carried on from the territories of the United States
against the dominions of Spain, and had, as minister of the French
republic, granted commissions to citizens of the United States, who
were privately recruiting troops for the proposed service. The first was
destined against Florida and the second against Louisiana. The detail
of the plans had been settled. The pay, rations, clothing, plunder, and
division of the conquered lands to be allotted to the military and the
proportion of the acquisitions to be reserved to the republic of France
were arranged. The troops destined to act against Florida were to be
raised in the three southern States, were to rendezvous in Georgia, were
to be aided by a body of Indians, and were to cooperate with the French
fleet, should one arrive on the coast. This scheme had been the subject
of a correspondence between the executive and Genet, but was in full
progress in the preceding December, when, by the vigilance of the
Legislature of South Carolina, it was more particularly developed, and
some of the principal agents were arrested.
About the same time, intelligence less authentic, but wearing every
circumstance of probability, was received, stating that the expedition
against Louisiana, which was to be carried on down the Ohio from
Kentucky, was in equal maturity.
This intelligence seemed to render a further forbearance incompatible
with the dignity of the United States. The question of superseding
the diplomatic functions of Genet and depriving him of the privileges
attached to that character was brought before the Cabinet, and a message
to Congress was prepared, communicating these transactions and avowing
a determination to adopt that measure, unless one or the other House
should signify the opinion that it was not advisable so to do, when the
business was arrested by receiving a letter from Mr. Morris announcing
officially the recall of this rash minister. Mr. Fauchet, the successor
of Genet, arrived in February (1794), and brought with him strong
assurances that his government totally disapproved the conduct of
his predecessor. He avowed a determination to avoid whatever might be
offensive to those to whom he was deputed, and a wish to carry into full
effect the friendly dispositions of his nation toward the United States.
For some time his actions were in the spirit of these professions.
Not long after the arrival of Mr. Fauchet, the executive government
of France requested the recall of Gouverneur Morris. With this request
Washington, as we have already seen, immediately complied, and James
Monroe was appointed to succeed him.
The discontents which had been long fomented in the western country
had assumed a serious and alarming appearance. A remonstrance to the
President and Congress of the United States from the inhabitants of
Kentucky, respecting the navigation of the Mississippi, was laid before
the executive and each branch of the Legislature. The style of this
paper accorded well with the instructions under which it had been
prepared. It demanded the free navigation of the Mississippi as a right,
and arraigned the government for not having secured its enjoyment. The
paper was submitted to both Houses of Congress.
In the Senate the subject was referred to a committee who reported "that
in the negotiation now carrying on at Madrid between the United States
and Spain, the right of the former to the free navigation of the
Mississippi is well asserted and demonstrated, and their claim to its
enjoyment is pursued with all the assiduity and firmness which the
magnitude of the subject demands, and will doubtless continue to be
so pursued until the object shall be obtained or adverse circumstances
shall render the further progress of the negotiation impracticable. That
in the present state of the business it would improper for Congress to
interfere, but, in order to satisfy the citizens of the United States
more immediately interested in the event of this negotiation, that the
United States, have uniformly asserted their right to the free use of
the navigation of the river Mississippi, and have employed and will
continue to pursue such measures as are best adapted to obtain the
enjoyment of this important territorial right, the committee recommend
that it be resolved by the Senate:
"That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is requested
to cause to be communicated to the executive of the State of Kentucky,
such part of the existing negotiation between the United States and
Spain relative to this subject, as he may deem advisable and consistent
with the course of the negotiation."
In the House of Representatives also a resolution was passed, expressing
the conviction of the House, that the executive was urging the claim
of the United States to the navigation of the Mississippi in the manner
most likely to prove successful.
This answer was not satisfactory to the Kentuckians. Later developments
showed that they had a different object from that of obtaining the free
navigation of the Mississippi by negotiation.
In October, 1793, it was alleged by the Spanish commissioners that four
Frenchmen had left Philadelphia, empowered by the minister of the French
republic to prepare an expedition, in Kentucky, against New Orleans.
This fact was immediately communicated by Mr. Jefferson to the
governor of that State, with a request that he would use those means
of prevention which the law enabled him to employ. This letter was
accompanied by one from the Secretary of War, conveying the request of
the President, that, if preventive means should fail, effectual military
force should then be employed to arrest the expedition, and General
Wayne was ordered to hold a body of troops at the disposal of the
governor should he find the militia insufficient for his purpose.
The governor had already received information that a citizen of Kentucky
was in possession of a commission appointing him Commander-in-Chief of
the proposed expedition; and that the Frenchmen alluded to in the letter
of Mr. Jefferson had arrived, and, far from affecting concealment,
declared that they only waited for money, which they expected soon to
receive, in order to commence their operations.
The governor, however, in a letter, containing very singular views
of his duty in the affair, declined to interfere with the proposed
expedition.
Upon the receipt of this extraordinary letter, Washington directed
General Wayne to establish a military post at Fort Massac, on the Ohio,
for the purpose of stopping by force, if peaceful means should fail, any
body of armed men who should be proceeding down that river.
This precaution appears to have been necessary. The preparations for the
expedition were, for some time, carried on with considerable activity;
and there is reason to believe that it was not absolutely relinquished
until the war ceased between France and Spain.
It will be recollected that, in the preceding year, the attempt to treat
with the hostile Indians had suspended the operations of General Wayne
until the season for action had nearly passed away. After the total
failure of negotiation, the campaign was opened with as much vigor as a
prudent attention to circumstances would permit.
The Indians had expected an attempt upon their villages, and had
collected in full force, with the apparent determination of risking a
battle in their defense. A battle was desired by the American general,
but the consequences of another defeat were too serious to warrant
him in putting more to hazard by precipitate movements than the
circumstances of the war required. The negotiations with the Indians
were not terminated till September, and it was then too late to complete
the preparations which would enable General Wayne to accomplish his
object. He, therefore, contented himself with collecting his army and
penetrating about six miles in advance of Fort Jefferson, where he
established himself for the winter in a camp called Greensville. After
fortifying his camp, he took possession of the ground on which the
Americans had been defeated in 1791, where he erected Fort Recovery.
These positions afforded considerable protection to the frontiers, and
facilitated the opening of the ensuing campaign.
Seeing only the dark side of every measure adopted by the government,
and not disinclined to militia expeditions made at the expense of the
United States, the people of Kentucky loudly charged the President with
a total disregard of their safety, pronounced the Continental troops
entirely useless, declared that the Indians should be kept in awe alone
by the militia, and insisted that the power should be deposited with
some person in their State to call them out at his discretion, at the
charge of the United States.
Meanwhile, some steps were taken by the Governor of Upper Canada, which
were well calculated to increase suspicions respecting the dispositions
of Great Britain.
It was believed by Washington, not without cause, that the cabinet of
London was disposed to avail itself of the nonexecution of that article
of the treaty of peace which stipulates for the payment of debts, to
justify a permanent detention of the posts on the southern side of the
lakes, and to establish a new boundary line, whereby those lakes
should be entirely comprehended in Upper Canada. Early in the spring
a detachment from the garrison of Detroit repossessed and fortified a
position nearly fifty miles south of that station, on the Miami, a river
which empties into Lake Erie at its westernmost point.
This movement, and other facts which strengthened the belief that the
hostile Indians were at least countenanced by the English, were the
subjects of a correspondence between the Secretary of State and Mr.
Hammond, in which crimination was answered by recrimination, in which
a considerable degree of mutual irritation was displayed, and in which
each supported his charges against the nation of the other, much better
than he defended his own. It did not, however, in any manner, affect the
operations of the army.
The delays inseparable from the transportation of necessary supplies
through an uninhabited country, infested by an active enemy peculiarly
skilled in partisan war, unavoidably protracted the opening of the
campaign until near midsummer. Meanwhile several sharp skirmishes took
place, in one of which a few white men were stated to be mingled with
the Indians.
On the 8th of August (1794) General Wayne reached the confluence of the
Au Glaize, where he threw up some works of defense and protection for
magazines. The richest and most extensive settlements of the western
Indians lay about this place.
The mouth of the Au Glaize is distant about thirty miles from the post
occupied by the British, in the vicinity of which the whole strength of
the enemy, amounting, according to intelligence on which General Wayne
relied, to rather less than 2,000 men, was collected. The Continental
legion was not much inferior in number to the Indians, and a
reinforcement of about 1,100 mounted militia from Kentucky, commanded
by General Scott, gave a decided superiority of strength to the army
of Wayne. That the Indians had determined to give him battle was well
understood, and the discipline of his legion, the ardor of all his
troops, and the superiority of his numbers, authorized him confidently
to expect a favorable issue. Yet, in pursuance of that policy by which
the United States had been uniformly actuated, he determined to make one
more effort for the attainment of peace without bloodshed. Messengers
were dispatched to the several hostile tribes who were assembled in his
front, inviting them to appoint deputies to meet him on his march, in
order to negotiate a lasting peace.
On the 15th of August (1794) the American army advanced down the Miami,
with its right covered by that river, and on the 18th arrived at the
rapids. Here they halted on the 19th, in order to erect a temporary work
for the protection of the baggage and to reconnoiter the situation of
the enemy.
The Indians were advantageously posted behind a thick wood, and behind
the British fort.
At 8 in the morning of the 20th the American army advanced in columns,
the legion with its right flank covered by the Miami. One brigade of
mounted volunteers, commanded by General Todd, was on the left; and
the other, under General Barbee, was in the rear. A select battalion,
commanded by Major Price, moved in front of the legion, sufficiently in
advance to give timely notice for the troops to form in case of action.
After marching about five miles Major Price received a heavy fire from a
concealed enemy, and was compelled to retreat.
The Indians had chosen their ground with judgment. They had advanced
into the thick wood in front of the British works, which extends several
miles west from the Miami, and had taken a position rendered almost
inaccessible to horse by a quantity of fallen timber which appeared to
have been blown up in a tornado. They were formed in three lines, within
supporting distance of each other; and, as is their custom, with a very
extended front. Their line stretched to the west, at right angles with
the river, about two miles, and their immediate effort was to turn the
left flank of the American army.
On the discharge of the first rifle, the legion was formed in two lines,
and the front was ordered to advance with trailed arms and rouse the
enemy from his covert at the point of the bayonet; then, and not until
then, to deliver a fire, and to press the fugitives too closely to allow
them time to load after discharging their pieces. Soon perceiving the
strength of the enemy in front, and that he was endeavoring to turn the
American left, the general ordered the second line to support the first.
The legion cavalry, led by Captain Campbell, was directed to penetrate
between the Indians and the river, where the wood was less thick and
entangled, in order to charge their left flank; and General Scott, at
the head of the mounted volunteers, was directed to make a considerable
circuit, and to turn their right flank.
These orders were executed with spirit and promptitude, but such was
the impetuosity of the charge made by the first line of infantry, so
entirely was the enemy broken by it, and so rapid was the pursuit that
only a small part of the second line and of the mounted volunteers could
get into action. In the course of one hour the Indians were driven more
than two miles through thick woods, when the pursuit terminated within
gunshot of the British fort.
General Wayne remained three days on the banks of the Miami, in front of
the field of battle, during which time the houses and cornfields above
and below the fort, some of them within pistol-shot of it, were reduced
to ashes. In the course of these operations a correspondence took place
between General Wayne and Major Campbell, the commandant of the
fort, which is stated by the former in such a manner as to show that
hostilities between them were avoided only by the prudent acquiescence
of the latter in this devastation of property within the range of his
guns.
On the 28th (August, 1794), the army returned to Au Glaize by easy
marches, destroying on its route all the villages and corn within fifty
miles of the river.
In this decisive battle the loss of the Americans in killed and wounded,
amounted to 107, including officers. Among the dead were Captain
Campbell, who commanded the cavalry, and Lieutenant Towles of the
infantry, both of whom fell in the first charge. General Wayne bestowed
great and well-merited praise on the courage and alacrity displayed by
every part of the army.
The hostility of the Indians still continuing, their whole country was
laid waste, and forts were erected in the heart of their settlements to
prevent their return.
This seasonable victory rescued the United States from a general
war with all the Indians northwest of the Ohio. The Six Nations had
discovered a restless, uneasy temper, and the interposition of the
President to prevent a settlement which Pennsylvania was about to make
at Presque Isle seemed rather to suspend the commencement of hostilities
than to establish permanent pacific dispositions among those tribes. The
battle of the 20th of August, however, had an immediate effect, and
the clouds which had been long gathering in that quarter were instantly
dissipated.
In the South, too, its influence was felt. In that quarter the
inhabitants of Georgia and the Indians seemed equally disposed to
war. Scarcely was the feeble authority of the government competent
to restrain the aggressions of the former, or the dread of its force
sufficient to repress those of the latter. In this doubtful state of
things, the effect of a victory could not be inconsiderable.
About this time the seditions and violent resistance to the execution
of the law imposing duties on spirits distilled within the United States
had advanced to a point in the counties of Pennsylvania lying west of
the Allegheny mountains, which required the decisive interposition of
government.
The laws being openly set at defiance, Washington determined to
test their efficiency. Bills of indictment were found against the
perpetrators of certain outrages, and process was issued against them
and placed in the hands of the United States marshal for execution.
The marshal repaired in person to the country which was the scene of
disorder for the purpose of serving the processes. On the 15th of July
(1794), while in the execution of his duty, he was beset on the road
by a body of armed men, who fired on him, but fortunately did him no
personal injury. At daybreak the ensuing morning a party attacked
the house of General Nevil, the inspector, but he defended himself
resolutely and obliged the assailants to retreat.
Knowing well that this attack had been preconcerted, and apprehending
that it would be repeated, he applied to the militia officers and
magistrates of the county for protection. The answer was that, "owing to
the too general combination of the people to oppose the revenue system,
the laws could not be executed so as to afford him protection; that
should the _posse comitatus_ be ordered out to support the civil
authority they would favor the party of the rioters."
On the succeeding day the insurgents reassembled to the number of about
500 to renew their attack on the house of the inspector. That officer,
finding that no protection could be afforded by the civil authority,
had applied to the commanding officer at Fort Pitt, and had obtained a
detachment of eleven men from that garrison, who were joined by Major
Kirkpatrick. Successful resistance to so great a force being obviously
impracticable, a parley took place, at which the assailants, after
requiring that the inspector and all his papers should be delivered up,
demanded that the party in the house should march out and ground
their arms. This being refused, the parley terminated and the assault
commenced. The action lasted until the assailants set fire to several
adjacent buildings, the heat from which was so intense that the house
could no longer be occupied. From this cause, and from the apprehension
that the fire would soon be communicated to the main building, Major
Kirkpatrick and his party surrendered themselves.
The marshal and Col. Pressly Nevil were seized on their way to General
Nevil's house and detained until 2 the next morning. The marshal
especially was treated with extreme severity. His life was frequently
threatened, and was probably saved by the interposition of some leading
individuals, who possessed more humanity or more prudence than those
with whom they were associated. He could obtain his liberty only by
entering into a solemn engagement, which was guaranteed by Colonel
Nevil, to serve no more processes on the western side of the Allegheny
mountains.
The marshal and inspector having both retired to Pittsburgh, the
insurgents deputed two of their body, one of whom was a justice of the
peace, to demand that the former should surrender all his authority,
and that the latter should resign his office, threatening, in case of
refusal, to attack the place and seize their persons. These demands were
not acceded to, but Pittsburghh affording no security, these officers
escaped from the danger which threatened them by descending the Ohio;
after which they found their way, by a circuitous route, to the seat of
government.
The rioters next proceeded to intercept the mail and take out letters
from certain parties in Pittsburghh, containing expressions of
disapproval of their proceedings. The writers of these letters they
caused to be banished. They next held meetings on Braddock's Field and
at Parkinson's Ferry, at which the determination to resist the laws by
force of arms was openly avowed.
Affidavits attesting this serious state of things were laid before
Washington. Affairs had now reached a point which seemed to forbid the
continuance of a temporizing system. The efforts at conciliation, which,
for more than three years, the government had persisted to make, and
the alterations repeatedly introduced into the act for the purpose of
rendering it less exceptionable, instead of diminishing the arrogance of
those who opposed their will to the sense of the nation, had drawn
forth sentiments indicative of designs much deeper than the evasion of
a single act. The execution of the laws had at length been resisted
by open force, and a determination to persevere in these measures was
unequivocally avowed. The alternative of subduing this resistance or of
submitting to it was presented to the government.
The act of Congress which provided for calling forth the militia
"to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel
invasions" required, as a prerequisite to the exercise of this power,
"that an associate justice, or the judge of the district, should certify
that the laws of the United States were opposed, or their execution
obstructed, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the
ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the
marshals." In the same act it was provided, "that if the militia of
the State where such combinations may happen shall refuse, or be
insufficient, to suppress the same, the President may employ the militia
of other States."
The evidence which had been transmitted to Washington was laid before
one of the associate justices, who gave the certificate, which enabled
the chief magistrate to employ the militia in aid of the civil power.
Washington now called a cabinet to consider the subject, and the
Governor of Pennsylvania was also consulted respecting it. Randolph,
the Secretary of State, and the Governor of Pennsylvania urged reasons
against coercion by force of arms; Hamilton, Knox, and Bradford were
in favor of employing military force. These members of the Cabinet were
also of opinion that policy and humanity equally dictated the employment
of a force which would render resistance desperate. The insurgent
country contained 16,000 men able to bear arms, and the computation
was that they could bring 7,000 into the field. If the army of the
government should amount to 12,000 men, it would present an imposing
force which the insurgents would not venture to meet.
It was impossible that Washington could hesitate to embrace the latter
of these opinions. That a government entrusted to him should be trampled
under foot by a lawless section of the Union, which set at defiance
the will of the nation, as expressed by its representatives, was an
abasement to which neither his judgment nor his feelings could submit.
He resolved, therefore, to issue the proclamation which, by law, was to
precede the employment of force.
On the same day a requisition was made on the Governors of New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia for their several quotas of militia
to compose an army of 12,000 men, who were to be immediately organized
and prepared to march at a minute's warning. The force was ultimately
increased to 15,000. While steps were taking to bring this force into
the field, a last essay was made to render its employment unnecessary.
Three distinguished and popular citizens of Pennsylvania were deputed by
the government to be the bearers of a general amnesty for past offenses,
on the sole condition of future obedience to the laws.
It having been deemed advisable that the executive of the State should
act in concert with that of the United States, Governor Mifflin also
issued a proclamation and appointed commissioners to act with those of
the general government.
These commissioners were met by a committee from the convention at
Parkinson's Ferry, and the conference resulted in a reference of
the offer of amnesty to the people. This reference only served to
demonstrate that, while a few persons were disposed to submit to the
laws, the masses in the disturbed districts were determined to obstruct
the re-establishment of civil authority.
On the 25th of September (1794), Washington issued a proclamation
describing in terms of great energy the obstinate and perverse spirit
with which the lenient propositions of the government had been received,
and declaring his fixed determination, in obedience to the high and
irresistible duty consigned to him by the constitution, "to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed," to reduce the refractory to
obedience.
The troops of New Jersey and Pennsylvania were directed to rendezvous
at Bedford, and those of Maryland and Virginia at Cumberland, on the
Potomac. The command of the expedition had been conferred on Governor
Lee, of Virginia, and the Governors of New Jersey and Pennsylvania
commanded the militia of their respective States under him.
Washington in person visited each division of the army, but, being
confident that the force employed must look down all resistance, he left
Hamilton, the Secretary of the Treasury, to accompany it, and returned
himself to Philadelphia, where the approaching session of Congress
required his presence. [1]
From Cumberland and Bedford the army marched in two divisions into the
country of the insurgents. The greatness of the force prevented the
effusion of blood. The disaffected did not venture to assemble in arms.
Several of the leaders, who had refused to give assurances of future
submission to the laws, were seized, and some of them detained for legal
prosecution.
But although no direct and open opposition was made, the spirit of
insurrection was not subdued. A sour and malignant temper displayed
itself, which indicated but too plainly that the disposition to resist
had only sunk under the pressure of the great military force brought
into the country, but would rise again should that force be withdrawn.
It was, therefore, thought advisable to station for the winter a
detachment, to be commanded by Major-General Morgan, in the center of
the disaffected country.
"Thus," says Marshall, "without shedding blood, did the prudent vigor of
the executive terminate an insurrection which, at one time, threatened
to shake the government of the United States to its foundation. That so
perverse a spirit should have been excited in the bosom of prosperity,
without the pressure of a single grievance, is among those political
phenomena which occur not infrequently in the course of human affairs,
and which the statesman can never safely disregard. When real ills are
felt there is something positive and perceptible to which the judgment
may be directed, the actual extent of which may be ascertained and
the cause of which may be discerned. But when the mind, inflamed by
suppositious dangers, gives full play to the imagination, and fastens
upon some object with which to disturb itself, the belief that the
danger exists seems to become a matter of faith, with which reason
combats in vain."
Washington's own view of the insurrection and its causes is contained
in a letter to John Jay, then on his mission to England. "As you
have been," he writes, "and will continue to be fully informed by the
Secretary of State of all transactions of a public nature which relate
to, or may have an influence on, the points of your mission, it would be
unnecessary for me to touch upon any of them in this letter were it not
for the presumption that the insurrection in the western counties
of this State has excited much speculation and a variety of opinions
abroad, and will be represented differently, according to the wishes of
some and the prejudices of others, who may exhibit, as an evidence of
what has been predicted, 'that we are unable to govern ourselves.' Under
this view of the subject, I am happy in giving it to you as the
general opinion that this event having happened at the time it did was
fortunate, although it will be attended with considerable expense.
"That the self-created societies which have spread themselves over this
country have been laboring incessantly to sow the seeds of distrust,
jealousy, and, of course, discontent, thereby hoping to effect some
revolution in the government, is not unknown to you. That they have been
the fomenters of the western disturbances admits of no doubt in the
mind of anyone who will examine their conduct, but, fortunately, they
precipitated a crisis for which they were not prepared, and thereby have
unfolded views which will, I trust, effectuate their annihilation sooner
than it might otherwise have happened, at the same time that it has
afforded an occasion for the people of this country to show their
abhorrence of the result and their attachment to the constitution and
the laws; for I believe that five times the number of militia that was
required would have come forward, if it had been necessary, to support
them.
"The spirit which blazed out on this occasion, as soon as the object was
fully understood, and the lenient measures of the government were made
known to the people, deserves to be communicated. There are instances
of general officers going at the head of a single troop and of light
companies; of field officers, when they came to the place of rendezvous
and found no command for them in that grade, turning into the ranks
and proceeding as private soldiers, under their own captains; and of
numbers, possessing the first fortunes in the country, standing in the
ranks as private men, and marching day by day with their knapsacks and
haversacks at their backs, sleeping on straw, with a single blanket, in
a soldier's tent, during the frosty nights which we have had, by way of
example to others. Nay, more; many young Quakers of the first families,
character, and property, not discouraged by the elders, have turned into
the ranks and are marching with the troops.
"These things have terrified the insurgents, who had no conception
that such a spirit prevailed, but, while the thunder only rumbled at
a distance, were boasting of their strength and wishing for and
threatening the militia by turns, intimating that the arms they should
take from them would soon become a magazine in their hands. Their
language is much changed, indeed, but their principles want correction.
"I shall be more prolix in my speech to Congress on the commencement and
progress of this insurrection than is usual in such an instrument, or
than I should have been on any other occasion, but as numbers at home
and abroad will hear of the insurrection, and will read the speech, that
may know nothing of the documents to which it might refer, I conceived
it would be better to encounter the charge of prolixity by giving a
cursory detail of facts, that would show the prominent features of
the thing, than to let it go naked into the world, to be dressed up
according to the fancy or inclination of the readers or the policy of
our enemies."
Sentiments similar to these were expressed in a letter to Washington's
old and intimate friend, Edmund Pendleton. "The successes of our army
to the westward," he writes, "have already been productive of good
consequences. They have dispelled a cloud which lowered very heavily in
the northern hemisphere (the Six Nations), and, though we have received
no direct advices from General Wayne since November, there is reason
to believe that the Indians with whom we are or were at war in that
quarter, together with their abettors, [2] begin to see things in a
different point of view."
One of the most important effects of the suppression of the western
rebellion was the fatal blow it gave to the democratic societies founded
by Genet.
Washington's opinion of these societies is thus expressed in a letter to
one of his friends: "The real people, occasionally assembled in order
to express their sentiments on political subjects, ought never to be
confounded with permanent self-appointed societies, usurping the right
to control the constituted authorities and to dictate to public opinion.
While the former is entitled to respect, the latter is incompatible with
all government and must either sink into general disesteem or finally
overturn the established order of things."
1. Footnote: General Knox, the Secretary of War, accompanied the army to
the expected scene of action. The command in chief was confided to Gen.
Henry Lee, Washington's old friend and companion in the Revolutionary
War. He was at this time Governor of Virginia.
2. Footnote: The British on the border.
CHAPTER IX.
WASHINGTON SIGNS JAY'S TREATY. 1794-1795.
Congress had adjourned to meet on the 4th of November (1794), but
a quorum of the Senate was not present until the 10th. Washington
addressed both Houses of Congress in a longer speech than usual, giving,
according to the intention he had expressed in his letter to Mr. Jay,
already quoted, a particular view of the insurrection in Pennsylvania,
and the measures which he had taken in order to suppress it.
As Commander-in-Chief of the militia when called into actual service, he
had, he said, visited the places of general rendezvous, to obtain more
correct information and to direct a plan for ulterior movements.
Had there been reason for supposing that the laws were secure from
obstruction, he should have caught with avidity at the opportunity
of restoring the militia to their families and homes. But succeeding
intelligence had tended to manifest the necessity of what had been done,
it being now confessed by those who were not inclined to exaggerate the
ill conduct of the insurgents, that their malevolence was not pointed
merely to a particular law, but that a spirit inimical to all order had
actuated many of the offenders.
After bestowing a high encomium on the alacrity and promptitude with
which persons in every station had come forward to assert the dignity
of the laws, thereby furnishing an additional proof that they understood
the true principles of government and liberty, and felt the value of
their inseparable union, he added:
"To every description indeed of citizens let praise be given. But
let them persevere in their affectionate vigilance over that precious
depository of American happiness--the constitution of the United States.
And when, in the calm moments of reflection, they shall have retraced
the origin and progress of the insurrection, let them determine whether
it has not been fomented by combinations of men, who--careless of
consequences and disregarding the unerring truth that those who rouse
cannot always appease a civil convulsion--have disseminated, from
an ignorance or perversion of facts, suspicions, jealousies, and
accusations of the whole government."
Washington could not omit this fair occasion once more to press
on Congress a subject which had always been near his heart. After
mentioning the defectiveness of the existing system, he said:
"The devising and establishing a well-regulated militia would be a
general source of legislative honor and a perfect title to public
gratitude. I therefore entertain a hope that the present session will
not pass without carrying to its full energy the power of organizing,
arming, and disciplining the militia, and thus providing, in the
language of the constitution, for calling them forth to execute the laws
of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions."
After mentioning the intelligence from the army under the command of
General Wayne and the state of Indian affairs, he again called the
attention of the House of Representatives to a subject scarcely less
interesting than a system of defense against external and internal
violence.
"The time," he said, "which has elapsed since the commencement of our
fiscal measures has developed our pecuniary resources so as to open the
way for a definitive plan for the redemption of the public debt. It is
believed that the result is such as to encourage Congress to consummate
this work without delay. Nothing can more promote the permanent welfare
of the Union, and nothing would be more grateful to our constituents.
Indeed, whatever is unfinished of our system of public credit cannot
be benefited by procrastination, and, as far as may be practicable, we
ought to place that credit on grounds which cannot be disturbed, and
to prevent that progressive accumulation of debt which must ultimately
endanger all governments."
In alluding to the intercourse of the United States with foreign
nations, he said: "It may not be unseasonable to announce that my policy
in our foreign transactions has been to cultivate peace with all the
world; to observe treaties with pure and inviolate faith; to check every
deviation from the line of impartiality; to explain what may have been
misapprehended, and correct what may have been injurious to any nation,
and having thus acquired the right, to lose no time in acquiring the
ability to insist upon justice being done to ourselves."
In the Senate an answer was reported which contained the following
clause: "Our anxiety, arising from the licentious and open resistance to
the laws in the western counties of Pennsylvania, has been increased by
the proceedings of certain self-created societies relative to the laws
and administration of the government, proceedings in our apprehension,
founded in political error, calculated, if not intended, to disorganize
our government, and which, by inspiring delusive hopes of support, have
been instrumental in misleading our fellow-citizens in the scene of
insurrection."
The address proceeded to express the most decided approbation of the
conduct of Washington in relation to the insurgents, and, after noticing
the different parts of the speech, concluded with saying:
"At a period so momentous in the affairs of nations the temperate, just,
and firm policy that you have pursued in respect to foreign powers, has
been eminently calculated to promote the great and essential interest of
our country, and has created the fairest title to the public gratitude
and thanks."
To this unequivocal approbation of the policy adopted by the executive
with regard to foreign nations, no objections were made. The clause
respecting democratic societies was seriously opposed, but the party
in favor of the administration had been strengthened in the Senate by
recent events, and the address reported by the committee was agreed to
without alteration.
In the House, Mr. Madison, Mr. Sedgwick, and Mr. Scott were the
committee to report an answer to the speech of the President. It was
silent, not only with respect to the self-created societies, but also as
to the success of General Wayne, and the foreign policy of Washington.
His interference with a favorite system of commercial restrictions was
not forgotten, and the mission of John Jay still rankled in the memory
of the republicans. No direct censure of the societies or approbation
of the foreign policy of the President could be carried, and after an
animated debate the opposition party triumphed in the House.
This triumph over the administration revived for a moment the drooping
energies of these turbulent societies, but it was only for a moment. The
agency ascribed to them by the opinion of the public as well as of the
President, in producing an insurrection which was generally execrated,
had essentially affected them, and while languishing under this wound
they received a deadly blow from a quarter whence hostility was least
expected. The remnant of the French convention, rendered desperate by
the ferocious despotism of the Jacobins, and of the sanguinary
tyrant who had become their chief, had at length sought for safety by
confronting danger, and, succeeding in a desperate attempt to bring
Robespierre to the guillotine, had terminated the reign of terror. The
colossal powers of the clubs fell with that of their favorite member,
and they sunk into long-merited disgrace. Not more certain is it that
the boldest streams must disappear, if the fountain that fed them
be emptied, than was the dissolution of the democratic societies in
America, when the Jacobin clubs were denounced in France. As if their
destinies depended on the same thread the political death of the former
was the unerring signal for that of the latter. [1]
Notwithstanding the disagreement between the executive and one branch
of the Legislature concerning self-created societies, and the policy
observed toward foreign nations, the speech of the President was treated
with marked respect, and the several subjects which it recommended
engaged the immediate attention of Congress. A bill was passed
authorizing the President to station a detachment of militia in the four
western counties of Pennsylvania; provision was made to compensate those
whose property had been destroyed by the insurgents, should those who
had committed the injury be unable to repair it, and an appropriation
exceeding $1,100,000 was made to defray the expenses occasioned by the
insurrection.
Many of the difficulties which had occurred in drawing out the militia
were removed, and a bill was introduced to give greater energy to the
militia system generally, but this subject possessed so many intrinsic
difficulties that the session passed away without effecting anything
respecting it.
A bill for the gradual redemption of the national debt was more
successful. The President had repeatedly and earnestly recommended
to the Legislature the adoption of measures which might effect this
favorite object, but, although that party, which had been reproached
with a desire to accumulate debt as a means of subverting the
republican system, had uniformly manifested a disposition to carry this
recommendation into effect, their desire had hitherto been opposed by
obstacles they were unable to surmount. The party in opposition to the
government, while professing always a desire to reduce the debt took
good care to oppose in detail every proposition having this object in
view. While the subject was under discussion Colonel Hamilton, Secretary
of the Treasury, addressed a letter to the House of Representatives,
through their speaker, informing them that he had digested and prepared
a plan on the basis of the actual revenues, for the further support of
public credit, which he was ready to communicate. This comprehensive and
valuable report was the last official act of Hamilton.
The penurious provision made for those who filled the high executive
departments in the American government, excluded from a long continuance
in office all those whose fortunes were moderate and whose professional
talents placed a decent independence within their reach. While slandered
as the accumulator of thousands by illicit means, Hamilton had wasted in
the public service great part of the property acquired by his previous
labors, and had found himself compelled to decide on retiring from
his political station. The accusations brought against him in the last
session of the second Congress had postponed the execution of
this design until opportunity should be afforded for a more full
investigation of his official conduct, but he informed Washington that,
on the close of the session to meet in December, 1793, he should resign
his situation in the administration. The events which accumulated about
that time, and which were, he said, in a letter to Washington, of a
nature to render the continuance of peace in a considerable degree
precarious, deferred his meditated retreat. "I do not perceive," he
added, "that I could voluntarily quit my post at such a juncture,
consistently with considerations either of duty or character, and,
therefore, I find myself reluctantly obliged to defer the offer of my
resignation."
"But if any circumstances should have taken place in consequence of the
intimation of an intention to resign, or should otherwise exist, which
serve to render my continuance in office in any degree inconvenient or
ineligible, I beg to leave to assure you, sir, that I should yield to
them with all the readiness naturally inspired by an impatient desire to
relinquish a situation in which even a momentary stay is opposed by the
strongest personal and family reasons, and could only be produced by a
sense of duty or reputation."
Assurances being given by Washington of the pleasure with which the
intelligence that he would continue at his post through the crisis was
received; he remained in office until the commencement of the ensuing
year. Immediately on his return from the western country, the dangers
of domestic insurrection or foreign war having subsided, he gave
notice that he should on the last day of January (1795) give in his
resignation.
In the esteem and good opinion of Washington, to whom he was best known,
Hamilton at all times maintained a high place. While deciding on the
mission to England and searching for a person to whom the interesting
negotiation with that government should be confided, the mind of the
chief magistrate was directed, among others, to him. He carried with him
out of office the same cordial esteem for his character and respect for
his talents which had induced his appointment.
The vacant office of Secretary of the Treasury was filled by Oliver
Wolcott, of Connecticut, a gentleman of sound judgment, who was well
versed in its duties. He had served as Comptroller for a considerable
time, and in that situation had been eminently useful to the head of the
department.
The bill for the gradual reduction of the public debt, on the basis of
Hamilton's plan, was resisted in detail through nearly the whole session
of Congress, but by the persevering exertions of the Federal party
was finally carried, and the system inaugurated by Hamilton became a
permanent portion of the financial policy of the country.
On the 3d of March (1795) this important session was ended. Although the
party hostile to the administration had obtained a small majority in one
branch of the Legislature several circumstances had concurred to give
great weight to the recommendations of Washington. Among these may be
reckoned the victory obtained by General Wayne and the suppression of
the western insurrection. In some points, however, which he had pressed
with earnestness, his sentiments did not prevail. One of these was a
bill introduced into the Senate for preserving peace with the Indians,
by protecting them from the intrusions and incursions of the whites.
General Knox, Secretary of War, like Hamilton, was driven from the
service of his country by the scantiness of the compensation allowed
him. He resigned at the close of the year 1794. Colonel Pickering, a
gentleman who had filled many important offices through the war of the
Revolution, who had discharged several trusts of considerable
confidence under the present government, and who at the time was
Postmaster-General, was appointed to succeed him.
After the rising of Congress, Washington made a short visit to Mount
Vernon. He returned to Philadelphia about the 1st of May. Meantime, on
the 7th of March (1795) the treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation
between the United States and Great Britain, which had been signed by
the ministers of the two nations on the 19th of the preceding November,
was received.
From his arrival in London, on the 15th of June, 1794, Mr. Jay had been
assiduously and unremittingly employed on the arduous duties of his
mission. By a deportment respectful, yet firm, mingling a decent
deference for the government to which he was deputed with a proper
regard, for the dignity of his own, this minister avoided those little
asperities which frequently embarrass measures of great concern, and
smoothed the way to the adoption of those which were suggested by the
real interests of both nations. Many and intricate were the points to be
discussed. On some of them an agreement was found to be impracticable,
but at length a treaty was concluded, which Mr. Jay declared to be the
best that was attainable, and which he believed it for the interests
of the United States to accept. Indeed it was scarcely possible to
contemplate the evidences of extreme exasperation which were given in
America, and the nature of the differences which subsisted between the
two countries, without feeling a conviction that war was inevitable,
should this attempt to adjust those differences prove unsuccessful.
The constitution had provided that all treaties should be ratified by
the Senate, and Washington summoned that body to meet on Monday, the
8th of June, in order to take it into consideration. In the meantime
Washington devoted himself to the task of examining its provisions with
the utmost care. It was not, in all respects, what he had wished and
expected. Many points were omitted which he had desired to be introduced
and settled, others were arranged so as to leave room for future
misunderstandings between the two nations. But he felt satisfied that
Mr. Jay had obtained the best terms in his power, and that this
treaty was the best that could have been made under all circumstances.
Important privileges were secured, no great national advantages had been
sacrificed, nothing detrimental to the national honor had been admitted,
and peace was maintained. That the rejection of the treaty would be
followed by a calamitous war did not admit of a doubt. In the existing
state of Europe a war with Great Britain would have involved the United
States in the long-continued agitations of Europe and deprive them of
all the advantages of neutrality and undisturbed commerce. Fully aware
of all these considerations, Washington determined that if the Senate
should ratify the treaty he would give it the sanction of his signature.
On Monday, the 8th of June (1795), the Senate, in conformity with
the summons of the President, convened in the Senate chamber, and the
treaty, with the documents connected with it, were submitted to their
consideration.
On the 24th of June, after a minute and laborious investigation, the
Senate, by precisely a constitutional majority, advised and consented to
its conditional ratification.
An insuperable objection existed to an article regulating the
intercourse with the British West Indies, founded on a fact which
is understood to have been unknown to Mr. Jay. The intention of the
contracting parties was to admit the direct intercourse between the
United States and those islands, but not to permit the productions of
the latter to be carried to Europe in the vessels of the former. To give
effect to the intention, the exportation from the United States of those
articles which were the principal productions of the islands was to be
relinquished. Among these was cotton. This article, which a few
years before was scarcely raised in sufficient quantity for domestic
consumption, was becoming one of the richest staples of the southern
States. The Senate, being informed of this act, advised and consented
that the treaty should be ratified on condition that an article be added
thereto, suspending that part of the twelfth article which related to
the intercourse with the West Indies.
This resolution of the Senate presented difficulties which required
consideration. Whether they could advise and consent to an article which
had not been laid before them, and whether their resolution was to be
considered as the final exercise of their power, were questions not
entirely free from difficulty. Nor was it absolutely clear that the
executive could ratify the treaty, under the advice of the Senate, until
the suspending article should be introduced into it. A few days were
employed in the removal of these doubts, at the expiration of which,
intelligence was received from Europe which suspended the resolution the
President had formed.
The English newspapers reported that the British government had renewed
the order in council for seizing provisions in neutral vessels bound to
French ports. Washington directed the Secretary of State to prepare
a strong memorial to the British government against this order, and
postponed the signing of the treaty until it should be ready. In the
meantime his private affairs required that he should visit Mount Vernon,
for which place he set off about the middle of July (1795).
Meanwhile, one of the Virginia senators, S. T. Mason, in violation of
the obligation of secrecy and the evident demands of propriety, sent
a copy of the treaty to the "Aurora," a violent partisan paper in
Philadelphia. On the 2nd of July it was published and spread before the
community without the authority of the executive, and without any of the
official documents and correspondence necessary to a fair appreciation
and understanding of its various provisions.
If, in the existing state of parties and the embittered feelings which
widely prevailed, the mission of Jay was censured, and the result of his
labors condemned in advance, before it was known at all what the treaty
contained, the reader can imagine what an effect must have been produced
by the publication of the treaty in this clandestine manner. Great
Britain was hated and reviled, and France was almost adored by a large
and powerful party in the United States, and there were numbers ready,
in their blind political fury and excitement, to sacrifice everything
rather than be on any terms of concord with the mother country, and
rather than moderate in any degree their passionate devotion to France.
In the populous cities meetings of the people were immediately summoned,
in order to take into consideration and to express their opinions
respecting the treaty. It may well be supposed that persons feeling some
distrust of their capacity to form a correct judgment on a subject
so complex, would be unwilling to make so hasty a decision, and
consequently be disinclined to attend such meetings. Many intelligent
men stood aloof, while the most intemperate assumed, as usual, the name
of the people--pronounced a definitive and unqualified condemnation of
every article in the treaty, and, with the utmost confidence, assigned
reasons for their opinions which, in many instances, had only an
imaginary existence, and in some were obviously founded on the strong
prejudices which were entertained with respect to foreign powers. It is
difficult to review the various resolutions and addresses to which the
occasion gave birth without feeling some degree of astonishment, mingled
with humiliation, at perceiving such proofs of the fallibility of human
reason.
The first meeting was held in Boston. The example of that city was soon
followed by New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Charleston, and,
as if their addresses were designed at least as much for their
fellow-citizens as for their President, while one copy was transmitted
to him another was committed to the press. The precedent set by these
large cities was followed with wonderful rapidity throughout the Union,
and the spirit in which this system of opposition originated sustained
no diminution of violence in its progress. The party which supported
the administration, however, were not idle; they held meetings and sent
addresses to Washington, approving his principles of neutrality and
peace. On the 18th of July (1795), at Baltimore, on his way to Mount
Vernon, the President received the resolutions passed by the meeting
at Boston, which were enclosed to him in a letter from the selectmen of
that town. The answer to this letter and to these resolutions, given in
a subsequent page, evinced the firmness with which he had resolved to
meet the effort that was obviously making to control the exercise of
his constitutional functions, by giving a promptness and vigor to the
expression of the sentiments of a party which might impose it upon the
world as the deliberate judgment of the public.
Addresses to Washington, and resolutions of town and country meetings
were not the only means which were employed to enlist the American
people against the measure which had been advised by the Senate. In an
immense number of essays, the treaty was critically examined and every
argument which might operate on the judgment or prejudice of the public
was urged in the warm and glowing language of passion. To meet these
efforts by counter efforts was deemed indispensably necessary by the
friends of that instrument, and the gazettes of the day are replete with
appeals to the passions and to the reason of those who are the ultimate
arbiters of every political question. That the treaty affected the
interests of France not less than those of the United States, was, in
this memorable controversy, asserted by the one party with as much zeal
as it was denied by the other. These agitations furnished matter to
Washington for deep reflection and for serious regret, but they appear
not to have shaken the decision he had formed or to have affected
his conduct otherwise than to induce a still greater degree of
circumspection in the mode of transacting the delicate business before
him. On their first appearance, therefore, he resolved to hasten his
return to Philadelphia, for the purpose of considering at that place,
rather than at Mount Vernon, the memorial against the provision order
and the conditional ratification of the treaty.
The following confidential letters are extremely interesting, as
evincing the precise state of Washington's mind at this momentous and
exciting period:
"_To Edmund Randolph, Secretary of State_.
"Private.
"MOUNT VERNON, July 29, 1795.
"My Dear Sir.--Your private letters of the 24th and 25th instant have
been received, and you will learn by the official letter of this date my
determination of returning to Philadelphia after Monday, if nothing in
the interim casts up to render it unnecessary.
"I am excited to this resolution by the violent and extraordinary
proceedings which have and are about taking place in the northern parts
of the Union, and may be expected in the southern; because I think that
the Memorial, the Ratification, and the Instructions, which are framing,
are of such vast magnitude as not only to require great individual
consideration, but a solemn conjunct revision. The latter could not
take place if you were to come here, nor would there be that source of
information which is to be found at, and is continually flowing to, the
seat of government; and, besides, in the course of deliberation on these
great objects, the examination of official papers may more than probably
be found essential, which could be resorted to at no other place than
Philadelphia.
"To leave home so soon will be inconvenient. A month hence it would have
been otherwise; and it was, as I hinted to you before I left the city,
in contemplation by me for the purpose of Mrs. Washington's remaining
here till November, when I intended to come back for her. But whilst I
am in office I shall never suffer private convenience to interfere with
what I conceive to be my official duty.
"I view the opposition which the treaty is receiving from the meetings
in different parts of the Union in a very serious light, not because
there is more weight in any of the objections which are made to it
than was foreseen at first, for there is none in some of them and gross
misrepresentations in others, nor as it respects myself personally, for
this shall have no influence on my conduct--plainly perceiving, and I am
accordingly preparing my mind for it, the obloquy which disappointment
and malice are collecting to heap upon me. But I am alarmed at the
effect it may have on and the advantage the French government may be
disposed to take of the spirit which is at work to cherish a belief
in them, that the treaty is calculated to favor Great Britain at their
expense. Whether they believe or disbelieve these tales, the effect it
will have upon the nation will be nearly the same; for, whilst they
are at war with that power, or so long as the animosity between the two
nations exists, it will, no matter at whose expense, be their policy,
and it is to be feared will be their conduct, to prevent us from being
on good terms with Great Britain, or her from deriving any advantages
from our trade, which they can hinder, however much we may be benefited
thereby ourselves. To what length this policy and interest may carry
them is problematical, but, when they see the people of this country
divided, and such a violent opposition given to the measures of
their own government, pretendedly in their favor, it may be extremely
embarrassing, to say no more of it."
"To sum the whole up in a few words, I have never, since I have been in
the administration of the government, seen a crisis which in my judgment
has been so pregnant with interesting events, nor one from which more
is to be apprehended, whether viewed on one side or the other. From New
York there is, and I am told will further be, a counter current, but how
formidable it may appear, I know not. If the same does not take place at
Boston and other towns, it will afford but too strong evidence that the
opposition is in a manner universal, and would make the ratification
a very serious business indeed. But, as it respects the French, even
counter resolutions would, for the reasons I have already mentioned, do
little more than weaken, in a small degree, the effect the other side
would have."
"I have written, and do now enclose the letter, the draught of which was
approved by the heads of departments, to the selectmen of the town of
Boston; but if new lights have been had upon the subject, since it was
agreed to, or if upon reconsideration any alteration should be deemed
necessary, I request you to detain it until I see you. Let me also
request that the same attention may be given to the draught of a letter
to Portsmouth and the Chamber of Commerce at New York as was recommended
on that occasion. I am, etc."
"_To Edmund Randolph, Secretary of State._"
"Private."
"Mount Vernon, _July 31, 1795._
"My Dear Sir.--On Wednesday evening I sent the packet, now under cover
with this, to the post-office in Alexandria, to be forwarded next
morning at the usual hour, 4 o'clock, by the Baltimore mail. But,
behold! when my letter-bag was brought back from the office and emptied,
I not only got those which were addressed to me, among which yours
of the 27th was one, but those also which I had sent up the evening
before."
"I have to regret this blunder of the postmaster on account of the
enclosures, some of which I wished to have got to your hands without
delay, that they might have undergone the consideration and acting upon
which were suggested in the letter accompanying them. On another account
I am not sorry for the return of the packet, as I resolved thereupon and
on reading some letters which I received at the same time, to wait your
acknowledgment of the receipt of my letter of the 24th instant before I
would set out, as I should thereby be placed on a certainty whether your
journey hither or mine to Philadelphia would, under all circumstances,
be deemed most eligible, or whether the business could not be equally
well done without either; repeating now what I did in my letter of the
24th, that I do not require more than a day's notice to repair to the
seat of government, and that if you and the confidential officers with
you are not clear in the measures which are best to be pursued in the
several matters mentioned in my last, my own opinion is, and for the
reasons there given, that difficult and intricate or delicate questions
had better be settled there, where the streams of information are
continually flowing in, and that I would set out accordingly. To be wise
and temperate, as well as firm, the present crisis most eminently calls
for. There is too much reason to believe, from the pains which have
been taken before, at, and since the advice of the Senate respecting
the treaty, that the prejudices against it are more extensive than is
generally imagined. This I have lately understood to be the case in this
quarter, from men who are of no party, but well disposed to the present
administration. How should it be otherwise, when no stone has been left
unturned that could impress on the minds of the people the most arrant
misrepresentation of facts: that their rights have not only been
neglected, but absolutely sold; that there are no reciprocal advantages
in the treaty; that the benefits are all on the side of Great Britain;
and, what seems to have had more weight with them than all the rest, and
to have been most pressed, that the treaty is made with the design to
oppress the French, in open violation of our treaty with that nation,
and contrary, too, to every principle of gratitude and sound policy? In
time, when passion shall have yielded to sober reason, the current may
possibly turn; but, in the meanwhile, this government, in relation
to France and England, may be compared to a ship between the rocks of
Scylla and Charybdis. If the treaty is ratified, the partisans of the
French, or rather of war and confusion, will excite them to hostile
measures, or at least to unfriendly sentiments; if it is not, there is
no foreseeing all the consequences which may follow as it respects Great
Britain."
"It is not to be inferred from hence that I am disposed to quit the
ground I have taken, unless circumstances more imperious than have yet
come to my knowledge should compel it, for there is but one straight
course, and that is to seek truth and pursue it steadily. But these
things are mentioned to show that a close investigation of the subject
is more than ever necessary, and that they are strong evidences of the
necessity of the most circumspect conduct in carrying the determination
of government into effect, with prudence as it respects our own people,
and with every exertion to produce a change for the better from Great
Britain."
"The memorial seems well designed to answer the end proposed, and by
the time it is revised and new dressed you will probably (either in
the resolutions, which are or will be handed to me, or in the newspaper
publications, which you promised to be attentive to) have seen all the
objections against the treaty which have any real force in them, and
which may be fit subjects for representation in the memorial, or in
the instructions, or both. But how much longer the presentation of the
memorial can be delayed without exciting unpleasant sensations here,
or involving serious evils elsewhere, you, who are at the scene of
information and action can decide better than I. In a matter, however,
so interesting and pregnant with consequences as this treaty, there
ought to be no precipitation, but, on the contrary, every step should be
explored before it is taken and every word weighed before it is uttered
or delivered in writing."
"The form of the ratification requires more diplomatic experience and
legal knowledge than I possess or have the means of acquiring at this
place, and, therefore, I shall say nothing about it. I am, etc."
The answer to the selectmen of Boston, already referred to, is too
characteristic to be omitted. It is as follows:
"_To the Selectmen of the Town of Boston._"
"United States, _July 28, 1795._
"Gentlemen.--In every act of my administration I have sought the
happiness of my fellow-citizens. My system for the attainment of this
object has uniformly been to overlook all personal, local, and partial
considerations; to contemplate the United States as one great whole; to
consider that sudden impressions, when erroneous, would yield to candid
reflection, and to consult only the substantial and permanent interests
of our country. Nor have I departed from this line of conduct on the
occasion which has produced the resolutions contained in your letter of
the 13th instant."
"Without a predilection for my own judgment, I have weighed with
attention every argument which has at any time been brought into view.
But the constitution is the guide which I can never abandon. It has
assigned to the President the power of making treaties, with the advice
and consent of the Senate. It was doubtless supposed that these two
branches of government would combine, without passion and with the best
means of information, those facts and principles upon which the success
of our foreign relations will always depend; that they ought not to
substitute for their own conviction the opinions of others, or to seek
truth through any channel but that of a temperate and well-informed
investigation." "Under this persuasion, I have resolved on the manner of
executing the duty before me. To the high responsibility attached to
it, I freely submit; and you, gentlemen, are at liberty to make these
sentiments known, as the ground of my procedure. While I feel the most
lively gratitude for the many instances of approbation from my country,
I can no otherwise deserve it than by obeying the dictates of my
conscience."
"With due respect, I am, gentlemen, your obedient
"George Washington."
In nearly the same terms Washington replied to other committees and
public bodies who thought proper to remonstrate against his exercising
the constitutional right of signing the treaty.
In the afternoon of the 11th of August (1795), Washington arrived
in Philadelphia, and, on the next day, the question respecting the
immediate ratification of the treaty was brought before the Cabinet.
Randolph, Secretary of State, maintained, singly, the opinion that,
during the existence of the provision order, and during the war between
Britain and France, this step ought not to be taken. This opinion,
however, did not prevail. The resolution was adopted to ratify the
treaty immediately and to accompany the ratification with a strong
memorial against the provision order, which should convey, in explicit
terms, the sense of the American government on that subject. By this
course the views of the executive were happily accomplished. The order
was revoked and the ratifications of the treaty were exchanged.
Washington was most probably determined to adopt this course by the
extreme intemperance with which the treaty was opposed and the rapid
progress which this violence was apparently making. It was obvious that,
unless this temper could be checked, it would soon become so extensive
and would arrive at such a point of fury as to threaten dangerous
consequences. It was obviously necessary either to attempt a diminution
of its action, by rendering its exertions hopeless and by giving to
the treaty the weight of his character and influence, or to determine
ultimately to yield to it. A species of necessity, therefore, seems to
have been created for abandoning the idea, if it was ever taken up, of
making the ratification of the treaty dependent on the revocation of the
provision order. The soundness of the policy which urged this decisive
measure was proved by the event. The confidence which was felt in the
judgment and virtue of Washington induced many who, swept away by the
popular current, had yielded to the common prejudices, to re-examine
and discard opinions which had been too hastily embraced; and many
were called forth by a desire to support the administration in measures
actually adopted, to take a more active part in the general contest
than they would otherwise have pursued. The consequence was that more
moderate opinions respecting the treaty began to prevail.
In a letter from Mount Vernon of the 20th of September (1795), addressed
to General Knox, who had communicated to him the change of opinion which
was appearing in the eastern States, Washington expressed in warm terms
the pleasure derived from that circumstance, and added: