precisely proportioned to the degrees of excitement. A graduated scale,
on which should be marked the capabilities of propositions to approach
to the test of the senses, would be a just measure of the belief which
ought to be attached to them: and but for the influence of prejudice or
ignorance this invariably _is_ the measure of belief. That is believed
which is apprehended to be true, nor can the mind by any exertion avoid
attaching credit to an opinion attended with overwhelming evidence.
Belief is not an act of volition, nor can it be regulated by the mind:
it is manifestly incapable therefore of either merit or criminality.
The system which assumes a false criterion of moral virtue, must be as
pernicious as it is absurd. Above all, it cannot be divine, as it is
impossible that the Creator of the human mind should be ignorant of its
primary powers.
The degree of evidence afforded by miracles and prophecies in favour of
the Christian Religion is lastly to be considered.
Evidence of a more imposing and irresistible nature is required
in proportion to the remoteness of any event from the sphere of
our experience. Every case of miracles is a contest of opposite
improbabilities, whether it is more contrary to experience that a
miracle should be true, or that the story on which it is supported
should be false: whether the immutable laws of this harmonious world
should have undergone violation, or that some obscure Greeks and Jews
should have conspired to fabricate a tale of wonder.
The actual appearance of a departed spirit would be a circumstance
truly unusual and portentous; but the accumulated testimony of twelve
old women that a spirit had appeared is neither unprecedented nor
miraculous.
It seems less credible that the God whose immensity is uncircumscribed
by space, should have committed adultery with a carpenter’s wife,
than that some bold knaves or insane dupes had deceived the credulous
multitude.[29] We have perpetual and mournful experience of the latter:
the former is yet under dispute. History affords us innumerable
examples of the possibility of the one: Philosophy has in all ages
protested against the probability of the other.
Every superstition can produce its dupes, its miracles, and its
mysteries; each is prepared to justify its peculiar tenets by an equal
assemblage of portents, prophecies and martyrdoms.
Prophecies, however circumstantial, are liable to the same objection as
direct miracles: it is more agreeable to experience that the historical
evidence of the prediction really having preceded the event pretended
to be foretold should be false, or that a lucky conjuncture of events
should have justified the conjecture of the prophet, than that God
should communicate to a man the discernment of future events.[30] I
defy you to produce more than one instance of prophecy in the Bible,
wherein the inspired writer speaks so as to be understood, wherein his
prediction has not been so unintelligible and obscure as to have been
itself the subject of controversy among Christians.
That one prediction which I except is certainly most explicit and
circumstantial. It is the only one of this nature which the Bible
contains. Jesus himself here predicts his own arrival in the clouds to
consummate a period of supernatural desolation, before the generation
which he addressed should pass away.[31] Eighteen hundred years have
past, and no such event is pretended to have happened. This single
plain prophecy, thus conspicuously false, may serve as a criterion of
those which are more vague and indirect, and which apply in an hundred
senses to an hundred things.
Either the pretended predictions in the Bible were meant to be
understood, or they were not. If they were, why is there any dispute
concerning them: if they were not, wherefore were they written at all?
But the God of Christianity spoke to mankind in parables, that seeing
they might not see, and hearing they might not understand.
The Gospels contain internal evidence that they were not written by
eye-witnesses of the event which they pretend to record. The Gospel of
St. Matthew was plainly not written until some time after the taking
of Jerusalem, that is, at least forty years after the execution of
Jesus Christ: for he makes Jesus say that _upon you may come all the
righteous blood shed upon the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel
unto the blood of Zacharias son of Barachias whom ye slew between
the altar and the temple_.[32] Now Zacharias, son of Barachias, was
assassinated between the altar and the temple by a faction of zealots,
during the siege of Jerusalem.[33]
You assert that the design of the instances of supernatural
interposition which the Gospel records was to convince mankind that
Jesus Christ was truly the expected Redeemer. But it is as impossible
that any human sophistry should frustrate the manifestation of
Omnipotence, as that Omniscience should fail to select the most
efficient means of accomplishing its design. Eighteen centuries have
passed and the tenth part of the human race have a blind and mechanical
belief in that Redeemer, without a complete reliance on the merits
of whom, their lot is fixed in everlasting misery: surely if the
Christian system be thus dreadfully important its Omnipotent author
would have rendered it incapable of those abuses from which it has
never been exempt, and to which it is subject in common with all human
institutions, he would not have left it a matter of ceaseless cavil or
complete indifference to the immense majority of mankind. Surely some
more conspicuous evidences of its authenticity would have been afforded
than driving out devils, drowning pigs, curing blind men, animating a
dead body, and turning water into wine. Some theatre worthier of the
transcendent event, than Judea, would have been chosen, some historians
more adapted by their accomplishments and their genius to record the
incarnation of the immutable God. The humane society restores drowned
persons; every empiric can cure every disease; drowning pigs is no
very difficult matter, and driving out devils was far from being an
original or an unusual occupation in Judea. Do not recite these stale
absurdities as proofs of the Divine origin of Christianity.
If the Almighty has spoken, would not the Universe have been convinced?
If he had judged the knowledge of his will to have been more important
than any other science to mankind, would he not have rendered it more
evident and more clear?
Now, O Eusebes, have I enumerated the general grounds of my disbelief
of the Christian Religion.--I could have collated its Sacred Writings
with the Brahminical record of the early ages of the world, and
identified its institutions with the antient worship of the Sun. I
might have entered into an elaborate comparison of the innumerable
discordances which exist between the inspired historians of the same
event. Enough however has been said to vindicate me from the charge of
groundless and infatuated scepticism. I trust therefore to your candour
for the consideration, and to your logic for the refutation, of my
arguments.
Eusebes.
I will not dissemble, O Theosophus, the difficulty of solving your
general objections to Christianity, on the grounds of human reason.
I did not assist at the councils of the Almighty when he determined
to extend his mercy to mankind, nor can I venture to affirm that it
exceeded the limits of his power to have afforded a more conspicuous or
universal manifestation of his will.
But this is a difficulty which attends Christianity in common with the
belief in the being and attributes of God. This whole scheme of things
might have been, according to our partial conceptions, infinitely more
admirable and perfect. Poisons, earthquakes, disease, war, famine and
venomous serpents; slavery and persecution are the consequences of
certain causes, which according to human judgment might well have been
dispensed with in arranging the economy of the globe.
Is this the reasoning which the Theist will choose to employ? Will he
impose limitations on that Deity whom he professes to regard with so
profound a veneration? Will he place his God between the horns of a
logical dilemma which shall restrict the fulness either of his power or
his bounty?
Certainly he will prefer to resign his objections to Christianity,
than pursue the reasoning upon which they are found, to the dreadful
conclusions of cold and dreary Atheism.
I confess that Christianity appears not unattended with difficulty to
the understanding which approaches it with a determination to judge its
mysteries by reason. I will ever[34] confess that the discourse, which
you have just delivered, ought to unsettle any candid mind engaged
in a similar attempt. The children of this world are wiser in their
generation than the children of light.
But if I succeed in convincing you that reason conducts to conclusions
destructive of morality, happiness, and the hope of futurity, and
inconsistent with the very existence of human society, I trust that you
will no longer confide in a director so dangerous and faithless.
I require you to declare, O Theosophus, whether you would embrace
Christianity or Atheism, if no other systems of belief shall be found
to stand the touchstone of enquiry.
Theosophus.
I do not hesitate to prefer the Christian system, or indeed any
system of religion, however rude and gross, to Atheism. Here we truly
sympathize; nor do I blame, however I may feel inclined to pity, the
man who in his zeal to escape this gloomy faith, should plunge into the
most abject superstition.
The Atheist is a monster among men. Inducements, which are omnipotent
over the conduct of others, are impotent for him. His private judgment
is his criterion of right and wrong. He dreads no judge but his own
conscience, he fears no hell but the loss of his self-esteem. He is
not to be restrained by punishments, for death is divested of its
terror, and whatever enters into his heart to conceive, that will he
not scruple to execute. _Iste non timet omnia providentem et
cogitantem, et animadvertentem, et omnia ad se pertinere putantem,
curiosum et plenum negotii Deum._
This dark and terrible doctrine was surely the abortion of some
blind speculator’s brain; some strange and hideous perversion of
intellect, some portentous distortion of reason. There can surely be
no metaphysician sufficiently bigoted to his own system to look upon
this harmonious world, and dispute the necessity of intelligence; to
contemplate the design and deny the designer; to enjoy the spectacle of
this beautiful Universe and not feel himself instinctively persuaded to
gratitude and adoration. What arguments of the slightest plausibility
can be adduced to support a doctrine rejected alike by the instinct of
the savage and the reason of the sage?
I readily engage, with you, to reject reason as a faithless guide, if
you can demonstrate that it conducts to Atheism. So little, however,
do I mistrust the dictates of reason, concerning a supreme Being, that
I promise, in the event of your success, to subscribe the wildest and
most monstrous creed which you can devise. I will call credulity,
faith; reason, impiety; the dictates of the understanding shall be the
temptations of the Devil, and the wildest dreams of the imagination,
the infallible inspirations of Grace.
Eusebes.
Let me request you then to state, concisely, the grounds of your belief
in the being of a God. In my reply I shall endeavour to controvert your
reasoning, and shall hold myself acquitted by my zeal for the Christian
religion, of the blasphemies which I must utter in the progress of my
discourse.
Theosophus.
I will readily state the grounds of my belief in the being of a God.
You can only have remained ignorant of the obvious proofs of this
important truth, from a superstitious reliance upon the evidence
afforded by a revealed religion. The reasoning lies within an extremely
narrow compass; _quicquid enim nos vel meliores vel beatiores
facturum est, aut in aperto, nut in proximo posuit natura_.
From every design we justly infer a designer. If we examine the
structure of a watch, we shall readily confess the existence of a
watch-maker. No work of man could possibly have existed from all
eternity. From the contemplation of any product of human art, we
conclude that there was an artificer who arranged its several parts. In
like manner, from the marks of design and contrivance exhibited in the
Universe, we are necessitated to infer a designer, a contriver. If the
parts of the Universe have been designed, contrived, and adapted, the
existence of a God is manifest.
But design is sufficiently apparent. The wonderful adaptation of
substances which act to those which are acted upon; of the eye to
light, and of light to the eye; of the ear to sound, and of sound to
the ear; of every object of sensation to the sense which it impresses
prove that neither blind chance, nor undistinguishing necessity has
brought them into being. The adaptation of certain animals to certain
climates, the relation borne to each other by animals and vegetables,
and by different tribes of animals; the relation, lastly, between
man and the circumstances of his external situation are so many
demonstrations of Deity.
All is order, design, and harmony, so far as we can descry the tendency
of things, and every new enlargement of our views, every new display of
the material world, affords a new illustration of the power, the wisdom
and the benevolence of God.
The existence of God has never been the topic of popular dispute. There
is a tendency to devotion, a thirst for reliance on supernatural aid
inherent in the human mind. Scarcely any people, however barbarous,
have been discovered, who do not acknowledge with reverence and awe the
supernatural causes of the natural effects which they experience. They
worship, it is true, the vilest and most inanimate substances, but they
firmly confide in the holiness and power of these symbols, and thus own
their connexion with what they can neither see nor perceive.
If there is motion in the Universe, there is a God.[35] The power of
beginning motion is no less an attribute of mind than sensation or
thought. Wherever motion exists it is evident that mind has operated.
The phenomena of the Universe indicate the agency of powers which
cannot belong to inert matter.
Every thing which begins to exist must have a cause: every combination,
conspiring to an end, implies intelligence.
Eusebes.
Design must be proved before a designer can be inferred. The matter
in controversy is the existence of design in the Universe, and it is
not permitted to assume the contested premises and thence infer the
matter in dispute. Insidiously to employ the words contrivance, design,
and adaptation before these circumstances are made apparent in the
Universe, thence justly inferring a contriver, is a popular sophism
against which it behoves us to be watchful.
To assert that motion is an attribute of mind, that matter is inert,
that every combination is the result of intelligence is also an
assumption of the matter in dispute.
Why do we admit design in any machine of human contrivance? Simply
because innumerable instances of machines having been contrived by
human art are present to our mind, because we are acquainted with
persons who could construct such machines; but if, having no previous
knowledge of any artificial contrivance, we had accidentally found a
watch upon the ground, we should have been justified in concluding
that it was a thing of Nature, that it was a combination of matter
with whose cause we were unacquainted, and that any attempt to account
for the origin of its existence would be equally presumptuous and
unsatisfactory.
The analogy which you attempt to establish between the contrivances of
human art, and the various existences of the Universe, is inadmissible.
We attribute these effects to human intelligence, because we know
beforehand that human intelligence is capable of producing them.
Take away this knowledge, and the grounds of our reasoning will be
destroyed. Our entire ignorance, therefore, of the Divine Nature leaves
this analogy defective in its most essential point of comparison.
What consideration remains to be urged in support of the creation
of the Universe by a supreme Being? Its admirable fitness for the
production of certain effects, that wonderful consent of all its
parts, that universal harmony by whose changeless laws innumerable
systems of worlds perform their stated revolutions, and the blood is
driven through the veins of the minutest animalcule that sports in
the corruption of an insect’s lymph: on this account did the Universe
require an intelligent Creator, because it exists producing invariable
effects, and inasmuch as it is admirably organised for the production
of these effects, so the more did it require a creative intelligence.
Thus have we arrived at the substance of your assertion, “That whatever
exists, producing certain effects, stands in need of a Creator, and the
more conspicuous is its fitness for the production of these effects,
the more certain will be our conclusion that it would not have existed
from eternity, but must have derived its origin from an intelligent
creator.”
In what respect then do these arguments apply to the Universe, and not
apply to God? From the fitness of the Universe to its end you infer
the necessity of an intelligent Creator. But if the fitness of the
Universe, to produce certain effects, be thus conspicuous and evident,
how much more exquisite fitness to his end must exist in the Author
of this Universe? If we find great difficulty from its admirable
arrangement in conceiving that the Universe has existed from all
eternity, and to resolve this difficulty suppose a Creator, how much
more clearly must we perceive the necessity of this very Creator’s
creation whose perfections comprehend an arrangement far more accurate
and just.
The belief of an infinity of creative and created Gods, each more
eminently requiring an intelligent author of his being than the
foregoing, is a direct consequence of the premises which you have
stated. The assumption that the Universe is a design, leads to a
conclusion that there are [an] infinity of creative and created Gods,
which is absurd. It is impossible indeed to prescribe limits to
learned error, when Philosophy relinquishes experience and feeling for
speculation.
Until it is clearly proved that the Universe was created, we may
reasonably suppose that it has endured from all eternity. In a case
where two propositions are diametrically opposite, the mind believes
that which is less incomprehensible: it is easier to suppose that the
Universe has existed from all eternity, than to conceive an eternal
being capable of creating it. If the mind sinks beneath the weight of
one, is it an alleviation to increase the intolerability of the burthen?
A man knows, not only that he now is, but that there was a time when he
did not exist; consequently there must have been a cause. But we can
only infer, from effects, causes exactly adequate to those effects.
There certainly is a generative power which is effected by particular
instruments; we cannot prove that it is inherent in these instruments,
nor is the contrary hypothesis capable of demonstration. We admit
that the generative power is incomprehensible, but to suppose that
the same effects are produced by an eternal Omnipotent and Omniscient
Being, leaves the cause in the same obscurity, but renders it more
incomprehensible.
We can only infer from effects causes exactly adequate to those
effects. An infinite number of effects demand an infinite number
of causes, nor is the philosopher justified in supposing a greater
connexion or unity in the latter, than is perceptible in the former.
The same energy cannot be at once the cause of the serpent and the
sheep; of the blight by which the harvest is destroyed, and the
sunshine by which it is matured; of the ferocious propensities by which
man becomes a victim to himself, and of the accurate judgment by which
his institutions are improved. The spirit of our accurate and exact
philosophy is outraged by conclusions which contradict each other so
glaringly.
The greatest, equally with the smallest motions of the Universe, are
subjected to the rigid necessity of inevitable laws. These laws are
the unknown causes of the known effects perceivable in the Universe.
Their effects are the boundaries of our knowledge, their names the
expressions of our ignorance. To suppose some existence beyond, or
above them, is to invent a second and superfluous hypothesis to
account for what has already been accounted for by the laws of motion
and the properties of matter. I admit that the nature of these laws
is incomprehensible, but the hypothesis of a Deity adds a gratuitous
difficulty, which so far from alleviating those which it is adduced
to explain, requires new hypotheses for the elucidation of its own
inherent contradictions.
The laws of attraction and repulsion, desire and aversion, suffice
to account for every phenomenon of the moral and physical world. A
precise knowledge of the properties of any object, is alone requisite
to determine its manner of action. Let the mathematician be acquainted
with the weight and volume of a cannon ball, together with the degree
of velocity and inclination with which it is impelled, and he will
accurately delineate the course it must describe, and determine the
force with which it will strike an object at a given distance. Let the
influencing motive, present to the mind of any person be given, and
the knowledge of his consequent conduct will result. Let the bulk and
velocity of a comet be discovered, and the astronomer, by the accurate
estimation of the equal and contrary actions of the centripetal and
centrifugal forces, will justly predict the period of its return.
The anomalous motions of the heavenly bodies, their unequal velocities
and frequent aberrations, are corrected by that gravitation by which
they are caused. The illustrious Laplace has shewn that the approach
of the Moon to the Earth, and the Earth to the Sun, is only a secular
equation of a very long period, which has its maximum and minimum. The
system of the Universe then is upheld solely by physical powers. The
necessity of matter is the ruler of the world. It is vain philosophy
which supposes more causes than are exactly adequate to explain the
phenomena of things. _Hypotheses non fingo: quicquid enim ex
phænomenis non deducitur, hypothesis vocanda est; et hypotheses vel
metaphysicæ, vel physicæ, vel qualitatum occultarum, seu mechanicæ, in
philosophiâ locum non habent._
You assert that the construction of the animal machine, the fitness
of certain animals to certain situations, the connexion between the
organs of perception and that which is perceived; the relation between
everything which exists, and that which tends to preserve it in its
existence, imply design. It is manifest that if the eye could not see,
nor the stomach digest, the human frame could not preserve its present
mode of existence. It is equally certain, however, that the elements
of its composition, if they did not exist in one form, must exist in
another; and that the combinations which they would form, must so long
as they endured, derive support for their peculiar mode of being from
their fitness to the circumstances of their situation.
It by no means follows, that because a being exists, performing certain
functions, he was fitted by another being to the performance of these
functions. So rash a conclusion would conduct, as I have before shewn,
to an absurdity; and it becomes infinitely more unwarrantable from
the consideration that the known laws of matter and motion, suffice
to unravel, even in the present imperfect state of moral and physical
science, the majority of those difficulties which the hypothesis of a
Deity was invented to explain.
Doubtless no disposition of inert matter, or matter deprived of
qualities, could ever have composed an animal, a tree, or even a stone.
But matter deprived of qualities, is an abstraction, concerning which
it is impossible to form an idea. Matter, such as we behold it, is not
inert. It is infinitely active and subtile. Light, electricity, and
magnetism are fluids not surpassed by thought itself in tenuity and
activity: like thought they are sometimes the cause and sometimes the
effect of motion; and, distinct as they are from every other class of
substances with which we are acquainted, seem to possess equal claims
with thought to the unmeaning distinction of immateriality.
The laws of motion and the properties of matter suffice to account
for every phenomenon, or combination of phenomena exhibited in the
Universe. That certain animals exist in certain climates, results
from the consentaneity of their frames to the circumstances of
their situation: let these circumstances be altered to a sufficient
degree, and the elements of their composition must exist in some new
combination no less resulting than the former from those inevitable
laws by which the Universe is governed.
It is the necessary consequence of the organization of man, that his
stomach should digest his food: it inevitably results also from his
gluttonous and unnatural appetite for the flesh of animals that his
frame be diseased and his vigour impaired; but in neither of these
cases is adaptation of means to end to be perceived. Unnatural diet,
and the habits consequent upon its use are the means, and every
complication of frightful disease is the end, but to assert that these
means were adapted to this end by the Creator of the world, or that
human caprice can avail to traverse the precautions of Omnipotence,
is absurd. These are the consequences of the properties of organized
matter; and it is a strange perversion of the understanding to argue
that a certain sheep was created to be butchered and devoured by a
certain individual of the human species, when the conformation of the
latter, as is manifest to the most superficial student of comparative
anatomy, classes him with those animals who feed on fruits and
vegetables.[36]
The means by which the existence of an animal is sustained, requires a
designer in no greater degree than the existence itself of the animal.
If it exists, there must be means to support its existence. In a world
where _omne mutatur nihil interit_, no organized being can exist
without a continual separation of that substance which is incessantly
exhausted, nor can this separation take place otherwise than by the
invariable laws which result from the relations of matter. We are
incapacitated only by our ignorance from referring every phenomenon,
however unusual, minute or complex, to the laws of motion and the
properties of matter; and it is an egregious offence against the first
principles of reason to suppose an immaterial creator of the world,
_in quo omnia moventur sed sine mutuâ passione_: which is equally a
superfluous hypothesis in the mechanical philosophy of Newton, and a
useless excrescence on the inductive logic of Bacon.
What then is this harmony, this order which you maintain to have
required for its establishment, what it needs not for its maintenance,
the agency of a supernatural intelligence? Inasmuch as the order
visible in the Universe requires one cause, so does the disorder
whose operation is not less clearly apparent, demand another. Order
and disorder are no more than modifications of our own perceptions of
the relations which subsist between ourselves and external objects,
and if we are justified in inferring the operation of a benevolent
power from the advantages attendant on the former, the evils of the
latter bear equal testimony to the activity of a malignant principle,
no less pertinacious in inducing evil out of good, than the other is
unremitting in procuring good from evil.
If we permit our imagination to traverse the obscure regions of
possibility, we may doubtless imagine, according to the complexion of
our minds, that disorder may have a relative tendency to unmingled
good, or order be relatively replete with exquisite and subtile evil.
To neither of these conclusions, which are equally presumptuous
and unfounded, will it become the philosopher to assent. Order and
disorder are expressions denoting our perceptions of what is injurious
or beneficial to ourselves, or to the beings in whose welfare we are
compelled to sympathize by the similarity of their conformation to our
own.[37]
A beautiful antelope panting under the fangs of a tiger, a defenceless
ox, groaning beneath the butcher’s axe, is a spectacle which instantly
awakens compassion in a virtuous and unvitiated breast. Many there
are, however, sufficiently hardened to the rebukes of justice and the
precepts of humanity, as to regard the deliberate butchery of thousands
of their species, as a theme of exultation and a source of honour, and
to consider any failure in these remorseless enterprises as a defect in
the system of things. The criteria of order and disorder are as various
as those beings from whose opinions and feelings they result.
Populous cities are destroyed by earthquakes, and desolated by
pestilence. Ambition is everywhere devoting its millions to
incalculable calamity. Superstition, in a thousand shapes, is employed
in brutalizing and degrading the human species, and fitting it to
endure without a murmur the oppression of its innumerable tyrants. All
this is abstractedly neither good nor evil, because good and evil are
words employed to designate that peculiar state of our own perceptions,
resulting from the encounter of any object calculated to produce
pleasure or pain. Exclude the idea of relation, and the words good and
evil are deprived of import.
Earthquakes are injurious to the cities which they destroy, beneficial
to those whose commerce was injured by their prosperity, and
indifferent to others which are too remote to be affected by their
influence. Famine is good to the corn-merchant, evil to the poor,
and indifferent to those whose fortunes can at all times command a
superfluity. Ambition is evil to the restless bosom it inhabits, to
the innumerable victims who are dragged by its ruthless thirst for
infamy, to expire in every variety of anguish, to the inhabitants of
the country it depopulates, and to the human race whose improvement it
retards; it is indifferent with regard to the system of the Universe,
and is good only to the vultures and the jackalls that track the
conqueror’s career, and to the worms who feast in security on the
desolation of his progress. It is manifest that we cannot reason
with respect to the universal system from that which only exists in
relation to our own perceptions.
You allege some considerations in favour of a Deity from the
universality of a belief in his existence.
The superstitions of the savage, and the religion of civilized Europe
appear to you to conspire to prove a first cause. I maintain that it
is from the evidence of revelation alone that this belief derives the
slightest countenance.
That credulity should be gross in proportion to the ignorance of the
mind which it enslaves, is in strict consistency with the principles
of human nature. The idiot, the child, and the savage, agree in
attributing their own passions and propensities[38] to the inanimate
substances by which they are either benefited or injured. The former
become Gods and the latter Demons; hence prayers and sacrifices, by the
means of which the rude Theologian imagines that he may confirm the
benevolence of the one, or mitigate the malignity of the other. He has
averted the wrath of a powerful enemy by supplications and submission;
he has secured the assistance of his neighbour by offerings; he has
felt his own anger subside before the entreaties of a vanquished foe,
and has cherished gratitude for the kindness of another. Therefore does
he believe that the elements will listen to his vows. He is capable of
love and hatred towards his fellow beings, and is variously impelled
by those principles to benefit or injure them. The source of his error
is sufficiently obvious. When the winds, the waves and the atmosphere,
act in such a manner as to thwart or forward his designs, he attributes
to them the same propensities of whose existence within himself he is
conscious when he is instigated by benefits to kindness, or by injuries
to revenge. The bigot of the woods can form no conception of beings
possessed of properties differing from his own: it requires, indeed, a
mind considerably tinctured with science, and enlarged by cultivation
to contemplate itself, not as the centre and model of the Universe, but
as one of the infinitely various multitude of beings of which it is
actually composed.
There is no attribute of God which is not either borrowed from the
passions and powers of the human mind, or which is not a negation.
Omniscience, Omnipotence, Omnipresence, Infinity, Immutability,
Incomprehensibility, and Immateriality, are all words which designate
properties and powers peculiar to organised beings, with the addition
of negations, by which the idea of limitation is excluded.[39]
That the frequency of a belief in God (for it is not universal) should
be any argument in its favour, none to whom the innumerable mistakes of
men are familiar, will assert. It is among men of genius and science
that Atheism alone is found, but among these alone is cherished an
hostility to those errors, with which the illiterate and vulgar are
infected.
How small is the proportion of those who really believe in God, to the
thousands who are prevented by their occupations from ever bestowing
a serious thought upon the subject, and the millions who worship
butterflies, bones, feathers, monkeys, calabashes and serpents. The
word God, like other abstractions, signifies the agreement of certain
propositions, rather than the presence of any idea. If we found our
belief in the existence of God on the universal consent of mankind, we
are duped by the most palpable of sophisms. The word God cannot mean
at the same time an ape, a snake, a bone, a calabash, a Trinity, and a
Unity. Nor can that belief be accounted universal against which men of
powerful intellect and spotless virtue have in every age protested.
_Non pudet igitur physicum, id est speculatorem venatoremque
naturæ, ex animis consuetudine imbutis petere testimonium veritatis?_
Hume has shewn, to the satisfaction of all philosophers, that the only
idea which we can form of causation is derivable[40] from the constant
conjunction of objects, and the consequent inference of one from the
other. We denominate that phenomenon the cause of another which we
observe with the fewest exceptions to precede its occurrence. Hence it
would be inadmissible to deduce the being of a God from the existence
of the Universe; even if this mode of reasoning did not conduct to the
monstrous conclusion of an infinity of creative and created Gods, each
more eminently requiring a Creator than its predecessor.
If Power[41] be an attribute of existing substance, substance could not
have derived its origin from power. One thing cannot be at the same
time the cause and the effect of another.--The word power expresses the
capability of any thing to be or act. The human mind never hesitates to
annex the idea of power to any object of its experience. To deny that
power is the attribute of being, is to deny that being can be. If power
be an attribute of substance, the hypothesis of a God is a superfluous
and unwarrantable assumption.
Intelligence is that attribute of the Deity, which you hold to be most
apparent in the Universe. Intelligence is only known to us as a mode of
animal being. We cannot conceive intelligence distinct from sensation
and perception, which are attributes to organized bodies. To assert
that God is intelligent, is to assert that he has ideas; and Locke has
proved that ideas result from sensation. Sensation can exist only in
an organized body, an organised body is necessarily limited both in
extent and operation. The God of the rational Theosophis is a vast and
wise animal.
You have laid it down as a maxim that the power of beginning motion is
an attribute of mind as much as thought and sensation.
Mind cannot create, it can only perceive. Mind is the recipient of
impressions made on the organs of sense, and without the action of
external objects we should not only be deprived of all knowledge of
the existence of mind, but totally incapable of the knowledge of any
thing. It is evident, therefore, that mind deserves to be considered as
the effect, rather than the cause of motion. The ideas which suggest
themselves too are prompted by the circumstances of our situation,
these are the elements of thought, and from the various combinations of
these our feelings, opinions, and volitions inevitably result.
That which is infinite necessarily includes that which is finite. The
distinction therefore between the Universe, and that by which the
Universe is upheld, is manifestly erroneous. To devise the word God,
that you may express a certain portion of the universal system, can
answer no good purpose in philosophy: In the language of reason, the
words God and Universe are synonymous. _Omnia enim per Dei
potentiam facta sunt, imo, quia naturæ potentia nulla est nisi ipsa Dei
potentia, artem est nos catemus Dei potentiam non intelligere quatenus
causas naturales ignoramus; adeoque stultè ad eandam Dei
potentiam recurritur, quando rei alicujus, causam naturalem, sive est,
ipsam Dei potentiam ignoramus._[42]
Thus from the principles of that reason to which you so rashly appealed
as the ultimate arbiter of our dispute, have I shewn that the popular
arguments in favour of the being of a God are totally destitute of
colour. I have shewn the absurdity of attributing intelligence to the
cause of those effects which we perceive in the Universe, and the
fallacy which lurks in the argument from design. I have shewn that
order is no more than a peculiar manner of contemplating the operation
of necessary agents, that mind is the effect, not the cause of motion,
that power is the attribute, not the origin of Being. I have proved
that we can have no evidence of the existence of a God from the
principles of reason.
You will have observed, from the zeal with which I have urged arguments
so revolting to my genuine sentiments, and conducted to a conclusion
in direct contradiction to that faith which every good man must
eternally preserve, how little I am inclined to sympathise with those
of my religion who have pretended to prove the existence of God by
the unassisted light of reason. I confess that the necessity of a
revelation has been compromised by treacherous friends to Christianity,
who have maintained that the sublime mysteries of the being of a God
and the immortality of the soul are discoverable from other sources
than itself.
I have proved that on the principles of that philosophy to which
Epicurus, Lord Bacon, Newton, Locke and Hume were addicted, the
existence of God is a chimera.
The Christian Religion then, alone, affords indisputable assurance that
the world was created by the power, and is preserved by the Providence
of an Almighty God, who, in justice has appointed a future life for the
punishment of the vicious and the remuneration of the virtuous.
Now, O Theosophus, I call upon you to decide between Atheism and
Christianity; to declare whether you will pursue your principles to the
destruction of the bonds of civilized society, or wear the easy yoke of
that religion which proclaims “peace upon earth, good-will to all men.”
Theosophus.
I am not prepared at present, I confess, to reply clearly to your
unexpected arguments. I assure you that no considerations, however
specious, should seduce me to deny the existence of my Creator.
I am willing to promise that if, after mature deliberation, the
arguments which you have advanced in favour of Atheism should appear
incontrovertible, I will endeavour to adopt so much of the Christian
scheme as is consistent with my persuasion of the goodness, unity, and
majesty of God.
FOOTNOTES:
[13] _Judæi, impulsore Chresto, turbantes, facile
comprimuntur._--_Suet. in Tib._
_Affecti suppliciis Christiani, genus hominum superstitionis novæ et
maleficæ._--_Id. in Nerone._
[14] _Multi omnis ætatis utriusque sexus etiam; neque enim civitates
tantum, sed vicos etiam et agros superstitionis istius contagio
pervagata est._--_Plin. Epist._
[15] Tacit. Annal L. xv., Sect. xlv.
[16] See the _Internal Evidence of Christianity_; see also Paley’s
Evidences, Vol. II., p 27.
[17] Paley’s Evidences, Vol. I., p. 3.
[18] Plin. Nat. His. Cap. de Deo., Euripides, Bellerophon, Frag. xxv.
_Hunc igitur terrorem animi, tenebrasque necesse est_
_Non radii solis, neque lucida tela diei_
_Discutient, sed naturæ species ratioque:_
_Principium hinc cujus nobis exordia sumet_,
Nullam rem nihilo gigni divinitus unquam.
Luc. de Rer. Nat. Lib. 1 [_v._ 147-151].
[19] See Cicero de Natura Deorum.
[20] Hobbes.
[21] See Preface to Le Bon Sens.
[22] See Hosea, chap. i., chap. ix. Ezekiel, chap. iv., chap. xvi.,
chap. xxiii. Heyne, speaking of the opinions entertained of the Jews by
ancient poets and philosophers, says:--_Meminit quidem superstitionis
Judaicæ Horatius, verum ut eam risu exploderet._--_Heyn. ad Virg. Poll.
in Arg._
[23] I. Sam. chap. v., 8.
[24] Wordsworth’s Lyrical Ballads.
[25] Then Moses stood in the gate of the camp, and said, Who is on the
Lord’s side? let him come unto me. And all the sons of Levi gathered
themselves together unto him. And he said unto them, _Thus saith the
Lord God of Israel_, Put every man his sword by his side, and go in
and out from gate to gate throughout the camp, _and slay every man his
brother, and every man his companion, and every man his neighbour_. And
the children of Levi did according to the word of Moses: and there fell
of the people on that day twenty-three thousand men.--_Exodus_ xxxii.,
26.
And they warred against the Midianites, as the Lord commanded Moses;
and they slew all the males. And the children of Israel took all the
women of Midian captives, and their little ones, and took the spoil
of all their cattle, and all their flocks, and all their goods. And
they burned all their huts wherein they dwelt, and all their goodly
castles, with fire. And Moses, and Eleazar the priest, and all the
princes of the congregation, went forth to meet them without the camp.
And Moses was [wroth] with the officers of the host, with the captains
over thousands, and captains over hundreds, which came from the battle.
And Moses said unto them, _Have ye saved all the women alive?_ behold,
these caused the children of Israel, through the counsel of Balaam, to
commit trespass against the Lord in the matter of Peor, and there was
a plague among the congregation of the Lord. _Now therefore kill every
male among the little ones, and kill every woman that hath known man by
lying with him. But all the women-children, that have not known a man
by lying with him_, KEEP ALIVE FOR YOURSELVES.--_Numbers_ xxxi., 7-18.
And we utterly destroyed them, as we did unto Sihon, king of Heshbon,
utterly destroying the men, women, and children of every city.--_Deut._
iii., 6.
And they utterly destroyed all that was in the city, both man and
woman, young and old, and ox and sheep and ass, with the edge of the
sword.--_Joshua._
So Joshua fought against Debir, and utterly destroyed all the souls
that were therein: he left none remaining, but utterly destroyed all
that breathed, as the Lord God of Israel commanded.--_Joshua_, chap. x.
And David gathered all the people together, and went to Rabbah, and
took it. And he brought forth the people therein, and _put them under
saws, and under harrows of iron, and made them pass through the brick
kiln; this did he also unto all the children of Ammon._--_II. Sam._
xii., 29.
[26] Now concerning the things whereof ye wrote to me; it is good for a
man not to touch a woman.
I say, therefore, to the unmarried and widows, it is good for them if
they abide even as I. But if they cannot contain, let them marry; it is
better to marry than burn.--_I. Cor._ chap. vii.
[27] _See_ Gibbon’s “Decline and Fall,” vol. ii., p. 210.
[28] Ibid. Vol. ii., p. 269.
[29] See Paley’s Evidences. Vol. i. chap. 1.
[30] See the Controversy of Bishop Watson and Thomas Paine.--Paine’s
Criticism on the xixth chapter of Isaiah.
[31] Immediately after the tribulation of these days shall the sun be
darkened, and the moon shall not give her light, and the stars shall
fall from heaven, and the powers of the heavens shall be shaken: and
then shall appear the sign of the Son of man in heaven, and then shall
all the tribes of the earth mourn, and they shall see the Son of man
coming in the clouds of heaven with power and great glory. And he shall
send his angel with a great sound of a trumpet, and they shall gather
together his elect from the four winds, from one end of heaven to the
other. _Verily I say unto you, this generation shall not pass, until
all these things be fulfilled._--_Matt._ chap, xxiv.
[32] See Matthew, chap. xxiii. v. 35.
[33] Josephus.
[34] Qy.? _even_.
[35] See Dugald Stewart’s Outlines of Moral Philosophy, and Paley’s
Natural Theology.
[36] See Cuvier Leçons d’Anat. Comp. tom. iii. p. 169, 373, 448, 465,
480. Rees’ Cyclopædia, Art. Man.
Ουκ αιδεισθε τους ἡμερους καρπους αιματι και φονῳ μιγνυοντες; αλλὰ
δράκοντας ἀγρίους καλεῖτε καὶ παρδάλεις καἰ λέοντας, αὐτοὶ δὲ
μιαιφονεῖτε εἰς ὠμότητα καταλιπόντες ἐκείνοις οὐδέν. Ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ ὁ
φόνος τροφὴ, ὑμῖν δε ὄψον ἐστίν.
Ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνθρώπῳ κατὰ φύσιν τὸ σαρκοφαγεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν
σωμάτων δηλοῦται τῆς κατασκευῆς. Οὐδενὶ γὰρ ἔοικε τὸ ἀνθρώπου σῶμα τῶν
ἐπὶ σαρκοφαγίᾳ γεγονότων, οὐ γρυπότης χείλους, οὐκ ὀξύτης ὄνυχοϛ, οὐ
τραχύτης ὀδόντων πρόσεστιν, οὐ κοιλίας εὐτονία καὶ πνεύματος θερμότης,
τρέψαι καὶ κατεργάσασθαι δυνατὴ τὸ βαρὺ καὶ κρεῶδες. Ἀλλ’ αὐτόθεν ἡ
φύσις τῇ λειότητι τῶν ὀδόντων, καὶ τῇ σμικρότητι τοῦ στόματος, καὶ τῇ
μαλακότητι τῆς γλώσσης, καὶ τῇ πρὸς πέψιν ἀμβλύτητι τοῦ πνευματος,
ἐξόμνυται τὴν σαρκοφαγίαν. Εἰ δὲ λέγεις, πεφυκέναι σεαυτὸν ἐπὶ τοιαύτην
ἐδωδὴν, ὅ βούλει φαγεῖν, πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἀπόκτεινον· αλλ’ αὐτὸς, διὰ
σεαυτοῦ, μὴ χρησάμενος κοπίδι, μηδὲ τυμπάνῳ τινὶ μηδὲ πελέκει· ἀλλὰ,
ὡς λύκοι καὶ ἄρκτοι, καὶ λεόντες αὐτοὶ ὡς ἐσθίουσι φονευούσιν, ἄνελε
δήγματι βοῦν, ἢ σώματι σῦν, ἢ ἄρνα ἤ λαγωὸν διάῤῥηξον, καὶ φάγε
προσπεσῶν ἔτι ζῶντος ὡς ἐκεῖνα.
Πλουτ. περὶ Σαρκοφαγ. Λογ. β.
[The same passage is quoted in the Notes to Queen Mab (Vol. iii. p.
359-360).]
[37] See Godwin’s Political Justice, Vol. i. p. 449.
[38] See Southey’s History of Brazil, p. 255.
[39] See Le Systeme de la Nature: this book is one of the most eloquent
vindications of Atheism.
[40] Printed _deniable_.
[41] For a very profound disquisition on this subject, see Sir William
Drummond’s Academical Questions, chap. i. p. 1.
[42] Spinosa. Tract. Theologico.-Pol., chap. i. p. 14. [Quoted also in
the Notes to Queen Mab (Vol. iii. p. 328).]
HISTORY
OF
A SIX WEEKS’ TOUR
THROUGH
A PART OF FRANCE,
SWITZERLAND, GERMANY, AND HOLLAND:
WITH LETTERS
DESCRIPTIVE OF
A SAIL ROUND THE LAKE OF GENEVA, AND OF
THE GLACIERS OF CHAMOUNI.
LONDON:
* * * * *
PUBLISHED BY T. HOOKHAM, JUN.
OLD BOND STREET;
AND C. AND J. OLLIER,
WELBECK STREET.
* * * * *
1817.
[_The two following Letters were addressed by_ Shelley _to_ Thomas
Love Peacock. _The remainder of the little volume was written by_ Mrs.
Shelley.]
[Decoration]
To T. P. Esq.
MELLERIE--CLARENS--CHILLON--VEVAI--LAUSANNE.
Montalegre, near Coligni. Geneva, July 12th, 1816.
It is nearly a fortnight since I have returned from Vevai. This journey
has been on every account delightful, but most especially, because
then I first knew the divine beauty of Rousseau’s imagination, as it
exhibits itself in _Julie_. It is inconceivable what an enchantment
the scene itself lends to those delineations, from which its own most
touching charm arises. But I will give you an abstract of our voyage,
which lasted eight days, and if you have a map of Switzerland, you can
follow me.
We left Montalegre at half-past two on the 23rd of June. The lake
was calm, and after three hours of rowing we arrived at Hermance,
a beautiful little village, containing a ruined tower, built, the
villagers say, by Julius Cæsar. There were three other towers similar
to it, which the Genevese destroyed for their own fortifications
in 1560. We got into the tower by a kind of window. The walls are
immensely solid, and the stone of which it is built so hard, that it
yet retained the mark of chisels. The boatmen said, that this tower
was once three times higher than it is now. There are two staircases
in the thickness of the walls, one of which is entirely demolished,
and the other half ruined, and only accessible by a ladder. The town
itself, now an inconsiderable village inhabited by a few fishermen,
was built by a Queen of Burgundy, and reduced to its present state by
the inhabitants of Berne, who burnt and ravaged everything they could
find.
Leaving Hermance, we arrived at sunset at the village of Nerni. After
looking at our lodgings, which were gloomy and dirty, we walked out by
the side of the lake. It was beautiful to see the vast expanse of these
purple and misty waters broken by the craggy islets near to its slant
and “beached margin.” There were many fish sporting in the lake, and
multitudes were collected close to the rocks to catch the flies which
inhabited them.
On returning to the village, we sat on a wall beside the lake, looking
at some children who were playing at a game like nine-pins. The
children here appeared in an extraordinary way deformed and diseased.
Most of them were crooked, and with enlarged throats; but one little
boy had such exquisite grace in his mien and motions, as I never
before saw equalled in a child. His countenance was beautiful for the
expression with which it overflowed. There was a mixture of pride and
gentleness in his eyes and lips, the indications of sensibility, which
his education will probably pervert to misery or seduce to crime; but
there was more of gentleness than of pride, and it seemed that the
pride was tamed from its original wildness by the habitual exercise of
milder feelings. My companion gave him a piece of money, which he took
without speaking, with a sweet smile of easy thankfulness, and then,
with an unembarrassed air, turned to his play. All this might scarcely
be; but the imagination surely could not forbear to breathe into the
most inanimate forms some likeness of its own visions, on such a serene
and glowing evening, in this remote and romantic village, beside the
calm lake that bore us hither.
On returning to our inn, we found that the servant had arranged our
rooms, and deprived them of the greater portion ot their former
disconsolate appearance. They reminded my companion of Greece: it was
five years, he said, since he had slept in such beds. The influence
of the recollections excited by this circumstance on our conversation
gradually faded, and I retired to rest with no unpleasant sensations,
thinking of our journey to-morrow, and of the pleasure of recounting
the little adventures of it when we return.
The next morning we passed Yvoire, a scattered village with an ancient
castle, whose houses are interspersed with trees, and which stands at a
little distance from Nerni, on the promontory which bounds a deep bay,
some miles in extent. So soon as we arrived at this promontory, the
lake began to assume an aspect of wilder magnificence. The mountains of
Savoy, whose summits were bright with snow, descended in broken slopes
to the lake: on high, the rocks were dark with pine-forests, which
become deeper and more immense, until the ice and snow mingle with the
points of naked rock that pierce the blue air; but below, groves of
walnut, chesnut, and oak, with openings of lawny fields, attested the
milder climate.
As soon as we had passed the opposite promontory, we saw the river
Drance, which descends from between a chasm in the mountains, and makes
a plain near the lake, intersected by its divided streams. Thousands
of _besolets_, beautiful water-birds, like sea-gulls, but smaller,
with purple on their backs, take their station on the shallows, where
its waters mingle with the lake. As we approached Evian, the mountains
descended more precipitously to the lake, and masses of intermingled
wood and rock overhung its shining spire.
We arrived at this town about seven o’clock, after a day which involved
more rapid changes of atmosphere than I ever recollect to have observed
before. The morning was cold and wet; then an easterly wind, and the
clouds hard and high; then thunder showers, and wind shifting to every
quarter; then a warm blast from the south, and summer clouds hanging
over the peaks, with bright blue sky between. About half an hour after
we had arrived at Evian, a few flashes of lightning came from a dark
cloud, directly overhead, and continued after the cloud had dispersed.
“Diespiter, per pura tonantes egit equos:” a phenomenon which
certainly had no influence on me, corresponding with that which it
produced on Horace.
The appearance of the inhabitants of Evian is more wretched, diseased,
and poor, than I ever recollect to have seen. The contrast indeed
between the subjects of the King of Sardinia and the citizens of the
independent republics of Switzerland, affords a powerful illustration
of the blighting mischiefs of despotism, within the space of a few
miles. They have mineral waters here, _eaux savonneuses_, they call
them. In the evening we had some difficulty about our passports, but so
soon as the syndic heard my companion’s rank and name, he apologized
for the circumstance. The inn was good. During our voyage, on the
distant height of a hill, covered with pine-forests, we saw a ruined
castle, which reminded me of those on the Rhine.
We left Evian on the following morning, with a wind of such violence as
to permit but one sail to be carried. The waves also were exceedingly
high, and our boat so heavily laden, that there appeared to be some
danger. We arrived, however, safe at Mellerie, after passing with great
speed mighty forests which overhung the lake, and lawns of exquisite
verdure, and mountains with bare and icy points, which rose immediately
from the summit of the rocks, whose bases were echoing to the waves.
We here heard that the Empress Maria Louisa had slept at Mellerie,
before the present inn was built, and when the accommodations were
those of the most wretched village, in remembrance of St. Preux. How
beautiful it is to find that the common sentiments of human nature can
attach themselves to those who are the most removed from its duties
and its enjoyments, when Genius pleads for their admission at the gate
of Power. To own them was becoming in the Empress, and confirms the
affectionate praise contained in the regret of a great and enlightened
nation. A Bourbon dared not even to have remembered Rousseau. She owed
this power to that democracy which her husband’s dynasty outraged, and
of which it was, however, in some sort the representative among the
nations of the earth. This little incident shows at once how unfit and
how impossible it is for the ancient system of opinions, or for any
power built upon a conspiracy to revive them, permanently to subsist
among mankind. We dined there, and had some honey, the best I have ever
tasted, the very essence of the mountain flowers, and as fragrant.
Probably the village derives its name from this production. Mellerie
is the well-known scene of St. Preux’s visionary exile; but Mellerie
is indeed enchanted ground, were Rousseau no magician. Groves of pine,
chesnut, and walnut overshadow it; magnificent and unbounded forests
to which England affords no parallel. In the midst of these woods are
dells of lawny expanse, inconceivably verdant, adorned with a thousand
of the rarest flowers and odorous with thyme.
The lake appeared somewhat calmer as we left Mellerie, sailing close
to the banks, whose magnificence augmented with the turn of every
promontory. But we congratulated ourselves too soon: the wind gradually
increased in violence, until it blew tremendously; and as it came from
the remotest extremity of the lake, produced waves of a frightful
height, and covered the whole surface with a chaos of foam. One of
our boatmen, who was a dreadfully stupid fellow, persisted in holding
the sail at a time when the boat was on the point of being driven
under water by the hurricane. On discovering his error, he let it
entirely go, and the boat for a moment refused to obey the helm; in
addition, the rudder was so broken as to render the management of it
very difficult; one wave fell in, and then another. My companion, an
excellent swimmer, took off his coat; I did the same, and we sat with
our arms crossed, every instant expecting to be swamped. The sail was
however again held, the boat obeyed the helm, and, still in imminent
peril from the immensity of the waves, we arrived in a few minutes at a
sheltered port, in the village of St. Gingoux.
I felt in this near prospect of death a mixture of sensations, among
which terror entered, though but subordinately. My feelings would have
been less painful had I been alone; but I know that my companion would
have attempted to save me, and I was overcome with humiliation, when
I thought that his life might have been risked to preserve mine. When
we arrived at St. Gingoux, the inhabitants, who stood on the shore,
unaccustomed to see a vessel as frail as ours and fearing to venture at
all on such a sea, exchanged looks of wonder and congratulation with
our boatmen, who, as well as ourselves, were well pleased to set foot
on shore.
St. Gingoux is even more beautiful than Mellerie; the mountains are
higher, and their loftiest points of elevation descend more abruptly
to the lake. On high, the aerial summits still cherish great depths of
snow in their ravines, and in the paths of their unseen torrents. One
of the highest of these is called Roche de St. Julien, beneath whose
pinnacles the forests become deeper and more extensive; the chesnut
gives a peculiarity to the scene, which is most beautiful, and will
make a picture in my memory, distinct from all other mountain scenes
which I have ever before visited.
As we arrived here early, we took a _voiture_ to visit the mouth of
the Rhone. We went between the mountains and the lake, under groves of
mighty chesnut trees, beside perpetual streams, which are nourished by
the snows above, and form stalactites on the rocks, over which they
fall. We saw an immense chesnut tree, which had been overthrown by the
hurricane of the morning. The place where the Rhone joins the lake
was marked by a line of tremendous breakers; the river is as rapid as
when it leaves the lake, but is muddy and dark. We went about a league
farther on the road to La Valais, and stopped at a castle called La
Tour de Bouverie, which seems to be the frontier of Switzerland and
Savoy, as we were asked for our passports, on the supposition of our
proceeding to Italy.
On one side of the road was the immense Roche de St. Julien, which
overhung it; through the gateway of the castle we saw the snowy
mountains of La Valais, clothed in clouds, and on the other side was
the willowy plain of the Rhone, in a character of striking contrast
with the rest of the scene, bounded by the dark mountains that overhang
Clarens, Vevai, and the lake that rolls between. In the midst of the
plain rises a little isolated hill, on which the white spire of a
church peeps from among the tufted chesnut-woods. We returned to St.
Gingoux before sunset, and I passed the evening in reading _Julie_.
As my companion rises late, I had time before breakfast, on the ensuing
morning, to hunt the waterfalls of the river that fall into the lake
at St. Gingoux. The stream is indeed, from the declivity over which
it falls, only a succession of waterfalls, which roar over the rocks
with a perpetual sound, and suspend their unceasing spray on the leaves
and flowers that overhang and adorn its savage banks. The path that
conducted along this river sometimes avoided the precipices of its
shores, by leading through meadows; sometimes threaded the base of the
perpendicular and caverned rocks. I gathered in these meadows a nosegay
of such flowers as I never saw in England, and which I thought more
beautiful for that rarity.
On my return, after breakfast, we sailed for Clarens, determining first
to see the three mouths of the Rhone, and then the castle of Chillon;
the day was fine, and the water calm. We passed from the blue waters of
the lake over the stream of the Rhone, which is rapid even at a great
distance from its confluence with the lake; the turbid waters mixed
with those of the lake, but mixed with them unwillingly. (_See Nouvelle
Héloise, Lettre 17, Part 4._) I read _Julie_ all day; an overflowing,
as it now seems, surrounded by the scenes which it has so wonderfully
peopled, of sublimest genius, and more than human sensibility.
Mellerie, the Castle of Chillon, Clarens, the mountains of La Valais
and Savoy, present themselves to the imagination as monuments of things
that were once familiar, and of beings that were once dear to it. They
were created indeed by one mind, but a mind so powerfully bright as to
cast a shade of falsehood on the records that are called reality.
We passed on to the Castle of Chillon, and visited its dungeons and
towers. These prisons are excavated below the lake; the principal
dungeon is supported by seven columns, whose branching capitals
support the roof. Close to the very walls, the lake is 800 feet deep;
iron rings are fastened to these columns, and on them were engraven a
multitude of names, partly those of visitors, and partly doubtless of
the prisoners, of whom now no memory remains, and who thus beguiled a
solitude which they have long ceased to feel. One date was as ancient
as 1670. At the commencement of the Reformation, and indeed long after
that period, this dungeon was the receptacle of those who shook, or who
denied the system of idolatry from the effects of which mankind is
even now slowly emerging.
Close to this long and lofty dungeon was a narrow cell, and beyond it
one larger and far more lofty and dark, supported upon two unornamented
arches. Across one of these arches was a beam, now black and rotten,
on which prisoners were hung in secret. I never saw a monument more
terrible of that cold and inhuman tyranny which it has been the delight
of man to exercise over man. It was indeed one of those many tremendous
fulfilments which render the “pernicies humani generis” of the great
Tacitus, so solemn and irrefragable a prophecy. The gendarme, who
conducted us over this castle, told us that there was an opening to
the lake, by means of a secret spring, connected with which the whole
dungeon might be filled with water before the prisoners could possibly
escape!
We proceeded with a contrary wind to Clarens, against a heavy swell. I
never felt more strongly than on landing at Clarens, that the spirit
of old times had deserted its once cherished habitation. A thousand
times, thought I, have Julia and St. Preux walked on this terrassed
road, looking towards these mountains which I now behold; nay, treading
on the ground where I now tread. From the window of our lodging our
landlady pointed out “le bosquet de Julie.” At least the inhabitants
of this village are impressed with an idea, that the persons of that
romance had actual existence. In the evening we walked thither. It is
indeed Julia’s wood. The hay was making under the trees; the trees
themselves were aged, but vigorous, and interspersed with younger ones,
which are destined to be their successors, and in future years, when we
are dead, to afford a shade to future worshippers of nature, who love
the memory of that tenderness and peace of which this was the imaginary
abode. We walked forward among the vineyards, whose narrow terraces
overlook this affecting scene. Why did the cold maxims of the world
compel me at this moment to repress the tears of melancholy transport
which it would have been so sweet to indulge, immeasurably, even until
the darkness of night had swallowed up the objects which excited them?
I forgot to remark, what indeed my companion remarked to me, that our
danger from the storm took place precisely in the spot where Julie
and her lover were nearly overset, and where St. Preux was tempted to
plunge with her into the lake.
On the following day we went to see the castle of Clarens, a square
strong house, with very few windows, surrounded by a double terrace
that overlooks the valley, or rather the plain of Clarens. The road
which conducted to it wound up the steep ascent through woods of walnut
and chesnut. We gathered roses on the terrace, in the feeling that they
might be the posterity of some planted by Julia’s hand. We sent their
dead and withered leaves to the absent.
We went again to the “bosquet de Julie,” and found that the precise
spot was now utterly obliterated, and a heap of stones marked the place
where the little chapel had once stood. Whilst we were execrating
the author of this brutal folly, our guide informed us that the land
belonged to the convent of St. Bernard, and that this outrage had been
committed by their orders. I knew before, that if avarice could harden
the hearts of men, a system of prescriptive religion has an influence
far more inimical to natural sensibility. I know that an isolated man
is sometimes restrained by shame from outraging the venerable feelings
arising out of the memory of genius, which once made nature even
lovelier than itself; but associated man holds it as the very sacrament
of his union to forswear all delicacy, all benevolence, all remorse,
all that is true, or tender, or sublime.
We sailed from Clarens to Vevai. Vevai is a town more beautiful in its
simplicity than any I have ever seen. Its market-place, a spacious
square interspersed with trees, looks directly upon the mountains of
Savoy and La Valais, the lake, and the valley of the Rhone. It was at
Vevai that Rousseau conceived the design of _Julie_.
From Vevai we came to Ouchy, a village near Lausanne. The coasts of the
Pays de Vaud, though full of villages and vineyards, present an aspect
of tranquillity and peculiar beauty which well compensates for the
solitude which I am accustomed to admire. The hills are very high and
rocky, crowned and interspersed with woods. Waterfalls echo from the
cliffs, and shine afar. In one place we saw the traces of two rocks of
immense size, which had fallen from the mountain behind. One of these
lodged in a room where a young woman was sleeping, without injuring
her. The vineyards were utterly destroyed in its path, and the earth
torn up.
The rain detained us two days at Ouchy. We, however, visited Lausanne,
and saw Gibbon’s house. We were shown the decayed summer-house where
he finished his History, and the old acacias on the terrace from which
he saw Mont Blanc after having written the last sentence. There is
something grand and even touching in the regret which he expresses at
the completion of his task. It was conceived amid the ruins of the
Capitol. The sudden departure of his cherished and accustomed toil must
have left him, like the death of a dear friend, sad and solitary.
My companion gathered some acacia leaves to preserve in remembrance
of him. I refrained from doing so, fearing to outrage the greater and
more sacred name of Rousseau; the contemplation of whose imperishable
creations had left no vacancy in my heart for mortal things. Gibbon had
a cold and unimpassioned spirit. I never felt more inclination to rail
at the prejudices which cling to such a thing, than now that Julie
and Clarens, Lausanne and the Roman empire, compelled me to a contrast
between Rousseau and Gibbon.
When we returned, in the only interval of sunshine during the day, I
walked on the pier which the lake was lashing with its waves. A rainbow
spanned the lake, or rather rested one extremity of its arch upon the
water, and the other at the foot of the mountains of Savoy. Some white
houses, I know not if they were those of Mellerie, shone through the
yellow fire.
On Saturday the 30th of June we quitted Ouchy, and after two days of
pleasant sailing arrived on Sunday evening at Montalegre.
S.
* * * * *
TO T. P. ESQ.
ST. MARTIN--SERVOZ--CHAMOUNI--MONTANVERT--MONT BLANC.
Hôtel de Londres, Chamouni, July 22nd, 1816.
Whilst you, my friend, are engaged in securing a home for us, we are
wandering in search of recollections to embellish it. I do not err in
conceiving that you are interested in details of all that is majestic
or beautiful in nature; but how shall I describe to you the scenes
by which I am now surrounded? To exhaust the epithets which express
the astonishment and the admiration--the very excess of satisfied
astonishment, where expectation scarcely acknowledged any boundary,
is this to impress upon your mind the images which fill mine now even
till it overflow? I too have read the raptures of travellers; I will
be warned by their example; I will simply detail to you all that I can
relate, or all that, if related, would enable you to conceive of what
we have done or seen since the morning of the 20th, when we left Geneva.
We commenced our intended journey to Chamouni at half-past eight in the
morning. We passed through the champain country, which extends from
Mont Salève to the base of the higher Alps. The country is sufficiently
fertile, covered with corn-fields and orchards, and intersected by
sudden acclivities with flat summits. The day was cloudless and
excessively hot, the Alps were perpetually in sight, and as we
advanced, the mountains, which form their outskirts, closed in around
us. We passed a bridge over a stream, which discharges itself into the
Arve. The Arve itself, much swoln by the rains, flows constantly to the
right of the road.
As we approached Bonneville through an avenue composed of a beautiful
species of drooping poplar, we observed that the corn-fields on each
side were covered with inundation. Bonneville is a neat little town,
with no conspicuous peculiarity, except the white towers of the prison,
an extensive building overlooking the town. At Bonneville the Alps
commence, one of which, clothed by forests, rises almost immediately
from the opposite bank of the Arve.
From Bonneville to Cluses the road conducts through a spacious and
fertile plain, surrounded on all sides by mountains, covered like
those of Mellerie with forests of intermingled pine and chesnut.
At Cluses the road turns suddenly to the right, following the Arve
along the chasm, which it seems to have hollowed for itself among the
perpendicular mountains. The scene assumes here a more savage and
colossal character: the valley becomes narrow, affording no more space
than is sufficient for the river and the road. The pines descend to
the banks, imitating with their irregular spires, the pyramidal crags
which lift themselves far above the regions of forest into the deep
azure of the sky, and among the white dazzling clouds. The scene, at
the distance of half a mile from Cluses, differs from that of Matlock
in little else than in the immensity of its proportions, and in its
untameable, inaccessible solitude, inhabited only by the goats which we
saw browsing on the rocks.
Near Maglans, within a league of each other, we saw two waterfalls.
They were no more than mountain rivulets, but the height from which
they fell, at least of _twelve_ hundred feet, made them assume a
character inconsistent with the smallness of their stream. The first
fell from the overhanging brow of a black precipice on an enormous
rock, precisely resembling some colossal Egyptian statue of a female
deity. It struck the head of the visionary image, and, gracefully
dividing there, fell from it in folds of foam more like to cloud than
water, imitating a veil of the most exquisite woof. It then united,
concealing the lower part of the statue, and hiding itself in a winding
of its channel, burst into a deeper fall, and crossed our route in its
path towards the Arve.
The other waterfall was more continuous and larger. The violence with
which it fell made it look more like some shape which an exhalation had
assumed than like water, for it streamed beyond the mountain, which
appeared dark behind it, as it might have appeared behind an evanescent
cloud.
The character of the scenery continued the same until we arrived at
St. Martin (called in the maps Sallanches), the mountains perpetually
becoming more elevated, exhibiting at every turn of the road more
craggy summits, loftier and wider extent of forests, darker and more
deep recesses.
The following morning we proceeded from St. Martin on mules to
Chamouni, accompanied by two guides. We proceeded, as we had done the
preceding day, along the valley of the Arve, a valley surrounded on
all sides by immense mountains, whose rugged precipices are intermixed
on high with dazzling snow. Their bases were still covered with the
eternal forests, which perpetually grew darker and more profound as we
approached the inner regions of the mountains.
On arriving at a small village, at the distance of a league from St.
Martin, we dismounted from our mules, and were conducted by our guides
to view a cascade. We beheld an immense body of water fall two hundred
and fifty feet, dashing from rock to rock, and casting a spray which
formed a mist around it, in the midst of which hung a multitude of
sunbows, which faded or became unspeakably vivid, as the inconstant sun
shone through the clouds. When we approached near to it, the rain of
the spray reached us, and our clothes were wetted by the quick-falling
but minute particles of water. The cataract fell from above into a deep
craggy chasm at our feet, where, changing its character to that of a
mountain stream, it pursued its course towards the Arve, roaring over
the rocks that impeded its progress.
As we proceeded, our route still lay through the valley, or rather, as
it had now become, the vast ravine, which is at once the couch and the
creation of the terrible Arve. We ascended, winding between mountains
whose immensity staggers the imagination. We crossed the path of a
torrent, which three days since had descended from the thawing snow,
and torn the road away.
We dined at Servoz, a little village, where there are lead and copper
mines, and where we saw a cabinet of natural curiosities, like those
of Keswick and Bethgelert. We saw in this cabinet some chamois’ horns,
and the horns of an exceedingly rare animal called the bouquetin, which
inhabits the deserts of snow to the south of Mont Blanc: it is an
animal of the stag kind; its horns weigh at least twenty-seven English
pounds. It is inconceivable how so small an animal could support so
inordinate a weight. The horns are of a very peculiar conformation,
being broad, massy, and pointed at the ends, and surrounded with a
number of rings, which are supposed to afford an indication of its age:
there were seventeen rings on the largest of these horns.
From Servoz three leagues remain to Chamouni.--Mont Blanc was before
us--the Alps, with their innumerable glaciers on high all around,
closing in the complicated windings of the single vale--forests
inexpressibly beautiful, but majestic in their beauty--intermingled
beech and pine, and oak, overshadowed our road, or receded, whilst
lawns of such verdure as I have never seen before occupied these
openings, and gradually became darker in their recesses. Mont Blanc
was before us, but it was covered with cloud; its base, furrowed with
dreadful gaps, was seen above. Pinnacles of snow intolerably bright,
part of the chain connected with Mont Blanc, shone through the clouds
at intervals on high. I never knew--I never imagined what mountains
were before. The immensity of these aerial summits excited, when
they suddenly burst upon the sight, a sentiment of ecstatic wonder,
not unallied to madness. And remember this was all one scene, it all
pressed home to our regard and our imagination. Though it embraced a
vast extent of space, the snowy pyramids which shot into the bright
blue sky seemed to overhang our path; the ravine, clothed with gigantic
pines, and black with its depth below, so deep that the very roaring
of the untameable Arve, which rolled through it, could not be heard
above--all was as much our own, as if we had been the creators of such
impressions in the minds of others as now occupied our own. Nature was
the poet, whose harmony held our spirits more breathless than that of
the divinest.
As we entered the valley of Chamouni (which in fact may be considered
as a continuation of those which we have followed from Bonneville and
Cluses) clouds hung upon the mountains at the distance perhaps of 6000
feet from the earth, but so as effectually to conceal not only Mont
Blanc, but the other _aiguilles_, as they call them here, attached and
subordinate to it. We were travelling along the valley, when suddenly
we heard a sound as of the burst of smothered thunder rolling above;
yet there was something earthly in the sound, that told us it could not
be thunder. Our guide hastily pointed out to us a part of the mountain
opposite, from whence the sound came. It was an avalanche. We saw the
smoke of its path among the rocks, and continued to hear at intervals
the bursting of its fall. It fell on the bed of a torrent, which it
displaced, and presently we saw its tawny-coloured waters also spread
themselves over the ravine, which was their couch.
We did not, as we intended, visit the _Glacier de Boisson_ to-day,
although it descends within a few minutes’ walk of the road, wishing
to survey it at least when unfatigued. We saw this glacier which
comes close to the fertile plain, as we passed; its surface was
broken into a thousand unaccountable figures: conical and pyramidical
crystallizations, more than fifty feet in height, rise from its
surface, and precipices of ice, of dazzling splendour, overhang the
woods and meadows of the vale. This glacier winds upwards from the
valley, until it joins the masses of frost from which it was produced
above, winding through its own ravine like a bright belt flung over
the black region of pines. There is more in all these scenes than mere
magnitude of proportion: there is a majesty of outline; there is an
awful grace in the very colours which invest these wonderful shapes--a
charm which is peculiar to them, quite distinct even from the reality
of their unutterable greatness.
* * * * *
July 24.
Yesterday morning we went to the source of the Arveiron. It is
about a league from this village; the river rolls forth impetuously
from an arch of ice, and spreads itself in many streams over a vast
space of the valley, ravaged and laid bare by its inundations. The
glacier by which its waters are nourished, overhangs this cavern and
the plain, and the forests of pine which surround it, with terrible
precipices of solid ice. On the other side rises the immense glacier of
Montanvert, fifty miles in extent, occupying a chasm among mountains
of inconceivable height, and of forms so pointed and abrupt, that they
seem to pierce the sky. From this glacier we saw, as we sat on a rock
close to one of the streams of the Arveiron, masses of ice detach
themselves from on high, and rush with a loud dull noise into the vale.
The violence of their fall turned them into powder, which flowed over
the rocks in imitation of waterfalls, whose ravines they usurped and
filled.
In the evening I went with Ducrée, my guide, the only tolerable person
I have seen in this country, to visit the glacier of Boisson. This
glacier, like that of Montanvert, comes close to the vale, overhanging
the green meadows and the dark woods with the dazzling whiteness
of its precipices and pinnacles, which are like spires of radiant
crystal, covered with a net-work of frosted silver. These glaciers flow
perpetually into the valley, ravaging in their slow but irresistible
progress the pastures and the forests which surround them, performing a
work of desolation in ages which a river of lava might accomplish in an
hour, but far more irretrievably; for where the ice has once descended
the hardiest plant refuses to grow; if even, as in some extraordinary
instances, it should recede after its progress has once commenced.
The glaciers perpetually move onward, at the rate of a foot each day,
with a motion that commences at the spot where, on the boundaries of
perpetual congelation, they are produced by the freezing of the waters
which arise from the partial melting of the eternal snows. They drag
with them from the regions whence they derive their origin all the
ruins of the mountain, enormous rocks, and immense accumulations of
sand and stones. These are driven onwards by the irresistible stream
of solid ice; and when they arrive at a declivity of the mountain,
sufficiently rapid, roll down, scattering ruin. I saw one of these
rocks which had descended in the spring (winter here is the season of
silence and safety) which measured forty feet in every direction.
The verge of a glacier, like that of Boisson, presents the most vivid
image of desolation that it is possible to conceive. No one dares to
approach it; for the enormous pinnacles of ice which perpetually fall,
are perpetually reproduced. The pines of the forest, which bound it at
one extremity, are overthrown and shattered to a wide extent at its
base. There is something inexpressibly dreadful in the aspect of the
few branchless trunks, which, nearest to the ice rifts, still stand
in the uprooted soil. The meadows perish, overwhelmed with sand and
stones. Within this last year, these glaciers have advanced three
hundred feet into the valley. Saussure, the naturalist, says, that they
have their periods of increase and decay: the people of the country
hold an opinion entirely different; but as I judge, more probable. It
is agreed by all, that the snow on the summit of Mont Blanc and the
neighbouring mountains perpetually augments, and that ice, in the form
of glaciers, subsists without melting in the valley of Chamouni during
its transient and variable summer. If the snow which produces this
glacier must augment, and the heat of the valley is no obstacle to the
perpetual existence of such masses of ice as have already descended
into it, the consequence is obvious; the glaciers must augment and
will subsist, at least until they have overflowed this vale.
I will not pursue Buffon’s sublime but gloomy theory--that this globe
which we inhabit will at some future period be changed into a mass of
frost by the encroachments of the polar ice, and of that produced on
the most elevated points of the earth. Do you, who assert the supremacy
of Ahriman, imagine him throned among these desolating snows, among
these palaces of death and frost, so sculptured in this their terrible
magnificence by the adamantine hand of necessity, and that he casts
around him, as the first essays of his final usurpation, avalanches,
torrents, rocks, and thunders, and above all these deadly glaciers, at
once the proof and symbols of his reign;--add to this, the degradation
of the human species--who in these regions are half deformed or
idiotic, and most of whom are deprived of anything that can excite
interest or admiration. This is a part of the subject more mournful and
less sublime; but such as neither the poet nor the philosopher should
disdain to regard.
This morning we departed, on the promise of a fine day, to visit the
glacier of Montanvert. In that part where it fills a slanting valley,
it is called the Sea of Ice. This valley is 950 toises, or 7600 feet
above the level of the sea. We had not proceeded far before the rain
began to fall, but we persisted until we had accomplished more than
half our journey, when we returned, wet through.
* * * * *
Chamouni, July 25th.
We have returned from visiting the glacier of Montanvert, or, as it is
called, the Sea of Ice, a scene in truth of dizzying wonder. The path
that winds to it along the side of a mountain, now clothed with pines,
now intersected with snowy hollows, is wide and steep. The cabin of
Montanvert is three leagues from Chamouni, half of which distance is
performed on mules, not so sure footed, but that on the first day the
one which I rode fell in what the guides call a _mauvais pas_, so that
I narrowly escaped being precipitated down the mountain. We passed
over a hollow covered with snow, down which vast stones are accustomed
to roll. One had fallen the preceding day, a little time after we had
returned: our guides desired us to pass quickly, for it is said that
sometimes the least sound will accelerate their descent. We arrived at
Montanvert, however, safe.
On all sides precipitous mountains, the abodes of unrelenting frost,
surround this vale: their sides are banked up with ice and snow,
broken, heaped high, and exhibiting terrific chasms. The summits are
sharp and naked pinnacles, whose overhanging steepness will not even
permit snow to rest upon them. Lines of dazzling ice occupy here and
there their perpendicular rifts, and shine through the driving vapours
with inexpressible brilliance: they pierce the clouds like things not
belonging to this earth. The vale itself is filled with a mass of
undulating ice, and has an ascent sufficiently gradual even to the
remotest abysses of these horrible deserts. It is only half a league
(about two miles) in breadth, and seems much less. It exhibits an
appearance as if frost had suddenly bound up the waves and whirlpools
of a mighty torrent. We walked some distance upon its surface. The
waves are elevated about 12 or 15 feet from the surface of the mass,
which is intersected by long gaps of unfathomable depth, the ice of
whose sides is more beautifully azure than the sky. In these regions
everything changes, and is in motion. This vast mass of ice has one
general progress, which ceases neither day nor night; it breaks and
bursts for ever: some undulations sink while others rise; it is never
the same. The echo of rocks, or of the ice and snow which fall from
their overhanging precipices, or roll from their aerial summits,
scarcely ceases for one moment. One would think that Mont Blanc, like
the god of the Stoics, was a vast animal, and that the frozen blood for
ever circulated through his stony veins.
We dined (M----, C----, and I) on the grass, in the open air,
surrounded by this scene. The air is piercing and clear. We returned
down the mountain, sometimes encompassed by the driving vapours,
sometimes cheered by the sunbeams, and arrived at our inn by seven
o’clock.
* * * * *
Montalegre, July 28th.
The next morning we returned through the rain to St. Martin. The
scenery had lost something of its immensity, thick clouds hanging over
the highest mountains; but visitings of sunset intervened between the
showers, and the blue sky shone between the accumulated clouds of
snowy whiteness which brought them; the dazzling mountains sometimes
glittered through a chasm of the clouds above our heads, and all the
charm of its grandeur remained. We repassed _Pont Pellisier_, a wooden
bridge over the Arve, and the ravine of the Arve. We repassed the
pine-forests which overhang the defile, the château of St. Michel,
a haunted ruin, built on the edge of a precipice, and shadowed over
by the eternal forest. We repassed the vale of Servoz, a vale more
beautiful, because more luxuriant, than that of Chamouni. Mont Blanc
forms one of the sides of this vale also, and the other is inclosed by
an irregular amphitheatre of enormous mountains, one of which is in
ruins, and fell fifty years ago into the higher part of the valley; the
smoke of its fall was seen in Piedmont, and people went from Turin to
investigate whether a volcano had not burst forth among the Alps. It
continued falling many days, spreading, with the shock and thunder of
its ruin, consternation into the neighbouring vales. In the evening we
arrived at St. Martin. The next day we wound through the valley, which
I have described before, and arrived in the evening at our home.
We have bought some specimens of minerals and plants, and two or three
crystal seals, at Mont Blanc, to preserve the remembrance of having
approached it. There is a cabinet of _Histoire Naturelle_ at Chamouni,
just as at Keswick, Matlock, and Clifton, the proprietor of which is
the very vilest specimen of that vile species of quack that, together
with the whole army of aubergistes and guides, and indeed the entire
mass of the population, subsist on the weakness and credulity of
travellers as leeches subsist on the sick. The most interesting of my
purchases is a large collection of all the seeds of rare alpine plants,
with their names written upon the outside of the papers that contain
them. These I mean to colonize in my garden in England, and to permit
you to make what choice you please from them They are companions which
the Celandine--the classic Celandine, need not despise; they are as
wild and more daring than he, and will tell him tales of things even as
touching and sublime as the gaze of a vernal poet.
Did I tell you that there are troops of wolves among these mountains?
In the winter they descend into the valleys, which the snow occupies
six months of the year, and devour everything that they can find out
of doors. A wolf is more powerful than the fiercest and strongest dog.
There are no bears in these regions. We heard, when we were at Lucerne,
that they were occasionally found in the forests which surround that
lake. Adieu.
S.
A Proposal
FOR PUTTING
REFORM TO THE VOTE
_THROUGHOUT THE KINGDOM_.
BY THE HERMIT OF MARLOW.
LONDON:
PRINTED FOR C. AND J. OLLIER,
3, WELBECK STREET, CAVENDISH SQUARE;
_By C. H. Reynell, 21, Piccadilly_.
1817.
[Decoration]
A PROPOSAL, &c.
A great question is now agitating in this nation, which no man or
party of men is competent to decide; indeed there are no materials of
evidence which can afford a foresight of the result. Yet on its issue
depends whether we are to be slaves or free men.
It is needless to recapitulate all that has been said about Reform.
Every one is agreed that the House of Commons is not a representation
of the people. The only theoretical question that remains is, whether
the people ought to legislate for themselves, or be governed by laws
and impoverished by taxes originating in the edicts of an assembly
which represents somewhat less than a thousandth part of the entire
community. I think they ought not to be so taxed and governed. An
hospital for lunatics is the only theatre where we can conceive so
mournful a comedy to be exhibited as this mighty nation now exhibits: a
single person bullying and swindling a thousand of his comrades out of
all they possessed in the world, and then trampling and spitting upon
them, though he were the most contemptible and degraded of mankind,
and they had strength in their arms and courage in their hearts. Such
a parable realized in political society is a spectacle worthy of the
utmost indignation and abhorrence.
The prerogatives of Parliament constitute a sovereignty which is
exercised in contempt of the People, and it is in strict consistency
with the laws of human nature that it should have been exercised
for the People’s misery and ruin. Those whom they despise, men
instinctively seek to render slavish and wretched, that their scorn may
be secure. It is the object of the Reformers to restore the People to a
sovereignty thus held in their contempt. It is my object, or I would be
silent now.
Servitude is sometimes voluntary. Perhaps the People choose to be
enslaved; perhaps it is their will to be degraded and ignorant and
famished; perhaps custom is their only God, and they its fanatic
worshippers will shiver in frost and waste in famine rather than deny
that idol, perhaps the majority of this nation decree that they will
not be represented in Parliament, that they will not deprive of power
those who have reduced them to the miserable condition in which they
now exist. It is _their_ will--it is their own concern. If such be
their decision, the champions of the rights and the mourners over the
errors and calamities of man, must retire to their homes in silence,
until accumulated sufferings shall have produced the effect of reason.
The question now at issue is, whether the majority of the adult
individuals of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland desire
or no a complete representation in the Legislative Assembly.
I have no doubt that such is their will, and I believe this is the
opinion of most persons conversant with the state of the public
feeling. But the fact ought to be formally ascertained before we
proceed. If the majority of the adult population should solemnly state
their desire to be, that the representatives whom they might appoint
should constitute the Commons House of Parliament, there is an end to
the dispute. Parliament would then be required, not petitioned, to
prepare some effectual plan for carrying the general will into effect;
and if Parliament should then refuse, the consequences of the contest
that might ensue would rest on its presumption and temerity. Parliament
would have rebelled against the People then.
If the majority of the adult population shall, when seriously called
upon for their opinion, determine on grounds, however erroneous, that
the experiment of innovation by Reform in Parliament is an evil of
greater magnitude than the consequences of misgovernment to which
Parliament has afforded a constitutional sanction, then it becomes us
to be silent; and we should be guilty of the great crime which I have
conditionally imputed to the House of Commons, if after unequivocal
evidence that it was the national will to acquiesce in the existing
system we should, by partial assemblies of the multitude, or by any
party acts, excite the minority to disturb this decision.
The first step towards Reform is to ascertain this point. For which
purpose I think the following plan would be effectual:--
That a Meeting should be appointed to be held at the _Crown and
Anchor_ Tavern on the ---- of ----, to take into consideration the
most effectual measures for ascertaining whether or no, a Reform in
Parliament is the will of the majority of the individuals of the
British Nation.
That the most eloquent and the most virtuous and the most venerable
among the Friends of Liberty, should employ their authority and
intellect to persuade men to lay aside all animosity and even
discussion respecting the topics on which they are disunited, and
by the love which they bear to their suffering country conjure them
to contribute all their energies to set this great question at
rest--whether the Nation desires a Reform in Parliament or no?
That the friends of Reform, residing in any part of the country, be
earnestly entreated to lend perhaps their last and the decisive effort
to set their hopes and fears at rest; that those who can should go to
London, and those who cannot, but who yet feel that the aid of their
talents might be beneficial, should address a letter to the Chairman
of the Meeting, explaining their sentiments: let these letters be
read aloud, let all things be transacted in the face of day. Let
Resolutions, of an import similar to those that follow be proposed.
1. That those who think that it is the duty of the People of this
nation to exact such a Reform in the Commons House of Parliament, as
should make that House a complete representation of their will, and
that the People have a right to perform this duty, assemble here for
the purpose of collecting evidence as to how far it is the will of
the majority of the People to acquit themselves of this duty, and to
exercise this right.
2. That the population of Great Britain and Ireland be divided into
three hundred distinct portions, each to contain an equal number of
inhabitants, and three hundred persons be commissioned, each personally
to visit every individual within the district named in his commission,
and to inquire whether or no that individual is willing to sign the
declaration contained in the third Resolution, requesting him to annex
to his signature any explanation or exposure of his sentiments which
he might choose to place on record. That the following Declaration be
proposed for signature:--
3. That the House of Commons does not represent the will of the People
of the British Nation; we the undersigned therefore declare, and
publish, and our signatures annexed shall be evidence of our firm and
solemn conviction that the liberty, the happiness, and the majesty of
the great nation to which it is our boast to belong, have been brought
into danger and suffered to decay through the corrupt and inadequate
manner in which Members are chosen to sit in the Commons House of
Parliament; we hereby express, before God and our country, a deliberate
and unbiassed persuasion, that it is our duty, if we shall be found in
the minority in this great question, incessantly to petition; if among
the majority, to require and exact that that House should originate
such measures of Reform as would render its Members the actual
Representatives of the Nation.
4. That this Meeting shall be held day after day, until it determines
on the whole detail of the plan for collecting evidence as to the will
of the nation on the subject of a Reform in Parliament.
5. That this Meeting disclaims any design, however remote, of lending
their sanction to the revolutionary and disorganizing schemes which
have been most falsely imputed to the Friends of Reform, and declares
that its object is purely constitutional.
6. That a subscription be set on foot to defray the expenses of this
Plan.
In the foregoing proposal of Resolutions, to be submitted to a National
Meeting of the Friends of Reform, I have purposely avoided detail. If
it shall prove that I have in any degree afforded a hint to men who
have earned and established their popularity by personal sacrifices and
intellectual eminence such as I have not the presumption to rival, let
it belong to them to pursue and develop all suggestions relating to the
great cause of liberty which has been nurtured (I am scarcely conscious
of a metaphor) with their very sweat, and blood, and tears: some have
tended it in dungeons, others have cherished it in famine, all have
been constant to it amidst persecution and calumny, and in the face of
the sanctions of power:--so accomplish what ye have begun.
I shall mention therefore only one point relating to the practical
part of my Proposal. Considerable expenses, according to my present
conception, would be necessarily incurred: funds should be created by
subscription to meet these demands. I have an income of a thousand a
year, on which I support my wife and children in decent comfort, and
from which I satisfy certain large claims of general justice. Should
any plan resembling that which I have proposed be determined on by you,
I will give £100, being a tenth part of one year’s income, towards its
object; and I will not deem so proudly of myself, as to believe that
I shall stand alone in this respect, when any rational and consistent
scheme for the public benefit shall have received the sanction of those
great and good men who have devoted themselves for its preservation.
A certain degree of coalition among the sincere Friends of Reform, in
whatever shape, is indispensable to the success of this proposal. The
friends of Universal or of Limited Suffrage, of Annual or Triennial
Parliaments, ought to settle these subjects on which they disagree,
when it is known whether the Nation desires that measure on which they
are all agreed. It is trivial to discuss what species of Reform shall
have place, when it yet remains a question whether there will be any
Reform or no.
Meanwhile, nothing remains for me but to state explicitly my sentiments
on this subject of Reform. The statement is indeed quite foreign to the
merits of the Proposal in itself, and I should have suppressed it until
called upon to subscribe such a requisition as I have suggested, if the
question which it is natural to ask, as to what are the sentiments of
the person who originates the scheme, could have received in any other
manner a more simple and direct reply. It appears to me that Annual
Parliaments ought to be adopted as an immediate measure, as one which
strongly tends to preserve the liberty and happiness of the Nation; it
would enable men to cultivate those energies on which the performance
of the political duties belonging to the citizen of a free state as
the rightful guardian of its prosperity essentially depends; it would
familiarize men with liberty by disciplining them to an habitual
acquaintance with its forms. Political institution is undoubtedly
susceptible of such improvements as no rational person can consider
possible, so long as the present degraded condition to which the vital
imperfections in the existing system of government has reduced the vast
multitude of men, shall subsist. The securest method of arriving at
such beneficial innovations, is to proceed gradually and with caution;
or in the place of that order and freedom which the Friends of Reform
assert to be violated now, anarchy and despotism will follow. Annual
Parliaments have my entire assent. I will not state those general
reasonings in their favour which Mr. Cobbett and other writers have
already made familiar to the public mind.
With respect to Universal Suffrage, I confess I consider its adoption,
in the present unprepared state of public knowledge and feeling, a
measure fraught with peril. I think that none but those who register
their names as paying a certain small sum in _direct taxes_ ought
at present to send Members to Parliament. The consequences of the
immediate extension of the elective franchise to every male adult,
would be to place power in the hands of men who have been rendered
brutal and torpid and ferocious by ages of slavery. It is to suppose
that the qualities belonging to a demagogue are such as are sufficient
to endow a legislator. I allow Major Cartwright’s arguments to be
unanswerable; abstractedly it is the right of every human being to
have a share in the government. But Mr. Paine’s arguments are also
unanswerable; a pure republic may be shown, by inferences the most
obvious and irresistible, to be that system of social order the fittest
to produce the happiness and promote the genuine eminence of man. Yet
nothing can less consist with reason, or afford smaller hopes of any
beneficial issue, than the plan which should abolish the regal and the
aristocratical branches of our constitution, before the public mind,
through many gradations of improvement, shall have arrived at the
maturity which can disregard these symbols of its childhood.
“WE PITY THE PLUMAGE, BUT FORGET THE DYING BIRD.”
* * * * *
AN ADDRESS to the PEOPLE ON
_The Death of the Princess Charlotte_.
* * * * *
BY
The Hermit of Marlow.
[Decoration]
AN ADDRESS, &c.
I. The Princess Charlotte is dead. She no longer moves, nor thinks,
nor feels. She is as inanimate as the clay with which she is about to
mingle. It is a dreadful thing to know that she is a putrid corpse,
who but a few days since was full of life and hope; a woman young,
innocent, and beautiful, snatched from the bosom of domestic peace, and
leaving that single vacancy which none can die and leave not.
II. Thus much the death of the Princess Charlotte has in common with
the death of thousands. How many women die in childbed and leave
their families of motherless children and their husbands to live on,
blighted by the remembrance of that heavy loss? How many women of
active and energetic virtues; mild, affectionate, and wise, whose life
is as a chain of happiness and union, which once being broken, leaves
those whom it bound to perish, have died, and have been deplored with
bitterness, which is too deep for words? Some have perished in penury
or shame, and their orphan baby has survived, a prey to the scorn and
neglect of strangers. Men have watched by the bedside of their expiring
wives, and have gone mad when the hideous death-rattle was heard within
the throat, regardless of the rosy child sleeping in the lap of the
unobservant nurse. The countenance of the physician had been read by
the stare of this distracted husband, till the legible despair sunk
into his heart. All this has been and is. You walk with a merry heart
through the streets of this great city, and think not that such are
the scenes acting all around you. You do not number in your thought
the mothers who die in childbed. It is the most horrible of ruins:--In
sickness, in old age, in battle, death comes as to his own home; but in
the season of joy and hope, when life should succeed to life, and the
assembled family expects one more, the youngest and the best beloved,
that the wife, the mother--she for whom each member of the family was
so dear to one another, should die!--Yet thousands of the poorest poor,
whose misery is aggravated by what cannot be spoken now, suffer this.
And have they no affections? Do not their hearts beat in their bosoms,
and the tears gush from their eyes? Are they not human flesh and blood?
Yet none weep for them--none mourn for them--none when their coffins
are carried to the grave (if indeed the parish furnishes a coffin for
all) turn aside and moralize upon the sadness they have left behind.
III. The Athenians did well to celebrate, with public mourning, the
death of those who had guided the republic with their valour and
their understanding, or illustrated it with their genius. Men do
well to mourn for the dead; it proves that we love something beside
ourselves; and he must have a hard heart who can see his friend depart
to rottenness and dust, and speed him without emotion on his voyage to
“that bourne whence no traveller returns.” To lament for those who have
benefited the State, is a habit of piety yet more favourable to the
cultivation of our best affections. When Milton died it had been well
that the universal English nation had been clothed in solemn black,
and that the muffled bells had tolled from town to town. The French
nation should have enjoined a public mourning at the deaths of Rousseau
and Voltaire. We cannot truly grieve for every one who dies beyond
the circle of those especially dear to us; yet in the extinction of
the objects of public love and admiration, and gratitude, there is
something, if we enjoy a liberal mind, which has departed from within
that circle. It were well done also, that men should mourn for any
public calamity which has befallen their country or the world, though
it be not death. This helps to maintain that connexion between one man
and another, and all men considered as a whole, which is the bond of
social life. There should be public mourning when those events take
place which make all good men mourn in their hearts,--the rule of
foreign or domestic tyrants, the abuse of public faith, the wresting of
old and venerable laws to the murder of the innocent, the established
insecurity of all those, the flower of the nation, who cherish an
unconquerable enthusiasm for public good. Thus, if Horne Tooke and
Hardy had been convicted of high treason, it had been good that there
had been not only the sorrow and the indignation which would have
filled all hearts, but the external symbols of grief. When the French
Republic was extinguished, the world ought to have mourned.
IV. But this appeal to the feelings of men should not be made lightly,
or in any manner that tends to waste, on inadequate objects, those
fertilizing streams of sympathy, which a public mourning should be
the occasion of pouring forth. This solemnity should be used only to
express a wide and intelligible calamity, and one which is felt to be
such by those who feel for their country and for mankind; its character
ought to be universal, not particular.
V. The news of the death of the Princess Charlotte, and of the
execution of Brandreth, Ludlam, and Turner, arrived nearly at the same
time. If beauty, youth, innocence, amiable manners, and the exercise
of the domestic virtues could alone justify public sorrow when they
are extinguished for ever, this interesting Lady would well deserve
that exhibition. She was the last and the best of her race. But there
were thousands of others equally distinguished as she, for private
excellences, who have been cut off in youth and hope. The accident
of her birth neither made her life more virtuous nor her death more
worthy of grief. For the public she had done nothing either good or
evil; her education had rendered her incapable of either in a large
and comprehensive sense. She was born a Princess; and those who are
destined to rule mankind are dispensed with acquiring that wisdom and
that experience which is necessary even to rule themselves. She was
not like Lady Jane Grey, or Queen Elizabeth, a woman of profound and
various learning. She had accomplished nothing, and aspired to nothing,
and could understand nothing respecting those great political questions
which involve the happiness of those over whom she was destined to
rule. Yet this should not be said in blame, but in compassion: let
us speak no evil of the dead. Such is the misery, such the impotence
of royalty--Princes are prevented from the cradle from becoming
anything which may deserve that greatest of all rewards next to a good
conscience, public admiration and regret.
VI. The execution of Brandreth, Ludlam, and Turner is an event of
quite a different character from the death of the Princess Charlotte.
These men were shut up in a horrible dungeon for many months, with the
fear of a hideous death and of everlasting hell thrust before their
eyes; and at last were brought to the scaffold and hung. They too had
domestic affections, and were remarkable for the exercise of private
virtues. Perhaps their low station permitted the growth of those
affections in a degree not consistent with a more exalted rank. They
had sons, and brothers, and sisters, and fathers, who loved them, it
should seem, more than the Princess Charlotte could be loved by those
whom the regulations of her rank had held in perpetual estrangement
from her. Her husband was to her as father, mother, and brethren.
Ludlam and Turner were men of mature years, and the affections were
ripened and strengthened within them. What these sufferers felt shall
not be said. But what must have been the long and various agony of
their kindred may be inferred from Edward Turner, who, when he saw
his brother dragged along upon the hurdle, shrieked horribly and fell
in a fit, and was carried away like a corpse by two men. How fearful
must have been their agony, sitting in solitude on that day when the
tempestuous voice of horror from the crowd, told them that the head
so dear to them was severed from the body! Yes--they listened to the
maddening shriek which burst from the multitude: they heard the rush
of ten thousand terror-stricken feet, the groans and the hootings
which told them that the mangled and distorted head was then lifted
into the air. The sufferers were dead. What is death? Who dares to
say that which will come after the grave?[43] Brandreth was calm, and
evidently believed that the consequences of our errors were limited by
that tremendous barrier. Ludlam and Turner were full of fears, lest God
should plunge them in everlasting fire. Mr. Pickering, the clergyman,
was evidently anxious that Brandreth should not by a false confidence
lose the single opportunity of reconciling himself with the Ruler of
the future world. None knew what death was, or could know. Yet these
men were presumptuously thrust into that unfathomable gulf, by other
men, who knew as little and who reckoned not the present or the future
sufferings of their victims. Nothing is more horrible than that man
should for any cause shed the life of man. For all other calamities
there is a remedy or a consolation. When that Power through which we
live ceases to maintain the life which it has conferred, then is grief
and agony, and the burthen which must be borne: such sorrow improves
the heart. But when man sheds the blood of man, revenge, and hatred,
and a long train of executions, and assassinations, and proscriptions
is perpetuated to remotest time.
VII. Such are the particular, and some of the general considerations
depending on the death of these men. But, however deplorable, if it
were a mere private or customary grief, the public as the public should
not mourn. But it is more than this. The events which led to the death
of those unfortunate men are a public calamity. I will not impute blame
to the jury who pronounced them guilty of high treason, perhaps the
law requires that such should be the denomination of their offence.
Some restraint ought indeed to be imposed on those thoughtless men who
imagine they can find in violence a remedy for violence, even if their
oppressors had tempted them to this occasion of their ruin. They are
instruments of evil, not so guilty as the hands that wielded them, but
fit to inspire caution. But their death, by hanging and beheading,
and the circumstances of which it is the characteristic and the
consequence, constitute a calamity such as the English nation ought to
mourn with an unassuageable grief.