importance, unless suspended in their operation till his assent should
be obtained; and when so suspended he has utterly neglected to attend
to them. He has refused to pass other laws for the accommodation of
large districts of people, unless those people would relinquish the
right of representation in the legislature—a right inestimable to
them, and formidable to tyrants only.
He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual,
uncomfortable, and distant from the repository of the public records,
for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his
measures.
He has dissolved representative houses repeatedly for opposing, with
manly firmness, his invasions on the rights of the people.
He has refused for a long time after such dissolution to cause others
to be elected; whereby the legislative powers, incapable of
annihilation, have returned to the people at large for their exercise,
the State remaining, in the mean time, exposed to all the dangers of
invasion from without and convulsions within.
He has endeavored to prevent the population of these States; for that
purpose obstructing the laws of naturalization of foreigners; refusing
to pass others to encourage their migration hither, and raising the
conditions of new appropriations of lands.
He has obstructed the administration of justice by refusing his assent
to laws for establishing judiciary powers.
He has made judges dependent on his will alone for the tenure of their
offices and the amount of payment of their salaries.
He has erected a multitude of new offices, and sent hither swarms of
officers to harass our people, and eat out their substance.
He has kept among us, in times of peace, standing armies, without the
consent of our legislatures.
He has affected to render the military independent of and superior to
the civil power.
He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to
our Constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his assent to
their acts of pretended legislation:
For quartering large bodies of armed troops among us:
For protecting them by a mock trial from punishment for any murders
which they should commit on the inhabitants of these States:
For cutting off our trade with all parts of the world:
For imposing taxes on us without our consent:
For depriving us, in many cases, of the benefits of trial by jury:
For transporting us beyond seas to be tried for pretended offences:
For abolishing the free system of English laws in a neighboring
province, establishing therein an arbitrary government, and enlarging
its boundaries, so as to render it at once an example and fit
instrument for introducing the same absolute rule into these colonies:
For taking away, our charters, abolishing our most valuable laws, and
altering, fundamentally, the forms of our government:
For suspending our own legislatures, and declaring themselves invested
with power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever.
He has abdicated government here by declaring us out of his
protection, and waging war against us.
He has plundered our seas, ravaged our coasts, burnt our towns, and
destroyed the lives of our people.
He is at this time transporting large armies of foreign mercenaries to
complete the works of death, desolation, and tyranny already begun,
with circumstances of cruelty and perfidy scarcely paralleled in the
most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the head of a civilized
nation.
He has constrained our fellow-citizens, taken captive on the high
seas, to bear arms against their country, to become the executioners
of their friends and brethren, or to fall themselves by their hands.
He has excited domestic insurrections among us, and has endeavored to
bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers the merciless Indian
savages, whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished destruction
of all ages, sexes, and conditions.
In every stage of these oppressions we have petitioned for redress in
the most humble terms; our repeated petitions have been answered only
by repeated injury. A prince whose character is thus marked by every
act which may define a tyrant is unfit to be the ruler of a free
people.
Nor have we been wanting in attentions to our British brethren. We
have warned them, from time to time, of attempts by their legislature
to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us. We have reminded them
of the circumstances of our emigration and settlement here. We have
appealed to their native justice and magnanimity, and we have conjured
them by the ties of our common kindred to disavow these usurpations,
which would inevitably interrupt our connections and correspondence.
They, too, have been deaf to the voice of justice and consanguinity.
We must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity which denounces our
separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, enemies in
war, in peace friends.
We, therefore, the representatives of the United States of America, in
General Congress assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the
world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the name and by the
authority of the good people of these colonies, solemnly publish and
declare that these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free
and independent States; that they are absolved from all allegiance to
the British crown, and that all political connection between them and
the State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved; and
that, as free and independent States, they have full power to levy
war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do
all other acts and things which independent States may of right do.
And for the support of this declaration, with a firm reliance on the
protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our
lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor.
INDEX.
_The figures refer to the numbers of the paragraphs._
Acceptance by the maker of a motion, of an amendment, 92, 93.
Addition of propositions, how effected, 88.
Adjournment, without day, equivalent to a dissolution, 139.
effect of, on business under consideration, 140.
_motion for_, takes precedence of all other motions, 137.
when it may be amended, 137.
form of, 138, 200.
Amendment, purposes of motions for, 60, 78.
order of proceeding in, 95, 191.
acceptance of by mover of proposition, 92, 93.
of amendments by striking out and inserting, 107, 108.
of amendment, to be put before the original amendment, 110.
of an amendment to an amendment, not allowed, 96.
object of such motion, how attained, 96, 97.
cannot be made to what has been agreed to on a question, 98, 99,
100, 101.
inconsistency of, with one already adopted, 102.
may show the absurdity of the original object of the proposition,
132.
may change the object, 128, 129, 133.
or may defeat the object, 130, 131.
by addition, 88.
by separation, 89.
by transposition, 90.
by striking out, 94, 103 to 112.
by inserting or adding, 94, 113 to 121.
by striking out and inserting, 94, 122 to 127.
_motion for_, by striking out and inserting, 103, 104, 111, 122.
may be divided, 122.
may be amended, 126.
manner of stating question on, 112, 121, 127.
precedence of question on, 123.
to strike out, decided in the negative, equivalent to the
affirmative of agreeing, 98, 100, 252.
if passed may not be renewed, 103 to 106, 113 to 116, 119, 124,
125.
stands in the same degree with the previous question, and indefinite
postponement, 184.
superseded by a motion to postpone to a day or to commit, 185.
may be amended, 96, 107, 117, 126, 184.
effect of vote on, 94 to 127, 187.
to be put before the original motion, 110, 120.
Apology, 42.
Assembly, Deliberative, purposes of, how effected, 1.
how organized, 2, 3.
judgment of, how expressed, 13.
Assembling, time of, to be fixed beforehand, 23.
place of, in possession of assembly, 9.
Authentication of acts, etc., of a deliberative assembly, 27, 32.
Blanks, filling of, 84.
with times or numbers, rule for, 85, 86, 87.
See _Precedence_.
Chairman, preliminary election of, 3.
See _Presiding Officer_.
Clerk, 5.
See _Recording Officer_.
Committees, objects and advantages of, 258, 260, 261.
who to compose, 258, 270.
usually those favorable to the proposed measure, 271.
mode of appointment of, 263, 267, 268, 269.
when by the presiding officer, under a standing rule, 266.
how notified of their appointment, 32, 272.
when and where to sit, 274, 275, 277.
_select_, 259.
how appointed, 264 to 269.
_standing_, 259.
what to be referred to, 74.
instructions to, 65, 76, 77, 262.
list of, etc., given by the clerk to the member first appointed,
272.
person first appointed on, acts as chairman by courtesy, 273.
proceed like other assemblies, 276, 279.
may proceed by sub-committees, 306.
mode of proceeding on a paper which has been referred to them, 279,
281, 283.
mode of proceeding on a paper originating in the committee, 279,
280, 282.
manner of closing session of, 285.
report of, how made, 282, 283, 284, 286, 287, 292.
form of report of, 286, 292.
mode of proceeding on report of, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296.
acceptance of report of, 295.
form of stating questions on report of, 295, 296.
See _Report_.
Committee of the Whole, of whom composed, 259.
how constituted, 297.
what a quorum of, 299.
who presides over, 297, 298.
who is clerk of, 301.
proceeding of, similar to those of the assembly itself, 302, 309.
mode of proceeding if one session does not complete the business,
304.
who may speak in, and how often, 305.
cannot refer any matter to another committee, 306.
cannot punish for breaches of order, 308.
disorderly words in, how noticed, 308.
differences between and other committees, 302 to 308.
presiding officer of assembly to remain in the room, during the
session of, 300.
See _Reports_, _Disorderly Words_.
Commitment, definition and purposes of, 73.
when a proper course, 60.
what may be committed, 75, 76, 77.
effect of a vote on a motion for, 183.
_motion for_, may be amended, 181.
supersedes a motion to amend, 185.
is of the same degree with motions for the previous question and
postponement, 182.
See _Committees_.
Communications to the assembly, how made, 44, 46, 48, 49.
Consent of the assembly, in what cases, and how far, to be presumed by
the presiding officer, 35, 237, 293.
Contested Elections, 7.
See _Returns_.
Credentials of members, 7.
Debate, proper character of, 201.
should be confined to the question, 209.
usual mode of putting an end to, 220, 221.
of shortening, 222.
See _Speaking_.
Decorum, Breaches of, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 223, 224.
how to be noticed, 40.
remedy for, 224, 225, 226.
how a member is to proceed to exculpate himself from a charge of,
40.
See _Disorderly Words_, _Order_.
Disorderly Words, cause of proceedings, when spoken, 227 to 231.
to be written down by the clerk, as spoken, 228, 229.
members not to be censured for, unless complained of at the time,
232.
spoken in a committee during its session, 278.
in committee of the whole to be written down, and reported to the
assembly, 308.
Disorderly Conduct, 9, 37 to 40, 313.
Division of a question, 79 to 83, 122, 123.
effect of, 80.
motion for, how made, 80.
right to demand, 81, 82.
when it may take place, 83.
See _Question_.
Elections and Returns, 6, 7, 8.
Expulsion, 42.
Floor, how to obtain, 46.
who has a right to, 47, 203, 204, 205.
member in possession of, to be interrupted only by a call to order,
200.
when usually allowed to the mover of a motion, 204.
when one relinquishes, for one purpose, he does so for all purposes,
205, 219.
Forms of proceeding, 10, 59, 315.
See _Order_, _Rules_.
Incidental Questions, 150 to 165.
questions of order, 151 to 154.
reading papers, 155 to 160.
withdrawal of a motion, 161, 162.
suspension of a rule, 163, 164.
amendment of amendments, 165.
See _Question_.
Introduction of business, how accomplished, 43.
See _Rules_.
Journal of a deliberate assembly, what and how kept, 32, 33.
Judgment of an aggregate body, how evidenced, 14.
Lie on the Table, purpose of motion for, 60, 71, 72.
_Motion for_, cannot be amended, 170.
when to be resorted to, 171.
effect of vote on, 71, 72, 172, 173.
takes precedence of all other subsidiary motions, 171.
List of members, 6.
Main Question, 63, 64, 135, 213.
Majority, decision by, on questions and elections, 24.
Members, rights and duties of, 36.
punishments of, 42.
not to be present at debates on matters concerning themselves, 41,
225, 230.
proceedings on quarrels between, caution relating to, 314.
Membership, rights of, how decided, 8.
Modification of a motion by the mover, 92.
Motion, definition of, 45, 59, 233.
to be in writing, 54.
to be seconded, 53 to 55.
how seconded, 55.
when in order, 247.
subsidiary, need not be in writing, 54.
but must be seconded, 55.
to suppress a proposition, 62.
to be stated or read for the information of any member, 57.
can be withdrawn only by leave, 56, 92.
when before the assembly, none other can be received, except
privileged motions, 58.
is not before the assembly, until stated by its presiding officer,
198.
not in order unless the maker be called to by the presiding officer,
200.
by one seated, or not addressing the chair, not to be received, 200.
principal and subsidiary, cannot be made together, 199.
Naming a member, what, 40, 225.
Numbers prefixed to paragraphs of a proposition, not a part of it, 91.
Officers of an assembly, titles of, 5.
who are, usually, 26.
how appointed, and removable, 26.
a majority, necessary to elect, 26.
when not members of the assembly, 5.
_pro tempore_, when to be chosen, 29.
See _Presiding Officer_, _Recording Officer_.
Order of a deliberative assembly, what, 13.
_of business_, 188 to 200.
how established, 190.
_questions of_, what, 152.
how decided, 154, 248.
form of, on appeal, 154.
no debate upon, allowed during divisions, 248.
_rules of_, to be enforced without delay, 151.
_call to_, effect of, 214.
who may make, 151.
interrupts the business under consideration, 153.
See _Disorderly Conduct_, _Disorderly Words_.
Orders of the Day, definition of, 142.
motion for, a privileged question for the day, 143, 144, 145, 146.
motion for, generally supersedes other propositions, 143, 144.
being taken up, the business interrupted thereby is suspended, 147.
fall, if not taken up on the day fixed, 149.
unless by special rule, 149.
Organization, necessity for, 1.
usual mode of, 3.
on report of a committee, 4.
Papers and Documents, in whose custody, 33.
Parliamentary Law, common, what, 6, 10.
See _Rules_.
Parliamentary Rules, whence derived, 11.
in each State, how formed, 11.
See _Rules_.
Petitions, requisites to, 49.
to be offered by members, 49, 50.
mode of offering, 51.
to be read by the clerk, if received, 52.
regular and usual action on presenting, 51, 52.
contents of, to be known by member presenting, 50.
to be in respectful language, 50.
Postponement, effect of vote on motion for, 180.
_motion for_, may be amended, 176.
how amended, 177, 178.
supersedes a motion to amend, 185.
is not superseded by a motion to commit or to amend, 179.
is of the same degree with a motion for the previous question,
179.
_indefinite_, purpose of motion for, 60, 67.
effect of vote on motion for, 67.
_to a day certain_, purpose of motion for, 68, 69.
an improper use of, 70.
Power of assembly to eject strangers, 9.
Preamble, or title, usually considered after the paper is gone through
with, 192.
Precedence _of motions_, 171, 174, 179, 182, 186, 197, 220.
_of questions_, 123, 134, 135, 153.
as to reference to a committee, 74.
on motions to fill blanks, 85, 86, 87.
questions of privilege take precedence of all motions but for
adjournment, 141.
President, 5.
See _Presiding Officer_.
Presiding Officer, duties of, 27, 30, 40, 225, 313, 314.
to be first heard on questions of order, 207.
how far member of an assembly, 5.
not usually to take part in debate, 5, 202.
but in committees of the whole, 307.
or on point of order, 154.
to give a casting vote, 5, 243.
effect of not giving casting vote, 243.
may not interrupt one speaking, but to call to order, 207.
may not decide upon inconsistency of a proposed amendment with one
already adopted, 102.
Previous Question, _motion for_, purpose of, 60.
form of, 64, 170.
original use of, 63, 64, 65.
present use of, 65, 66, 220.
use of in England, 66.
cannot be amended, 170.
effect of vote on, 64, 66, 175.
effect of negative decision of, 65.
cannot be made in committee of the whole, 303.
stands in same degree with other subsidiary motions, except to lie
on the table, 174.
Privileged Questions, 136 to 149.
adjournment, 137 to 140.
questions of privilege, 141.
orders of the day, 142 to 149.
take precedence of all motions but for adjournments, 141.
when settled, business thereby interrupted to be resumed, 141.
Proceedings, how set in motion, 43.
Punishment of members, 41, 42.
a question of, pending, the member to withdraw, 230.
Quarrel between members, 38, 314.
See _Disorderly Words_.
Question, definition of, 233.
forms of, in use, 15, 60, 61.
when to be put, 235.
mode of putting, 236.
on a series of propositions, 193.
on amendments reported by a committee, 194.
mode of taking, 238, 240, 241, 242, 245.
when and how decision of may be questioned, 238, 239.
all the members in the room when a question is put are bound to vote
upon it, 244.
members not in the room, cannot vote on, 244.
when taken by yeas and nays, 245.
mode of taking, in Massachusetts, 246.
when and how to be divided, 79.
how taken when divided, 80.
motion to divide, may be amended, 80.
what may be divided, 83.
who may divide, 81, 122.
usually regulated by rule, 82.
incidental, defined and enumerated, 150 to 165.
subsidiary, or secondary, defined and enumerated, 166 to 170.
privileged, defined and enumerated, 136.
See _Incidental Questions_, _Privileged Questions_, _Subsidiary
Questions_.
Quorum, necessity for, 17, 19.
what constitutes, 16.
effect of want of, on pending question, 249.
necessary on a division of the assembly, 249.
want of, how ascertained, 19.
consequences of want of, 19, 249.
Reading of Papers by the clerk, 155.
by members not allowed, without leave obtained by motion and vote,
157, 158.
when to be omitted, 159.
when necessary, if called for, 155.
question on, to be first decided, 160.
Reception, question of, on petition, 51.
on report, 286, 293.
Recommitment, what, 73, 290, 291.
Reconsideration, general principle relating to, 250 to 253.
_motion for_, allowed in this country, 254, 255.
effect of, 256.
usually regulated by rule, 257.
Recording Officer, duties of, 31, 32, 33, 35.
how his absence is to be supplied, 34.
how elected, 3, 4.
precedence of, if more than one, 5.
papers and documents to be in his charge, 33.
Recurrence of Business, when interrupted by want of quorum, 249.
by motion for the previous question, 66.
for indefinite postponement, 67.
to lie on the table, 71, 72.
for adjournment, 140.
for the orders of the day, 147, 148.
by a question of privilege, 141.
by a question of order, 153, 230.
by a call of a member to order, 200, 214.
Reports of Committees, how made and received, 286 to 289.
how treated and disposed of, 292 to 296.
of a paper with amendments, 288.
action upon, 194, 195, 292 to 296.
when a new draft of a paper, 196.
acceptance of, 295, 296.
of committees of the whole, 310.
when to be received, 311.
Reprimand, 42.
See _Punishment_.
Resolution, what, 13, 233.
Returns, 6.
time for investigating, 7.
mode of investigating, 7.
who to be on the investigating committee, 8.
who to be heard on a question on, 8.
Roll, calling of, 32, 35, 245.
Rules of debate and proceeding, subject of, 14, 15.
general purpose of, 315.
what are necessarily adopted by assembly, 10, 20.
the same in this country and in England, 11.
usage does not give them the character of general laws, 12.
to be enforced without delay or debate, 22, 151, 152.
who may notice an infringement of, 22.
_special_, each assembly may adopt, 10, 20.
supersede ordinary parliamentary rules, 10.
usually provide for their own amendment, 21.
may be suspended on motion, 21, 163, 164.
motion to suspend, supersedes the original question, 163.
suspended only by general consent, 21, 164.
usually provide for their own suspension, 164.
may determine the number necessary to express the will of the
assembly, 25.
See _Reading of Papers_, _Speaking_.
Secondary Questions, 166.
See _Subsidiary Questions_.
Seconding of motions, 55, 309.
Secretary, 5.
See _Recording Officer_.
Separation of propositions, how effected, 89.
Speaking, rules as to manner of, 203 to 208.
as to matter in, 209 to 214.
as to times of, 215 to 219.
member, to stand uncovered, 203, 208.
not to make personal remarks, 211.
not to mention names of members, 206.
not to reflect on the assembly, or on its prior determinations,
210.
confined to the subject, 209, 213.
not to be interrupted, 219.
to speak but once on the same question, 215, 216,
except by leave, 217.
or to explain himself in matter of fact, 218.
See _Debate_, _Presiding Officer_.
Speech, reading of, by member, 157.
Subsidiary Questions, 166 to 187.
nature and effect of, 166.
enumeration of, 167.
cannot be applied to one another, 168.
exceptions to this rule, 169.
lie on the table, 171, 172, 173.
amendment, 184 to 187.
previous question, 174, 175.
postponement, 176 to 180.
commitment, 181, 182, 183.
Suspension of a rule, 21, 163, 164.
See _Rules_.
Transposition of proposition, how effected, 90.
Vice-President, duties of, 5, 28.
See _Officers_.
Vote, what, 13, 233.
Voting, right and duty of, 41, 244.
prohibition from, 42.
See _Members_.
Will of assembly, majority necessary to express, 24.
special rule may determine what proportion may express, 25.
Withdrawal of motion can be only by leave, 161.
effect of vote upon motion for leave for, 162.
Yeas and Nays, how taken, 32, 245.
in Massachusetts, 246.
what number of members may require, 25.
form of putting question, 245.
WASHINGTON’S FAREWELL ADDRESS.
_Friends and Fellow-Citizens_:
The period for a new election of a citizen to administer the executive
government of the United States, being not far distant, and the time
actually arrived when your thoughts must be employed in designating
the person who is to be clothed with that important trust, it appears
to me proper, especially as it may conduce to a more distinct
expression of the public voice, that I should now apprise you of the
resolution I have formed, to decline being considered among the number
of those out of whom the choice is to be made.
I beg you at the same time to do me the justice to be assured, that
this resolution has not been taken, without a strict regard to all the
considerations appertaining to the relation which binds a dutiful
citizen to his country; and that in withdrawing the tender of service,
which silence in my situation might imply, I am influenced by no
diminution of zeal for your future interest; no deficiency of grateful
respect for your past kindness; but am supported by a full conviction,
that the step is compatible with both.
The acceptance of, and continuance hitherto in, the office to which
your suffrages have twice called me, have been a uniform sacrifice of
inclination to the opinion of duty, and to a deference for what
appeared to be your desire. I constantly hoped that it would have been
much earlier in my power, consistently with motives which I was not at
liberty to disregard, to return to that retirement from which I had
been reluctantly drawn. The strength of my inclination to do this,
previous to the last election, had even led to the preparation of an
address to declare it to you; but mature reflection on the then
perplexed and critical posture of our affairs with foreign nations,
and the unanimous advice of persons entitled to my confidence,
impelled me to abandon the idea. I rejoice that the state of your
concerns, external as well as internal, no longer renders the pursuit
of inclination incompatible with the sentiment of duty or propriety;
and am persuaded, whatever partiality may be retained for my services,
that in the present circumstances of our country, you will not
disapprove of my determination to retire.
The impressions with which I first undertook the arduous trust were
explained on the proper occasion. In the discharge of this trust I
will only say that I have, with good intentions, contributed toward
the organization and administration of the government the best
exertions of which a very fallible judgment was capable. Not
unconscious, in the outset, of the inferiority of my qualifications,
experience in my own eyes, perhaps still more in the eyes of others,
has strengthened the motives to diffidence of myself; and every day
the increasing weight of years admonishes me more and more, that the
shade of retirement is as necessary to me as it will be welcome.
Satisfied that if any circumstances have given peculiar value to my
services, they were temporary, I have the consolation to believe, that
while choice and prudence invite me to quit the political scene,
patriotism does not forbid it.
In looking forward to the moment which is to terminate the career of
my political life, my feelings do not permit me to suspend the deep
acknowledgment of that debt of gratitude which I owe to my beloved
country, for the many honors it has conferred upon me; still more for
the steadfast confidence with which it has supported me; and for the
opportunities I have thence enjoyed of manifesting my inviolable
attachment, by services faithful and persevering, though in usefulness
unequal to my zeal. If benefits have resulted to our country from
these services, let it always be remembered to your praise, and as an
instructive example in our annals, that under circumstances in which
the passions agitated in every direction, were liable to
mislead—amidst appearances sometimes dubious—vicissitudes of fortune
often discouraging—in situations in which not unfrequently want of
success has countenanced the spirit of criticism—the constancy of your
support was the essential prop of the efforts and a guarantee of the
plans by which they were effected. Profoundly penetrated with this
idea, I shall carry it with me to my grave, as a strong incitement to
unceasing wishes, that Heaven may continue to you the choicest tokens
of its beneficence—that your union and brotherly affection may be
perpetual—that the free constitution which is the work of your hands,
may be sacredly maintained—that its administration in every department
may be stamped with wisdom and virtue—that, in fine, the happiness of
the people of these States, under the auspices of liberty, may be made
complete, by so careful a preservation and so prudent a use of this
blessing, as will acquire to them the glory of recommending it to the
applause, the affection, and the adoption of every nation which is yet
a stranger to it.
Here, perhaps, I ought to stop. But a solicitude for your welfare,
which can not end but with my life, and the apprehension of danger
natural to that solicitude, urge me, on an occasion like the present,
to offer to your solemn contemplation, and to recommend to your
frequent view, some sentiments, which are the result of much
reflection, of no inconsiderable observation, and which appear to me
all-important to the permanency of your felicity as a people. These
will be offered to you with the more freedom, as you can only see in
them the disinterested warning of a parting friend, who can possibly
have no personal motive to bias his counsel. Nor can I forget as an
encouragement to it your indulgent reception of my sentiments on a
former and not dissimilar occasion.
Interwoven as is the love of liberty with every ligament of your
hearts, no recommendation of mine is necessary to fortify or confirm
the attachment.
The unity of government, which constitutes you one people, is also now
dear to you. It is justly so; for it is a main pillar in the edifice
of your real independence; the support of your tranquillity at home;
your peace abroad; of your safety, of your prosperity; of that very
liberty which you so highly prize. But as it is easy to foresee, that
from different causes and from different quarters, much pains will be
taken, many artifices employed to weaken in your minds the conviction
of this truth; as this is the point in your political fortress against
which the batteries of internal and external enemies will be most
constantly and actively (though often covertly and insidiously)
directed, it is of infinite moment that you should properly estimate
the immense value of your national union, to your collective and
individual happiness; that you should cherish a cordial, habitual, and
immovable attachment to it; accustom yourself to think and speak of it
as of the palladium of your political safety and prosperity; watching
for its preservation with jealous anxiety; discountenancing whatever
may suggest even a suspicion that it can in any event be abandoned;
and indignantly frowning upon the first dawning of every attempt to
alienate any portion of our country from the rest, or to enfeeble the
sacred ties which now link together the various parts.
For this you have every inducement of sympathy and interest. Citizens
by birth or choice of a common country, that country has a right to
concentrate your affections. The name of AMERICAN, which belongs to
you in your national capacity, must always exalt the just pride of
patriotism, more than any appellation derived from local
discriminations. With slight shades of difference, you have the same
religion, manners, habits, and political principles. You have in a
common cause fought and triumphed together; the independence and
liberty you possess are the work of joint councils and joint
efforts—of common dangers, sufferings, and successes.
But these considerations, however powerfully they address themselves
to your sensibility, are greatly outweighed by those which apply more
immediately to your interest. Here every portion of our country finds
the most commanding motives for carefully guarding and preserving the
union of the whole.
The _north_, in an unrestrained intercourse with the _south_,
protected by the equal laws of a common government, finds in the
productions of the latter, great additional resources of maritime and
commercial enterprise, and precious materials of manufacturing
industry. The _south_, in the same intercourse, benefiting by the
agency of the _north_, sees its agriculture grow and its commerce
expand. Turning partly into its own channels the seamen of the
_north_, it finds its particular navigation invigorated—and while it
contributes, in different ways, to nourish and increase the general
mass of the national navigation, it looks forward to the protection of
a maritime strength, to which itself is equally adapted. The _east_,
in like intercourse with the _west_, already finds, and in the
progressive improvement of interior communications, by land and water,
will more and more find a valuable vent for the commodities which it
brings from abroad, or manufactures at home. The _west_ derives from
the _east_ supplies requisite to its growth and comfort—and, what is
of perhaps still greater consequence, it must of necessity owe the
secure enjoyment of indispensable outlets for its own productions, to
the weight, influence, and the future maritime strength of the
Atlantic side of the union, directed by an indissoluble community of
interest as one nation. Any other tenure by which the _west_ can hold
this essential advantage, whether derived from its own separate
strength, or from an apostate and unnatural connection with any
foreign power, must be intrinsically precarious.
While then every part of our country thus feels an immediate and
particular interest in union, all the parts combined can not fail to
find in the united mass of means and efforts, greater strength,
greater resources, proportionately greater security from external
danger, a less frequent interruption of their peace by foreign
nations; and, what is of inestimable value, they must derive from
union an exemption from those broils and wars between themselves,
which so frequently afflict neighboring countries not tied together by
the same government which their own rivalships alone would be
sufficient to produce; but which opposite foreign alliances,
attachments, and intrigues would stimulate and imbitter. Hence,
likewise, they will avoid the necessity of those over-grown military
establishments, which, under any form of government, are inauspicious
to liberty, and which are to be regarded as particularly hostile to
republican liberty. In this sense it is that your union ought to be
considered as a main prop of your liberty, and that the love of the
one ought to endear to you the preservation of the other.
These considerations speak a persuasive language to every reflecting
and virtuous mind, and exhibit the continuance of the union as a
primary object of patriotic desire. Is there a doubt whether a common
government can embrace so large a sphere? Let experience solve it. To
listen to mere speculation in such a case were criminal. We are
authorized to hope that a proper organization of the whole, with the
auxiliary agency of governments for the respective subdivisions, will
afford a happy issue to the experiment. It is well worth a fair and
full experiment. With such powerful and obvious motives to union
affecting all parts of our country, while experience shall not have
demonstrated its impracticability, there will always be reason to
distrust the patriotism of those who, in any quarter, may endeavor to
weaken its bands.
In contemplating the causes which may disturb our union, it occurs as
matter of serious concern, that any ground should have been furnished
for characterizing parties by geographical discriminations—_Northern_
and _Southern_—_Atlantic_ and _Western_; whence designing men may
endeavor to excite a belief that there is real difference of local
interests and views. One of the expedients of party to acquire
influence, within particular districts, is to misrepresent the
opinions and aims of other districts. You can not shield yourselves
too much against the jealousies and heart-burnings which spring from
these misrepresentations; they tend to render alien to each other
those who ought to be bound together by fraternal affection. The
inhabitants of our western country have lately had a useful lesson on
this head. They have seen, in the negotiation by the executive, and in
the unanimous ratification by the senate, of the treaty with Spain,
and in the universal satisfaction at that event throughout the United
States, a decisive proof how unfounded were the suspicion propagated
among them of a policy in the general government, and in the Atlantic
States unfriendly to their interests in regard to the Mississippi.
They have been witnesses to the formation of two treaties—that with
Great Britain and that with Spain—which secure to them everything they
could desire in respect to our foreign relations toward confirming
their prosperity. Will it not be their wisdom to rely for the
preservation of these advantages on the union by which they were
procured? Will they not henceforth be deaf to those advisers, if such
there are, who would sever them from their brethren and connect them
with aliens?
To the efficacy and permanency of your union, a government for the
whole is indispensable. No alliances, however strict, between the
parts can be an adequate substitute; they must inevitably experience
the infractions and interruptions which all alliances in all times
have experienced. Sensible of this momentous truth, you have improved
upon your first essay, by the adoption of a constitution of government
better calculated than your former, for an intimate union, and for the
efficacious management of your common concerns. This government—the
offspring of your own choice, uninfluenced and unawed, adopted upon
full investigation and mature deliberation, completely free in its
principles, in the distribution of its powers uniting security with
energy, and containing within itself a provision for its own
amendments—has a just claim to your confidence and your support.
Respect for its authority, compliance with its laws, acquiescence in
its measures, are duties enjoined by the fundamental maxims of true
liberty. The basis of our political systems is the right of the people
to make and to alter their constitutions of government. But the
constitution which at any time exists, until changed by an explicit
and authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon
all. The very idea of the power and the right of the people to
establish a government, presupposes the duty of every individual to
obey the established government.
All obstructions to the execution of the laws, all combinations and
associations, under whatever plausible character, with the real design
to direct, control, counteract, or awe the regular deliberations and
actions of the constituted authorities, are destructive of this
fundamental principle, and of fatal tendency. They serve to organize
faction, to give it an artificial and extraordinary force, to put in
the place of the delegated will of the nation the will of a party,
often a small but artful and enterprising minority of the community;
and, according to the alternate triumphs of different parties, to make
the public administration the mirror of the ill-concerted and
incongruous projects of faction, rather than the organ of consistent
and wholesome plans, digested by common councils, and modified by
mutual interests.
However combinations or associations of the above description may now
and then answer popular ends, they are likely, in the course of time
and things, to become potent engines, by which cunning, ambitious, and
unprincipled men, will be enabled to subvert the power of the people,
and to usurp for themselves the reins of government, destroying
afterward the very engines which have lifted them to unjust dominion.
Towards the preservation of your government, and the permanency of
your present happy state, it is requisite not only that you steadily
discountenance irregular oppositions to its acknowledged authority,
but also that you resist with care the spirit of innovation upon its
principles, however specious the pretexts. One method of assault may
be to effect in the forms of the constitution alterations which will
impair the energy of the system, and thus to undermine what can not be
directly overthrown. In all the changes to which you may be invited,
remember that time and habit are at least as necessary to fix the true
character of governments as of other human institutions—that
experience is the surest standard by which to test the real tendency
of the existing constitution of a country—that facility in changes
upon the credit of a mere hypothesis and opinion, exposes to perpetual
change from the endless variety of hypothesis and opinion; and
remember especially that for the efficient management of your common
interests, in a country so extensive as ours, a government of as much
vigor as is consistent with the perfect security of liberty, is
indispensable. Liberty itself will find in such a government, with
powers properly distributed and adjusted, its surest guardian. It is,
indeed, little else than a name, where the government is too feeble to
withstand the enterprises of faction, to confine each member of the
society within the limits prescribed by the laws, and to maintain all
in the secure and tranquil enjoyment of the rights of person and
property.
I have already intimated to you the danger of parties in the state,
with particular references to the founding of them on geographical
discriminations. Let me now take a more comprehensive view, and warn
you in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the
spirit of party, generally.
This spirit, unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature, having its
root in the strongest passions of the human mind. It exists under
different shapes in all governments, more or less stifled or
controlled or repressed; but in those of the popular form, it is seen
in its greatest rankness, and is truly their worst enemy.
The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the
spirit of revenge, natural to party dissension, which in different
ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is
itself a frightful despotism. But this leads at length to a more
formal and permanent despotism. The disorders and miseries which
result, gradually incline the minds of men to seek security and repose
in the absolute power of an individual: and sooner or later the chief
of some prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his
competitors, turns this disposition to the purposes of his own
elevation, on the ruins of public liberty.
Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which
nevertheless ought not to be entirely out of sight), the common and
continual mischiefs of the spirit of party, are sufficient to make it
the interest and duty of a wise people to discourage and restrain it.
It serves always to distract the public councils, and enfeeble the
public administration. It agitates the community with ill-founded
jealousies and false alarms; kindles the animosity of one part against
another; foments occasional riot and insurrection. It opens the door
to foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated access
to the government itself through the channels of party passions. Thus
the policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and
will of another.
There is an opinion that parties in free countries are useful checks
upon the administration of the government, and serve to keep alive the
spirit of liberty. This, within certain limits, is probably true; and
in governments of a monarchical cast, patriotism may look with
indulgence, if not with favor, upon the spirit of party. But in those
of the popular character, in governments purely elective, it is a
spirit not to be encouraged. From their natural tendency it is certain
there will always be enough of that spirit for every salutary purpose.
And there being constant danger of excess, the effort ought to be, by
force of public opinion, to mitigate and assuage it. A fire not to be
quenched, it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into
a flame, lest, instead of warming, it should consume.
It is important, likewise, that the habits of thinking in a free
country should inspire caution in those intrusted with its
administration, to confine themselves within their respective
constitutional spheres, avoiding in the exercise of the powers of one
department to encroach upon another. The spirit of the encroachment
tends to consolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and
thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism. A
just estimate of that love of power, and proneness to abuse it, which
predominate in the human heart, is sufficient to satisfy us of the
truth of this position. The necessity of reciprocal checks in the
exercise of the political power, by dividing and distributing it into
different depositaries, and constituting each the guardian of the
public weal against invasions by the others, has been evinced by
experiments ancient and modern; some of them in our country, and under
our own eyes. To preserve them must be as necessary as to institute
them. If, in the opinion of the people, the distribution or
modification of the constitutional powers be, in any particular,
wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way which the
constitution designates; but let there be no change by usurpation; for
though this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the
customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. The
precedent must always greatly overbalance, in permanent evil, any
partial or transient benefit which the use can at any time yield.
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity,
religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that
man claim the tribute of patriotism, who would labor to subvert these
great pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of
men and citizens. The mere politician, equally with the pious man,
ought to respect and to cherish them. A volume could not trace all
their connections with private and public felicity. Let it simply be
asked where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if
the sense of religious obligation desert the oaths which are the
instruments of investigation in courts of justice? And let us with
caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained
without religion. Whatever may be conceded of the influence of refined
education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both
forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of
religious principle.
It is substantially true that virtue or morality is a necessary spring
of popular government. The rule indeed extends with more or less force
to every species of free government. Who that is a sincere friend to
it can look with indifference upon attempts to shake the foundation of
the fabric?
Promote, then, as an object of primary importance, institutions for
the general diffusion of knowledge. In proportion as the structure of
a government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that
public opinion should be enlightened.
As a very important source of strength and security, cherish public
credit. One method of preserving it is to use it as sparingly as
possible, avoiding occasions of expense, by cultivating peace, but
remembering also that timely disbursements, to prepare for dangers,
frequently prevent much greater disbursements, to repel it; avoiding
likewise the accumulation of debt, not only by shunning occasions of
expense, but by vigorous exertions in time of peace to discharge the
debts which unavoidable wars may have occasioned, not ungenerously
throwing upon posterity the burden which we ourselves ought to bear.
The execution of these maxims belongs to your representatives, but it
is necessary that public opinion should co-operate. To facilitate to
them the performance of their duty, it is essential that you should
practically bear in mind that toward the payment of debts there must
be revenue; that to have revenue there must be taxes; and no taxes can
be devised which are not more or less inconvenient and unpleasant;
that the intrinsic embarrassment inseparable from the selection of the
proper objects (which is always a choice of difficulties) ought to be
a decisive motive for a candid construction of the conduct of the
government in making it, and for a spirit of acquiescence in the
measures for obtaining revenue which the public exigencies may at any
time dictate.
Observe good faith and justice toward all nations; cultivate peace and
harmony with all. Religion and morality enjoin this conduct; and can
it be that good policy does not equally enjoin it? It will be worthy
of a free, enlightened, and (at no distant period) a great nation, to
give to mankind the magnanimous and novel example of a people always
guided by an exalted justice and benevolence. Who can doubt that, in
the course of time and things, the fruits of such a plan would richly
repay any temporary advantages which might be lost by a steady
adherence to it? Can it be that Providence has not connected the
permanent felicity of a nation with virtue? The experiment, at least,
is recommended by every sentiment which ennobles human nature. Alas!
is it rendered impossible by its vices?
In the execution of such a plan, nothing is more essential than that
permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations, and
passionate attachments for others, should be excluded; and that, in
the place of them, just and amicable feelings towards all should be
cultivated. The nation which indulges towards another an habitual
hatred, or an habitual fondness, is in some degree a slave. It is a
slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is
sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest. Antipathy
in one nation against another disposes each more readily to offer
insult and injury, to lay hold of slight causes of umbrage, and to be
haughty and intractable when accidental or trifling occasions of
dispute occur. Hence, frequent collisions, obstinate, envenomed and
bloody contests. The nation, prompted by ill-will and resentment,
sometimes impels to war the government, contrary to the best
calculations of policy. The government sometimes participates in the
national propensity, and adopts, through passion, what reason would
reject; at other times it makes the animosity of the nation
subservient to projects of hostility, instigated by pride, ambition,
and other sinister and pernicious motives. The peace often, sometimes
perhaps the liberty of nations, has been the victim.
So, likewise, a passionate attachment of one nation for another
produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favorite nation,
facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common interest, in cases
where no real common interest exists, and infusing into one the
enmities of the other, betrays the former into a participation in the
quarrels and wars of the latter without adequate inducement or
justification. It leads also to concessions to the favorite nation, of
privileges denied to others, which is apt doubly to injure the nation
making the concessions by unnecessarily parting with what ought to
have been retained, and by exciting jealousy, ill-will, and a
disposition to retaliate in the parties from whom equal privileges are
withheld; and it gives to ambitious, corrupted or deluded citizens
(who devote themselves to the favorite nation) facility to betray, or
sacrifice the interests of their own country, without odium, sometimes
even with popularity, gilding with the appearances of a virtuous sense
of obligation a commendable deference for public opinion, or a
laudable zeal for public good, the base or foolish compliances of
ambition, corruption, or infatuation.
As avenues to foreign influence in innumerable ways, such attachments
are particularly alarming to the truly enlightened and independent
patriot. How many opportunities do they afford to tamper with domestic
factions, to practice the arts of seduction, to mislead public
opinion, to influence or awe the public councils; such an attachment
of a small or weak, toward a great and powerful nation, dooms the
former to be the satellite of the latter.
Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to
believe me, fellow-citizens), the jealousy of a free people ought to
be _constantly_ awake; since history and experience prove that foreign
influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government.
But that jealousy, to be useful, must be impartial, else it becomes
the instrument of the very influence to be avoided, instead of a
defense against it. Excessive partiality for one foreign nation and
excessive dislike of another, cause those whom they actuate to see
danger only on one side, and serve to veil and even second the arts of
influence on the other. Real patriots, who may resist the intrigues of
the favorite, are liable to become suspected and odious, while its
tools and dupes usurp the applause and confidence of the people to
surrender their interests. The great rule of conduct for us in regard
to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have
with them as little _political_ connection as possible. So far as we
have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect
good faith. Here let us stop.
Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none, or a very
remote relation. Hence, she must be engaged in frequent controversies,
the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence,
therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by
artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the
ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or her
enmities.
Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a
different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient
government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury
from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will
cause the neutrality, we may at any time resolve upon, to be
scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the
impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard
the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our
interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.
Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own
to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with
that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the
toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?
It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any
portion of the foreign world, so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty
to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing
infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less
applicable to public than to private affairs, that honesty is always
the best policy. I repeat it, therefore, let those engagements be
observed in their genuine sense: but, in my opinion, it is
unnecessary, and would be unwise to extend them.
Taking care always to keep ourselves, by suitable establishments, on a
respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary
alliances for extraordinary emergencies.
Harmony and a liberal intercourse with all nations are recommended by
policy, humanity, and interest. But even our commercial policy should
hold an equal and impartial hand, neither seeking nor granting
exclusive favors or preferences, consulting the natural course of
things, diffusing and diversifying, by gentle means, the streams of
commerce, but forcing nothing; establishing, with the powers so
disposed, in order to give trade a staple course, to define the rights
of our merchants, and to enable government to support them,
conventional rules of intercourse, the best that present circumstances
and mutual opinion will permit, but temporary, and liable to be, from
time to time, abandoned or varied, as experience and circumstances
shall dictate; constantly keeping in view, that it is folly in one
nation to look for disinterested favors from another; that it must
pay, with a portion of its independence, for whatever it may accept
under that character; that by such acceptance it may place itself in
the condition of having given equivalents for nominal favors, and yet
of being reproached with ingratitude for not giving more. There can be
no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favors from
nation to nation. It is an illusion which experience must cure, which
a just pride ought to discard.
In offering to you, my countrymen, these counsels of an old and
affectionate friend, I dare not hope they will make the strong and
lasting impression I could wish; that they will control the usual
current of the passions, or prevent our nation from running the course
which has hitherto marked the destiny of nations; but, if I may even
flatter myself that they may be productive of some partial benefit,
some occasional good; that they may now and then recur to moderate the
fury of party spirit; to warn against the mischiefs of foreign
intrigue; to guard against the impostures of pretended patriotism;
this hope will be a full recompense for the solicitude for your
welfare by which they have been dictated.
How far, in the discharge of my official duties, I have been guided by
the principles which have been delineated, the public records and
other evidences of my conduct must witness to you and to the world. To
myself the assurance of my own conscience is, that I have at least
believed myself to be guided by them.
In relation to the still subsisting war in Europe, my proclamation of
the 22d of April, 1793, is the index to my plan. Sanctioned by your
approving voice, and by that of your representatives in both houses of
Congress, the spirit of that measure has continually governed me,
uninfluenced by any attempts to deter or divert me from it.
After deliberate examination, with the aid of the best lights I could
obtain, I was well satisfied that our country, under all the
circumstances of the case, had a right to take—and was bound in duty
and interest to take—a neutral position. Having taken it, I
determined, as far as should depend on me, to maintain it with
moderation, perseverance, and firmness.
The considerations which respect the right to hold this conduct, it is
not necessary on this occasion to detail. I will only observe that,
according to my understanding of the matter, that right, so far from
being denied by any of the belligerent powers, has been virtually
admitted by all.
The duty of holding a neutral conduct may be inferred, without
anything more, from the obligation which justice and humanity impose
on every nation, in cases in which it is free to act, to maintain
inviolate the relations of peace and amity toward other nations.
The inducement of interests for observing that conduct will best be
referred to your own reflections and experience. With me, a
predominant motive has been to endeavor to gain time to our country to
settle and mature its yet recent institutions, and to progress,
without interruption, to that degree of strength and consistency which
is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the command of its own
fortunes.
Though in reviewing the incidents of my administration, I am
unconscious of intentional error, I am, nevertheless, too sensible of
my defects not to think it probable that I may have committed many
errors. Whatever they may be, I fervently beseech the Almighty to
avert or mitigate the evils to which they may tend. I shall also carry
with me the hope that my country will never cease to view them with
indulgence; and that after forty-five years of my life dedicated to
its service with an upright zeal, the faults of incompetent abilities
will be consigned to oblivion, as myself must soon be to the mansions
of rest.
Relying on its kindness in this as in other things, and actuated by
that fervent love towards it, which is so natural to a man who views
in it the native soil of himself and his progenitors for several
generations, I anticipate with phasing expectation that retreat in
which I promise myself to realize, without alloy, the sweet enjoyment
of partaking in the midst of my fellow-citizens, the benign influence
of good laws under a free government—the ever favorite object of my
heart, and the happy reward, as I trust, of our mutual cares, labors,
and dangers.
GEORGE WASHINGTON.
_United States, September 17, 1796._
Transcriber’s Note
Unequivocal typographical and paragraph numbering errors have been
corrected.