CRITICISM OF THE BILL NOW BEFORE THE COUNTRY.
That the maintenance of the Union is possible, and that complete
separation is possible, are two indisputable facts. But the question
is, was Wolfe Tone right when he said that these were the only two
possibilities; or is there a third one, and if so, what?
Residents in the Dominions will naturally be inclined to reply "Yes;
place Ireland in the position of a colony possessing responsible
government, such as New Zealand." It is a taking idea; but a little
reflection will show the falseness of the analogy. The relations
between the Mother Country and the self-governing colonies (now
often called "Dominions") have grown up of themselves; and, like
most political conditions which have so come about, are theoretically
illogical but practically convenient. The practical convenience arises
partly from the friendly spirit which animates both parties, but still
more from the nature of the case. The distance which separates the
Mother Country from the Dominions causes the anomalies to be scarcely
perceptible. In theory the Sovereign, acting on the advice of
British Ministers, can disallow any colonial statute, and the British
Parliament is supreme--it can pass laws that will bind the colonies,
even laws imposing taxes. But we all know that if the Home Government
were persistently to veto laws passed by the large majority of the
people in New Zealand, or the British Parliament were to attempt to
legislate for the colonies, relations would at once become strained,
and separation would be inevitable. The only important matters on
which the Home Government attempts to bind the colonies are those
relating to foreign countries (which are necessarily of an Imperial
nature) and those as to which the colonies themselves wish to have
an Act passed, such as the Act establishing Australian Federation. In
other words, the "supremacy of Parliament," which is a stern reality
in England, has very little meaning as regards New Zealand. Even if
the people of New Zealand were to manage the affairs of their country
in a manner contrary to English ideas--for instance if they were to
establish State lotteries and public gambling tables--England would be
but slightly affected, and certainly would never think of taking steps
to prevent them. And those matters in which the Home Government is
obliged to act are just those in which New Zealand has no desire
to interfere; for instance, New Zealand would never want to appoint
consuls of her own (which was the immediate cause of the separation
between Norway and Sweden); in the very few cases in which New Zealand
desires to make use of political or commercial agents abroad, she is
content to employ the British representatives, for whom she is
not called upon to pay. If New Zealand attempted to take part in a
European war in which England was not concerned--the idea is almost
too absurd to suggest--the only thing that England could do would be
to break off the connection and repudiate New Zealand altogether.
And if New Zealand desired to separate from the Mother Country, many
people would think it a most grievous mistake, but England certainly
would not seek to prevent her doing so by force; and though England
would in some ways be the worse for it, the government of England
and of the rest of the Empire would go on much the same as before. In
certain points, it is true, thoughtful men have generally come to the
conclusion that the present state of affairs cannot go on unchanged;
the time is coming when the great Dominions must provide for their own
defence by sea as well as by land; and whether this is to be done by
separate navies working together or by joint contributions to a
common navy, it will probably result in the formation of some Imperial
Council in which all parts will have a voice. That however, is a
matter for future discussion and arrangement.
But when we turn to Ireland, everything is different. The two islands
are separated by less than fifty miles. Ireland has for more than a
century been adequately represented in the Imperial Parliament; the
journey from Galway to London is shorter than that from Auckland
or Dunedin to Wellington. So long as Europe remains as it is, Great
Britain and Ireland must have a common system of defence--which means
one army, one navy, and one plan of fortifications. Again, Irishmen,
traders and others, will constantly have to make use of government
agents in other countries. Now unless Great Britain is to arrange and
pay for the whole of this, we are met at once by the insoluble problem
of Irish representation in the British Parliament. If Ireland is not
represented there, we are faced with the old difficulty of taxation
without representation; if Ireland is represented there for all
purposes, Ireland can interfere in the local affairs of England, but
England cannot in those of Ireland; if we have what has been called
the "in-and-out" scheme as proposed by Gladstone in 1893--that is, for
the Irish members to vote on all questions of an Imperial nature,
but to retire when matters affecting England only are under
discussion--then, even if the line could be drawn (which is doubtful)
we might have the absurdity of an English ministry which possessed
the confidence of the majority of Englishmen and whose management of
England met their approval, being turned out of office by the Irish
vote, and England being governed according to a policy which the
majority of Englishmen detested. Of course it may be said that there
ought to be a number of small Parliaments in the British Isles, like
those in the Provinces of Canada or the States of Australia, with one
great Parliament supreme over them--in other words, Federation.
That might be a good thing, although it would in its turn start many
difficulties which it is unnecessary now to discuss, for it is not
Home Rule nor does Home Rule lead to it. Federal systems arise by the
union of separate States, each State giving up a part of its power
to a joint body which can levy taxes and can overrule the local
authorities. In fact, when Federation comes about, the States cease to
be nations.
(I must here remark in passing that constant confusion has been caused
by the various senses in which the word "nation" is used. Thus it is
often quite correctly employed in a sentimental sense--we speak of
Scottish National character, or of the National Bible Society of
Scotland, though Scotland has no separate Parliament or flag and would
on a map of Europe be painted the same colour as the rest of Great
Britain. Quite distinct from that is the political sense, in which the
Irish Nationalists use the word when speaking of being "A Nation once
again," or of "The National Independence of Ireland.")
It might be possible for the United Kingdom to be broken up into a
Federation (though it is strange that there is no precedent in history
for such a course); but that would not be "satisfying the National
Aspirations of Ireland." In fact, as Mr. Childers, one of the ablest
of English advocates of Home Rule, has stated: "The term Federal, as
applied to Irish Home Rule at the present time, is meaningless."
But when we come to examine the existing Bill, which will become law
in 1914 unless something unforeseen occurs, we find that it is neither
the Colonial plan nor Federation but an elaborate system which really
seems as if it had been devised with the object of satisfying nobody
and producing friction at every point. England (by which of course I
mean Great Britain; I merely use the shorter term for convenience)
is not only to pay the total cost of the army, navy and diplomatic
services, including the defences of Ireland, but is also to grant an
annual subsidy to Ireland commencing with £500,000 but subsequently
reduced to £200,000. Whether the English taxpayer will relish this
when he comes to realise it, may be doubted. Certainly no precedent
can be cited for a Federal system under which all the common
expenditure is borne by one of the parties. And further, the present
Government state freely that they hope to carry out their policy by
introducing a Bill for Home Rule for Scotland and possibly also for
Wales. Will the Scotch and Welsh consent to contribute towards the
government of Ireland; or will they demand that they shall be treated
like Ireland, and leave the people of England to pay all Imperial
services and to subsidize Ireland, Scotland and Wales? Then again,
Ireland is to send forty-two representatives to what is still
sarcastically to be called the "Parliament of the United Kingdom," but
will no doubt popularly be known as the English Parliament. They
are to vote about the taxation of people in Great Britain, and to
interfere in local affairs of that country, whilst the people of
Great Britain are not to tax Ireland or interfere in any way with its
affairs. This is indeed representation without taxation. Of course it
is inevitable that the Irish members will continue to do what they are
doing at present--that is, offer their votes to whatever party will
promise further concessions to Irish Nationalism; and they will
probably find no more difficulty in getting an English party to
consent to such an immoral bargain than they do now.
The provisions as to legislation for Ireland are still more
extraordinary. The Irish Parliament is to have complete power of
legislating as to Irish affairs, with the exception of certain matters
enumerated in the Act; thus it may repeal any Acts of the Imperial
Parliament passed before 1914. On the other hand, the English
Parliament (in which Ireland will have only forty-two representatives)
will also be able to pass laws binding Ireland (and in this way to
re-enact the laws which the Irish Parliament has just repealed), and
these new laws the Irish Parliament may not repeal or overrule. Now
this power of the English Parliament will either be a reality or a
farce; if it is a reality, the Irish Nationalists will be no more
inclined to submit to laws made by "an alien Parliament" in which they
have only forty-two representatives than they are at present to submit
to those made by one in which they have 103; if it is a farce, the
"supremacy of the Imperial Parliament" is a misleading expression.
The Lord Lieutenant is to act as to some matters on the advice of the
Irish Ministry, as to others on the advice of the English. Anyone who
has studied the history of constitutional government in the colonies
in the early days, when the governor was still supposed to act as
to certain affairs independently of ministerial advice, will see the
confusion to which this must lead. Suppose the Lord Lieutenant acts
on the advice of the English ministers in a way of which the
Irish Parliament do not approve, and the Irish Ministry resign in
consequence, what can result but a deadlock?
But most extraordinary of all are the provisions as to finance. The
Government appointed a Committee of Experts to consider this question.
The committee made their report; but the Government rejected their
advice and substituted another plan which is so elaborate that it is
only possible to touch on some of its more important features here.
I have already said that the English Parliament will have no power
to tax Ireland. That statement, however, must be taken subject to two
reservations. The Bill provides that if ever the happy day arrives
when for three consecutive years the revenue of Ireland has exceeded
the cost of government, the English Parliament (with the addition of
twenty-three extra members summoned from Ireland for the purpose)
may make new provisions securing from Ireland a contribution towards
Imperial expenditure. As this is the only reference to the subject
in the Bill, the general opinion was that until those improbable
circumstances should occur, the English Parliament would have no power
to tax Ireland; but when the debates were drawing to a close, the
Government astonished the House by stating that according to their
construction of the Bill, should any new emergency arise at any time
after the Bill becomes law (for instance, a great naval emergency
requiring an addition to the Income Tax) it would be not merely the
right but also the duty of the Imperial Chancellor of the Exchequer
to see that the charge should be borne by the whole United Kingdom--in
other words, the Parliament in which Ireland possesses only forty-two
representatives may and ought to tax Ireland for Imperial purposes.
The friction which will arise should any attempt of the sort be made,
especially as the power is not stated in the Bill, is evident. In
plain words, it will be impossible to levy the tax.
But apart from these rights, which one may safely say will never be
exercised, the financial arrangements will from their very complexity
be a constant source of trouble. All taxes levied in Ireland are to be
paid into the English Exchequer (or as it is called in the Bill "The
Exchequer of the United Kingdom"). Some of the objects for which
these taxes have been levied are to be managed by the Irish
Government--these are called "Irish services"; others are to be
managed by the English Government--these are called "Reserved
services." The English Exchequer will then hand over to the Irish
Exchequer:--
(a) A sum representing the net cost to the Exchequer of the
United Kingdom of "Irish Services" at the time of the passing
of the Act;
(b) The sum of £500,000 a year, reducible to £200,000, above
referred to; and
(c) A sum equal to the proceeds of any new taxes levied by the
Irish Parliament.
Then the balance which the English Exchequer will retain, after
handing over these three sums, will go to the "Reserved Services." But
as, in consequence of the establishment of the Old Age Pensions
and some other similar liabilities, the aggregate cost of governing
Ireland at this moment exceeds the revenue derived from Ireland by
about £1,500,000, the English taxpayer will have to make up this sum,
as well as to give to Ireland an annual present of £500,000; and
even if the Irish Government succeeds in managing its affairs more
economically than the Government at present does, that will give no
relief to the British taxpayer, for it will be observed that the first
of the three sums which the Exchequer of the United Kingdom is to hand
over is not a sum representing the cost of the "Irish Services" at any
future date but the cost at the time of the passing of the Act.
It is possible of course that the Irish revenue derived from existing
taxes may increase, and so the burden on the English taxpayer may
be lightened; but as it is more probable that it will decrease, and
consequently the burden become heavier, the English taxpayer cannot
derive much consolation from that.
It will be seen from the foregoing remarks that a number of extremely
intricate and difficult financial questions must arise; for instance,
what sum really represents the net cost of "Irish Services" at the
time of the passing of the Act; what sum equals the net proceeds of
new taxes imposed by the Irish Parliament; and at what moment it can
be said that the revenue of Ireland has for three consecutive years
exceeded the cost of government. All such matters are to be decided
by a Board of Five, of whom one is to be nominated by the King
(presumably on the advice of the English Ministers), two by the
English Government, and two by the Irish. From the decisions of this
Board on matters of fact there is to be no appeal. It is needless
to point out that every detail in which the three English members
overrule the two Irish will be fought out again in the English
Parliament by the forty Irish members. This again will show how vain
is the hope that future English Parliaments will be relieved from
endless discussions as to Irish affairs. Professor Dicey has well
named the able work in which he has analysed the Bill and shown its
impossibilities "A Fool's Paradise."
The provisions concerning those matters as to which the Irish
Parliament is to have no power to legislate are as strange as the
other clauses of the Bill. For six years the Constabulary are to be a
"reserved service"; but as they will be under the orders of the Irish
Government, the object of this is hard to see--unless indeed it is to
create an impression that the Ulstermen if they refuse to obey them
are rebelling not against the Irish but the Imperial Government. The
Post Office Savings Banks are "reserved" for a longer period; as to
the postal services to places beyond Ireland, the Irish Parliament
will have no power to legislate; but the Post Office, so far as it
relates to Ireland alone, will be handed over at once to the Irish
Parliament--although even in the case of Federal Unions such as
Australia the Post Office is usually considered to be eminently a
matter for the Federal authority. And the question whether an Irish
Act is unconstitutional and therefore void will be decided by the
Privy Council, which will be regarded as an essentially English body;
hence if it attempts to veto an Irish Act, its action will be at once
denounced as a revival of Poyning's Act and the Declaratory Act of
George I.
The Bill excludes the relations with Foreign States from the powers of
the Irish Parliament, but says nothing to prevent the Irish Government
from appointing a political agent to the Vatican. That is probably one
of the first things that it will do; and as the Lord Lieutenant could
never form a Government which would consent to any other course, he
will be obliged to consent. This agent, not being responsible to the
British Foreign Office, may cause constant friction between England
and Italy.
But quite apart from the unworkable provisions of the Bill, everything
connected with its introduction and passing through Parliament has
tended to increase the hatred which the Opposition feel towards it,
and the determination of the Ulstermen to resist it if necessary even
by force. Those who lived in Australia whilst Federation was under
discussion will recollect how carefully the scheme was brought before
the people, discussed in various Colonial Parliaments, considered over
again line by line by the delegates in an Inter-Colonial Conference,
examined afresh in the Colonial Office in London and in the Imperial
Parliament and finally laid before each colony for its acceptance. Yet
here is a matter which vitally affects the government not of Ireland
only but of the whole United Kingdom, and thus indirectly of the
Empire at large; it was (as I have shown) not fairly brought before
the people at a general election; it has been introduced by what
is admittedly merely a coalition Government as a matter of bargain
between the various sections, at a time when the British Constitution
is in a state of dislocation, as the power of the House of Lords has
been destroyed and the new Upper Chamber not yet set up; and it has
been passed without adequate discussion. This I say deliberately; it
is no use to point out how many hours have been spent in Committee,
for the way in which the discussion has been conducted has deprived
it of any real value. The custom has been for the Government to state
beforehand the time at which each batch of clauses is to be passed,
and what amendments may be discussed (the rest being passed over in
silence); when the discussion is supposed to begin, their supporters
ostentatiously walk out, and the Opposition argue to empty benches;
then when the moment for closing the discussion arrives, the Minister
in charge gets up and says that the Government cannot accept any of
the amendments proposed; the bell rings, the Government supporters
troop back, and pass all the clauses unamended. As an instance of this
contemptible way of conducting the debate, it is sufficient to point
to the fact already mentioned, that so vital a matter as the power
of the English Parliament to tax Ireland was not even hinted at until
nearly the end of the debates.
And now the Bill is to become law without any further appeal to the
people.
Are English Unionists to be blamed if they declare that an Act so
passed will possess no moral obligation, and that they are determined,
should the terrible necessity arise, to aid the Ulstermen in resisting
it to the uttermost?