There was some slavery in the Northwest Territory to which Lincoln
moved with his father from Kentucky, for although that section had
been dedicated to freedom by the Ordinance of 1787, slavery in a
modified form existed there for three reasons. The Ordinance was not
considered emancipatory so far as it regarded the British slaves held
in such service prior to 1795, those of French masters prior to 1763
and those already in that condition when the Ordinance was passed.
Furthermore, after separating from the Indiana Territory, Illinois
legalized slavery by indenture, provided for the hiring of slaves from
Southern States to supply labor in its various industries, and at the
same time passed a stringent law to prohibit the immigration of free
Negroes into that State. Later there followed an attempt to open the
State to slavery by the Legislature of 1822-1823, but the slave party
was defeated by the election of Governor Coles, who would not permit
the reactionary element to reduce that commonwealth to a mediaeval
basis.[1] Such slavery as existed in Illinois, however, differed
widely from that in the South where it had become economic rather than
patriarchal as it then existed in certain parts of the North.
On a trip by way of the Sangamon and the Mississippi to New Orleans in
May 1831, Abraham Lincoln got his first impression of economic slavery
when he "saw Negroes chained, maltreated, whipped and scourged."[2] He
made no mention of this spectacle until a decade later when journeying
from Louisville to St. Louis he saw ten or twelve slaves shackled
together on a boat. This was sufficient to convince him that this
institution was not only an economic evil but a disgrace to a country
pretending to be free. Lincoln, therefore, early decided within
himself that if he ever attained a position of sufficient power to do
something for the extermination of this institution, he would count it
the opportunity of his life.
There soon followed an occasion when Lincoln had an opportunity to
show his constituents his position on this important question. As a
result of the murder of Lovejoy the question of slavery was brought up
at the session of the legislature held in 1837 and was referred to a
committee. The report of this committee expressed disapproval of
abolition societies and carried a declaration to the effect that the
Federal Constitution secured the right of property in slaves, and the
Government of the United States could not abolish slavery in the
District of Columbia without the consent of its citizens. After much
heated debate and filibustering these resolutions were finally passed,
although Lincoln and five other members voted in the negative. Then
there followed from Lincoln and Daniel A. Stone a protest, questioning
and attacking the moral support of slavery, yet recognizing all the
constitutional guarantees that protected it.[3]
Lincoln, as an Illinois Representative in Congress, resorted to a
similar procedure in that national body. At this time there was almost
a pitched battle between the slave States and the free commonwealths,
each one endeavoring to develop more strength than the other in the
effort to dictate the policy of the nation with reference to the
States to be formed out of the remaining western territory. Lincoln
did not take any active part in the discussion of slavery during the
first session of his service in Congress, but he always voted against
any measure providing for the extension of the institution. However,
he still adhered to his position as set forth in the protest in the
Illinois Legislature, that Congress had power under the Constitution
to regulate or prohibit slavery in all territory subject to its
jurisdiction, provided that such power be exercised with due regard to
constitutional rights. He, therefore, decided to test the question
whether it was possible to remove from the seat of the Federal
Government the offensive traffic in human beings. In formulating his
plans to carry out this policy, he consulted the leading citizens of
the District of Columbia and certain prominent men in Congress.
Having secured the approval of Mayor Seaton of Washington, a
representative of the intelligent slave-holding citizens of the
District of Columbia, and also the support of Joshua Giddings, the
leading abolition member of Congress, Lincoln proposed a bill to this
effect. Thereupon Giddings made these remarks: "This evening (January
11th) our whole mess remained in the dining room after tea, and
conversed upon the subject of Mr. Lincoln's bill to abolish slavery.
It was approved by all; I believe it as good bill as we could get at
this time, and am willing to pay for slaves to save them from the
southern market, as I suppose every man in the District would sell his
slaves if he saw that slavery was to be abolished."[4]
In the meantime a less radical bill providing also for the abolition
of slavery in the District of Columbia had been introduced by
Representative Gott of New York. Lincoln, therefore, moved as an
amendment on January 16, 1849, that a committee report a bill for the
emancipation of all slaves in the District of Columbia. This measure
prohibited the bringing of slaves into and selling them out of the
District except in the case of those temporarily serving persons
representing slave-holding States. It made provision for a tentative
system of apprenticeship and the eventual emancipation of children
born of slave mothers after January 1, 1850. It further provided for
the manumission of slaves by the Government of the United States with
compensation to the owners who might make application therefor, for
the return of fugitive slaves from Washington and Georgetown, and
finally for the submission of the bill to popular vote in the District
of Columbia. This measure, however, and its probability of success so
excited the proslavery members of Congress and the slave owners in the
District of Columbia that a violent opposition thereto followed. So
many influential forces were arrayed against the measure that its
friends did not further endeavor to pilot it through the House.[5]
This unsuccessful effort marked the expiration of Lincoln's term in
Congress.
Declining to become a candidate for renomination to Congress, Lincoln
returned to Springfield, partially withdrew from politics, and devoted
himself largely to the practice of law. He reappeared as an active
participant in politics in Illinois in 1854, when there appeared a new
aspect of the question as reflected by the debate incident to the
Kansas-Nebraska controversy. At this time Lincoln was called for in
all directions to deliver addresses to inform the people on the issue
of the day. In this connection he demonstrated his inalterable
opposition to the extension of slavery.[6] He objected to the
iniquitous doctrine of the Nebraska Bill in that it assumed that there
was moral right in the enslaving of one man by another, and, further,
that it tended to be unmistakably subversive of the basic principles
of the Declaration of Independence. Lincoln was of the opinion that
the salvation of the Union was dependent upon the extension or the
restriction of slavery. Realizing the futility and the hopelessness of
voluntary emancipation, he asserted that the "Autocrat of all the
Russias" would resign his crown, and proclaim freedom to all his
subjects sooner than the "American masters" would voluntarily give up
their slaves.[7] It is remarkable that Lincoln's speculative
affirmation was followed by what he thought an impossibility, for on
the day preceding Mr. Lincoln's inauguration the "Autocrat of all the
Russias," Alexander II, by an imperial decree emancipated his serfs;
"while six weeks after the inauguration, the proslavery element,
headed by Jefferson Davis, began the Rebellion to perpetuate and to
spread the institution of slavery."
In 1857 came the Dred Scott decision, in which Chief Justice Taney of
the Supreme Court dragged that tribunal into politics, aiming to
settle the question of slavery in the territories, but it stimulated
rather than suppressed the discussion of slavery, as was evident by
its outburst in the debates between Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Stephen A.
Douglas.[8] The main question was whether, according to the
Constitution, Congress could prohibit slavery in the territories.
Lincoln contended that it could but Douglas was evasive, as he hoped
to reconcile his popular sovereignty with the Dred Scott decision.
Lincoln, on the other hand, showed that the public estimate of the
Negro had become decidedly lower than it was prior to the industrial
revolution, when masters could emancipate their bondmen of their own
volition. Since then it had become common for the State Legislature,
which in the exercise of the sovereignty of the State had the power to
abolish slavery within its limits, to withhold that power and to make
legal restraints tantamount to prohibition.
Lincoln opposed Mr. Douglas in 1858 when he contested the latter's
reelection to the United States Senate. Toward this end he launched a
more determined antislavery program than ever before, advancing the
doctrine that "a house divided against itself cannot stand" and
likewise that "the Union could not endure permanently, half slave and
half free."[9] He further declared that either the advocates of
slavery would push the institution forward until it became alike
lawful in both North and South, or the opponents thereof would arrest
its extension. Douglas had charged the Republicans with the intent to
abolish slavery in the States and had asserted that their opposition
to the Dred Scott decision marked their desire for Negro equality and
amalgamation.[10] To this charge Lincoln replied that the Republicans
were not directing their efforts toward abolition in the slave States,
but toward the exclusion of slavery from the territories. He forcibly
denied the accusation that the Republicans solicited social equality
and amalgamation with the Negro, declaring that there was a physical
difference between the two races, which probably would forever forbid
their living together on equal footing; and that, inasmuch as it
became a necessity that there must be a difference, he, like Douglas,
favored his race for the superior position. Lincoln admitted that in
some respects the Negro, according to the Declaration of Independence,
was not the white man's equal; that in color, size, intellect, moral
development, or social capacity the Negro was not on a par with the
white man; but that that instrument did, with tolerable distinctness,
consider "all men created equal" with certain inalienable rights, such
as "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."[11] Lincoln held
that, notwithstanding all these facts, there was no reason why the
Negro was not entitled to all the natural rights embraced by the
Declaration of Independence, which are enjoyed by the white man.[12]
He interpreted the standard maxim that "all men are created equal" as
being of no practical use in effecting the separation of the thirteen
Colonies from Great Britain, and, on the contrary, contended that it
was placed in the Declaration of Independence for future use in the
attainment of democracy.
Lincoln failed to defeat Douglas for the United States Senate but he
continued to discuss the constitutionality of the restriction of
slavery. On more than one instance he limited his remarks to this
question, irrespective of the type of his audience or character of the
occasion. He persistently reiterated the doctrine that there was no
provision in the Constitution that precluded the right of the Federal
Government to control slavery in the territories.[13]
The crisis between 1850 and 1860 brought Lincoln's ideas before larger
groups. Until that year the Democrats had apparently remained united.
At the Democratic National Convention in Charleston, South Carolina,
in April, 1860, there was a division.[14] The Northern Democrats,
unable to comply with the demands of the slave power that the
convention should adopt a platform requiring Congress to protect
slavery in the territories and the Northerners to acknowledge and
advocate the moral right of slavery, forced the South to the radical
position of withdrawing from the Convention. Since no candidate could
then be nominated, the Convention adjourned to Baltimore, in the hope
that time would bring about a reconciliation; but in the end the
Northern Democrats nominated Douglas, and the Southerners nominated
Breckenridge.[15]
The Republican Convention was held in Chicago in May 1860, and there
was adopted a moderate platform, with a denial of the right of
Congress to interfere with slavery in the States. The Republicans
reaffirmed the Declaration of Independence and declared that Congress
should prohibit slavery in the territories. They repudiated the Dred
Scott decision and advocated a protective system. Their most difficult
problem was the selection of a candidate for the presidency. Inasmuch
as Seward and Chase had alienated certain elements by their bold
advocacy of advanced principles and Lincoln was comparatively unknown,
the managers of the party finally accepted him because of his
availability. This choice was received with much indignation among the
antislavery leaders, for even Wendell Phillips and William Lloyd
Garrison railed against the nominee and portrayed him as an
obscurity.[16]
Lincoln's election forced slavery into the foreground. Without
waiting for his inauguration, several Southern States, acting in
accordance with their previous threats that they would secede if a
Republican President were elected, withdrew from the Union. Others
soon followed their example. Congress hastened to offer various
concessions to the seceding States,[17] but these efforts for
compromise were in vain. The die was cast. When Lincoln asserted that
his oath of office bound him to preserve the Union at any cost, civil
war became inevitable. The proslavery element opened fire on the
American flag at Fort Sumter and forced its surrender April 14.[18] On
the next day Lincoln issued a proclamation calling for 75,000
volunteers. 500,000 others were later called to defend the honor of
the nation.
The emancipation of Negroes during the Civil War could not be kept
down. It appeared first in the acceptance of Negroes in the Union army
camps as contraband, on the ground that they were being used by the
Confederates to build fortifications and the like and, if returned to
the seceding territory, would be of further use in opposing the
Federal troops. General Butler set this precedent when he was in
charge of the forces at Fortress Monroe. At first there was some
hesitation as to whether the administration should adopt such a
policy. Butler's course, however, was approved by Cameron, the
Secretary of War, May 30, 1861, although Lincoln was not pleased with
it; for he did not desire to alienate the border slave States by
radical steps toward emancipation. He was hoping that the nation would
trust him, "as having the more commanding view, gradually to fix the
attitude of the Government toward the subject,"[19] as the conquest of
the Confederacy proceeded. The Federal troops, however, did not at
first make much headway in the East, but events west of the
Alleghenies progressed favorably for the Union cause, especially in
Missouri. Taking advantage of this state of affairs, General John C.
Fremont, in charge of this district, proclaimed military emancipation
in that State on August 30, 1861. All persons with arms were to be
tried by court martial and shot. Their property would be confiscated,
and their slaves would thereby be declared free. He appointed a
military commission, whose business it was to hear evidence and to
issue personal deeds of the manumission of slaves.
When Lincoln was apprised of this proclamation, he forthwith took
action. He feared that the provisions of General Fremont's drastic
order, providing for the confiscation of property and the emancipation
of slaves of traitorous owners, would alarm the Southern friends of
the Union, would drive them over to the seceding faction, and perhaps
would be instrumental in the loss of the border slave States.
Fremont's action was diametrically opposed to Lincoln's policy, in
that such emancipation was purely administrative and political, one of
civil administration that could not be justified by military
necessity. Consequently Lincoln issued an order instructing Fremont to
modify his proclamation by striking out the disturbing provisions of
the proclamation and substituting therefor the act to confiscate
property used for insurrectionary purposes, passed by Congress on
August 6, 1861, which authorized the President to cause property used
or employed in aid of insurrection to be seized, confiscated, or
condemned, providing, however, that such condemnation be made by
judicial procedure.[20]
Lincoln, nevertheless, hoped to increase the number of free States
through compensated emancipation, which he expected to come through
voluntary action on the part of the slave States at the suggestion of
the Federal Government. In his next annual message to Congress,
however, he made no direct reference to any specific plan of
emancipation, but discussed its practical necessities in general terms
so as to leave himself in a position to decide later on a definite
policy.[21] He endeavored to keep before Congress new and possible
contingencies and emphasized the fact that, by virtue of the
Confiscation Act, many of the slaves thus liberated were already
dependent upon the United States for maintenance, and that they must
be provided for. He recommended, therefore, that Congress provide for
accepting such persons from States so affected in lieu of direct
taxes, and that such persons accepted by the General Government be
declared free immediately.
With his plan for compensated emancipation in mind, it was quite
natural that Lincoln should look for a field of experimentation in a
small State, such as Delaware, especially since there was in Congress
from that State, Representative George E. Fisher, who was a staunch
Unionist and a friend of the President. Fisher gladly cooperated with
Lincoln in carrying out this plan. The Congressman tried to have the
Legislature of Delaware pass an act for the gradual compensated
emancipation of the 1,798 slaves which that State claimed according to
the census of 1861, on the condition that the United States would pay
the Delaware slaveholders $400 for each slave. During November of
1861, Lincoln wrote drafts of two separate bills to effect such an
agreement.[22] The first bill provided that, on the passage of the
act, all Negroes over thirty-five years of age should become free;
that all born after the passage of the measure should remain free; and
that the rest, after suitable apprenticeship for children, should
become free in 1893, while the State in the meanwhile should prohibit
the selling of Delaware slaves elsewhere. By the provisions of the
second bill the United States Government should pay the State of
Delaware $23,200 a year for thirty-one years and all Negroes born
after the passage of the act should be declared free, while all others
should automatically become free at thirty-five years of age until
January, 1893, when all remaining slaves of all ages should become
free, subject to apprenticeship for minors born of slave mothers up
to the respective ages of eighteen and twenty-one.
One of the drafts was rewritten by the friends of the measure that it
might embrace the details and alterations to conform with local
opinion and law. It was printed and circulated among the members of
the Legislature of Delaware and a special session of that body was
called to consider the proposal. The bill, however, was never
introduced, because it was feared that it would be voted down by the
hostile proslavery majority. The proslavery element, moreover,
prepared resolutions to the effect that the bill would encourage the
abolition element in Congress, that it bore evidence of an effort to
abolish slavery in the States, that Congress had no right to
appropriate money for the purchase of slaves, that it was not
desirable to make Delaware guarantee the public faith of the United
States, that the suggestion of saving expenses to the people by
compensated emancipation was a bribe, and that Delaware would abolish
slavery of its own volition at a time when its lawmakers would deem it
advisable. But these resolutions did not fare much better than
Lincoln's bill, for in spite of the fact that they passed the House
they were lost in the Senate.[23]
Although disappointed over the failure of his plans for compensated
emancipation in Delaware, Lincoln, encouraged by the victories of
Thomas and Grant in the West took his next step through Congress to
the States.[24] Accordingly, on March 6, 1862, he sent to that body a
special message, recommending the adoption of the joint resolution
that the United States would cooperate with any State which might
adopt gradual emancipation, giving such State compensation for all
inconveniences produced by the change of any system within its
confines.[25] Lincoln had figured out that less than the cost of the
war for a half day would pay for all the slaves in Delaware at $400
each, and that less than eighty-seven days' cost of the war would
compensate the slaveowners of Delaware, Maryland, the District of
Columbia, Kentucky, and Missouri for all the slaves at the same rate.
The next step took the form of Roscoe Conkling's joint resolution to
this effect recommended by Lincoln in his special message of March 6.
At the same time Lincoln assembled the Congressmen from the border
slave States of Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, and
Missouri at the Executive Mansion, where a prolonged discussion of the
subject ensued.[26] Lincoln tried to convince these Congressmen of the
good faith of the administration, and suggested to them that they take
this question of gradual abolition into serious consideration, for the
Government of the United States had no right to coerce them. He
asserted that emancipation was exclusively a State affair; and that
his purpose was simply to present the proposition. Yet probably one
reason for the failure of these Congressmen of the border slave States
to make a favorable reply or to commit themselves in any way was that
they were well aware of Lincoln's determination, according to his
special message of March 6, to use all means to save the Union; and
they, furthermore, understood the hint that necessity might force him
to resort to extreme measures. While this proposition gained no
headway with the border slave States, the joint resolution was
approved by Congress and received the signature of the President on
April 10.
Congress then passed an important measure, the expediency of which
Lincoln urged in 1849. This was emancipation in the District of
Columbia. Lincoln made no specific recommendations relative to this in
his annual message, but later sent a special message to Congress March
6, 1862, taking up the subject in its more extensive aspects. This
bill provided for the immediate emancipation of slaves in the
District of Columbia, and empowered a commission to distribute to
slave-holders for their manumitted slaves a compensation not to exceed
an aggregate of three hundred dollars a head, with an additional
appropriation for $100,000 for expenses of voluntary emigration of
freedmen to Haiti and Liberia.[27] Lincoln did not heartily approve
this measure, however, for he did not want this to interfere with his
policy of compensated emancipation in the border slave States. Even
after the bill had been amended, according to his suggestions, he
still hesitated and some of his friends thought that he might never
sign it, but he did.
The question of emancipation appeared in another form when, upon the
capture of Port Royal the previous November, many slaves, abandoned by
the fleeing slave-holders, sought protection in the Union army. These
slaves, thus dislodged by the misfortunes of war, outnumbered the
whites five to one and had to be organized in groups for government
protection. Relief societies in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia
sent funds and teachers for the slaves. This educational enterprise
received the official sanction of Secretary Chase at President
Lincoln's request. Wishing further to improve their condition, General
David Hunter, commander of the Department of the South, issued on May
9, 1862, an order of military emancipation, proclaiming the Department
of the South under martial law and declaring persons in Georgia,
Florida, and South Carolina, heretofore held as slaves, forever
free.[28] Hunter regarded this an act of military necessity, not an
instrument of political import as General Fremont's proclamation in
Missouri, for Hunter's forces were insufficient for offensive
movements, and he was doing this as the first step toward training and
arming Negroes within his lines. Assuming that the instructions of the
War Department conferred the necessary authority he proclaimed the
order without delay.
The news of this proclamation did not travel rapidly. It was published
in the newspapers one week later, owing to the slow mail by sea from
the South. By this means even Lincoln first learned of this decree, on
account of which he was being assailed in many parts. When the news
reached Lincoln he took decisive and prompt action. On May 19, he
published a proclamation in which he revoked the order of emancipation
and recited that the Government had no knowledge of such a decree nor
had it authorized General Hunter to give such an order.[29]
Lincoln, however, used this occasion for an admonition to the border
slave States, although he carefully distinguished between the limited
powers of the commanders in the field and his full executive
authority. He reminded the border States of the joint resolution
passed by Congress, to authorize compensated emancipation, and he
warned them not to neglect this opportunity to obtain financial
indemnity, for the "signs of the times" were multiplying to a degree
that should have convinced the border States that slavery was doomed.
In the very beginning of the Thirty-seventh Congress there came a
series of antislavery measures which constituted a complete and
decisive reversal of the policy of the Federal Government.[30] On
March 13, 1862, Congress approved an act, which prohibited all
military and naval officers and enlisted personnel from returning
fugitive slaves. Section 10 of the Confiscation Act, virtually an
amendment of the Fugitive Slave Law, which withheld from the claimant
the right to use his authority until he had taken an oath of
allegiance, and made it tantamount to a crime for any person in the
army or navy to surrender a fugitive slave or attempt to validate the
owner's claim, was rigidly enforced. Wishing to see Liberia and Haiti
welcomed into the family of nations, moreover, Lincoln in his annual
message in the previous December recommended the recognition of their
independence and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the
new nations. This resolution was passed by a Congress and approved
June 5, 1862. Lincoln then effected the passage of a measure to carry
into execution the treaty between Great Britain and the United States
for the suppression of the African slave trade. Soon thereafter
followed an act to secure freedom to all persons within the
territories of the United States. The Republican party had thus
carried out its platform by its restoration of the Missouri
Compromise, its extension and application to all Territories, and as a
logical result the rejection and condemnation of the Dred Scott
decision and the subversive property theory of the secessionists.[31]
Then followed the Confiscation Act, the discussion of which was
closely followed by Lincoln, who had his views incorporated therein by
pointing out its defects and suggesting amendments. Whereas the act of
August 6, 1861, freed slaves actually employed in military service,
the new Confiscation Act of 1862 proved to be a law to destroy slavery
under the powers of war. In conjunction with provisions for punishing
treason or rebellion it declared free all slaves of persons guilty and
convicted of these crimes, and provided that slaves deserted by rebels
escaping from them or coming under control of the United States and
slaves of rebels found on Union soil should be deemed captives and set
free. Then again, there were enacted other provisions, which by
implication permitted the employment of slaves in the United States
army that they might work their own enfranchisement. Under this law
the President was empowered to enroll and employ contrabands in such
service as they were fitted for. Their mothers, wives, and children,
if owned by rebels, should be declared free by virtue of such service.
The eleventh section of the Confiscation Act authorized the President
to employ as many Negroes as he might deem necessary for the
suppression of the rebellion. The organization of the earliest Negro
regiments resulted from this legislation.
Lincoln had some hesitation about signing this bill, however, for it
had to be changed to conform to his views. But he signed it and also
an anticipatory resolution of Congress to remedy its defects, placing
himself on record by transmitting with his approval a copy of his
intended veto, had certain defects remained. Mr. Lincoln objected to
the expression that Congress could free a slave within a State,
whereupon he suggested that it be changed to read that the ownership
of the slave would be transferred to the nation, and that Congress
would then liberate him.[32] The Democrats opposed this act, but
antislavery opinion gained momentum by increasing accessions to the
ranks of freedom and by that unusual ability of the highly talented
patriotic membership of Congress. Yet to the proslavery element and
the conservative Unionists, Lincoln's proposal of gradual compensated
emancipation was a daring innovation upon practical politics. "In
point of fact," say Nicolay and Hay, "the President stood sagaciously
midway between headlong reform and blind reaction. His steady,
cautious direction and control of the average public sentiment of the
country alike held back rash experiment and spurred lagging
opinion."[33]
Four months after Lincoln's proposal of compensated emancipation to
the border slave States and its sanction by Congress, the situation
seeming more complicated by the vicissitudes of war, Lincoln saw the
necessity for uniting the sentiment of the North for a practical
solution of the slavery problem. Looking forward into the future,
therefore, Lincoln readily realized that the North must present a
united front contending for a plain, practical policy, relative to
things both political and military.
Consequently he again met the border State delegations on July 12, and
made a second appeal to them to accept compensation for the
emancipation of the slaves in their respective States while the
opportunity was yet at hand.[34] He pointed out to them that the war
would have been ended, had they considered the acceptance of the
provisions of his first appeal for gradual emancipation, and that this
plan would not be a slow and weak means of ending the war. Dissuading
them from secession, he failed not to apprise them of the fact that,
if the rebellion continued, their institution would be destroyed
without any sort of indemnity or reparation. Again he referred to his
revoking General Hunter's proclamation of military abolition, with the
hope that he might possibly win them over to his plan, but his effort
was futile. Most of them replied with a qualified refusal; twenty of
them later presented a written reply, pledging themselves to continue
loyal, but at the same time giving the reasons why they could not
accept the plan of compensated emancipation.
In the meantime the capture of strategic points like Vicksburg and New
Orleans had given the control of the lower Mississippi to the
Union,[35] General Grant had crippled and driven back the Confederates
in the West,[36] and prospects for military success in the East seemed
to require some such a measure as military emancipation. After the
refusal of compensated emancipation by the border slave States the
President decided to emancipate the slaves of rebellious commonwealths
by military order.[37] While riding with Mr. Seward and Mr. Welles one
day, Mr. Lincoln made mention of emancipating the slaves by
proclamation, if the rebels did not lay down their arms. He believed
that such action could be guaranteed only as a military necessity. He
thought that the slaves must be liberated, or the Union would be
exterminated. Lincoln reached a final conclusion and called the
cabinet together on July 21, the day preceding the close of that
session of Congress.[38] Since he was at the end of his tether, he
determined to take a more definite and decisive step. Accordingly, he
prepared several orders which, gave authority to commanders in the
field to subsist their troops in hostile territory and to employ
Negroes as paid laborers, and further provided for the colonization of
Negroes in some tropical country.[39]
As this discussion led to no definite conclusion, the subject was
resumed at a meeting on the following day; but Lincoln decided that
the time was inopportune. While he thought that more evil than good
would be derived from the wholesale arming of Negroes, yet he was not
unwilling that the commanders arm, purely for defensive purposes,
those slaves who came within the Union lines. But the President had
reached a decision on the correlated policy of emancipation with which
it appears that his cabinet was not in accord. They were surprised
when he read to them the first draft of a proclamation warning the
rebels of the penalties provided by the Confiscation Act, suggesting
the renewal of his proposition of compensation to the loyal States,
and adding a summary order that, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
Navy, he would declare free the slaves of all States that might be in
rebellion on January 1, 1863. The Cabinet was somewhat "bewildered by
the magnitude and boldness of this proposal."[40]
Only two members of the cabinet concurred in the proposal. Secretary
Chase favored this plan of military emancipation, but could not
approve the method of execution. Blair, the Postmaster General,
deprecated this policy on the ground that it would cost the
administration the fall elections. Secretary Seward approved it and
yet questioned the expediency of its issue at that stage of the war,
owing to the depression of the public mind and the repeated reversals
for the Union armies. He further deemed it to be a last measure of an
exhausted government that was crying for help, stretching forth its
arms to Ethiopia instead of awaiting a reverse appeal from Ethiopia.
Consequently he urged a postponement of the issue of the proclamation
until the country was supported by military success. Lincoln, struck
by the wisdom of Seward's views, which he had entirely overlooked,
laid it away and postponed the proclamation on July 22 until the Union
forces reported a victory. Instead, after a three-day interval, he
issued a short announcement that contained warnings as required by the
provisions of the Confiscation Act.
Lincoln's postponement of the issue of the proclamation was wise.
Military reversals made the situation more serious for the President's
supporters. The radicals and the conservatives, resorted to incessant
criticism, railing against him and his policy. Lincoln, however, kept
up appearances of indecision, even though his own course had been
clearly and inalterably mapped out; but circumstances did not admit a
revelation. His main object was to restrain impatience and zeal, and
yet maintain the loyalty of both factions.[41]
Horace Greeley attacked Lincoln unmercifully in _The New York Tribune_
and accused him of being responsible for the deplorable results coming
from his failure to enforce the Confiscation Act. Lincoln, on the
contrary, lost no time in replying to Greeley, and declared that he
intended to save the Union by the shortest possible way in accordance
with the provisions of the Constitution; that his paramount object in
the struggle was to preserve the Union and not either to preserve or
destroy slavery; that he would save the Union, either without
liberating any slaves, or by freeing all the slaves, or by freeing
some and leaving others in servitude; that, at any rate, he would save
the Union; and that his efforts at emancipation would be determined by
its bearing on the more important question of saving the Union.
The expected easy victory did not follow; but, on the contrary, came
sad and humiliating defeat of Pope in the second battle of Bull Run in
August, 1862. At this juncture Lincoln was urged by both individuals
and delegations to follow one or the other decision relative to
emancipation, but his attitude remained the same. On September 13, he
informed a Chicago delegation that he was unable to free slaves by the
Constitution, especially when the Constitution could not be enforced
in the rebel States, and declared that any emancipation proclamation
would at that time be as effective and operative as "the Pope's bull
against the comet."[42] What the antislavery group wanted was not
granted; but wholesale emancipation was going on by virtue of the
provisions of the Confiscation Act, slavery had been abolished in the
District of Columbia, and the territories had been restored to
freedom. Lincoln, moreover, left himself a margin for action according
to his declaration, in his interview with the Chicago delegation,
that, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, he had the right to
take any measure which might best subdue the enemy.[43]
Upon hearing of the Union victory at Antietam three days after,
Lincoln immediately seized this opportunity to announce the policy
upon which he had already decided. He had promised to withhold his
Emancipation Proclamation until the rebels were out of Frederick. Now
that they had been driven from Maryland and Pennsylvania, Lincoln was
ready to carry out his plan. On September 22, 1862, therefore, he
announced, read, and published his preliminary Emancipation
Proclamation.[44] It embraced propositions that provided for the
renewal of the plan of compensated emancipation, voluntary
colonization, military emancipation of all slaves in rebellious States
on January 1, 1863, and the ultimate recommendation of compensation to
loyal owners.
Although this proclamation was endorsed by an assembly of Governors
from the Northern States, who had already convened at Altoona,
Pennsylvania, to consider emergency measures for the protection of
their respective States,[45] the political test of this announcement
of military emancipation came, as expected, in the autumn elections.
Popular discontent had arisen as the result of military failure. The
Democrats boldly declared that the war of the Union had been changed
to a war for abolition of slavery. Party conflicts became bitter and
resulted in a loss to the Republicans although they still retained a
majority.
In his next annual message, however, President Lincoln did not discuss
the Emancipation Proclamation, but he renewed his argument for
compensated emancipation. On December 11, 1862, George H. Yeaman of
Kentucky introduced in the House of Representatives a resolution
dubbing the President's proclamation as unwarranted by the
Constitution and a useless and dangerous war message. This resolution
was tabled by a vote of ninety-four to forty-five. Four days later
Representative S. C. Fessenden of Maine, on the contrary, offered a
resolution putting into affirmative form the identical phraseology of
Mr. Yeaman's proposition, and secured its passage by a test vote of
seventy-eight to fifty-four. No other action of consequence then
followed except a manifestation of interest in compensated
emancipation in Missouri.
At a cabinet meeting on the last day of December, 1862, Lincoln read
the final draft of the Emancipation Proclamation and invited
criticism. He made some revision of a minor nature but rejected the
proposal to eliminate from the order the provision that the freedmen
be armed. In this form the Proclamation was issued the following day,
January 1, 1863. The constitutionality of this document has been
questioned. It is conceded, however, that it did actually abolish
slavery within the rebellious area and as a moral stimulus to the
struggle for freedom, it proved to be of great value.