It was not till after the preceding pages had been sent to press that I
became acquainted with a little work recently published under the title
of _The Battle of the two Philosophies, by an Inquirer_. The author
appears to have been a personal pupil of Sir W. Hamilton's, as well as a
diligent student of his writings. At all events, he has "inquired" to
some purpose, and obtained a far more intelligent knowledge of Hamilton's
system than is exhibited by the majority of recent critics. It is
gratifying to find many of my remarks confirmed by the concurrent
testimony of so competent a witness. The following would have been
noticed in their proper places had I been sooner acquainted with them.
Of the popular confusion between the _infinite_ and the _indefinite_,
noticed above, pp. 50, 112, "An Inquirer" observes:--
"If we could realise in thought infinite space, that conception would be
a perfectly definite one; but the notion that is here offered us in its
place, though it may be real, is certainly not definite; it is merely the
conception of an indefinite extension.... In truth, when we strive to
think of infinite space, the nearest approach we can make to it is this
notion of an indefinite space, which Mr. Mill has substituted for it. But
these two conceptions are not only verbally, they are really wholly
distinct. An indefinite space is a space of the extent of which we think
vaguely, without knowing or without thinking where its boundaries are.
Infinite space has certainly, and quite distinctly, no boundaries
anywhere."--(Pp. 18-20.)
On Mr. Mill's strange distinction between the Divine Attributes, as some
infinite and others absolute, the author's remarks are substantially in
agreement with what has been said above on pp. 105-6.
"Mr. Mill argues that all the attributes of God cannot be infinite; but
that some, as power, may be infinite; and some, as goodness and
knowledge, must be absolute, because neither can knowledge be more than
complete, nor goodness more than perfect. When we know all there is to be
known, he says, knowledge has attained its utmost limit. But this is
merely begging the whole question. If there be an Infinite Being, He
cannot know all there is to be known unless He know Himself; and
adequately to know what is infinite is to have infinite knowledge. The
same thing would be true if there could be a Being whose power and
duration only were infinite. 'The will,' he adds, 'is either entirely
right, or wrong in different degrees: downwards there are as many
gradations as we choose to distinguish; but upwards there is an ideal
limit. Goodness can be imagined complete,--such that there can be no
greater goodness beyond it,'... But a Being of infinite power and finite
goodness would not be perfectly good, because His power would not be
wholly, but only in part directed by His goodness. Nay, as that which is
finite bears no proportion whatever to what is infinite: as, however
great it be absolutely, it is still infinitely less than infinity, such a
Being would be partly good and yet infinitely evil, which is absurd in
reason and impossible in fact."--(Pp. 24, 25.)
The following estimate of Mr. Mill's merits as a metaphysician coincides
with that which, contrary to my expectation, I found forced upon myself
after a careful examination of his book.--(See above, Pp. 62, 182.)
"We cannot but think that Mr. Mill in this, his first work in pure
metaphysics, has disappointed just expectation. In leaving the fields of
practical philosophy, he seems to have left his genius behind him. Even
the peculiar 'cunning of his right hand'--even his unexcelled logical
power avails him little, so continually does he fail to see distinctly
the conception with which he is fencing.... As long as he is applying
given principles to the solution of practical questions; as long as he
has to do with the process of an argument, he proves himself a most able
instructor and guide. But when he has to grapple with a metaphysical
problem, it almost invariably arrives that the central, the metaphysical
difficulty, escapes him."--(Pp. 78-80.)