CHAPTER VII.

"Hitherto we have considered writings in general, and certain things

relating to light literature in particular, towards which I see you are

more especially attracted. Let us now turn to philosophy, though it

must not be supposed that this science is separable from the study of

letters.

"Perhaps you will think that because philosophy is derived from

reason, which among civilised people is usually a stronger power

than the imagination or the affections, the value of philosophical

works ought to be more universally recognised than that of poems,

and other writings which treat of the pleasurable and the beautiful.

It is, however, my opinion that poetry is better understood and

appreciated than philosophy. In the first place, it is certain that a

subtle intelligence and great power of reasoning are not sufficient

to ensure much progress in philosophy. Considerable imaginative

power is also requisite. Indeed, judged from the nature of their

intellects, Descartes, Galileo, Leibnitz, Newton, and Vico would

have made excellent poets; and, on the other hand, Homer, Dante, and

Shakespeare might have been great philosophers. This subject would

require much elaboration; I will therefore merely affirm that none but

philosophers can perfectly appreciate the value and realise the charm

of philosophical books. Of course, I refer to their substance, and

not to whatever superficial merit they may have, whether of language,

style, or anything else. And, just as men are by nature unpoetical,

and consequently rarely catch the spirit of a poem or discern its

imagery, although they may follow the meaning of its words; similarly,

people unaccustomed to meditate and philosophise within themselves,

or who are incapable of deep sustained thought, cannot comprehend the

truths that a philosopher expounds, however clear and logical his

deductions, arguments, and conclusions may be, although they understand

the words that he uses and their signification. Because, being unable

or unused to analyse the essence of things by means of thought, or to

separate their own ideas into divisions, or to join and bind together

a number of these ideas, or simultaneously to grasp with the mind many

particulars so as to deduce a single general rule from them, or to

follow unweariedly with the mind's eye a long series of truths mutually

connected, or to discover the subtle and hidden connection between

each truth and a hundred others; they can with difficulty, if at all,

grasp and follow his working, or experience the impressions proved by

the philosopher. Therefore, they can neither understand nor estimate

rightly all the influences that led him to this or that opinion, and

made him affirm or deny this or that thing, and doubt such and such

another. Possibly they may understand his ideas, but they neither

recognise their truth nor probability; because they are unable to test

either the one or the other. They are like those cold and passionless

men who are incapable of appreciating the fancies and imagery of the

poets. And you know it is common to the poet and the philosopher to

penetrate into the depths of the minds of men, and thence to bring into

light all their hidden emotions, profundities, and secret working, with

their respective causes and effects; thus, men who are incapable of

sympathy with the poet and his thoughts, are also incapable of entering

into the thoughts of the philosopher.

"This is why we see daily many meritorious works, clear and

intelligible to all, interpreted by some people as containing a

thousand undoubted truths, and, by others, a thousand patent errors.

They are attacked in public and private, not only from motives of

malice, interest, and other similar causes, but also because of the

incapacity of the readers, and their inability to comprehend the

certainty of the principles, the correctness of the deductions and

conclusions, and the general fitness, sufficiency, and truth of the

reasoning put forward. It often happens that philosophical writings

of the most sublime nature are accused of obscurity, not necessarily

because they are obscure, but either because their vein of thought

is of too profound or novel a nature to be easily intelligible, or

because the reader himself is too dense to be a competent judge of

such works. Think, then, how difficult it must be to gain praise for

philosophical writings, however meritorious they may be. For there can

be no doubt that the number of really profound philosophers, who alone

can appreciate one another, is in the present day very small, although

philosophy is more cultivated than in past times.

"I will not refer to the various sects into which those who profess

philosophy are divided. Each sect ordinarily refuses to allow

that there is aught estimable in the others; this is not only from

unwillingness, but also because it occupies itself with different

principles of philosophy."

Essays and Dialogues · 第 6 / 12 章