And Present Condition of Tripoli, with some accounts of the other
Barbary States.
No. V.
On the arrival of Commodore Barron in the Mediterranean, he as senior
captain, superseded Preble in the command of the American forces in
that sea. The determined manner in which the war had been prosecuted
by the latter officer, and the many acts of gallantry which had
distinguished the period of his direction, caused his withdrawal to be
universally regretted; and the more so, as Barron was at that time
laboring under a disease of the liver, which disqualified him for
exertions, and indeed soon after obliged him to retire from active
duty. Preble returned to the United States, where he was received with
every mark of respect by the government and by his fellow-citizens in
general; leaving under Barron's command, six frigates, four brigs, two
schooners, a sloop of war and eight gunboats, which mounted in all
three hundred and twenty-six guns. The season was however too far
advanced to admit of farther operations against Tripoli; ships were
stationed off the harbor sufficient to maintain a blockade, the others
passed the winter in cruising or lying at Malta and the Sicilian
ports.
It has been stated that Mr. Cathcart was appointed to succeed Eaton as
Consul of the United States at Tunis, with instructions to obtain a
peace with Tripoli, even on condition of paying for it, should it be
otherwise impossible; but he was soon after removed, his place as
Consul being supplied by George Davis. The power to negotiate was
given to Tobias Lear, a gentleman who had been private secretary to
President Washington, and afterwards an agent of the American
Government in Saint Domingo, and who was sent in 1803 to reside at
Algiers, as Consul General for the Barbary States. Mr. Lear was
instructed to join Commodore Barron, in order to treat for peace with
Tripoli, which it was hoped "might be effected without any price or
pecuniary compensation whatever; but should adverse circumstances, of
which he could best judge, and which were not foreseen, render the
campaign abortive, and a pecuniary sacrifice preferable to a
protraction of the war," he was authorised, _in the last instance and
in that only_, "to agree to the payment of twenty thousand dollars
immediately, and of an annual tribute of eight or ten thousand more,
for peace." "For the ransom of the prisoners, _if ransom should be
unavoidable_, he might stipulate a sum not exceeding five hundred
dollars for each man, including officers," the Tripoline prisoners
being however exchanged for an equal number of Americans; but "this
rate of ransom was not to be yielded, without such a change in
affairs, by accident to the squadron, or by other powers joining
against the United States, as was very unlikely to happen;" and it was
to be borne in mind, that this sum, "connected with terms otherwise
favorable, was the voluntary offer of the Pasha[1] to Captain Preble
in January, 1804." The Commodore was at liberty to avail himself of
Hamet's co-operation, "if he should judge that it might prove useful;
to engage which, as well as to render it the more effectual, he had
discretionary authority to grant him pecuniary or other subsidies, not
exceeding twenty thousand dollars; but the less reliance was placed
upon his aid, as the force under the orders of the Commodore was
deemed sufficient for any exercise of coercion, which the obstinacy of
the Pasha might demand." The power to negotiate was confided to Mr.
Lear in the first instance, as Commissioner of the United States for
that purpose; in case of accident, it was to devolve upon the acting
Commodore of the squadron.
[Footnote 1: A mistake; no such proposition was made by the Pasha; of
this there are many proofs; it is sufficient however to quote Preble's
own words in his despatch of September 18th, 1804, in which, speaking
of the Pasha's offer of the 10th of August, to terminate the war on
payment by the Americans of five hundred dollars for each prisoner, he
says that "it was 350,000 dollars less than was demanded previous to
the bombardment of the 3d of the same month."]
These instructions bear the stamp of that extreme cautiousness and
uncertainty with regard to the employment of decisive measures, which
characterized the government of the United States at that period. A
force is sent, deemed adequate for any exercise of coercion which may
be required, without recourse to a Pretender from whose alliance, a
considerable accession of moral influence might have been fairly
expected; yet in anticipation of adverse events, or of circumstances
not then foreseen, a civil agent is vested with authority to purchase
a humiliating peace. It is doubtless proper in all cases, to provide
for possible mishaps, particularly where the scene of action is far
distant; but in this instance, it is difficult to conceive that any
occurrences should render necessary a total abandonment by the United
States, of principles, for the support of which so large an armament
had been prepared; and there were the less grounds for such
anticipations, as it was believed, though erroneously, that the Pasha
had already offered terms much more favorable than those to which the
agent was authorised in the end to agree. It must be observed however,
that these instructions were issued on the 6th of June, 1804, at which
period Preble's spirited attacks had not been made, and the
proceedings of the American forces in the Mediterranean had, with one
or two exceptions, been remarkable only for their inefficiency or
their disastrous results.
Having received these orders, Mr. Lear quitted Algiers, and joined
Barron off Tripoli; they both soon after retired to Malta, which they
considered the most convenient place, either for carrying on
negotiations with Tripoli, or for directing the operations of the
ships. On the 28th of December, 1804, a letter reached them from Don
G. J. de Sousa, Spanish Consul at Tripoli, in which he stated, that at
a late audience the Pasha had expressed his willingness to make peace
with the Americans, provided they would come forward on proper
grounds, but had added, "that their proposals had hitherto been
extravagant and inadmissible, not only from the trifling amount of
money offered, but also from their having sought to compel their
acceptance by force of arms, a method by which they would never
succeed." The Consul then suggested, that Mr. Lear should himself
appear before the city with a flag of truce, and treat directly with
the Pasha, "whom means would be found _sub rosa_, to dispose for a
peace on terms appropriate and suitable for both parties." He
concluded by tendering his own good offices in the affair, requesting
however, that for the present, the utmost secrecy might be observed
with regard to this communication.
Notwithstanding the last injunction, many circumstances conspired to
induce a belief that the letter had been written under Yusuf's
directions, in order to discover the temper and disposition of the
Americans. In truth, the general character of the Spanish Consul was
by no means respectable; he was known to be closely connected with the
Pasha, and it had even been suspected, that to his influence or agency
the war with the United States was chiefly to be attributed. In
addition to this, no communications had been received from Yusuf since
his last proposition to Preble, after the bombardment in August; nor
indeed was any thing known respecting his strength, or the effects
which had been produced by the attacks made during the preceding
summer. It was therefore difficult to judge what "would be appropriate
and suitable for both parties;" and the Spanish Consul's _sub rosa_
means of disposing the Pasha to such terms, were very naturally
mistrusted. For these reasons, and from an expectation that more
direct offers would soon be made, it was determined that no answer
should be given to the letter immediately.
Of Eaton, no news was received by the Commodore from the period of his
departure for Egypt, until the return of the Argus from Alexandria, on
the 10th of March, 1805. She brought despatches from him, containing
information of the means pursued to communicate with Hamet, of their
successful issue, of the Convention about to be made with the Prince,
and of their projected expedition to Derne, in aid of which he
intreated that supplies of money, provisions and ammunition might be
sent to Bomba, and if possible, a detachment of one hundred marines.
In the brig came also Mahumed Mezaluna, an old Moor, who had been
Hamet's secretary, and who now appeared as his accredited agent to
solicit assistance.
Barron had however, by this time become very doubtful as to the
propriety of acting in concert with the exile, and he moreover feared,
that he had already exceeded his own authority, in the instructions
which he had given to Eaton on parting. The information conveyed by
the despatches, particularly as regarded the Convention, increased his
uneasiness, as he was led to apprehend that Eaton had acted even
beyond the limits of those instructions, and had entered into
engagements "incompatable with the ideas and intentions of their
government, or with the authority vested in himself." Indeed,
independently of the evident disinclination of the government to act
in concert with Hamet, and the smallness of the sum allowed for the
purpose, absolute engagements to place him on the throne of Tripoli,
might have produced the most serious consequences to the Americans.
The enterprise, in order to be effective, would have been necessarily
attended with a great expenditure of funds, for which indemnification
could not have been reasonably expected, in whatever way or however
pointedly it may have been stipulated: by its failure the insolence of
the Barbary States would have been increased, and additional
encouragement have been given to the exactions of their Sovereigns;
and even if completely successful, the advantages to be derived by the
United States were by no means evident. The ruler of every country,
however unrestrained his authority may be, must in his policy take
into consideration, the habits and the prejudices of his people; few
have succeeded by acting without reference to both, and fewer still
have lived to witness any important change wrought in either through
their own efforts. The Tripolines were bigoted Mahometans, and piracy
was among them an ancient and most honorable calling; the
establishment of Hamet by the aid of Christians, and his engagement to
remain at peace with them, without immediate compensation or the
promise of tribute, would certainly render him unpopular with his own
subjects, and excite against him the enmity of the other Barbary
powers. To overcome such difficulties, the Prince would have neither
the courage nor the means; and it could hardly be anticipated, that
when once on the throne of Tripoli he would risk its possession, by
pursuing a course at variance with the wishes of his people, and the
requisitions of the adjoining Sovereigns, merely from gratitude to the
Americans, or from respect for engagements made to them in the days of
his adversity.
The probability of obtaining beneficial results through Hamet's
co-operation, or indeed from any offensive measures against Tripoli,
had always been doubted by Bainbridge; and his opinion certainly
merited attention, for although imprisoned, yet he had sufficient
intercourse with the foreign consuls and other residents of the town,
to enable him to judge of the Pasha's strength and of the dispositions
of the inhabitants with regard to the two brothers. By letters
received from him, about the time of the arrival of the Argus, he
repeated his conviction that the establishment of the exiled Prince in
Tripoli, was not possible, from the weakness of his character the
contempt in which he was held by the people, his want of resources and
the force which Yusuf was capable of employing against him; and that
if the liberation of the American prisoners were made to depend upon
that measure, it would be better to leave them to their fate, than to
squander lives and treasure in so futile an attempt. He acknowledged
that he had been mistaken in the ideas he had entertained of the
Pasha's strength, and of the effects to be produced on the place by
naval operations only; that the damage occasioned by Preble's attacks,
had been slight as the houses were miserably built and almost
destitute of furniture; and that although the blockade had occasioned
embarrassments to the mercantile class and somewhat straitened Yusuf's
means, yet he would be able to hold out a long time, and be disposed
to suffer any extremity rather than surrender his prisoners without
ransom.
The situation in which those prisoners might be placed by Hamet's
marching against Tripoli, was also to be considered. Although the
utmost precaution was adopted to conceal the object of Eaton's mission
to Egypt, it was soon made known to Yusuf, by an Italian who was his
agent at Malta. It gave him much alarm, but with his usual energy he
prepared to meet the consequences, by sending such troops as he could
spare to reinforce those under the Beys of his frontier provinces. He
likewise despatched an agent to Alexandria, to intreat the Viceroy not
to allow his brother to quit the country; but Eaton had been already
joined by the Prince, and had so completely secured the favor of the
Turkish authorities, that this attempt to defeat the plan proved
fruitless. Yusuf had however, a strong security for his throne, at
least so far as regarded any danger from the forces of the Americans;
for he held in his power three hundred and seven of their
fellow-citizens, whose lives he well knew would be considered
infinitely more valuable than any advantages which could be derived
from his expulsion. With this view, he declared that he should
consider them as hostages for the conduct of their government, and
that any attempts made in favor of his brother, might prove fatal to
them. Information of his intentions was conveyed to Barron in January,
by a letter from Bainbridge, which he concludes by saying: "The Pasha
is very attentive to your transactions with his brother at Alexandria;
a force is going against Derne. Give me leave to tell you, I have
found your plan with the Pasha's brother very vast, and that _you
sacrifice the lives of the prisoners here in case of success_." Other
notices of the same purport were received; and the determined violence
of Yusuf's disposition was too well known, to leave a doubt that in
the last extremity, he might be inclined thus to wreak his vengeance
on the unfortunate captives. Until such extremity however, no fears
were to be entertained with regard to them, as their existence was
evidently most important to the Pasha.
Considerations of this nature made a deep impression upon Barron, and
induced him to view the cause in which Eaton had embarked, in a most
unfavorable light; honor and policy, however, forbade the immediate
abandonment of Hamet. The Argus and Hornet were therefore laden with
ammunition and stores for the supply of the expedition, and despatched
to Bomba, where their opportune arrival and the assistance rendered by
them at Derne have been already noticed. A letter was also carried by
the Argus from Barron to Eaton, in which after applauding his courage
and perseverance, he represents to him "that their Government in
consenting to act in concert with Hamet, did not contemplate the
measure as leading necessarily and absolutely to his establishment in
Tripoli, but as a means which, provided there existed energy in the
exiled Prince, and attachment to his person on the parts of his former
subjects, might be employed to the common furtherance and advantage of
his claims and the American cause; that if he possessed these
qualities, and had sufficient interest with the people, he might after
getting possession of Derne and Bengazi, move on with firm steps, and
conduct his followers to the gates of the capital, in aid of which,
operations would be prosecuted with vigor by the squadron, as soon as
the season would permit." He declared, however, that "he must withhold
his sanction from any convention or engagement, tending to impress
upon Hamet, the idea that the Americans had bound themselves to place
him on the throne," such engagements being unauthorized and
inexpedient, particularly taking into view, the situation in which
Bainbridge and their other captive countrymen might be placed by this
co-operation: that he should not suffer any convention with the
Prince, to interfere with that "perfect and uncontrolled power of
choice and action, in concluding a pacification with the Pasha, which
it was important under such circumstances to preserve;" and "that
honorable and advantageous terms being once offered, and accepted by
the representative of government appointed to treat for peace, all
support to Hamet must necessarily cease." The request for a detachment
of marines could not be complied with, "as the services of all would
be required on board their respective ships." The confused and indeed
contradictory injunctions contained in this letter, mark the utmost
indecision in the mind of the writer, and were calculated only to
puzzle the person to whom they were directed. He is discouraged from
prosecuting the enterprise in which he had engaged, while he is at the
same time assured, that the utmost assistance will be afforded to its
advancement by the squadron. A few days after the sailing of the Argus
and Hornet, the Nautilus was also sent to Derne, with additional
supplies and some cannon, which proved serviceable in the attacks on
that place.
About the same time a small vessel being sent to Tripoli by the
Commodore with clothing and other necessaries for the prisoners, Mr.
Lear wrote to the Spanish Consul thanking him politely for his
communication and his offers, but assuring him at the same time, that
as the Pasha had rejected several propositions for terminating the
war, no others would be made on the part of the United States; and
that the armed force, which was then considerable, would be employed
with vigor against Tripoli as soon as the season would permit; in the
mean while however, any proposition from the Pasha, tending to the
establishment of peace on honorable terms, would receive due
consideration. The vessel on its return, (April 21,) brought a second
letter from the Spanish Consul conveying a direct proposition from
Yusuf, to terminate the war and surrender the prisoners, on condition
that the Americans should pay him two hundred thousand dollars and
restore the Tripolines who had fallen into their hands, with all their
property. The Consul added, that he considered this offer as only
intended to form the basis of a negotiation, for which he again urged
Mr. Lear to come to Tripoli, assuring him that he would be received
with respect and remain in safety. This proposition was considered
inadmissible; it was however important, as giving evidence of the
Pasha's disposition, and the American negotiators, under the
persuasion that it would soon be followed by others of a more
acceptable nature, very prudently remained silent.
Other letters giving assurances of the Pasha's desire to make peace,
were received at the same time, from persons, whose characters and
situations gave the utmost weight to their opinions. Bainbridge and
his unfortunate companions had borne their fate with so much manly
fortitude, as to interest in their behalf, not only several of the
most respectable foreign residents in Tripoli, but also the minister
of foreign affairs Mahomet D'Ghies, who has been previously mentioned,
as a worthy and intelligent person. This minister being himself
engaged in extensive mercantile transactions, was naturally anxious
for the termination of a war by which the commerce of the place was
almost destroyed; but independently of this consideration, the
accounts of Bainbridge and of all who have subsequently known him,
warrant the belief that he was actuated by motives of real benevolence
in his endeavors to procure peace, and in the steps taken by him to
mitigate the severity which his dark-souled master was disposed to
exercise towards the captive Americans. He had already made several
attempts to communicate with Preble, in order to induce him to treat
with the Pasha, on condition of paying ransom for the prisoners; but
the difficulties of transmission and the precautions which he was
obliged to adopt to prevent discovery, had caused them all to fail.
The state of his health had become such, as to require his absence
from Tripoli during the ensuing summer, and he was most anxious that
peace might be made before that time, as he was well aware of the
force of the Americans, and of the advantages which Hamet would have
from their assistance; he may have also entertained fears that the
desperate determination of Yusuf might lead him to the accomplishment
of his fatal threats against the prisoners. He therefore resolved to
make another effort, and knowing the views and inclinations of the
Pasha with regard to peace, he conferred with Bainbridge on the
subject, as also with Mr. Nissen the Danish Consul, a man of the
highest respectability who had been uniformly the friend of the
Americans. In consequence of arrangements between them, Mr. Nissen
wrote to the Commodore on the 18th of March, in the name of Mahomet
D'Ghies; recommending him to take measures for treating with the
Pasha, and proposing to that effect, that he should send some one duly
authorized and instructed to Tripoli, for whose perfect inviolability
during his stay the strongest guaranties would be given; he considered
this plan as much more likely to lead to a speedy and satisfactory
conclusion, than a negotiation carried on by correspondence, or
through a Tripoline agent on board the squadron. This letter was
accompanied by others from Bainbridge urging an immediate acquiescence
in the plan proposed, the result of which he believed would be as
favorable to the Americans, as they could expect; he had no doubt that
the ransom of the prisoners might be effected for a hundred and twenty
thousand dollars, and that their liberation could never be obtained
without paying for it, unless large land forces were employed;
concluding by an assurance, that no Tripoline would ever consider a
farthing, as paid for the Pasha's friendship, after what had been
already experienced from the Americans.
These communications were not received until late in April; they were
then accompanied by another of more recent date from Bainbridge,
enclosing a copy of one which had been sent him by Mahomet D'Ghies; in
the latter, the minister states that the Pasha had just heard of his
brother's being _with_ the American squadron, (a report probably
occasioned by the arrival of Hamet's agent at Malta) and had in
consequence manifested the strongest resentment; saying that "as long
as the war was a war of interest, it might easily be brought to a
conclusion by some sacrifice on one side or the other; but that it was
now directed against himself and for his dethronement, and he would
act in a manner, by which the feelings of the United States, should be
hurt in the most tender point which he had the means of reaching." The
minister concluded by intreating, that the Commodore might be made
fully aware of the difficulties attending any negotiation, while he
was at all in relations with Hamet. The French Consul also confirmed
the account of the Pasha's irritation, and of the danger in which the
captives were placed. The letters were all forwarded by Captain
Rodgers, who commanded the ships blockading the harbor of Tripoli;
this officer being acquainted with their contents, wrote at the same
time to Mr. Lear, (April 18) strongly dissuading him from meeting the
advances of the Pasha, "until he had been rendered more sensible of
the force of the Americans, and of their capacity to use it," and
insisting that if an attack were made within six weeks, under proper
regulations, peace might be concluded on terms perfectly honorable and
advantageous to the United States.
On the 11th of May, the Hornet arrived from Derne, bringing accounts
from Eaton of the capture of that place, and of all the occurrences
since leaving Egypt, with a reply at length to Barron's letter of
March 22d. He represented that the measures had been eminently
successful; Hamet was in possession of the most valuable province of
Tripoli, his enemies were retreating, and the supply of some funds
with a few regular troops to give effect to operations requiring
energy, would enable him without doubt soon to appear at the gates of
the City. He had however been much discouraged by the Commodore's
declaration, that all support to the Prince must cease, if the terms
which the Pasha might offer, should be accepted; he was convinced that
terms would be offered as soon as Yusuf entertained serious
apprehensions for his safety, but he considered it incumbent on the
United States, in case they were accepted, and it should be determined
to withdraw all aid from Hamet, to place him in a situation at least
as good as that from which he had been drawn, and out of the reach of
his vindictive brother. He expressed his opinion that Derne should not
be abandoned, nor peace made precipitately, as the navy might thus be
crushed and the national honor receive a heavy blow.
The result of all these communications, was a determination on the
parts of the Commander of the forces, and the Consul General, to
abandon the co-operation with Hamet and to enter into a negotiation
with Yusuf. Barron considered the moment the most favorable for
concluding peace, on advantageous terms, as the capture of Derne must
doubtless have produced a powerful effect on the Pasha's mind; and
although discarding the idea of yielding any point of national honor
or advantage, to obtain the liberation of the prisoners, he yet
contended that "the lives of so many valuable and estimable Americans
should not be sacrificed to abstract points of honor." Mr. Lear in
reply, conceived it his duty, "to open and bring to a happy issue, a
negotiation for peace consistent with the tenor of their instructions,
whenever the Commander of the American naval forces in the
Mediterranean should judge the occasion proper and favorable;" he
would therefore at once proceed to Tripoli for the purpose; he _could
not however believe that any impression favorable to the United States
had been made on Yusuf, by the measures in concert with his brother,
unless the bravery and perseverance of the Americans at Derne, had
given him a proof of what might be done against him without extraneous
aid_.
Preparations were instantly made to carry both these resolutions into
effect. The Hornet was sent back to Derne with despatches notifying
Eaton of the projected negotiation, directing him at the same time
explicitly to inform Hamet, that all supplies of arms and money were
at an end, and he must trust entirely to his own resources and
exertions; that as he was now "_in possession of the most valuable
province of Tripoli_," and at the post from which he was driven when
he first solicited the assistance of the United States, all had been
done for him which he had a right to expect; but that endeavors would
be made to stipulate some conditions in his favor, provided they could
be obtained "without any considerable sacrifice of national
advantage." Eaton and his companions were not indeed directly ordered
to retire from Hamet's service, but the expressions of the letter
conveyed a hint that they were expected to do so which could not be
mistaken; in addition to which, Captain Hull, who commanded the ships
at Derne, was required to proceed with them immediately to Tripoli.
The necessary arrangements being also made for carrying Mr. Lear to
Tripoli, he sailed in the Essex frigate for that place, off which he
arrived on the 26th of May. He bore with him a letter from Barron to
Rodgers, resigning to the latter the command of the American forces in
the Mediterranean, a station which, as he said, "the languor of
sickness, and consequent mental as well as bodily inactivity,
prevented him from filling any longer, with approbation to himself, or
with advantage to the service." Some remarks are here necessary.
Commodore Barron had arrived in the Mediterranean, affected with a
disease which universally weakens the mental powers of those who are
subject to it; in his case we have the evidence of his officers, that
during the whole winter and spring, he had been "disqualified from
transacting any business, his mind being so mach impaired, that he
scarcely recollected what transpired from one day to another; and on
applications being made to him for instructions, he would lose the
recollection of what passed in the course of conversation." It was
also generally believed by the officers in the Mediterranean, "that
Mr. Lear had a great ascendancy over the Commodore in all his measures
relative to the squadron." For merely exercising such an ascendancy,
Mr. Lear cannot certainly be blamed; nor can it be imputed as a fault
to Barron, that in his situation it should have existed; he had been
intrusted with an important command, which he wished to retain,
particularly as he was much better acquainted with the views and
wishes of his government, than the officer who would succeed him in
case of his resignation could possibly have been. Under these
circumstances it was natural, that being himself aware of his
debilitated state, he should have looked for counsel and assistance to
one in whom their government had manifested such implicit confidence.
Respecting the course to be pursued with Tripoli, Mr. Lear in all his
despatches and recorded conversations, had advocated the propriety of
strong measures, for which he considered the forces of the United
States alone as perfectly adequate. To the plan of co-operation with
Hamet, he had been from the first opposed, pronouncing it visionary
and impracticable; he insisted that Yusuf might be compelled to accede
to honorable terms without any extraneous assistance whatever, and
"that more reliance might be placed on a peace with him if well beaten
into it, than with his brother, if placed on the throne by the aid of
the Americans." When the accounts arrived of Eaton's junction with
Hamet, and their projected expedition from Egypt, he declared his
conviction openly that it would prove fruitless, and "that they with
their adherents, would be sacrificed before reaching Derne." For these
opinions there were certainly strong grounds; but knowing as he did,
that Yusuf had manifested the utmost uneasiness ever since he had been
informed of his brother's intended expedition, how could Mr. Lear have
supposed that no impression favorable to the United States had been
made on him, by the capture of Derne and the defeat of his army? We
have certainly a right here to suspect the existence of prejudice or
of personal feeling, or of too great a disinclination to acknowledge
the erroneousness of previous assertions. That "a deep impression had
in reality been made on the Pasha by the heroic bravery of the few
Americans at Derne, and by the idea that the United States had a large
force and immense supplies at that place," he indeed afterwards
admitted, and endeavored from thence to make an arrangement favorable
to Hamet. From the terms of Rodgers's letter already quoted, it
appears that he was by no means desirous to negotiate until the Pasha
should have been humbled; and he declares in another letter, that he
never had entertained any apprehensions for the lives of the
prisoners. It is therefore possible, that had not Barron before his
relinquishment, taken such decided steps with regard to the
abandonment of Hamet's cause, and (at least apparently) induced Mr.
Lear to enter upon the negotiation with Yusuf, those measures might
have met with some opposition from Rodgers, which delicacy under the
actual circumstances forbade.
The Spanish Consul boarded the Essex immediately on her arrival off
Tripoli; Mr. Lear informed him that he had come at the Pasha's request
to treat for peace, but that the terms which had been already proposed
through him were inadmissible, and that unless they were put aside
entirely, no progress could be made in the affair. The Consul returned
to Tripoli, and came on board again on the 29th, bringing a commission
from the Pasha to treat on the principal points of accommodation;
Yusuf relinquished all demands of payment for peace, and offered to
restore the prisoners for a hundred and thirty thousand dollars, the
Tripolines in the hands of the Americans being given up gratis. Mr.
Lear replied by other propositions, which were--that the prisoners
should be restored on both sides, the Americans immediately, the
Tripolines as soon as they could be brought from America and Sicily
where they then were; that as the Americans exceeded the Tripolines in
number by about two hundred, the sum of sixty thousand dollars would
be paid as ransom for the balance in favor of the Pasha; and that a
treaty of peace should then be made on mutually honorable and
beneficial terms. After some difficulties, Yusuf agreed to these
propositions, except that he refused to give up his prisoners until
the Tripolines were ready to be delivered to him in return for them.
This was probably only a pretence to gain time. Indeed, within the
preceding year, the question between the United States and Tripoli had
been materially changed. The Americans had appeared in such force in
the Mediterranean, that they could no longer be regarded as
supplicants for peace, and the great object was to obtain the
liberation of their captive fellow-citizens; on the other hand, the
Pasha had suffered so much from the blockade and the expenses of the
war, that he was desirous to have it terminated on as good terms as he
could obtain. Hamet's success at Derne had much increased his anxiety,
and knowing that it was entirely due to the assistance of the
Americans, he was determined not to give up the advantages he
possessed by means of the prisoners, without securing in return the
withdrawal of this important aid from his brother's cause; for this
reason he wished to have the treaty of peace made before the execution
of any other measures. As to the restoration of his own subjects who
were in the hands of the Americans, he was entirely indifferent; often
declaring when exchange was proposed, "that he would not give an
orange apiece for them."
On the 1st of June, Bainbridge came on board, under guaranty of
Mahomet D'Ghies and the Danish Consul. He assured Mr. Lear that Yusuf
would not consent to surrender the prisoners, until a treaty of peace
were made. As the objects of the Americans were to obtain the
liberation of their countrymen and security for their commerce and
navigation in future, it was not worth while to oppose this, and
Bainbridge was directed to inform the Pasha, that if the terms
proposed were accepted, a negotiation would be immediately entered
into for a treaty, with any proper person duly authorized by him, but
that no farther communication would be held with the Spanish Consul.
Yusuf upon this accordingly commissioned Mr. Nissen to confer with Mr.
Lear on the terms of the treaty; instructing him specially to have an
article inserted, stipulating that the American forces should be
withdrawn from Derne, and that efforts would be used to persuade Hamet
to leave the Tripoline dominions. This stipulation was agreed to by
Mr. Lear, who, however insisted that the Prince's family, who still
remained in the Pasha's hands, should be restored to him. Yusuf
objected and the negotiation was almost at a stand; at this crisis the
Nautilus arrived from Malta, bringing notices of Eaton's farther
successes at Derne, and also information of the arrival of additional
forces from the United States. Rodgers here expressed his anxiety to
try the effect of farther offensive operations against him; but Mr.
Lear "would not suffer the business to be broken off and leave his
countrymen longer in slavery," and therefore consented that _time
should be allowed for the delivery of Hamet's family_. The
difficulties between him and the Pasha were then removed and the
preliminaries were assented to by both parties. Mr. Lear landed
directly after, and on the 4th of June 1805, corresponding with the
6th of the first month of Rabbia of the year of the Hegira 1220, a
_Treaty of Peace and Amity between the United States of America and
the Pasha, Bey and subjects of Tripoline Barbary_, was signed at
Tripoli.
By this treaty, firm and inviolable peace and sincere friendship was
to exist between the two nations; the prisoners were to be returned on
each side, sixty thousand dollars being paid by the Americans for the
difference in number against them; the forces of the United States, in
hostility against the Pasha at Derne or elsewhere in his dominions,
were to be withdrawn, and no supplies to be given by the Americans
during the continuance of the peace, to any of his subjects who may be
in rebellion against him; the Americans were to use all means in their
power to persuade Hamet to retire from the Tripoline territory, but
they were to use no force or improper means to that effect, and in
case he should thus retire, the Pasha was to deliver up to him his
wife and children. The stipulations respecting commerce and
navigation, the rights of citizens and of consuls of either party in
the territories of the other, the assistance to be given to stranded
vessels, the protection to be afforded to vessels pursued by an enemy,
&c. were placed on the most equal footing; and it was moreover
declared, that in case a war should hereafter break out between the
two parties, the prisoners taken on either side should not be made
slaves, but should be returned at a stated ransom. This provision was
at least harmless, and it held out inducements to humane conduct.
The American prisoners were sent on board the squadron, immediately
after the signing of the treaty, and the Constitution frigate was sent
to Malta and Syracuse for the money to be paid as ransom and the
Tripolines. The American flag was again hoisted in the town, a Consul
was installed, and the inhabitants testified their pleasure on the
termination of a war by which they had so severely suffered.
This pacification has proved most advantageous for the Americans; no
tribute has been since paid by them to Tripoli, nor has any infraction
of the treaty been made either by the government, or the subjects of
that regency, without full indemnification having been promptly
obtained for it. The Pasha has indeed always appeared ready to do or
to submit to any thing, rather than have another war with the United
States. There is however every reason to suppose that the peace might
have been made on terms more honorable to the Americans; and it is
difficult to conceive what proper motives could have induced their
commissioner, to offer a sum of money as ransom for the prisoners,
with so strong a force at his disposal, and with the finest province
of the Tripoline dominions actually in the hands of his countrymen.
The proposition must certainly have surprised Yusuf, who had up to
that moment received from him nothing but expressions of a fixed
determination to seek peace only at the cannon's mouth.
Although it was expected that the information conveyed by the Hornet
would have induced Eaton and the other Americans to evacuate Derne,
still it was thought proper to despatch the frigate Constellation to
that place, with accounts of the peace which had been concluded; it
carried also one of Yusuf's officers, who was empowered to proclaim a
general amnesty, and her captain was instructed to receive Hamet and
his immediate followers on board, should they choose to accompany him.
The communications previously received by the Hornet had prepared
Eaton for these results; and he had instantly made known to Hamet the
critical state in which his affairs were placed; the poor Prince very
naturally exclaimed, that "to abandon him then, was to co-operate not
with him, but with his brother"--and seeing that it would be
impossible for him to prosecute the war, after the withdrawal of the
American forces, he prepared to leave Derne with them whenever they
should go. Eaton, however, could not bear "to strike the flag of his
country in presence of an enemy, who had not merited the triumph, and
to see the unbounded confidence placed by the inhabitants in the
American character, sink into contempt and eternal hatred;" he had,
therefore, resolved not to give up the advantages already obtained at
Derne, and carefully concealing his apprehensions, continued to pursue
the measures best calculated to advance the success of the enterprise.
In this determination he seems to have been seconded by Captain Hull,
and the other officers of the ships on the station, who had been
induced by the declarations of Commodore Barron and Mr. Lear, to
expect that an opportunity would have been afforded them in the
approaching season to chastise the insolence of the Pasha, and fully
establish the reputation of the Americans in the Mediterranean.
The Constellation arrived off Derne on the 11th of June, and it being
at once supposed that she brought supplies and troops in aid of Hamet,
the hopes of his partizans were excited to the highest pitch, while
the Tripolines were so much dismayed, that they broke up their camp in
haste, and retreated to the distance of fifteen miles from the town.
When Eaton had examined the despatches brought by her, he saw at once
that it would be a nice and difficult task to embark the Christians
with Hamet and his followers in safety, as the inhabitants would place
but little confidence in the Pasha's amnesty, and might be disposed to
sacrifice their lives in revenge for this apparent desertion. He
therefore took measures to conceal the real state of affairs; he
ordered the troops to be inspected, distributed ammunition and
rations, and sent off spies as if in anticipation of an attack. At
night, patroles were placed to cut off all communication between the
battery near the sea, which was occupied by the Christians and the
town; the Constellation's boats came to the wharf, and the Christians,
to their great astonishment, were all embarked and rowed off to the
frigate, except the Americans. A message was then sent to Hamet,
requesting an interview; he understood what was meant and instantly
came with his retinue; they entered the boats, which had by that time
returned, the Americans followed, and last of all went Eaton, just in
time to escape the soldiery and inhabitants, who learning what was
going on, rushed in distraction to the beach. Finding themselves
deserted by those who had led them to take up arms against their
tyrannical master, their rage burst forth in execrations against Hamet
and his infidel friends. In the morning, the Tripoline agent landed
and proclaimed amnesty to those who would return to their allegiance;
but the place was already nearly deserted; the Arabs had plundered it
of all that could be carried away and retreated to the mountains,
accompanied by many of the inhabitants; those who remained rejected
the terms of pardon offered them, and prepared to defend themselves to
the last from the tops of their houses. What was their fate we have
been unable to learn. At noon, on the 13th of June, Eaton writes, "In
a few minutes, we shall lose sight of this deserted city, which has
experienced as strange a reverse in as short a time, as ever recorded
in the disasters of war." The Constellation arrived in a few days at
Syracuse, where the men who had served with Eaton at Derne were paid
off. The whole expenses of the expedition amounted to about forty
thousand dollars.
A few words will suffice to trace the subsequent history of Hamet. It
has been stated that provision was made in the treaty of June 4th, for
the restoration of his family; but when he demanded them, his brother
refused to comply or to give him any assistance whatever. He had been
aided by Eaton, and by the orders of the Commodore of the squadron, he
received two hundred dollars per month for the support of himself, and
fifteen or twenty dependants in Syracuse. Two thousand four hundred
dollars were afterwards appropriated by Congress, for his "immediate
and temporary relief." The American Consul at Tripoli was also
instructed to require the delivery of his family; he did so, but in
reply a paper was exhibited, which proved to be a secret article
signed in due form by Mr. Lear, on the day after the conclusion of the
treaty, by which it was stipulated, that Yusuf should not be required
to give up his brother's wife and children, until the expiration of
four years, during which, Hamet was to evince his peaceful
disposition, and his determination not to disturb the tranquillity of
the Tripoline dominions. Of this article, no copy, and indeed no
notice whatever, had been transmitted by Mr. Lear to his Government;
whether from miscarriage or from other causes is not ascertained. The
Consul was however ordered to urge the delivery of the family by the
Pasha, and to endeavor to obtain some arrangements for their support
and that of Hamet. This was at length effected through the aid of
Mahomet D'Ghies; and on the 25th of October, 1807, his wife and
children arrived at Syracuse in an American sloop of war, with the
exception of one of the daughters, who had married the Bey Mahomet,
Yusuf's eldest son; an offer was also made by the Pasha, to settle a
handsome allowance on his brother, provided he would establish his
residence in Morocco. This Hamet positively refused, demanding at
least the restoration of his former governments of Derne and Bengazi;
after some difficulties Yusuf consented to his demand, and he went to
Derne in 1809, where he passed the remainder of his life in quiet, as
Bey of the two Eastern Provinces. Eaton immediately resigned his
situation as navy agent, and returned to the United States, where he
was universally received with interest and attention; but never
recovered his equanimity; he had been as he conceived, disappointed in
the opportunity of distinguishing himself, and moreover unjustly
robbed of his share in the credit of reducing the Pasha to terms. His
natural irritability was increased, and he was on many occasions
tempted to assert his claims, in a manner which savored of
boastfulness. His own peaceful country offered no field for the
display of his peculiar talents; he had no taste for the quiet
occupations of the farm, or for the petty intrigues and wordy war of
politics; he tried both and failed. He became involved in pecuniary
embarrassments, his spirits deserted him, and he sought for
consolation in the bowl. Those who knew him only at this period,
represent him as an intemperate disagreeable vain-glorious man, and
the few friends who followed him to the grave in June 1811, had reason
to regret that he had not died earlier.
For the Southern Literary Messenger.