_Reader._ From the non‐existence of innate ideas you infer, doctor, that
“the idea of a God, or the conception of a supreme personal being, who
created, who governs and preserves the world, is not innate in the human
mind, and therefore is not incontrovertible” (p. 184). On the other hand,
you say with Luther that “God is a blank sheet, upon which nothing is
found but what you have yourself written” (_ibid._) Do you mean that our
notion of God is merely subjective—that is, a creation of our fancy
without any objective foundation?
_Büchner._ Yes, sir. “We can have neither any knowledge nor any conception
of the _absolute_—of that which transcends the surrounding sensual world.
However much metaphysicians may vainly attempt to define the absolute,
however much religion may endeavor to excite faith in the absolute by the
assumption of a revelation, nothing can conceal the defect of the
definition. All our knowledge is relative, and results from the comparison
of surrounding sensible objects. We could have no notion of darkness
without light, no conception of high without low, of heat without
coldness, etc.; absolute ideas we have none. We are not able to form any
conception of ‘everlasting’ or ‘infinite,’ as our understanding, limited
by time and space, finds an impassable barrier for that conception. From
being in the sensual world accustomed to find a cause for every effect, we
have falsely concluded that there exists a primary cause of all things,
although such a cause is perfectly inaccessible to our ideas, and is
contradicted by scientific experience” (p. 179).
_Reader._ How do you show that we have neither any knowledge nor any
conception of the absolute? or that our understanding is limited by time
and space? or that, from being accustomed to find a cause for every
effect, we have _falsely_ concluded that there exists a primary cause of
all things? or that its existence is contradicted by scientific
experience? Of course you cannot expect that a rational man will swallow
such paradoxes on your puny authority.
_Büchner._ We know neither absolute truth, nor absolute good, nor absolute
beauty. This I have shown by proving that all our notions of truth, of
good, and of beauty are the fruit of experience, observation, and
comparison, and that such notions vary according to the character of the
nations in which they are to be found. It is only after this demonstration
that I concluded “that we can have neither any knowledge nor any
conception of the absolute.”
_Reader._ Yes; this is the only point which you have tried to establish,
and you have failed, as I am ready to show. But that our understanding is
limited by time and space you merely assert. That we falsely conclude that
there is a primary cause you boldly assume. That God’s existence is
contradicted by scientific experience you impudently affirm, well knowing
that it is a lie.
And now, with regard to the knowledge of the absolute, you are much
mistaken if you believe that we know no absolute truth, no absolute good,
and no absolute beauty. We know absolute being; and therefore we know
absolute truth, absolute good, and absolute beauty.
_Büchner._ We know of no absolute being, sir.
_Reader._ Be modest, doctor; for you know of how many blunders you stand
already convicted. Absolute being is not necessarily “that which
transcends the surrounding sensual world.” The sun, the moon, the planets
have their absolute being, and yet do not transcend matter. Now, can we
not form a notion of the absolute being of these bodies? You say that “all
our knowledge is relative, and results from the comparison of surrounding
sensible objects”; but you should reflect that all relative knowledge
implies the knowledge of the absolute terms from the comparison of which
the relation is to be detected. Hence you cannot admit the knowledge of
the relative without assuming the knowledge of the absolute. Accordingly,
it is false that “all our knowledge is relative,” at least in the sense of
your argumentation. Nor is it true that all our knowledge “results from
the comparison of surrounding sensible objects.” There is a kind of
knowledge which results from the comparison of intellectual principles, as
the knowledge of the logical rules; and there is also a knowledge which
results, not from the comparison, but from the intellectual analysis, of
things, as the knowledge of the constituent principles of being. If I ask
you what is _distance_, you will soon point out any two sensible objects,
by the comparison of which distance may become known; but if I ask you
what is _syllogism_, or what is _judgment_, or what is _philosophy_, I
defy you to point out any “surrounding sensible objects,” by the
comparison of which such notions may be understood.
I need not discuss your assertion that “we could have no notion of
darkness without light, no conception of high without low, of heat without
coldness, etc.” I may concede the assertion as irrelevant for, whenever we
designate things by relative terms, it is clear that each relative carries
within itself the connotation of its correlative. But it does not follow
that all our knowledge is relative. How can we know, for instance, the
relation of brotherhood intervening between James and John, if we know
neither the one nor the other? Can we conceive the _brother_ without the
_man_? Or is it necessary, when we know the man, that in such a man we
should see his peculiar relation to another man?
You pretend that we are not able to form any conception of “ever‐lasting”
or “infinite”; and, to prove this, you affirm that “our understanding,
being limited by time and space, finds an impassable barrier for that
conception.” Very well; but what did you mean when you contended that
matter is “eternal” and “infinite”? Had you then any conception of
“eternal” and “infinite”? If you had not such conceptions, you made a fool
of yourself by using terms which you did not understand; while, if you had
such conceptions, then it is false that we are not able to form them. In
the same manner, have you any conception of the “absolute”? If you have
it, then it is ridiculous to pretend that we cannot conceive the absolute;
while, if you have it not, you know not about what you are speaking. Alas!
poor doctor. What can you answer? It is the common fate of the enemies of
truth to be inconsistent with themselves, and to demolish with one hand
what they build with the other.
But is it true that our intellect “is limited by time and space”? No, it
is not true. Imagination is indeed limited by time and space, as all our
philosophers concede; but intellect understands things independently of
either space or time. This is evident. For in what space do we place the
universals? To what time do we confine mathematical truths? _Two and two
are known to make four_ in all places and in all times—that is, without
restriction or limit in space and time; and the same is true of all
intellectual principles. Hence it is obvious that our understanding
transcends both space and time, and can reach the infinite and the
eternal. It is through abstraction, of course, and not by comprehension or
by intuition, that we form such notions; for our intellect, though not
limited by time and space, is limited in its own entity, and therefore it
cannot conceive the unlimited, except by the help of the abstractive
process—that is, by removing the limits by which the objective reality of
the finite is circumscribed. That we can do this I need not prove _to
you;_ for you admit that space is infinite, and pretend that matter itself
is infinite, as I have just remarked; and consequently you cannot deny
that we have the notion of infinity.
What shall I say of your next assertion, that, from being accustomed to
find a cause for every effect, “we have _falsely_ concluded that there
exists a primary cause of all things”? Do you think that the principle of
causality has no other ground than experience? or that, when we do not
“find” the cause of a certain effect, we are to conclude that the effect
has had no cause? I hope you will not deny that the notions of cause and
effect are so essentially connected that there is no need of experiment to
compel the admission of a cause for every effect. Hence we are certain,
not only that all the effects for which we have found a cause proceed from
a cause, but also that all the effects for which we cannot find a cause
likewise proceed from a cause. This amounts to saying that the principle
of causality is analytical, not empirical, as you seem to hold. Now, if
all effects must have a cause, on what ground do you assert that “we have
_falsely_ concluded that there exists a primary cause of all things”? Our
conclusion cannot be false, unless it be false that the world has been
created; for if it was created, we must admit a Creator—that is, a primary
cause. But the fact of creation is, even philosophically, undeniable,
since the contingent nature of the world is manifestly established by its
liability to continuous change. And therefore it is manifestly established
that our admission of a primary cause is not a false conclusion. I might
say more on this point; but what need is there of refuting assertions
which have not even a shadow of plausibility? The primary cause, you say,
“is perfectly inaccessible to our ideas.” I answer that, if the word
“idea” means “concept,” your statement is perfectly wrong. You add that
the existence of a primary cause “is contradicted by scientific
experience.” I answer by challenging you to bring forward a single fact of
experimental science which supports your blasphemous assertion.
You must agree, doctor, that a man who in a few phrases commits so many
unconceivable blunders has no right to censure the metaphysicians or to
attack revelation. It is rash, therefore, on your part, to declare that
“however much metaphysicians may vainly attempt to define the absolute,
however much religion may endeavor to excite faith in the absolute by the
assumption of a revelation, nothing can conceal the defect of the
definition.” Of what definition do you speak? Your own definition of the
absolute, as “that which transcends the surrounding sensual world,” is
certainly most deficient; but religion and metaphysics are not to be made
responsible for it. Why did you not, before censuring the metaphysicians
and the theologians, ascertain their definitions? We call _absolute_ a
being whose existence does not depend on the existence of another being;
and in this sense God alone is absolute. He is _the absolute_
antonomastically. And we call _absolute_ analogically any being also whose
existence does not depend on any created being, although it depends on the
creative and conservative action of God; and in this sense every created
substance is absolute. And we call _absolute_ logically whatever is
conceived through its own intrinsic constituents without reference to any
other distinct entity; and in this sense we speak of absolute movement,
absolute weight, absolute volume, etc. Without enumerating other less
important meanings of the term, I simply observe that the absolute may be
defined as that which is independent of extraneous conditions; and that
the greater its independence, the more absolute and the more perfect is
the being. Have you anything to say against this definition?
We must, then, conclude that all your argumentation is nothing but a
shocking display of false assertions, and, I may add, of “intellectual
jugglery.”
_Büchner._ I will accept your conclusion, if you can show that our
conception of a God is not a childish delusion of our fancy. “An exact
knowledge and unprejudiced observation of individuals and nations in an
uncivilized state prove the contrary to be the fact. Only a prejudiced
mind can, in the worship of animals practised by ancient and existing
nations, find something analogous to a real belief in a God. It by no
means corresponds to the idea of a God when we see man worshipping such
animals as he from experience knows may injure or be useful to him.... A
stone, a tree, a river, an alligator, a parcel of rags, a snake, form the
idols of the negro of Guinea. Such a worship does not express the idea of
an almighty being, governing the world and ruling nature and man, but
merely a blind fear of natural forces, which frighten uncivilized man, or
appear supernatural, as he is not able to trace the natural connection of
things.... A god in the shape of an animal is no God, but a caricature”
(pp. 184, 185).
_Reader._ True. But individuals and nations existing “in an uncivilized
state” are scarcely to be appealed to for a decision of the question. The
notion of worship implies the notion of a supreme being; but rude and
brutal men, thinking of nothing but of the development of their animal
nature and the pursuit of degrading pleasure, though they know that there
is some superior being, are not the men we ought to consult about the
nature and attributes of divinity. It seems, doctor, as if you had a great
predilection for uncivilized and barbarous nations. You have already tried
to countenance abortion and fœticide, on the ground that barbarians
admitted the horrible practice; and now you would have us believe that our
conception of a God is a childish delusion, on the ground that barbarians
worship the snake, the alligator, or any other caricature of a god. This
will not do.
_Büchner._ But civilized men are not much in advance of barbarians with
regard to the notion of divinity. “No one has better expounded the purely
human origin of the idea of God than Ludwig Feuerbach. He calls all
conceptions of God and divinity _anthropomorphisms_—_i.e._, products of
human fancies and perceptions, formed after the model of human
individuality. Feuerbach finds this anthropomorphism in the feeling of
dependence inherent in the human nature. ‘An extraneous and superhuman
God,’ says Feuerbach, ‘is nothing but an extraneous and supernatural self,
a subjective being placed, by transgressing its limits, above the
objective nature of man.’ The history of all religions is indeed a
continuous argument for this assertion; and how could it be otherwise?
Without any knowledge or any notion of the absolute, without any immediate
revelation, the existence of which is indeed asserted by all, but not
proved by any religious sect, all ideas of God, no matter of what
religion, can only be human; and as man knows in animated nature no being
intellectually superior to himself, it follows that his conception of a
supreme being can only be abstracted from his own self, and must represent
a _self‐idealization_” (p. 190). Hence it is plain that our idea of a God
is a mere delusion.
_Reader._ It is by no means plain, doctor. Feuerbach’s authority, you
know, is worth very little. Your German philosophers, as you own, “have
pretty much lost their authority, and are now but little attended to” (p.
158). On the other hand, “nothing,” says Herschel, “is so improbable but a
German will find a theory for it” (p. 155). Therefore let Feuerbach alone.
As for the reasons which you adduce in support of the assumption, we need
not go into deep reasonings to lay open their true value. Is “the history
of all religions a continuous argument for Feuerbach’s assertion”? No. For
the history of the Mosaic and of the Christian religion is a continuous
refutation of such a slander. Are men “without any knowledge or any notion
of the absolute”? No. This I have already shown to be entirely false. Men,
however, are “without any immediate revelation.” This is true, but it has
nothing to do with the question; first, because philosophy and reason are
competent without supernatural revelation to ascertain the existence of a
primary cause infinitely superior to all the natural beings; secondly,
because, although we have no _immediate_ revelations, we have the old
revelation transmitted to us by written and oral tradition, and by the
teaching of the living church. That this revelation “is asserted by all,
but not proved by any religious sect,” is one of those lies which it is
quite unnecessary to refute, as there are whole libraries of Scriptural
treatises, in which the truth of revelation is superabundantly vindicated.
I would therefore conclude, without any further discussion, that it is to
yourself, and not to your opponents, that you should apply that low
criticism with which you close the twenty‐sixth chapter of your work. For
it is you that “delight in hashing up cold meat with new phrases, and
dishing them up as the last invention of the _materialistic_ kitchen” (p.
194).
To sum up: Do you admit that man is a finite being?
_Büchner._ Of course.
_Reader._ Do you admit that man had a beginning? That man is ignorant,
weak, wicked, and subject to death?
_Büchner._ Who can doubt that?
_Reader._ Then man by _self‐idealization_ cannot form an anthropomorphic
notion of a supreme being without involving limitation, ignorance,
impotence, malice, an origin, and an end of existence. Such, and no other,
would be the result of self‐idealization. Now, our notion of God is that
of a being eternal, infinite, omniscient, omnipotent, holy, immense. Is
this anthropomorphism?
To Be Continued.
Destiny.
From The French Of Louis Veuillot.
It is the lot of mortals here below
That they shall ever crawl from bad to worse,
Approaching step by step the dismal tomb—
Instance an aching tooth, with no relief
Save by its loss. Cure comes by sacrifice.
All victories are seeds of further strife—
Of strife that never ends but in the grave,
In which he only conquers who succumbs:
And this is destiny.
Ye dreamers of love‐dreams, of glory, wealth,
Who, growing old, are scouted by the world,
And then swept on into forgetfulness!
All disappears—laurels, affection, gold!
Blame not your faults that so things come to pass,
For this is destiny.
The Veil Withdrawn.
Translated, By Permission, From The French Of Mme. Craven, Author Of A “A
Sister’s Story,” “Fleurange,” Etc.