Now think of how the British Empire lies with relation to the great sea

and land masses of the world. There has been talk in Great Britain of

what people have called "all-red air routes," that is to say,

all-British air routes. There are no all-red air routes. You cannot get

out of Britain to any other parts of the Empire, unless perhaps it is

Canada, without crossing foreign territory. That is a fact that British

people have to face and digest, and the sooner they grasp it the better

for them. Britain cannot use air ways even to develop her commerce in

peace time without the consent and co-operation of a large number of her

intervening neighbours. If she embarks single-handed on any considerable

war she will find both her air and her sea communications almost

completely cut.

And so the British Empire, in spite of its size and its modernity, is

not much better off now in the way of standing alone than the other

European countries. It is no exception to our generalization that (apart

from all other questions) the scale and form of the European states are

out of harmony with contemporary and developing transport conditions,

and that all these powers are, if only on this account, under one urgent

necessity to sink those ideas of complete independence that have

hitherto dominated them. It is a life and death necessity. If they

cannot obey it they will all be destroyed.

III

THE ENLARGEMENT OF PATRIOTISM TO A WORLD STATE

In my opening argument I have shown the connexion between the present

intense political troubles of the world and more particularly of Europe,

and the advance in mechanical knowledge during the past hundred and

fifty years. I have shown that without a very drastic readjustment of

political ideas and habits, there opens before Europe and the world

generally, a sure prospect of degenerative conflicts; that without such

a readjustment, our civilization has passed its zenith and must continue

the process of collapse that has been in progress since August, 1914.

Now this readjustment means an immediate conflict with existing

patriotism. We have embarked here upon a discussion in which emotion and

passion seem quite unavoidable, the discussion of nationality. At the

very outset we bump violently against patriotism as any European

understands that word. And it is, I hold, impossible not to bump against

European patriotisms. We cannot temporize with patriotism, as one finds

it in Europe, and get on towards a common human welfare. The two things

are flatly opposed. One or other must be sacrificed. The political and

social muddle of Europe at the present time is very largely due to the

attempt to compromise between patriotism and the common good of Europe.

Do we want to get rid of patriotism altogether?

I do not think we want to get rid of patriotism, and I do not think we

could, even if we wanted to do so. It seems to be necessary to his moral

life, that a man should feel himself part of a community, belonging to

it, and it belonging to him. And that this community should be a single

and lovable reality, inspired by a common idea, with a common fashion

and aim.

But a point I have been trying to bring out throughout all this argument

so far is this--that when a European goes to the United States of

America he finds a new sort of state, materially bigger and materially

less encumbered than any European state. And he also finds an intensely

patriotic people whose patriotism isn't really the equivalent of a

European patriotism. It is historically and practically a synthesis of

European patriotisms. It is numerically bigger. It is geographically ten

times as big. That is very important indeed from the point of view of

this discussion. And it is synthetic; it is a thing made out of

something smaller. People, I believe, talk of 100 per cent. Americans.

There is no 100 per cent. American except the Red Indian. There isn't a

white man in the United States from whose blood a large factor of

European patriotism hasn't been washed out to make way for his American

patriotism.

Upon this fact of American patriotism, as a larger different thing than

European patriotism, I build. The thing can be done. If it can be done

in the Europeans and their descendants who have come to America, it can

conceivably be done in the Europeans who abide in Europe. And how can we

set about doing it?

America, the silent, comprehensive continent of America, did the thing

by taking all the various nationalities who have made up her population

and obliging them to live together.

Unhappily we cannot take the rest of our European nations now and put

them on to a great virgin continent to learn a wider political wisdom.

There are no more virgin continents. Europe must stay where she is....

Now I am told it sometimes helps scientific men to clear up their ideas

about a process by imagining that process reversed and so getting a view

of it from a different direction. Let us then, for a few moments,

instead of talking of the expansion and synthesis of patriotism in

Europe, imagine a development of narrow patriotism in America and

consider how that case could be dealt with.

Suppose, for instance, there was a serious outbreak of local patriotism

in Kentucky. Suppose you found the people of Kentucky starting a flag of

their own and objecting to what they would probably call the "vague

internationalism" of the stars and stripes. Suppose you found them

wanting to set up tariff barriers to the trade of the states round about

them. Suppose you found they were preparing to annex considerable parts

of the state of Virginia by force, in order to secure a proper strategic

frontier among the mountains to the east, and that they were also

talking darkly of their need for an outlet to the sea of their very own.

What would an American citizen think of such an outbreak? He would

probably think that Kentucky had gone mad. But this, which seems such

fantastic behaviour when we imagine it occurring in Kentucky, is exactly

what is happening in Europe in the case of little states that are hardly

any larger than Kentucky. They have always been so. They have not gone

mad; if this sort of thing is madness then they were born mad. And they

have never been cured. A state of affairs that is regarded in Europe as

normal would be regarded in the United States as a grave case of local

mental trouble.

And what would the American community probably do in such a case? It

would probably begin by inquiring where Kentucky had got these strange

ideas. They would look for sources of infection. Somebody must have been

preaching there or writing in the newspapers or teaching mischief in the

school. And I suppose the people of the United States would set

themselves very earnestly to see that sounder sense was talked and

taught to the people of Kentucky about these things.

Now that is precisely what has to be done in the parallel European case.

Everywhere in Europe there goes on in the national schools, in the

patriotic churches, in the national presses, in the highly nationalized

literatures, a unity-destroying propaganda of patriotism. The schools of

all the European countries at the present time with scarcely an

exception, teach the most rancid patriotism; they are centres of an

abominable political infection. The children of Europe grow up with an

intensity of national egotism that makes them, for all practical

international purposes, insane. They are not born with it, but they are

infected with it as soon as they can read and write. The British learn

nothing but the glories of Britain and the British Empire; the French

are, if possible, still more insanely concentrated on France; the

Germans are just recovering from the bitter consequences of forty years

of intensive nationalist education. And so on. Every country in Europe

is its own _Sinn Fein_, cultivating that ugly and silly obsession of

"ourselves alone." "Ourselves alone" is the sure guide to conflict and

disaster, to want, misery, violence, degradation and death for our

children and our children's children--until our race is dead.

The first task before us in Europe is, at any cost, to release our

children from this nationalist obsession, to teach the mass of European

people a little truthful history in which each one will see the past

and future of his own country in their proper proportions, and a little

truthful ethnology in which each country will get over the delusion that

its people are a distinct and individual race. The history teaching in

the schools of Europe is at the very core of this business.

But that is only, so to speak, the point of application of great complex

influences, the influences that mould us in childhood, the teachings of

literature, of the various religious bodies, and the daily reiteration

of the press. Before Europe can get on, there has to be a colossal

turnover of these moral and intellectual forces in the direction of

creating an international mind. If that can be effected then there is

hope for Europe and the Old World. If it cannot be effected, then

certainly Europe will go down--with its flags nailed to its masts. We

are on a sinking ship that only one thing can save. We have to oust

these European patriotisms by some greater idea or perish.

What is this greater idea to be?

Now I submit that this greater idea had best be the idea of the World

State of All Mankind.

I will admit that so far I have made a case only for teaching the idea

of a United States of Europe in Europe. I have concentrated our

attention upon that region of maximum congestion and conflict. But as a

matter of fact there are no real and effective barriers and boundaries

in the Old World between Europe and Asia and Africa. The ordinary

Russian talks of "Europe" as one who is outside it. The European

political systems flow over and have always overflowed into the greater

areas to the east and south. Remember the early empires of Macedonia and

Rome. See how the Russian language runs to the Pacific, and how Islam

radiates into all three continents. I will not elaborate this case.

When you bear such things in mind, I think you will agree with me that

if we are to talk of a United States of Europe, it is just as easy and

practicable to talk of a United States of the Old World. And are we to

stop at a United States of the Old World?

No doubt the most evident synthetic forces in America at the present

time point towards some sort of pan-American unification. That is the

nearest thing. That may come first.

But are we to contemplate a sort of dual world--the New World against

the Old?

I do not think that would be any very permanent or satisfactory

stopping-place. Why make two bites at a planet? If we work for unity on

the large scale we are contemplating, we may as well work for world

unity.

Not only in distance but in a score of other matters are London and Rome

nearer to New York than is Patagonia, and San Francisco is always likely

to be more interesting to Japan than Paris or Madrid. I cannot see any

reason for supposing that the mechanical drawing together of the

peoples of the world into one economic and political unity is likely to

cease--unless our civilization ceases. I see no signs that our present

facilities for transport and communication are the ultimate possible

facilities. Once we break away from current nationalist limitations in

our political ideas, then there is no reason and no advantage in

contemplating any halfway house to a complete human unity.

Now after what I have been saying it is very easy to explain why I would

have this idea of human unity put before people's minds in the form of a

World State and not of a League of Nations.

Let me first admit the extraordinary educational value of the League of

Nations propaganda, and of the attempt that has been made to create a

League of Nations. It has brought before the general intelligence of the

world the proposition of a world law and a world unity that could not

perhaps have been broached in any other way.

But is it a league of nations that is wanted?

I submit to you that the word "nations" is just the word that should

have been avoided--that it admits and tends to stereotype just those

conceptions of division and difference that we must at any cost minimize

and obliterate if our species is to continue. And the phrase has a thin

and legal and litigious flavour. What loyalty and what devotion can we

expect this multiple association to command? It has no unity--no

personality. It is like asking a man to love the average member of a

woman's club instead of loving his wife.

For the idea of Man, for human unity, for our common blood, for the one

order of the world, I can imagine men living and dying, but not for a

miscellaneous assembly that will not mix--even in its name. It has no

central idea, no heart to it, this League of Nations formula. It is weak

and compromising just where it should be strong--in defining its

antagonism to separate national sovereignty. For that is what it aims

at, if it means business. If it means business it means at least a

super-state overriding the autonomy of existing states, and if it does

not mean business then we have no use for it whatever.

It may seem a much greater undertaking to attack nationality and

nationalism instead of patching up a compromise with these things, but

along the line of independent nationality lies no hope of unity and

peace and continuing progress for mankind. We cannot suffer these old

concentrations of loyalty because we want that very loyalty which now,

concentrates upon them to cement and sustain the peace of all the world.

Just as in the past provincial patriotisms have given place to national

patriotisms, so now we need to oust these still too narrow devotions by

a new unity and a new reigning idea, the idea of one state and one flag

in all the earth.

The idea of the World State stands to the idea of the League of Nations

much as the idea of the one God of Earth and Heaven stands to a Divine

Committee composed of Wodin and Baal and Jupiter and Amon Ra and Mumbo

Jumbo and all the other national and tribal gods. There is no compromise

possible in the one matter as in the other. There is no way round. The

task before mankind is to substitute the one common idea of an

overriding world commonweal for the multitudinous ideas of little

commonweals that prevail everywhere to-day. We have already glanced at

the near and current consequences of our failure to bring about that

substitution.

Now this is an immense proposal. Is it a preposterous one? Let us not

shirk the tremendous scale upon which the foundations of a world state

of all mankind must be laid. But remember, however great that task

before us may seem, however near it may come to the impossible,

nevertheless, in the establishment of one world rule and one world law

lies the only hope of escape from an increasing tangle of wars, from

social overstrain, and at last a social dissolution so complete as to

end for ever the tale of mankind as we understand mankind.

Personally I am appalled by the destruction already done in the world in

the past seven years. I doubt if any untravelled American can realize

how much of Europe is already broken up. I do not think many people

realize how swiftly Europe is still sinking, how urgent it is to get

European affairs put back upon a basis of the common good if

civilization is to be saved.

And now, as to the immensity of this project of substituting loyalty to

a world commonweal for loyalty to a single egotistical belligerent

nation. It is a project to invade hundreds of millions of minds, to

attack certain ideas established in those minds and either to efface

those ideas altogether or to supplement and correct them profoundly by

this new idea of a human commonweal. We have to get not only into the at

present intensely patriotic minds of Frenchmen, Germans, English, Irish

and Japanese, but into the remote and difficult minds of Arabs and

Indians and into the minds of the countless millions of China. Is there

any precedent to justify us in hoping that such a change in world ideas

is possible?

I think there is. I would suggest that the general tendency of thought

about these things to-day is altogether too sceptical of what teaching

and propaganda can do in these matters. In the past there have been very

great changes in human thought. I need scarcely remind you of the spread

of Christianity in Western Europe. In a few centuries the whole of

Western Europe was changed from the wild confusion of warring tribes

that succeeded the breakdown of the Roman Empire, into the unity of

Christendom, into a community with such an idea of unity that it could

be roused from end to end by the common idea of the Crusades.

Still more remarkable was the swift transformation in less than a

century of all the nations and peoples to the south and west of the

Mediterranean, from Spain to Central Asia, into the unity of Islam, a

unity which has lasted to this day. In both these cases, what I may call

the mental turnover was immense.

I think if you will consider the spread of these very complex and

difficult religions, and compare the means at the disposal of their

promoters with the means at the disposal of intelligent people to-day,

you will find many reasons for believing that a recasting of people's

ideas into the framework of a universal state is by no means an

impossible project.

Those great teachings of the past were spread largely by word of mouth.

Their teachers had to travel slowly and dangerously. People were

gathered together to hear with great difficulty, except in a few crowded

towns. Books could be used only sparingly. Few people could read, fewer

still could translate, and MSS. were copied with extreme slowness upon

parchment. There was no printing, no paper, no post. And except for a

very few people there were no schools. Both Christendom and Islam had to

create their common schools in order to preserve even a minimum of their

doctrine intact from generation to generation. All this was done in the

teeth of much bitter opposition and persecution.

Now to-day we have means of putting ideas and arguments swiftly and

effectively before people all over the world at the same time, such as

no one could have dreamt of a hundred years ago. We have not only books

and papers, but in the cinema we have a means of rapid, vivid

presentation still hardly used. We have schools nearly everywhere. And

here in the need for an overruling world state, and the idea of world

service replacing combative patriotism, we have an urgent, a commanding

human need. We have an invincible case for this world state and an

unanswerable objection to the nationalisms and patriotisms that would

oppose it.

Is it not almost inevitable that some of us should get together and

begin a propaganda upon modern lines of this organized world peace,

without which our race must perish? The world perishes for the want of a

common political idea. It is still quite possible to give the world this

common political idea, the idea of a federal world state. We cannot help

but set about doing it.

So I put it to you that the most important work before men and women

to-day is the preaching and teaching, the elaboration and then at last

the realization of this Project of the World State. We have to create a

vision of it, to make it seem first a possibility and then an

approaching reality. This is a task that demands the work and thought of

thousands of minds. We have to spread the idea of a Federal World State,

as an approaching reality, throughout the world. We can do this nowadays

through a hundred various channels. We can do it through the press,

through all sorts of literary expression, in our schools, colleges, and

universities, through political mouthpieces, by special organizations,

and last, but not least, through the teaching of the churches. For

remember that all the great religions of the world are in theory

universalist; they may tolerate the divisions of men but they cannot

sanction them. We propose no religious revolution, but at most a

religious revival. We can spread ideas and suggestions now with a

hundred times the utmost rapidity of a century ago.

This movement need not at once intervene in politics. It is a

prospective movement, and its special concern will be with young and

still growing minds. But as it spreads it will inevitably change

politics. The nations, states, and kingdoms of to-day, which fight and

scheme against each other as though they had to go on fighting and

scheming for ever, will become more and more openly and manifestly

merely guardian governments, governments playing a waiting part in the

world, while the world state comes of age. For this World State, for

which the world is waiting, must necessarily be a fusion of all

governments, and heir to all the empires.

So far I have been occupied by establishing a case for the World State.

It has been, I fear, rather an abstract discussion. I have kept closely

to the bare hard logic of the present human situation.

But now let me attempt very briefly, in the barest outline, some

concrete realization of what a World State would mean. Let us try and

conceive for ourselves the form a World State would take. I do not care

to leave this discussion with nothing to it but a phrase which is really

hardly more than a negative phrase until we put some body to it. As it

stands World State means simply a politically undivided world. Let us

try and carry that over to the idea of a unified organized state

throughout the world.

Let us try to imagine what a World Government would be like. I find that

when one speaks of a World State people think at once of some existing

government and magnify it to world proportions. They ask, for example,

where will the World Congress meet; and how will you elect your World

President? Won't your World President, they say, be rather a tremendous

personage? How are we to choose him? Or will there be a World King?

These are very natural questions, at the first onset. But are they sound

questions? May they not be a little affected by false analogies? The

governing of the whole of the world may turn out to be _not_ a magnified

version of governing a part of the world, but a different sort of job

altogether. These analogies that people draw so readily from national

states may not really work in a world state.

And first with regard to this question of a king or president. Let us

ask whether it is probable that the world state will have any single

personal head at all?

Is the world state likely to be a monarchy--either an elective short

term limited monarchy such as is the United States, or an inherited

limited monarchy like the British Empire?

Many people will say, you _must_ have a head of the state. But _must_

you? Is not this idea a legacy from the days when states were small

communities needing a leader in war and diplomacy?

In the World State we must remember there will be no war--and no

diplomacy as such.

I would even question whether in such a great modern state as the U.S.A.

the idea and the functions of the president may not be made too

important. Indeed I believe that question has been asked by many people

in the States lately, and has been answered in the affirmative.

The broad lines of the United States constitution were drawn in a period

of almost universal monarchy. American affairs were overshadowed by the

personality of George Washington, and as you know, monarchist ideas were

so rife that there was a project, during the years of doubt and division

that followed the War of Independence, for importing a German King, a

Prussian Prince, in imitation of the British Monarchy. But if the United

States were beginning again to-day on its present scale, would it put so

much power and importance upon a single individual as it put upon George

Washington and his successors in the White House? I doubt it very much.

There may be a limit, I suggest, to the size and complexity of a

community that can be directed by a single personal head. Perhaps that

limit may have been passed by both the United States and by the British

Empire at the present time. It may be possible for one person to be

leader and to have an effect of directing personality in a community of

millions or even of tens of millions. But is it possible for one small

short-lived individual to get over and affect and make any sort of

contact with hundreds of millions in thousands of towns and cities?

Recently we have watched with admiration and sympathy the heroic efforts

of the Prince of Wales to shake hands with and get his smile well home

into the hearts of the entire population of the British Empire of which

he is destined to become the "golden link." After tremendous exertions a

very large amount of the ground still remains to be covered.

I will confess I cannot see any single individual human head in my

vision of the World State.

The linking reality of the World State is much more likely to be not an

individual but an idea--such an idea as that of a human commonweal under

the God of all mankind.

The Salvaging of Civilization · 第 4 / 12 段