We have already stated the clear necessity, if mankind is no

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THE SALVAGING OF CIVILIZATION

THE SALVAGING

OF CIVILIZATION

BY

H. G. WELLS

CASSELL AND COMPANY, LIMITED

London, New York, Toronto and Melbourne

1921

CONTENTS

PAGE

I. THE PROBABLE FUTURE OF MANKIND 1

II. THE PROJECT OF A WORLD STATE 42

III. THE ENLARGEMENT OF PATRIOTISM TO A WORLD STATE 68

IV. THE BIBLE OF CIVILIZATION; PART ONE 95

V. THE BIBLE OF CIVILIZATION; PART TWO 118

VI. THE SCHOOLING OF THE WORLD 139

VII. COLLEGE, NEWSPAPER AND BOOK 166

VIII. THE ENVOY 193

INDEX 199

The Salvaging of Civilization

I

THE PROBABLE FUTURE OF MANKIND[A]

[A] First published in the _Review of Reviews_.

Sec. 1

The present outlook of human affairs is one that admits of broad

generalizations and that seems to require broad generalizations. We are

in one of those phases of experience which become cardinal in history. A

series of immense and tragic events have shattered the self-complacency

and challenged the will and intelligence of mankind. That easy general

forward movement of human affairs which for several generations had

seemed to justify the persuasion of a necessary and invincible progress,

progress towards greater powers, greater happiness, and a continual

enlargement of life, has been checked violently and perhaps arrested

altogether. The spectacular catastrophe of the Great War has revealed an

accumulation of destructive forces in our outwardly prosperous society,

of which few of us had dreamt; and it has also revealed a profound

incapacity to deal with and restrain these forces. The two years of

want, confusion, and indecision that have followed the Great War in

Europe and Asia, and the uncertainties that have disturbed life even in

the comparatively untouched American world, seem to many watchful minds

even more ominous to our social order than the war itself. What is

happening to our race? they ask. Did the prosperities and confident

hopes with which the twentieth century opened, mark nothing more than a

culmination of fortuitous good luck? Has the cycle of prosperity and

progress closed? To what will this staggering and blundering, the

hatreds and mischievous adventures of the present time, bring us? Is the

world in the opening of long centuries of confusion and disaster such as

ended the Western Roman Empire in Europe or the Han prosperity in China?

And if so, will the debacle extend to America? Or is the American (and

Pacific?) system still sufficiently removed and still sufficiently

autonomous to maintain a progressive movement of its own if the Old

World collapse?

Some sort of answer to these questions, vast and vague though they are,

we must each one of us have before we can take an intelligent interest

or cast an effective vote in foreign affairs. Even though a man

formulate no definite answer, he must still have an implicit persuasion

before he can act in these matters. If he have no clear conclusions

openly arrived at, then he must act upon subconscious conclusions

instinctively arrived at. Far better is it that he should bring them

into the open light of thought.

The suppression of war is generally regarded as central to the complex

of contemporary problems. But war is not a new thing in human

experience, and for scores of centuries mankind has managed to get along

in spite of its frequent recurrence. Most states and empires have been

intermittently at war throughout their periods of stability and

prosperity. But their warfare was not the warfare of the present time.

The thing that has brought the rush of progressive development of the

past century and a half to a sudden shock of arrest is not the old and

familiar warfare, but warfare strangely changed and exaggerated by novel

conditions. It is this change in conditions, therefore, and not war

itself, which is the reality we have to analyse in its bearing upon our

social and political ideas. In 1914 the European Great Powers resorted

to war, as they had resorted to war on many previous occasions, to

decide certain open issues. This war flamed out with an unexpected

rapidity until all the world was involved; and it developed a horror, a

monstrosity of destructiveness, and, above all, an inconclusiveness

quite unlike any preceding war. That unlikeness was the essence of the

matter. Whatever justifications could be found for its use in the past,

it became clear to many minds that under the new conditions war was no

longer a possible method of international dealing. The thing lay upon

the surface. The idea of a League of Nations sustaining a Supreme World

Court to supersede the arbitrament of war, did not so much arise at any

particular point as break out simultaneously wherever there were

intelligent men.

Now what was this change in conditions that had confronted mankind with

the perplexing necessity of abandoning war? For perplexing it certainly

is. War has been a ruling and constructive idea in all human societies

up to the present time; few will be found to deny it. Political

institutions have very largely developed in relation to the idea of war;

defence and aggression have shaped the outer form of every state in the

world, just as co-operation sustained by compulsion has shaped its inner

organization. And if abruptly man determines to give up the waging of

war, he may find that this determination involves the most extensive and

penetrating modifications of political and social conceptions that do

not at the first glance betray any direct connection with belligerent

activities at all.

It is to the general problem arising out of this consideration, that

this and the three following essays will be addressed; the question:

What else has to go if war is to go out of human life? and the problem

of what has to be done if it is to be banished and barred out for ever

from the future experiences of our race. For let us face the truth in

this matter; the abolition of war is no casting of ancient, barbaric,

and now obsolete traditions, no easy and natural progressive step; the

abolition of war, if it can be brought about, will be a reversal not

only of the general method of human life hitherto but of the general

method of nature, the method, that is, of conflict and survival. It will

be a new phase in the history of life, and not simply an incident in the

history of man. These brief essays will attempt to present something

like the true dimensions of the task before mankind if war is indeed to

be superseded, and to show that the project of abolishing war by the

occasional meeting of some Council of a League of Nations or the like,

is, in itself, about as likely to succeed as a proposal to abolish

thirst, hunger, and death by a short legislative act.

Let us first examine the change in the conditions of human life that has

altered war from a normal aspect of the conflict for existence of human

societies into a terror and a threat for the entire species. The change

is essentially a change in the amount of power available for human

purposes, and more particularly in the amount of material power that can

be controlled by one individual. Human society up to a couple of

centuries ago was essentially a man-power and horse-power system. There

was in addition a certain limited use of water power and wind power, but

that was not on a scale to affect the general truth of the proposition.

The first intimation of the great change began seven centuries ago with

the appearance of explosives. In the thirteenth century the Mongols made

a very effective military use of the Chinese discovery of gunpowder.

They conquered most of the known world, and their introduction of a

low-grade explosive in warfare rapidly destroyed the immunity of castles

and walled cities, abolished knighthood, and utterly wrecked and

devastated the irrigation system of Mesopotamia, which had been a

populous and civilized region since before the beginnings of history.

But the restricted metallurgical knowledge of the time set definite

limits to the size and range of cannon. It was only with the nineteenth

century that the large scale production of cast steel and the growth of

chemical knowledge made the military use of a variety of explosives

practicable. The systematic extension of human power began in the

eighteenth century with the utilization of steam and coal. That opened a

crescendo of invention and discovery which thrust rapidly increasing

quantities of material energy into men's hands. Even now that crescendo

may not have reached its climax.

We need not rehearse here the familiar story of the abolition of

distance that ensued; how the radiogram and the telegram have made every

event of importance a simultaneous event for the minds of everyone in

the world, how journeys which formerly took months or weeks now take

days or hours, nor how printing and paper have made possible a

universally informed community, and so forth. Nor will we describe the

effect of these things upon warfare. The point that concerns us here is

this, that before this age of discovery communities had fought and

struggled with each other much as naughty children might do in a crowded

nursery, _within the measure of their strength_. They had hurt and

impoverished each other, but they had rarely destroyed each other

completely. Their squabbles may have been distressing, but they were

tolerable. It is even possible to regard these former wars as healthy,

hardening and invigorating conflicts. But into this nursery has come

Science, and has put into the fists of these children razor blades with

poison on them, bombs of frightful explosive, corrosive fluids and the

like. The comparatively harmless conflicts of these infants are suddenly

fraught with quite terrific possibilities, and it is only a question of

sooner or later before the nursery becomes a heap of corpses or is blown

to smithereens. A real nursery invaded by a reckless person distributing

such gifts, would be promptly saved by the intervention of the nurse;

but humanity has no nurse but its own poor wisdom. And whether that poor

wisdom can rise to the pitch of effectual intervention is the most

fundamental problem in mundane affairs at the present time.

The deadly gifts continue. There was a steady increase in the

frightfulness and destructiveness of belligerence from 1914 up to the

beginning of 1918, when shortage of material and energy checked the

process; and since the armistice there has been an industrious

development of military science. The next well-organized war, we are

assured, will be far more swift and extensive in its destruction--more

particularly of the civilian population. Armies will advance no longer

along roads but extended in line, with heavy tank transport which will

plough up the entire surface of the land they traverse; aerial bombing,

with bombs each capable of destroying a small town, will be practicable

a thousand miles beyond the military front, and the seas will be swept

clear of shipping by mines and submarine activities. There will be no

distinction between combatants and non-combatants, because every

able-bodied citizen, male or female, is a potential producer of food and

munitions; and probably the safest, and certainly the best supplied

shelters in the universal cataclysm, will be the carefully buried,

sandbagged, and camouflaged general-headquarters of the contending

armies. There military gentlemen of limited outlook and high

professional training will, in comparative security, achieve destruction

beyond their understanding. The hard logic of war which gives victory

always to the most energetic and destructive combatant, will turn

warfare more and more from mere operations for loot or conquest or

predominance into operations for the conclusive destruction of the

antagonists. A relentless thrust towards strenuousness is a

characteristic of belligerent conditions. War is war, and vehemence is

in its nature. You must hit always as hard as you can. Offensive and

counter-offensive methods continue to prevail over merely defensive

ones. The victor in the next great war will be bombed from the air,

starved, and depleted almost as much as the loser. His victory will be

no easy one; it will be a triumph of the exhausted and dying over the

dead.

It has been argued that such highly organized and long prepared warfare

as the world saw in 1914-18 is not likely to recur again for a

considerable time because of the shock inflicted by it upon social

stability. There may be spasmodic wars with improvised and scanty

supplies, these superficially more hopeful critics admit, but there

remain no communities now so stable and so sure of their people as to

prepare and wage again a fully elaborated scientific war. But this view

implies no happier outlook for mankind. It amounts to this, that so long

as men remain disordered and impoverished they will not rise again to

the full height of scientific war. But manifestly this will only be for

so long as they remain disordered and impoverished. When they recover

they will recover to repeat again their former disaster with whatever

modern improvements and intensifications the ingenuity of the

intervening time may have devised. This new phase of disorder,

conflict, and social unravelling upon which we have entered, this phase

of decline due to the enhanced and increasing powers for waste and

destruction in mankind, is bound, therefore, to continue so long as the

divisions based upon ancient ideas of conflict remain; and if for a time

the decadence seems to be arrested, it will only be to accumulate under

the influence of those ideas a fresh war-storm sufficiently destructive

and disorganizing to restore the decadent process.

Unless mankind can readjust its political and social ideas to this

essential new fact of its enormously enlarged powers, unless it can

eliminate or control its pugnacity, no other prospect seems open to us

but decadence, at least to such a level of barbarism as to lose and

forget again all the scientific and industrial achievements of our

present age. Then, with its powers shrunken to their former puny scale,

our race may recover some sort of balance between the injuries and

advantages of conflict. Or, since our decadent species may have less

vitality and vigour than it had in its primitive phases, it may dwindle

and fade out altogether before some emboldened animal antagonist, or

through some world-wide disease brought to it perhaps by rats and dogs

and insects and what not, who may be destined to be heirs to the rusting

and mouldering ruins of the cities and ports and ways and bridges of

to-day.

Only one alternative to some such retrogression seems possible, and that

is the conscious, systematic reconstruction of human society to avert

it. The world has been brought into one community, and the human mind

and will may be able to recognize and adapt itself to this fact--in

time. Men, as a race, may succeed in turning their backs upon the method

of warfare and the methods of conflict and in embarking upon an immense

world-wide effort of co-operation and mutual toleration and salvage.

They may have the vigour to abandon their age-long attempt to live in

separate sovereign states, and to grapple with and master the now quite

destructive force that traditional hostility has become, and bring their

affairs together under one law and one peace. These new vast powers over

nature which have been given to them, and which will certainly be their

destruction if their purposes remain divergent and conflicting, will

then be the means by which they may set up a new order of as yet

scarcely imaginable interest and happiness and achievement. But is our

race capable of such an effort, such a complete reversal of its

instinctive and traditional impulses? Can we find premonitions of any

such bold and revolutionary adaptations as these, in the mental and

political life of to-day? How far are we, reader and writer, for

example, working for these large new securities? Do we even keep them

steadfastly in our minds? How is it with the people around us? Are not

we and they and all the race still just as much adrift in the current

of circumstances as we were before 1914? Without a great effort on our

part (or on someone's part) that current which swirled our kind into a

sunshine of hope and opportunity for a while will carry our race on

surely and inexorably to fresh wars, to shortages, hunger, miseries, and

social debacles, at last either to complete extinction or to a

degradation beyond our present understanding.

Sec.2

The urgent need for a great creative effort has become apparent in the

affairs of mankind. It is manifest that unless some unity of purpose can

be achieved in the world, unless the ever more violent and disastrous

incidence of war can be averted, unless some common control can be

imposed on the headlong waste of man's limited inheritance of coal, oil,

and moral energy that is now going on, the history of humanity must

presently culminate in some sort of disaster, repeating and exaggerating

the disaster of the great war, producing chaotic social conditions, and

going on thereafter in a degenerative process towards extinction. So

much all reasonable men seem now prepared to admit. But upon the

question of how and in what form a unity of purpose and a common control

of human affairs is to be established, there is still a great and

lamentable diversity of opinion and, as a consequence, an enfeeblement

and wasteful dispersal of will. At present nothing has been produced but

the manifestly quite inadequate League of Nations at Geneva, and a

number of generally very vague movements for a world law, world

disarmament, and the like, among the intellectuals of the various

civilized countries of the world.

The common failings of all these initiatives are a sort of genteel

timidity and a defective sense of the scale of the enterprise before us.

A neglect of the importance of scale is one of the gravest faults of

contemporary education. Because a world-wide political organ is needed,

it does not follow that a so-called League of Nations without

representative sanctions, military forces, or authority of any kind, a

League from which large sections of the world are excluded altogether,

is any contribution to that need. People have a way of saying it is

better than nothing. But it may be worse than nothing. It may create a

feeling of disillusionment about world-unifying efforts. If a mad

elephant were loose in one's garden, it would be an excellent thing to

give one's gardener a gun. But it would have to be an adequate gun, an

elephant gun. To give him a small rook-rifle and tell him it was better

than nothing, and encourage him to face the elephant with that in his

hand, would be the directest way of getting rid not of the elephant but

of the gardener.

It is, if people will but think steadfastly, inconceivable that there

should be any world control without a merger of sovereignty, but the

framers of these early tentatives towards world unity have lacked the

courage of frankness in this respect. They have been afraid of outbreaks

of bawling patriotism, and they have tried to believe, and to make

others believe, that they contemplate nothing more than a league of

nations, when in reality they contemplate a subordination of nations and

administrations to one common law and rule. The elementary necessity of

giving the council of any world-peace organization which is to be more

than a sentimental international gesture, not only a complete knowledge

but an effective control of all the military resources and organizations

in the world, appalled them. They did not even ask for such a control.

The frowning solidity of existing things was too much for them. They

wanted to change them, but when it came to laying hands on them--No!

They decided to leave them alone. They wanted a new world--and it is to

contain just the same things as the old.

But are these intellectuals right in their estimate of the common man?

Is he such a shallow and vehement fool as they seem to believe? Is he so

patriotic as they make out? If mankind is to be saved from destruction

there must be a world control; a world control means a world government,

it is only another name for it, and manifestly that government must have

a navy that will supersede the British navy, artillery that will

supersede the French artillery, air forces superseding all existing air

forces, and so forth. For many flags there must be one sovereign flag;

_orbis terrarum_. Unless a world control amounts to that it will be

ridiculous, just as a judge supported by two or three unarmed policemen,

a newspaper reporter and the court chaplain, proposing to enforce his

decisions in a court packed with the heavily armed friends of the

plaintiff and defendant would be ridiculous. But the common man is

supposed to be so blindly and incurably set upon his British navy or his

French army, or whatever his pet national instrument of violence may be,

that it is held to be impossible to supersede these beloved and adored

forces. If that is so, then a world law is impossible, and the wisest

course before us is to snatch such small happiness as we may hope to do

and leave the mad elephant to work its will in the garden.

But is it so? If the mass of common men are incurably patriotic and

belligerent why is there a note of querulous exhortation in nearly all

patriotic literature? Why, for instance, is Mr. Rudyard Kipling's

"History of England" so full of goading and scolding? And very

significant indeed to any student of the human outlook was the

world-response to President Wilson's advocacy of the League of Nations

idea, in its first phase in 1918, before the weakening off and

disillusionment of the Versailles Conference. Just for a little while it

seemed that President Wilson stood for a new order of things in the

world, that he had the wisdom and will and power to break the net of

hatreds and nationalisms and diplomacies in which the Old World was

entangled. And while he seemed to be capable of that, while he promised

most in the way of change and national control, then it was that he

found his utmost support in every country in the world. In the latter

half of 1918 there was scarcely a country anywhere in which one could

not have found men ready to die for President Wilson. A great

hopefulness was manifest in the world. It faded, it faded very rapidly

again. But that brief wave of enthusiasm, which set minds astir with the

same great idea of one peace of justice throughout the earth in China

and Bokhara and the Indian bazaars, in Iceland and Basutoland and

Ireland and Morocco, was indeed a fact perhaps more memorable in history

even than the great war itself. It displayed a possibility of the

simultaneous operation of the same general ideas throughout the world

quite beyond any previous experience. It demonstrated that the

generality of men are as capable of being cosmopolitan and pacifist as

they are of being patriotic and belligerent. Both moods are extensions

and exaltations beyond the everyday life, which itself is neither one

thing nor the other. And both are transitory moods, responses to

external suggestion.

It is to that first wave of popular feeling for a world law transcending

and moving counter to all contemporary diplomacies, and not to the timid

legalism of the framers of the first schemes for a League of Nations

that we must look, if we are to hope at all for the establishment of a

new order in human affairs. It is upon the spirit of that transitory

response to the transitory greatness of President Wilson that we have to

seize; we have to lay hold of that, to recall it and confirm it and

enlarge and strengthen it, to make it a flux of patriotisms and a

creator of new loyalties and devotions, and out of the dead dust of our

present institutions to build up for it and animate with it the body of

a true world state.

We have already stated the clear necessity, if mankind is not to perish

by the hypertrophy of warfare, for the establishment of an armed and

strong world law. Here in this spirit that has already gleamed upon the

world is the possible force to create and sustain such a world law. What

is it that intervenes between the universal human need and its

satisfaction? Why, since there are overwhelming reasons for it and a

widespread disposition for it, is there no world-wide creative effort

afoot now in which men and women by the million are participating--and

participating with all their hearts? Why is it that, except for the weak

gestures of the Geneva League of Nations and a little writing of books

and articles, a little pamphleteering, some scattered committee

activities on the part of people chiefly of the busybody class, an

occasional speech and a diminishing volume of talk and allusion, no

attempts are apparent to stay the plain drift of human society towards

new conflicts and the sluices of final disaster?

The answer to that Why, probes deep into the question of human motives.

It must be because we are all creatures of our immediate surroundings,

because our minds and energies are chiefly occupied by the affairs of

every day, because we are all chiefly living our own lives, and very few

of us, except by a kind of unconscious contribution, the life of

mankind. In moments of mental activity, in the study or in

contemplation, we may rise to a sense of the dangers and needs of human

destiny, but it is only a few minds and characters of prophetic quality

that, without elaborate artificial assistance, seem able to keep hold

upon and guide their lives by such relatively gigantic considerations.

The generality of men and women, so far as their natural disposition

goes, are scarcely more capable of apprehending and consciously serving

the human future than a van full of well-fed rabbits would be of

grasping the fact that their van was running smoothly and steadily down

an inclined plane into the sea. It is only as the result of considerable

educational effort and against considerable resistance that our minds

are brought to a broader view. In every age for many thousands of years

men of exceptional vision have spent their lives in passionate efforts

to bring us ordinary men into some relation of response and service to

the greater issues of life. It is these pioneers of vision who have

given the world its religions and its philosophical cults, its loyalties

and observances; and who have imposed ideas of greatness and duty on

their fellows. In every age the ordinary man has submitted reluctantly

to such teachings, has made his peculiar compromises with them, has

reduced them as far as possible to formula and formality, and got back

as rapidly as possible to the eating and drinking and desire, the

personal spites and rivalries and glories which constitute his reality.

The mass of men to-day do not seem to care, nor want to care, whither

the political and social institutions to which they are accustomed are

taking them. Such considerations overstrain us. And it is only by the

extremest effort of those who are capable of a sense of racial danger

and duty that the collective energies of men can ever be gathered

together and organized and orientated towards the common good. To nearly

all men and women, unless they are in the vein for it, such discussion

as this in these essays does not appeal as being right or wrong; it does

not really interest them, rather it worries them; and for the most part

they would be glad to disregard it as completely as a lecture on wheels

and gravitation and the physiological consequences of prolonged

submergence would be disregarded by those rabbits in the van.

But man is a creature very different in his nature from a rabbit, and if

he is less instinctively social, he is much more consciously social.

Chief among his differences must be the presence of those tendencies

which we call conscience, that haunting craving to be really right and

to do the really right thing which is the basis of the moral and perhaps

also of most of the religious life. In this lies our hope for mankind.

Man hates to be put right, and yet also he wants to be right. He is a

creature divided against himself, seeking both to preserve and to

overcome his egotism. It is upon the presence of the latter strand in

man's complex make-up that we must rest our hopes of a developing will

for the world state which will gradually gather together and direct into

a massive constructive effort the now quite dispersed chaotic and

traditional activities of men.

As we have examined this problem it has become clear that the task of

bringing about that consolidated world state which is necessary to

prevent the decline and decay of mankind is not primarily one for the

diplomatists and lawyers and politicians at all. It is an educational

one. It is a moral based on an intellectual reconstruction. The task

immediately before mankind is to find release from the contentious

loyalties and hostilities of the past which make collective world-wide

action impossible at the present time, in a world-wide common vision of

the history and destinies of the race. On that as a basis, and on that

alone, can a world control be organized and maintained. The effort

demanded from mankind, therefore, is primarily and essentially a bold

reconstruction of the outlook upon life of hundreds of millions of

minds. The idea of a world commonweal has to be established as the

criterion of political institutions, and also as the criterion of

general conduct in hundreds of millions of brains. It has to dominate

education everywhere in the world. When that end is achieved, then the

world state will be achieved, and it can be achieved in no other way.

And unless that world state can be achieved, it would seem that the

outlook before mankind is a continuance of disorder and of more and more

destructive and wasteful conflicts, a steady process of violence,

decadence, and misery towards extinction, or towards modifications of

our type altogether beyond our present understanding and sympathy.

Sec. 3

In framing an estimate of the human future two leading facts are

dominant. The first is the plain necessity for a political

reorganization of the world as a unity, to save our race from the social

disintegration and complete physical destruction which war, under modern

conditions, must ultimately entail, and the second is the manifest

absence of any sufficient will in the general mass of mankind at the

present time to make such a reorganization possible. There appear to be

the factors of such a will in men, but they are for the most part

unawakened, or they are unorganized and ineffective. And there is a

very curious incapacity to grasp the reality of the human situation, a

real resistance to seeing things as they are--for man is an

effort-shirking animal--which greatly impedes the development of such a

will. Failing the operation of such a sufficient will, human affairs are

being directed by use and wont, by tradition and accidental deflections.

Mankind, after the tragic concussion of the great war, seems now to be

drifting again towards new and probably more disastrous concussions.

The catastrophe of the Great War did more or less completely awaken a

certain limited number of intelligent people to the need of some general

control replacing this ancient traditional driftage of events. But they

shrank from the great implications of such a world control. The only

practicable way to achieve a general control in the face of existing

governments, institutions and prejudices, interested obstruction and the

common disregard, is by extending this awakening to great masses of

people. This means an unprecedented educational effort, an appeal to

men's intelligence and men's imagination such as the world has never

seen before. Is it possible to rationalize the at present chaotic will

of mankind? That possibility, if it is a possibility, is the most

important thing in contemporary human affairs.

We are asking here for an immense thing, for a change of ideas, a vast

enlargement of ideas, and for something very like a change of heart in

hundreds of millions of human beings. But then we are dealing with the

fate of the entire species. We are discussing the prevention of wars,

disorders, shortages, famines and miseries for centuries ahead. The

initial capital we have to go upon is as yet no more than the aroused

understanding and conscience of a few thousands, at most of a few score

thousands of people. Can so little a leaven leaven so great a lump? Is a

response to this appeal latent in the masses of mankind? Is there

anything in history to justify hope for so gigantic a mental turnover in

our race?

A consideration of the spread of Christianity in the first four

centuries A.D. or of the spread of Islam in the seventh century will, we

believe, support a reasonable hope that such a change in the minds of

men, whatever else it may be, is a practicable change, that it can be

done and that it may even probably be done. Consider our two instances.

The propagandas of those two great religions changed and changed for

ever the political and social outlook over vast areas of the world's

surface. Yet while the stir for world unity begins now simultaneously in

many countries and many groups of people, those two propagandas each

radiated from a single centre and were in the first instance the

teachings of single individuals; and while to-day we can deal with great

reading populations and can reach them by press and printed matter, by a

universal distribution of books, by great lecturing organizations and

the like, those earlier great changes in human thought were achieved

mainly by word of mouth and by crabbed manuscripts, painfully copied and

passed slowly from hand to hand. So far it is only the trader who has

made any effectual use of the vast facilities the modern world has

produced for conveying a statement simultaneously to great numbers of

people at a distance. The world of thought still hesitates to use the

means of power that now exist for it. History and political philosophy

in the modern world are like bashful dons at a dinner party; they

crumble their bread and talk in undertones and clever allusions to their

nearest neighbour, abashed at the thought of addressing the whole table.

But in a world where Mars can reach out in a single night and smite a

city a thousand miles away, we cannot suffer wisdom to hesitate in an

inaudible gentility. The knowledge and vision that is good enough for

the best of us is good enough for all. This gospel of human brotherhood

and a common law and rule for all mankind, the attempt to meet this

urgent necessity of a common control of human affairs, which indeed is

no new religion but only an attempt to realize practically the common

teaching of all the established religions of the world, has to speak

with dominating voice everywhere between the poles and round about the

world.

And it must become part of the universal education. It must speak

through the school and university. It is too often forgotten, in

America, perhaps, even more than in Europe, that education exists for

the community, and for the individual only so far as it makes him a

sufficient member of the community. The chief end of education is to

subjugate and sublimate for the collective purposes of our kind the

savage egotism we inherit. Every school, every college, teaches directly

and still more by implication, relationship to a community and devotion

to a community. In too many cases that community we let our schools and

colleges teach to our children is an extremely narrow one; it is the

community of a sect, of a class, or of an intolerant, greedy and

unrighteous nationalism. Schools have increased greatly in numbers

throughout the world during the last century, but there has been little

or no growth in the conception of education in schools. Education has

been extended, but it has not been developed. If man is to be saved from

self-destruction by the organization of a world community, there must be

a broadening of the reference of the teaching in the schools of all the

world to that community of the world. World-wide educational development

and reform are the necessary preparations for and the necessary

accompaniments of a political reconstruction of the world. The two are

the right and left hands of the same thing. Neither can effect much

without the other.

Now it is manifest that this reorganization of the world's affairs and

of the world's education which we hold to be imperatively dictated by

the change in warfare, communications and other conditions of human

life brought about by scientific discovery during the last hundred

years, carries with it a practical repudiation of the claims of every

existing sovereign government in the world to be final and sovereign, to

be anything more than provisional and replaceable. There is the

difficulty that has checked hundreds of men after their first step

towards this work for a universal peace. It involves, it cannot but

involve, a revision of their habitual allegiances. At best existing

governments are to be regarded as local trustees and caretakers for the

coming human commonweal.

If they are not that, then they are necessarily obstructive and

antagonistic. But few rulers, few governments, few officials, will have

the greatness of mind to recognize and admit this plain reality. By a

kind of necessity they force upon their subjects and publics a conflict

of loyalties. The feeble driftage of human affairs from one base or

greedy arrangement or cowardly evasion to another, since the Armistice

of 1918, is very largely due to the obstinate determination of those who

are in positions of authority and responsibility to ignore the plain

teachings of the great war and its sequelae. They are resisting

adjustments; their minds are fighting against the sacrifices of pride

and authority that a full recognition of their subordination to the

world commonweal will involve. They are prepared, it would seem, to

fight against the work of human salvation basely and persistently,

whenever their accustomed importance is threatened.

Even in the schools and in the world of thought the established thing

will make its unrighteous fight for life. The dull and the dishonest in

high places will suppress these greater ideas when they can, and ignore

when they dare not suppress. It seems too much to hope for that there

should be any willingness on the part of any established authority to

admit its obsolescence and prepare the way for its merger in a world

authority. It is not creative minds that produce revolutions, but the

obstinate conservatism of established authority. It is the blank refusal

to accept the idea of an orderly evolution towards new things that gives

a revolutionary quality to every constructive proposal. The huge task of

political and educational reconstruction which is needed to arrest the

present drift of human affairs towards catastrophe, must be achieved, if

it is to be achieved at all, mainly by voluntary and unofficial effort;

and for the most part in the teeth of official opposition.

There are one or two existing states to which men have looked for some

open recognition of their duty to mankind as a whole, and of the

necessarily provisional nature of their contemporary constitutions. The

United States of America constitute a political system, profoundly

different in its origin and in its spirit, from any old-world state; it

was felt that here at least might be an evolutionary state; and in the

palmy days of President Wilson it did seem for a brief interval as if

the New World was indeed coming to the rescue of the old, as if America

was to play the role of a propagandist continent, bringing its ideas of

equality and freedom, and extending the spirit of its union to all the

nations of the earth. From that expectation, the world opinion is now in

a state of excessive and unreasonable recoil. President Wilson fell away

from his first intimations of that world-wide federal embrace; his mind

and will were submerged by the clamour of contending patriotisms and the

subtle expedients of old-world diplomacy in Paris; but American

accessibility to the idea of a federalized world neither began with him

nor will it end with his failure. America is still a hopeful laboratory

of world-unifying thought. A long string of arbitration treaties stands

to the credit of America, and a series of developing Pan-American

projects, pointing clearly to at least a continental synthesis within a

measurable time. There has been, and there still is, a better

understanding of, and a greater receptivity to, ideas of international

synthesis in America than in any European state.

And the British Empire, which according to many of its liberal

apologists is already a league of nations linked together in a mutually

advantageous peace, to that too men have looked for some movement of

adaptation to this greater synthesis which is the world's pre-eminent

need. But so far the British Empire has failed to respond to such

expectations. The war has left it strained and bruised and with its

affairs very much in the grip of the military class, the most illiterate

and dangerous class in the community. They have done, perhaps,

irreparable mischief to the peace of the empire in Ireland, India and

Egypt, and they have made the claim of the British system to be an

exemplary unification of dissimilar peoples seem now to many people

incurably absurd. It is a great misfortune for mankind that the British

Empire, which played so sturdy and central a part in the great war,

could at its close achieve no splendid and helpful gesture towards a

generous reconstruction.

Since the armistice there has been an extraordinary opportunity for the

British monarchy to have displayed a sense of the new occasions before

the world, and to have led the way towards the efforts and renunciations

of an international renascence. It could have taken up a lead that the

President of the United States had initiated and relinquished; it could

have used its peculiar position to make an unexampled appeal to the

whole world. It could have created a new epoch in history. The Prince of

Wales has been touring the world-wide dominions of which, some day, he

is to be the crowned head. He has received addresses, visited sights,

been entertained, shaken hands with scores of thousands of people and

submitted himself to the eager, yet unpenetrating gaze of vast

multitudes. His smallest acts have been observed with premeditated

admiration, his lightest words recorded. He is not now a boy; he saw

something of the great war, even if his exalted position denied him any

large share of its severer hardships and dangers; he cannot be blind to

the general posture of the world's affairs. Here, surely, was a chance

of saying something that would be heard from end to end of the earth,

something kingly and great-minded. Here was the occasion for a fine

restatement of the obligations and duties of empire. But from first to

last the prince has said nothing to quicken the imaginations of the

multitude of his future subjects to the gigantic possibilities of these

times, nothing to reassure the foreign observer that the British Empire

embodies anything more than the colossal national egotism and

impenetrable self-satisfaction of the British peoples. "Here we are,"

said the old order in those demonstrations, "and here we mean to stick.

Just as we have been, so we remain. British!--we are Bourbons." These

smiling tours of the Prince of Wales in these years of shortage, stress,

and insecurity, constitute a propaganda of inanity unparalleled in the

world's history.

* * * * *

Nor do we find in the nominal rulers and official representatives of

other countries any clear admission of the necessity for a great and

fundamental change in the scope and spirit of government. These official

and ruling people, more than any other people, are under the sway of

that life of use and wont which dominates us all. They are often

trained to their positions, or they have won their way to their

positions of authority through a career of political activities which

amounts to a training. And that training is not a training in enterprise

and change; it is a training in sticking tight and getting back to

precedent. We can expect nothing from them. We shall be lucky if the

resistance of the administrative side of existing states to the

conception of a world commonweal is merely passive. There is little or

no prospect of any existing governing system, unless it be such a

federal system as Switzerland or the United States, passing directly and

without extensive internal changes into combination with other sovereign

powers as part of a sovereign world system. At some point the

independent states will as systems resist, and unless an overwhelming

world conscience for the world state has been brought into being and

surrounds them with an understanding watchfulness, and invades the

consciences of their supporters and so weakens their resisting power,

they will resist violently and disastrously. But it will be an

incoherent resistance because the very nature of the sovereign states of

to-day is incoherence. There can be no world-wide combination of

sovereign states to resist the world state, because that would be to

create the world state in the attempt to defeat it.

Sec. 4

In the three preceding essays an attempt has been made to state the pass

at which mankind has arrived, the dangers and mischiefs that threaten

our race, and the need there is and the opportunities there are for a

strenuous attempt to end the age-long bickerings of nations and empires

and establish one community of law and effort throughout the whole

world. Stress has been laid chiefly upon the monstrous evils and

disasters a continuation of our present divisions, our nationalisms and

imperialisms and the like, will certainly entail. These considerations

of evil however are only the negative argument for this creative effort;

they have been thrust forward because war, disorder, insufficiency, and

the ill health, the partings, deprivations, boredom and unhappiness that

arise out of these things are well within our experience and entirely

credible; the positive argument for a world order demands at once more

faith and imagination.

Given a world law and world security, a release from the net of

bickering frontiers, world-wide freedom of movement, and world-wide

fellowship, a thousand good things that are now beyond hope or dreaming

would come into the ordinary life. The whole world would be our

habitation, and the energies of men, released from their preoccupation

with contention, would go more and more abundantly into the

accumulation and application of scientific knowledge, that is to say

into the increase of mental and bodily health, of human power, of

interest and happiness. Even to-day the most delightful possibilities

stand waiting, inaccessible to nearly all of us because of the general

insecurity, distrust and anger. Flying, in a world safely united in

peace, could take us now to the ends of the earth smoothly, securely

through the sweet upper air, in five or six days. In two or three years

there could again be abundance of food and pleasant clothing for

everyone throughout the whole world. Men could be destroying their slums

and pestilential habitations and rebuilding spacious and beautiful

cities. Given only peace and confidence and union we could double our

yearly production of all that makes life desirable and still double our

leisure for thought and growth. We could live in a universal palace and

make the whole globe our garden and playground.

The Salvaging of Civilization · 第 1 / 12 段