1863
The Umbeyla expedition--The Akhund of Swat
--The 'Eagle's Nest' and 'Crag piquet'--The death of Lord Elgin
--Loyalty of our Pathan soldiers--Bunerwals show signs of submission
--The conical hill--Umbeyla in flames--Bunerwals agree to our terms
--Malka destroyed
In the autumn of 1863, while we were preparing for the usual winter
tour, Sir Hugh Rose, who had accompanied Lord Elgin on a trip through
the hills, telegraphed to the Head-Quarters staff to join him at Mian
Mir without delay.
The news which greeted us on our arrival was indeed disturbing. Lord
Elgin was at Dharmsala in a dying condition, and the Chief had
been obliged to leave him and push on to Lahore, in consequence of
unsatisfactory reports from Brigadier-General Chamberlain, who was
just then commanding an expedition which had been sent into the
mountains near Peshawar, and had met with unexpected opposition. The
civil authorities on the spot reported that there existed a great deal
of excitement all along the border, that the tribes were collecting in
large numbers, that emissaries from Kabul had appeared amongst
them, and that, unless reinforcements could be sent up at once, the
Government would be involved in a war which must inevitably lead to
the most serious complications, not only on the frontier, but with
Afghanistan. In so grave a light did the Lieutenant-Governor, Sir
Robert Montgomery, view the position, that he contemplated the force
being withdrawn and the undertaking abandoned.
Sir Hugh had had nothing to do with the despatch of this expedition;
it had been decided on by the Government of India in consultation with
the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. When the Commander-in-Chief was
communicated with, he expressed himself adverse to the proposal, and
placed his views at length before the Government, pointing out the
inexpediency of entering a difficult and unknown country, unless the
troops were properly equipped with transport, supplies, and reserve
ammunition; that time did not permit of their being so equipped before
the winter set in; and that, to provide a force of 5,000 men (the
strength considered necessary by the Government), the frontier would
have to be dangerously weakened. Moreover, he gave it as his opinion
that it would be better to postpone operations until the spring, when
everything could be perfectly arranged. Subsequent events proved how
sound was this advice. But before proceeding with my narrative it will
be as well to explain the circumstances with led the authorities to
undertake this expedition.
In 1857, when all our resources were required to quell internal
tumult, the Hindustani fanatics[1] took the opportunity to stir up
disturbances all along the Yusafzai frontier of the Peshawar district,
and, aided by the rebel sepoys who had fled to them for protection,
they made raids upon our border, and committed all kinds of
atrocities. We were obliged, therefore, to send an expedition against
them in 1858, which resulted in their being driven from their
stronghold, Sitana, and in the neighbouring tribes being bound down to
prevent them reoccupying that place. Three years later the fanatics
returned to their former haunts and built up a new settlement at
Malka; the old troubles recommenced, and for two years they had been
allowed to go on raiding, murdering, and attacking our outposts with
impunity. It was, therefore, quite time that measures should be taken
to effectually rid the frontier of these disturbers of the peace,
provided such measures could have been decided upon early enough in
the year to ensure success.
The Punjab Government advocated the despatch of a very strong force.
Accordingly, two columns were employed, the base of one being in the
Peshawar valley, and that of the other in Hazara. The Peshawar column
was to move by the Umbeyla Pass, the Buner frontier, and the Chamla
valley, thus operating on the enemy's line of retreat. This route
would not have been chosen, had not Chamberlain been assured by the
civil authorities that no hostility need be feared from the Bunerwals,
even if their country had to be entered, as they had given no trouble
for fifteen years, and their spiritual head, the Akhund of Swat,[2]
had no sympathy with the fanatics. It was not, therefore, considered
necessary to warn the Buner people of our approach until preparations
were completed; indeed, it was thought unadvisable to do so, as it was
important to keep the proposed line of advance secret. The strength of
the force was 6,000 men, with 19 guns, but to make up these numbers
the stations in Upper India had to be considerably weakened, and there
was no reserve nearer than Lahore.
The Peshawar column[3] being all ready for a start, a Proclamation was
forwarded to the Buner and other neighbouring tribes, informing
them of the object of the expedition, and stating that there was no
intention of interfering with them or their possessions.
On the following morning, the 20th October, the Umbeyla Pass was
entered, and by noon the kotal[4] was reached without any resistance
to speak of; but, from information brought in, it was evident that any
further advance would be stoutly opposed. The road turned out to be
much more difficult than had been anticipated, and the hurriedly
collected transport proved unequal to the strain. Not a single baggage
animal, except the ammunition mules, got up that night; indeed, it was
not until the morning of the 22nd--more than forty-eight hours after
they started--that the rear guard reached the kotal, a distance of
only six miles. As soon as it arrived Colonel Alex. Taylor, R.E., was
sent off with a body of Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Probyn, to
reconnoitre the road in front. The delay in reaching the top of the
pass had given the tribes time to collect, and when the reconnoitring
party entered the Chamla valley the Bunerwals could be seen about two
miles and a half off, occupying in force the range which separates
Buner and Chamla. Whatever may have been their first intention, they
apparently could not resist the temptation to try and cut off this
small body of Cavalry, for our horsemen on their return journey found
a large number of the trusted Buner tribe attempting to block the
mouth of the pass. A charge was made, but mounted men could not do
much in such a hilly country; the proceedings of the Bunerwals,
however, had been observed from the kotal, and Major Brownlow,[5] with
some of his own regiment (the 20th Punjab Infantry), was sent to the
assistance of the party. A hand-to-hand fight ensued, and the enemy
pressed our troops closely on their way back, coming right in amongst
them with the utmost daring.
There was now brought in to the Commissioner by a spy the copy of
a letter from the Hindustani fanatics, addressed to the Bunerwals,
telling them not to be taken in by our assurances that our only object
was to punish the fanatics, for our real intentions were to annex
Chamla, Buner, and Swat. This letter no doubt aroused the suspicions
of the tribes, and, encouraged by the slowness of our movements, they
all joined against us from Buner, Mahaban, and the Black Mountain.
On the 23rd large bodies of men with numerous standards were to be
seen approaching the mouth of the pass, and a day or two later a
report was received that our foes were to have the support of the
Akhund of Swat, which meant a most formidable accession of moral as
well as material strength, and put a stop, for the time being, to
any possibility of a successful advance being made with the force at
Chamberlain's disposal.
The position occupied by our troops was enclosed on the left (west)
by the Guru Mountain, which separates Umbeyla from Buner, and on the
right (east) by a range of hills, not quite so high. The main piquet
on the Guru occupied a position upon some precipitous cliffs known as
the Eagle's Nest, while that on the right was designated the 'Crag
piquet.' The Eagle's Nest was only large enough to accommodate 110
men, so 120 more were placed under the shelter of some rocks at its
base, and the remainder of the troops told off for the defence of the
left piquet were drawn up on and about a rocky knoll, 400 feet west of
the Eagle's Nest.
Some 2,000 of the enemy occupied a breastwork on the crest of a spur
of the Guru Mountain; and about noon on the 26th they moved down, and
with loud shouts attacked the Eagle's Nest. Their matchlock men posted
themselves to the greatest advantage in a wood, and opened a galling
fire upon our defences, while their swordsmen made a determined
advance. The nature of the ground prevented our guns from being
brought to bear upon the assailants, and they were thus able to
get across the open space in front of the piquet, and plant their
standards close under its parapet. For some considerable time they
remained in this position, all our efforts to dislodge them proving of
no avail. Eventually, however, they were forced to give way, and were
driven up the hill, leaving the ground covered with their dead, and a
great many wounded, who were taken into our hospitals and carefully
treated, while a still greater number were carried off by their
friends. Our losses were, 2 British officers, 1 Native officer, and
26 men killed; and 2 British officers, 7 Native officers, and 86 men
wounded.
The day following the fight the Bunerwals were told they might carry
away their dead, and we took advantage of their acceptance of this
permission to reason with them as to the uselessness of an unnecessary
sacrifice of their tribesmen, which would be the certain result of
further opposition to us. Their demeanour was courteous, and they
conversed freely with General Chamberlain and Colonel Reynell Taylor,
the Commissioner, but they made it evident that they were determined
not to give in.
Our position had now become rather awkward; there was a combination
against us of all the tribes between the Indus and the Kabul rivers,
and their numbers could not be less than 15,000 armed men. Mutual
animosities were for the time allowed to remain in abeyance, and
the tribes all flocked to fight under the Akhund's standard in the
interests of their common faith. Moreover, there was trouble in the
rear from the people along the Yusafzai border, who assisted the
enemy by worrying our lines of communication. Under these changed
conditions, and with such an inadequate force, Chamberlain came to
the conclusion that, for the moment, he could only remain on the
defensive, and trust to time, to the discouragement which repeated
unsuccessful attacks were sure to produce on the enemy, and to the
gradual decrease of their numbers, to break up the combination against
us; for, as these tribesmen only bring with them the quantity of food
they are able to carry, as soon as it is finished they are bound to
suspend operations till more can be procured.
For three weeks almost daily attacks were made on our position; the
enemy fought magnificently, some of them being killed inside our
batteries, and twice they gained possession of the 'Crag piquet,' the
key of the position, which it was essential should be retaken at all
hazards. On the second occasion General Chamberlain himself led the
attacking party, and was so severely wounded that he was obliged to
relinquish the command of the force.
The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, being convinced that
reinforcements were necessary, in consultation with Colonels Durand[6]
and Norman (the Foreign and Military Secretaries, who had come to
Lahore to meet the Viceroy), and without waiting for the sanction of
the Commander-in-Chief, ordered to the frontier the three regiments
which had been detailed for the Viceroy's camp,[7] as well as the 93rd
Highlanders, then at Sialkot; and when Sir Hugh Rose on his arrival
at Lahore heard of the heavy losses the expeditionary force had
sustained, and of General Chamberlain being _hors de combat_ from his
wound, further reinforcements from every direction were hurried to the
front. Subsequently, however, it became a question whether the troops
should not be withdrawn altogether, and the punishment of the fanatics
given up, the Government of India and the Punjab Government being
completely in accord in favouring this view, while the Commissioner of
Peshawar, Major James (who had succeeded Reynell Taylor),[8] and Sir
Hugh Rose were as strongly opposed to a retrograde movement. The
Commander-in-Chief pointed out to the Government that the loss of
prestige and power we must sustain by retiring from the Umbeyla Pass
would be more disastrous, both from a military and political point
of view, than anything that could happen save the destruction of the
force itself, and that General Chamberlain, on whose sound judgment he
could rely, was quite sure that a retirement was unnecessary.
Unfortunately at this time the Viceroy died at Dharmsala, and the
question remained in abeyance pending the arrival of Sir William
Denison, Governor of Madras, who was coming round to take over the
reins of Government until a successor to Lord Elgin should be sent
from England.
In the meantime Sir Hugh Rose was most anxious to obtain exact
information respecting our position at Umbeyla, the means of operating
from it, the nature of the ground--in fact, all details which could
only be satisfactorily obtained by sending someone to report on the
situation, with whom he had had personal communication regarding
the points about which he required to be enlightened. He therefore
determined to despatch two officers on special service, whose duty it
would be to put the Commander-in-Chief in possession of all the facts
of the case; accordingly, Colonel Adye[9] (Deputy-Adjutant-General
of Royal Artillery) and I were ordered to proceed to Umbeyla without
delay.
Adye proved a most charming travelling companion, clever and
entertaining, and I think we both enjoyed our journey. We reached the
pass on the 25th November.
There had been no fighting for some days, and most of the wounded had
been removed. Sir Neville Chamberlain was still in camp, and I was
sorry to find him suffering greatly from his wound. We were much
interested in going over the piquets and listening to the story of the
different attacks made upon them, which had evidently been conducted
by the enemy with as much skill as courage.[10] The loyalty of our
Native soldiers struck me as having been most remarkable. Not a single
desertion had occurred, although all the Native regiments engaged,
with the exception of the Gurkhas and Punjab Pioneers, had amongst
them members of the several tribes we were fighting, and many of our
soldiers were even closely related to some of the hostile tribesmen;
on one occasion a young Buner sepoy actually recognized his own father
amongst the enemy's dead when the fight was over.[11]
We listened to many tales of the gallantry of the British officers.
The names of Brownlow, Keyes,[12] and Hughes[13] were on everyone's
lips, and Brownlow's defence of the Eagle's Nest on the 26th October,
and of the 'Crag piquet' on the 12th November, spoke volumes for his
coolness and pluck, and for the implicit faith reposed in him by the
men of the 20th Punjab Infantry, the regiment he had raised in 1857
when but a subaltern. In his official report the General remarked that
'to Major Brownlow's determination and personal example he attributed
the preservation of the "Crag piquet."' And Keyes's recapture of the
same piquet was described by Sir Neville as 'a most brilliant exploit,
stamping Major Keyes as an officer possessing some of the highest
military qualifications.' Brownlow and Keyes were both recommended for
the Victoria Cross.
We (Adye and I) had no difficulty in making up our minds as to
the course which ought to be taken. The column was daily being
strengthened by the arrival of reinforcements, and although the
combination of the tribesmen was still formidable, the enemy were
showing signs of being disheartened by their many losses, and of a
wish to come to terms.
Having consulted the civil and military authorities on the spot, we
informed the Commander-in-Chief that they were of opinion a withdrawal
would be most unwise, and that it was hoped that on the arrival of
General Garvock[14] (Chamberlain's successor) an advance would be made
into the Chamla valley, for there would then be a sufficient number
of troops to undertake an onward move, as well as to hold the present
position, which, as we told the Chief, was one of the strongest we had
ever seen.
Sir William Denison reached Calcutta on the 2nd December. A careful
study of the correspondence in connexion with the Umbeyla expedition
satisfied him that the Commander-in-Chief's views were correct, and
that a retirement would be unwise.
Sir Hugh Rose had previously requested to be allowed to personally
conduct the operations, and in anticipation of the Government acceding
to his request, he had sent a light camp to Hasan Abdal, from which
place he intended to push on to Umbeyla; and with the object of
collecting troops near the frontier, where they would be available
as a reserve should the expedition not be soon and satisfactorily
settled, he desired me to select an encamping-ground between Rawal
Pindi and Attock suitable for 10,000 men.
Leaving Adye in the pass, I started for Attock, where I spent three
days riding about in search of a promising site for the camp. I
settled upon a place near Hasan Abdal, which, however, was not in the
end made use of. The people of the country were very helpful to me;
indeed, when they heard I had been a friend of John Nicholson, they
seemed to think they could not do enough for me, and delighted in
talking of their old leader, whom they declared to be the greatest man
they had ever known.
On my return I marched up the pass with the Rev. W. G. Cowie[15] and
Probyn, who, with 400 Cavalry, had been ordered to the front to be in
readiness for a move into the Chamla valley. James, the Commissioner,
had been working to detach the Bunerwals from the combination against
us, and on the afternoon of our arrival a deputation of their headmen
arrived in camp, and before their departure the next morning they
promised to accompany a force proceeding to destroy Malka, and to
expel the Hindustani fanatics from the Buner country.
Later, however, a messenger came in to say they could not fulfil their
promise, being unable to resist the pressure brought to bear upon them
by their co-religionists. The man further reported that large numbers
of fresh tribesmen had appeared on the scene, and that it was intended
to attack us on the 16th. He advised the Commissioner to take the
initiative, and gave him to understand that if we advanced the
Bunerwals would stand aloof.
Sir Hugh Rose had been accorded permission to take command of the
troops in the field, and had sent word to General Garvock not 'to
attempt any operations until further orders.' James, however, thinking
that the situation demanded immediate action, as disturbances had
broken out in other parts of the Peshawar valley, deprecated delay,
and pressed Garvock to advance, telling him that a successful
fight would put matters straight. Garvock consented to follow the
Commissioner's advice, and arranged to move on the following day.
The force was divided into three columns. The first and
second--consisting of about 4,800 men, and commanded respectively by
Colonel W. Turner, C.B.,[16] and Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, C.B.--were
to form the attacking party, while the third, about 3,000 strong,
under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan,[17] was to be left
for the protection of the camp.
At daybreak, on the 15th, the troops for the advance, unencumbered by
tents or baggage, and each man carrying two days' rations, assembled
at the base of the 'Crag piquet.' Turner, an excellent officer, who
during the short time he had been at Umbeyla had inspired great
confidence by his soldierly qualities, had on the previous afternoon
reconnoitred to the right of the camp, and had discovered that
about 4,000 men were holding the village of Lalu, from which it was
necessary to dislodge them before Umbeyla could be attacked. On being
told to advance, therefore, Turner moved off in the direction of Lalu,
and, driving the enemy's piquets before him, occupied the heights
overlooking the valley, out of which rose, immediately in front about
200 yards off, a conical hill which hid Lalu from view. This hill,
which was crowded with Hindustani fanatics and their Pathan allies,
was a most formidable position; the sides were precipitous, and the
summit was strengthened by _sangars_.[18] No further move could be
made until the enemy were dislodged, so Turner lined the heights all
round with his Infantry, and opened fire with his Mountain guns.
Meanwhile, Wilde's column had cleared off the enemy from the front
of the camp, and formed up on Turner's left. On the advance being
sounded, Turner's Infantry rushed down the slopes, and in ten minutes
could be seen driving the enemy from the heights on his right; at the
same time the 101st Fusiliers, the leading regiment of Wilde's column,
made straight for the top of the conical hill, and, under cover of
the fire from the Mountain guns of both columns, and supported by
the Guides, 4th Gurkhas, and 23rd Pioneers, they climbed the almost
perpendicular sides. When near the top a short halt was made to give
the men time to get their breath; the signal being then given, amidst
a shower of bullets and huge stones, the position was stormed, and
carried at the point of the bayonet. It was a grand sight as Adye and
I watched it from Hughes's battery; but we were considerably relieved
when we perceived the enemy flying down the sides of the hill, and
heard the cheers of the gallant Fusiliers as they stood victorious on
the highest peak.
[Illustration: THE STORMING OF THE CONICAL HILL AT UMBEYLA BY THE
101ST FOOT (BENGAL FUSILIERS).
_From a sketch by General Sir John Adye, G.C.B., R.A._]
Now that the enemy were on the run it was the time to press them, and
this Turner did so effectually that the leading men of his column
entered Lalu simultaneously with the last of the fugitives. The
rapidity of this movement was so unexpected that it threw the enemy
inside the walls into confusion; they made no stand, and were soon in
full retreat towards Umbeyla and the passes leading into Buner.
While affairs were thus prospering on our right, the enemy, apparently
imagining we were too busy to think of our left, came in large
numbers from the village of Umbeyla, threatening the camp and the
communications of the second column. Wilde, however, was prepared for
them, and held his ground until reinforced by Turner, when he made a
forward movement. The Guides, and detachments of the 5th Gurkhas and
3rd Sikhs, charged down one spur, and the 101st down another; the
enemy were driven off with great slaughter, leaving a standard in
the hands of the Gurkhas, and exposing themselves in their flight to
Turner's guns. During the day they returned, and, gathering on the
heights, made several unsuccessful attacks upon our camp. At last,
about 2 p.m., Brownlow, who was in command of the right defences,
assumed the offensive, and, aided by Keyes, moved out of the
breastworks and, by a succession of well-executed charges, completely
cleared the whole front of the position, and drove the tribesmen with
great loss into the plain below.
All opposition having now ceased, and the foe being in full retreat,
the force bivouacked for the night. We had 16 killed and 67 wounded;
while our opponents admitted to 400 killed and wounded.
The next morning we were joined by Probyn with 200 sabres of the 11th
Bengal Lancers and the same number of the Guides; and after a hasty
breakfast the order was given to march into the Chamla valley. My duty
was to accompany the Mountain batteries and show them the way. As we
debouched into comparatively open country, the enemy appeared on a
ridge which completely covered our approach to Umbeyla, and we could
descry many standards flying on the most prominent points. The road
was so extremely difficult that it was half-past two o'clock before
the whole force was clear of the hills.
General Garvock, having made a careful reconnaissance of the enemy's
position, which was of great strength and peculiarly capable of
defence, had decided to turn their right, a movement which was to be
entrusted to the second column, and I was told to inform Turner that
he must try and cut them off from the Buner Pass as they retreated.
I found Turner close to Umbeyla and delivered my message. He moved
forward at once with the 23rd Pioneers and a wing of the 32nd Pioneers
in line, supported by the second wing, having in reserve a wing of the
7th Royal Fusiliers.
When we had passed the village of Umbeyla, which was in flames, having
been set fire to by our Cavalry, the wing of the 32nd was brought up
in prolongation of our line to the right. The advance was continued
to within about 800 yards of the Buner Pass, when Turner, observing a
large body of the enemy threatening his left flank, immediately sent
two companies of the Royal Fusiliers in that direction. Just at that
moment a band of _Ghazis_ furiously attacked the left flank, which
was at a disadvantage, having got into broken ground covered with low
jungle. In a few seconds five of the Pioneer British officers were
on the ground, one killed and four wounded; numbers of the men were
knocked over, and the rest, staggered by the suddenness of the
onslaught, fell back on their reserve, where they found the needed
support, for the Fusiliers stood as firm as a rock. At the
critical moment when the _Ghazis_ made their charge, Wright, the
Assistant-Adjutant-General, and I, being close by, rushed in amongst
the Pioneers and called on them to follow us; as we were personally
known to the men of both regiments, they quickly pulled themselves
together and responded to our efforts to rally them. It was lucky they
did so, for had there been any delay or hesitation, the enemy, who
thronged the slopes above us, would certainly have come down in great
numbers, and we should have had a most difficult task. As it was, we
were entirely successful in repulsing the _Ghazis_, not a man of
whom escaped. We counted 200 of the enemy killed; our losses were
comparatively slight--8 killed and 80 wounded.
We bivouacked for the night near the village of Umbeyla, and the next
morning the Bunerwals, who, true to their word, had taken no part in
the fighting on the 15th or 16th, came in and made their submission.
The question which now had to be decided was, whether a force fully
equipped and strong enough to overcome all opposition should be sent
to destroy the fanatic settlement of Malka, or whether the work of
annihilation should be entrusted to the Bunerwals, witnessed by
British officers. The latter course was eventually adopted, chiefly
on account of the delay which provisioning a brigade would entail--a
delay which the Commissioner was anxious to avoid--for although for
the present the combination had broken up, and most of the tribesmen
were dispersing to their homes, the Akhund of Swat and his followers
were still hovering about in the neighbourhood, and inaction on our
part would in all probability have led to a fresh gathering and
renewed hostilities.
The terms which were drawn up, and to which the Bunerwals agreed,
were:
The breaking-up of the tribal gathering in the Buner Pass.
The destruction of Malka; those carrying out the work to be
accompanied by British officers and such escort as might be
considered necessary by us.
The expulsion of the Hindustanis from the Buner, Chamla, and
Amazai countries.
And, finally, it was stipulated that the headmen of their tribe
should be left as hostages until such time as the requirements
should have been fulfilled.
On the afternoon of Saturday, the 19th December, the little party
of British officers who were to witness the destruction of Malka
assembled at Umbeyla. Its members were Reynell Taylor (who was in
charge), Alex. Taylor (Commanding Engineer), two Survey officers,
Wright, Adye, and myself. Twenty-five Cavalry and 4 companies of the
Guides Infantry, under four officers, formed our escort, and it had
been arranged that we were to be accompanied by four leading Buner
Khans, with 2,000 followers, who would be responsible for our safety,
and destroy the fanatics' stronghold in our presence. Rain was falling
heavily, but as all our arrangements had been made, and delay was
considered undesirable, it was settled that we should make a start. It
was rough travelling, and it was almost dark when we reached Kuria,
only eight miles on our way, where we halted for the night, and where
we had to remain the next day, as the Bunerwals declared they could
not continue the journey until they had come to an understanding with
the Amazais, in whose territory Malka was situated.
We had noticed on leaving Umbeyla that, instead of 2,000 Bunerwals,
there were only about sixty or seventy at the most, and in reply to
our repeated questions as to what had become of the remainder, we were
told they would join us later on. It soon became evident, however,
that no more were coming, and that the Khans thought it wiser to trust
to their own influence with the Amazais rather than to intimidation.
We made a fresh start on the morning of the 21st. Malka was only
twelve miles off, but the way was so difficult, and our guides stopped
so often to consult with the numerous bands of armed men we came
across, that it was sunset before we arrived at our destination.
Malka was perched on a spur of the Mahabun mountain, some distance
below its highest peak. It was a strong, well-built place, with
accommodation for about 1,500 people. The Amazais did not attempt to
disguise their disgust at our presence in their country, and they
gathered in knots, scowling and pointing at us, evidently discussing
whether we should or should not be allowed to return.
The next morning Malka was set on fire, and the huge column of smoke
which ascended from the burning village, and was visible for miles
round, did not tend to allay the ill-feeling so plainly displayed. The
Native officers of the Guides warned us that delay was dangerous, as
the people were becoming momentarily more excited, and were vowing we
should never return. It was no use, however, to attempt to make a
move without the consent of the tribesmen, for we were a mere handful
compared to the thousands who had assembled around Malka, and we were
separated from our camp by twenty miles of most difficult country. Our
position was no doubt extremely critical, and it was well for us that
we had at our head such a cool, determined leader as Reynell Taylor. I
greatly admired the calm, quiet manner in which he went up and spoke
to the headmen, telling them that, the object of our visit having been
accomplished, we were ready to retrace our steps. At this the
Amazais became still further excited. They talked in loud tones, and
gesticulated in true Pathan fashion, thronging round Taylor, who stood
quite alone and perfectly self-possessed in the midst of the angry and
dangerous-looking multitude. At this crisis the Bunerwals came to our
rescue. The most influential of the tribe, a grey-bearded warrior,
who had lost an eye and an arm in some tribal contest, forced his way
through the rapidly increasing crowd to Taylor's side, and, raising
his one arm to enjoin silence, delivered himself as follows: 'You are
hesitating whether you will allow these English to return unmolested.
You can, of course, murder them and their escort; but if you do, you
must kill us Bunerwals first, for we have sworn to protect them, and
we will do so with our lives.' This plucky speech produced a quieting
effect, and taking advantage of the lull in the storm, we set out on
our return journey; but evidently the tribesmen did not consider the
question finally or satisfactorily settled, for they followed us the
whole way to Kuria. The slopes of the hills on both sides were covered
with men. Several times we were stopped while stormy discussions took
place, and once, as we were passing through a narrow defile, an armed
Amazai, waving a standard above his head, rushed down towards us.
Fortunately for us, he was stopped by some of those less inimically
disposed; for if he had succeeded in inciting anyone to fire a single
shot, the desire for blood would quickly have spread, and in all
probability not one of our party would have escaped.
On the 23rd December we reached our camp in the Umbeyla Pass, when the
force, which had only been kept there till our return, retired to the
plains and was broken up.
During my absence at Umbeyla my wife remained with friends at Mian Mir
for some time, and then made her way to Peshawar, where I joined her
on Christmas Day. She spent one night _en route_ in Sir Hugh Rose's
camp at Hasan Abdal, and found the Chief in great excitement and very
angry at such a small party having been sent to Malka, and placed at
the mercy of the tribes. He did not know that my wife had arrived, and
in passing her tent she heard him say: 'It was madness, and not one
of them will ever come back alive.' She was of course dreadfully
frightened. As soon as Sir Hugh heard she was in camp, he went to see
her, and tried to soften down what he knew she must have heard; but
he could not conceal his apprehension; and my poor wife's anxiety was
terrible, for she did not hear another word till the morning of the
day I returned to her.
[Footnote 1: In 1825 a religious adventurer from Bareilly made his
appearance on the Yusafzai frontier with about forty Hindustani
followers, and gave out that he was a man of superior sanctity, and
had a divine command to wage a war of extermination, with the aid of
all true believers, against the infidel. After studying Arabic at
Delhi, he proceeded to Mecca by way of Calcutta, and during this
journey his doctrines had obtained so great an ascendency over the
minds of the Mahomedans of Bengal that they have ever since supplied
the colony which Syad Ahmed Shah founded in Yusafzai with money and
recruits. The Syad was eventually slain fighting against the Sikhs,
but his followers established themselves at Sitana, and in the
neighbourhood of that place they continue to flourish, notwithstanding
that we have destroyed their settlements more than once during the
last forty years.]
[Footnote 2: The Akhund of Swat was a man of seventy years of age at
the time of the Umbeyla expedition; he had led a holy life, and had
gained such an influence over the minds of Mahomedans in general,
that they believed he was supplied by supernatural means with the
necessaries of life, and that every morning, on rising from his
prayers, a sum of money sufficient for the day's expenditure was found
under his praying carpet.]
[Footnote 3: The Peshawar column consisted of half of 19th Company
Royal Artillery, No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery, the Peshawar and
Hazara Mountain Batteries, the 71st and 101st Foot, the Guides, one
troop 11th Bengal Lancers, one company Bengal Sappers and Miners, 14th
Sikhs, 20th Punjab Infantry, 32nd Pioneers, 1st, 3rd, 5th and 6th
Punjab Infantry, and 4th and 5th Gurkhas. The Hazara column consisted
of a wing of the 51st Foot, 300 Native Cavalry, a regiment of Native
Infantry and eight guns, holding Darband, Torbela, and Topi on the
Indus.]
[Footnote 4: The highest point of a pass crossing a mountain range.]
[Footnote 5: Now General Sir Charles Brownlow, G.C.B.]
[Footnote 6: The late Sir Henry Marion Durand, K.C.S.I., C.B.,
afterwards Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.]
[Footnote 7: 7th Royal Fusiliers, 23rd Pioneers, and 24th Punjab
Native Infantry.]
[Footnote 8: Reynell Taylor remained with the force as political
officer.]
[Footnote 9: General Sir John Adye, G.C.B.]
[Footnote 10: The expedition was an admirable school for training men
in outpost duty. The Pathans and Gurkhas were quite at home at such
work, and not only able to take care of themselves, but when stalked
by the enemy were equal to a counter-stalk, often most successful. The
enemy used to joke with Brownlow's and Keyes's men on these occasions,
and say, 'We don't want you. Where are the _lal pagriwalas?_ [as the
14th Sikhs were called from their _lal pagris_ (red turbans)] or the
_goralog_ [the Europeans]? They are better _shikar_ [sport]!' The
tribesmen soon discovered that the Sikhs and Europeans, though full of
fight, were very helpless on the hill-side, and could not keep their
heads under cover.]
[Footnote 11: Colonel Reynell Taylor, whilst bearing like testimony to
the good conduct of the Pathan soldiery, said the personal influence
of officers will always be found to be the only stand-by for the
Government interests when the religious cry is raised, and the
fidelity of our troops is being tampered with. Pay, pensions, and
orders of merit may, and would, be cast to the winds when the honour
of the faith was in the scale; but to snap the associations of years,
and to turn in his hour of need against the man whom he has proved
to be just and worthy, whom he has noted in the hour of danger, and
praised as a hero to his family, is just what a Pathan will not do--to
his honour be it said. The fact was that the officers in camp had been
so long and kindly associated with their soldiers that the latter were
willing to set them before their great religious teacher, the Akhund
of Swat ('Records of Expeditions against the North-West Frontier
Tribes').]
[Footnote 12: The late General Sir Charles Keyes, G.C.B.]
[Footnote 13: The late Major-General T. E. Hughes, C.B., Royal
Artillery.]
[Footnote 14: The late General Sir John Garvock, G.C.B.]
[Footnote 15: Now Bishop of Auckland and Primate of New Zealand.]
[Footnote 16: The late Brigadier-General Sir W. W. Turner, K.C.B.]
[Footnote 17: General Sir T. L. Vaughan, K.C.B.]
[Footnote 18: Stone breastworks.]
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